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ABSTRACT 
The a101 of this study is to suggest, by selective example, a form of 
jurisprudence which relates to and may have a salutary effect upon law and justice in 
post-apartheid South Africa. I describe three ways in which South Africa can be 
regarded as negotiating a transition - from apartheid to post-apartheid, from modem 
to post modern and from colonial to postcolonial. I argue for a jurisprudence which 
directly concerns itself with each of these three overlapping and mutually informing 
modes of transition: an approach to law and justice which is post-apartheid, 
postmodem and postcolonial. Since my account of law and justice engages with all 
three transitions, it has the potential to bring about a positive transformation in the 
conservative legal theory currently in favour with the judiciary. 
I suggest that the positivist approach followed by the judiciary during 
aparthe id led in most cases to a removal of ethics from the legal universe and a 
diremption of law and justice. I contend further that the current approach of the 
judiciary still bears the hallmarks of positivism, in its continued adherence to the 
'literal approach' to constitutional interpretation and its misunderstanding of the role 
of morality in adjudication. I argue that positivism, with its potential to produce 
injustice, should be abandoned in favour of an approach based on a postmodem 
epistemology which incorporates a concept of justice which is both substantive and 
avoids the pitfalls of natural law: the historical exhaustion of classical teleology and 
the failure of religious transcendence to command widespread respect. The 
postmodem theorists I draw on, Michel Foucault, lacques Derrida and lean-Francois 
Lyotard, cumulatively point to the fai lure of the Enlightenment to ground legal 
practice upon the universalising faculty of reason. Postmodem jurisprudence. 
infonned by postcolonial theory, postulates justice as an ethic of alterity and is able to 
reintroduce ethics into law in a manner which avoids the critique of Enlightenment 
epistemology. 
Having set out the jurisprudential vIews of these theorists, I turn to the 
activity of constitutional interpretation to demonstrate the way in which the 
judiciary's current approach to interpretation could be positively transfonned through 
the introduction of interpretative techniques related to poststructuralism and 
specifically deconstruction. I argue that interpretation is an activity necessarily 
,v 
informed by values and that the indeterminacy of the language of the Constitution 
provides the interpreter with choice. Provided the choice is ethically motivated, 
interpretation is a transforrnative activity. 
Having concluded the expository section of this dissertation, I provide a close 
reading of two Constitutional Court judgements, Azanian Peoples Organisation 
(AZAPO) v President of (he Republic of SOlllh Africa and S v Makwanyane and 
Another. These judgements, decided under the interim Constitution, are arguably the 
most important judgements of the Constitutional Court to date. They represent sites of 
the judiciary's internal struggle to respond to the requirement for a new epistemology 
and practice of interpretation, which provide the means to adjudicate justly and also 
suggest ways in which to justify its decisions. My study is largely restricted to these 
two cases, and although I refer to other cases for their bearing on particular issues, I 
do not aim at a comprehensive survey of the Constitutional Court's record to date. 
Nevertheless. this study concludes with some provisional remarks about the record of 
the Constitutional Court since its inception and suggests possible ways in which the 
jurisprudence I have argued for may be pursued in furtherance of justice. 
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Chapter I: Transition(s) 
"South Africa is a deconstructing country" (Derrida 1999: 284). 
Philosophy (including ethical and legal theory), Richard RoTty contends, is 
necessarily ethnocentric: "We must start from where we are" (Rorty 1989: 198, 
emphasis in original). [ As a Hegelian observation about the situatedness of criticism 
and philosophical activity generally, this seems like a reasonable thing to say? 
However, if "where we arc" happens to be present day South Africa, Rorty's remark 
starts to sound less helpful. given that claims about'where we are (now), where we are 
going (in the future) and where we should be are inter~imbricated . varied and 
contradictory, the subject of widespread discursive contestation characteristic of the 
transitional moment, a moment characterised by Homi Bhabha in the following tcnns: 
South Africa represents, in an acute and tragic and problematic way, the 
opportunity to see transformative elements at work in the construction of a 
new historic destiny, where the question of race and cultural difference is 
foregrounded. (Bhabha in Attwell 1993a: 11 2) 
This dissertation both investigates and joins the heterogeneity of VOices, 
arguing that to understand the various contrary forces which prevail in and construct 
the context of these arguments enables reflexivity and ethical transfonnation.3 My aim 
is to advance (and in many cases, since the theoretical positions discussed are not 
new, defend) and illustrate a cluster of claims, which I set out in ascending order of 
I Rorty's view is ethnocentric in the sense that it reflects scepticism aboUl the philosopher's ability to 
transcend the contingent practices which happen to be in place in a particular community in any given 
moment. He is not advocating ethnocentric ism in the narrow sense of valorising one set of cultural 
practices above another as justification for some kind of imperialist intransigence. 
- Hegel 's ethical certainty and his abi li ty to approve lega l judgements depends on making judgements 
using the standards of the community. While I would accept the idea of an appeal to the ideal of the 
community - the community 'always sti ll to come' in Derrida and Lyotard's sense - as Drucilla Come l! 
rightly argues "the appeal to the community ineluctably slides into an appeal to totality" (Come l! 
1992a: 35). Hegel 's community and the values of siltlichkeit supply the element missing from Kant's 
fonnalist account of ethics in order to provide substance to the ethical judgements. But a community is 
a tOlality in the sense that it excludes those who do nOI fit - the other of gender, race, sexual preference 
etc. In South Africa. appeal to 'the community' as an ethical foundation is an appeal to a heterogenous 
cacophony, a polyvalence in relation to which no consensus exists. 
) Gunatilleke fonnulates the task as follows: 
An evaluation of how developing countries manage their transition is itself an exacting moral 
task ... there must be a profound understanding of the historical processes in these soc ieties, a 
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controversy. My first claim is to the effect that, six years on from its first ever 
democratic elections, South Africa is in the process of negotiating a transition. or 
rather a series of related and mutually informing transitions which combine in 
contemporary social conditions. lo this introductory chapter, I set out three ways in 
which South Africa can be regarded as transitional (the transitions are from apartheid 
to post-apartheid, modem to postmodem and colonial to postcolonial respectively) 
and show the way in which law informs or is informed by each. Second, I shall argue 
that law has the potential both to transform itself and South African society from the 
injustice of apartheid to a more democratic, and so more just society. Third, I shall 
demonstrate that the transformation of law and society is unlikely to take place for so 
long as the judiciary continues to follow either positivism or its current unstructured 
and vaguely theorised value-oriented approach. I suggest, in Chapter Two, that what I 
will term "postmodern jurisprudence~' offers a politically and epistemologically 
superior practice of adjudication and source of values to those currently followed by 
the judiciary. 
Fourth, I shall argue in Chapter Three that if the potential of the current legal 
system. a form of legal liberalism with a written constitution, to transform both itself 
and society is to be activated, a more epistemologically radica l practice of judicial 
interpretation is required than those currently in favour with the judiciary. Fifth, I 
shall demonstrate in Chapters Four and Five that postmodem and postcolonial theory 
may inform analysis of legal texts, particularly court judgements, with the effect of 
elucidating contradictions, hidden reasons, supplementary meanings and other 
undeclared possibilities, all of which have a potentially transformative significance.4 
Finally, I want to show how literary analysis may, 10 appropriate 
ci rcumstances, supplement both legal theory and practice and IS particularly 
consonant with the theoretical positions I advocate. If this seems disjunctive, impure 
or unfocussed, let me now acknowledge that I see considerable merit in syncretism. 
Law is a social phenomenon; its transformative possibilities are not simply a question 
of what Gayatri Spivak calls "mere philosophical justice" (Spivak 1987: 162). In 
other words, the problem of legal justice cannot be divorced from its social conditions 
of possibility. Since social conditions are comprised of a number of interconnected 
capacity to see the ethical issues in relation to these processes, and a sensitivity to the inner 
struggle ora society in the midst oran unprecedented transition. (gunatilleke 1983: 8) 
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practices, discourses and institutions - law, literature, politics and philosophy being 
four - it stands to reason that a study of law should reflect the influence of the other 
social discourses. I am not suggesting that law, literature, politics and philosophy are 
indistinct genres, but rather that to combine them, to experiment with and blur their 
distinct contours can lead to something new. As Rorty explains, "one way to create 
new genres is to stitch together bits and pieces of old genres" (Rorty 1998: 315). s 
1.1 Apartheid! Post-apartheid 
As a newly emergent neo-liberal democracy, South Africa has faced, and sti ll 
faces, the formidable challenge of reconstructing society in response to the legacy of 
exclusion and oppression bequeathed to it by the apartheid government, a regime 
notorious not only for its segregationist policies but also for severe and consistent 
coercion of the disenfranchised majority, systematic repression of particular parties 
and individuals, and gross injustices such as extra-judicial executions, 
'disappearances', systematic torture and secret detention. In 1.M. Coetzee's 
assessment of apartheid, "the whites of South Africa participated in various degrees, 
actively or passively, in an audacious and well-planned crime against Africa" 
(Coetzee 1992: 342). Ironically the "crime" of apartheid was largely, though not 
exclusivell. committed through the instrumentality of law: the National Party 
disenfranchised blacks soon after it took power in 1948; it outlawed liberation 
organisations such as the ANC and the PAC; it detained thousands under the Internal 
Security Act and declared States of Emergency. 
Given that the law operated as an instrument of oppression, augmenting and 
strengthening inequalities of wealth and power between racial groups, it is 
~ This dissertation does not anempt an analysis of all I he ConSlitutional Court cases decided thus far or 
even all the most important cases. Its focus lies elsewhere. 
j Both Lyotard and Derrida experiment freely with new combinations of genres. Lyotard calls this 
practice "paralogy". Rorty wants to distinguish syncretism from genius: " But even the most successfu l 
syncretism cannot hope to imitate the truly heroic philosophical achievements: the one's that let us see 
everything from a new angle. that induce a gestalt switch" (RoTty 1998 : 10). I am not convi nced. 
however. that experimentation with genres cou ld not induce a change in perception of the kind RoTTy 
has in mind. As Richard Shustennan argues: "By simultaneously celebraling their borrowing and their 
originality [syncretism] undennines any dichotomy between creat ion and approprialion , between 
making works and remaking them in making them work better" (Shustennan 1997: 140). 
6 As Richard Abel notes, the Nationa l Party government "was fully prepared to jettison law in favour of 
force: withholding services to drive blacks off land, detaining Ihousands without trial, killing and 
wound ing hundreds. and using the military to occupy townships. It wantonly tortured, less to extract 
infonnation than to humiliate and cow" (Abe l 1999: 70). 
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unsurprising that the apartheid government proclaimed fidelity to the rule of law 
(Abel 1999; Dyzenhaus 1998). The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty dictated 
that parliament was supreme. There was no wrinen constitution, no bill of rights, and 
judges, who were appointed by the National Party, mostly supported apartheid, 
applying the law in a manner which left no doubt as to their political allegiances 
(Dugard 1978; Corder 1984; Dyzenhaus 1991)7 
The recognition that the law can be used for evil should not preclude the 
acknowledgement that it can also be used to resist evil and to effect conditions 
conducive to social justice. 8 During apartheid, opposition groups challenged actions 
of the government in the courts with some success. Admittedly, where legal 
challenges did succeed, these cases were usually followed by legislative enactments 
overturning judicial pronouncements. There nevertheless survives, after forty years of 
apartheid, a pervasive optimism about law's potential to transfonn the conditions of 
South African society into something just. I want to call the role of law in securing the 
transformation of South African society from apartheid to an increasingly just form of 
democracy, "transitional justice".9 The study of transi tional justice has traditionally 
more or less limited itself to the question of successor justice: the accountability of 
former authoritarian regimes for gross human rights violations committed during their 
subsistence, incorporating the implications of pursuing various strategies to achieve 
corrective justice10 after transition (Kritz 1995; McAdams 1997; Neier 1998; Minow 
1998; Van Zijl 1999). Contrarily, the concept of transitional justice I wish to explore 
7 Raymond Wacks. on the basis of Dworkin 's assertion that judges do not exercise a discretion and that 
in South Africa "~laIn exclusively white jUdiciary applies unjust laws of an exclusively white legislature 
to an unconsenting majority" (Wacks 1984: 281). urged the judiciary to resign in protest. As John 
Dugard (1984) rightly pointed out in response, the judiciary has discretion in its interpretation of 
legislation and this in itself created the potential for judicial activism and reform. 
I Marxists and certain critical legal studies scho lars are wont to dismiss law out of hand on the basis 
that it is simply a vehicle for oppression. Although I agree that law is a discourse of power, resistance 
is always possible. Injustice can never be fully wiped out, yet it can be progressive ly ameliorated. 
9 I realise that, as definitions go, this might seem a little indeterminate or less than comprehensive. I 
will argue shortly that indeterminacy is, under certain conditions to be valorised and that attempts at 
comprehensiveness or at least closure are something to be avo ided. In any event, the term ;'trans itional 
justice" will accrue further valences throughout thi s work. 
10 Since at least the time of Aristotle, political justice has been divided into the categories of 
distributive justice and corrective justice (Aristotle. Nichomachean Elhics Book V.vAt 281). The 
fanner is concerned with the distribution of divisible goods from the common store while the latter is 
concerned with the award of damages which simultaneously quantifies the wrongdoing of one parry 
and the suffering of the other party in a bipolar (voluntary or involuntary) transaction, in short, the 
recovery of a 5101115 quo anle. Ernest Weinrib ( 1988) insists on a complete separation of these two 
categories of justice. but I do not believe there to be any insunnountable gap between the two, since the 
measure of compensation under corrective justice depends on a criterion of justice that is applicable 
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embraces law's participation in the full spectrum of political justice, including 
corrective justice and distributive justice, relevant to South Africa' s transition to 
democracy and social justice (Roedcrer 1999a). Accordingly, I do not restrict myself 
to commenting on questions of successor justice. \l This is not to deny that dealing 
with the past is crucial to a successful transition. It is merely to assert that the past is 
ineluctably bound up with the full spectrum of intersubjective dealings occurring in 
the present and future and that the institution of law is creative of social conditions at 
all times. Successor justice may be viewed as a subset of transitional justice as I have 
defined it. 
For the sake of context, it is worth providing a brief overview of the events 
leading up to the 1994 elections. By the late 1980s the ANC had come to understand 
that the government could not be overthrown and that an attempt to mobilise the 
population for armed struggle would be disastrous. At the same time, there was a 
growing realisation within the government and its supporters that apartheid was not 
viable. Apart from the diminished sense of security following the 1984-1986 
uprisings. international sanctions, refusals by foreign banks to roll over loans, and 
sports and cultural boycotts sent a message to white South African leaders that they 
would never be accepted internationally until minority rule ceased. Most significantly, 
the government came to realise that the very structures of apartheid were imploding 
(Herbst 1997).1 2 A further crucial development was the collapse of communism 
worldwide, symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The demise 
of the USSR and concomitantly Soviet-style Marxism was a major determinant in 
South Africa's transition from authoritarian rule. It led to a re-evaluation of the 
revolutionary and antinomian rejection of liberal rights discourse which had been 
stigmatised by Marxists as the unmcdiated expression of normative bourgeois 
authority and economic domination in a legal order, binding together at a political and 
ideological level a social order predicated on massive inequalities of wealth and 
opportuni ty (Pashukanis 1978; Sugarman 1983). Moreover, liberal democratic powers 
such as the United States and Sweden were influential on the African National 
across the board to all intersubjective dealings coming within the sweep of an all-encompassing system 
of justice (Rosenfeld 1992: 187). 
11 Nevertheless this question is an important one and I devote Chapter Four to it . 
12 As F. W. de Klerk later admined "[I]f our old policy, which was so unpopular in many circles, could 
work, then we would have sure ly clung to it. But as responsible leaders charged with the governance of 
the country, we came to the conclusion that the policy we had planned simply could not work ..... (De 
Klerk interviewed on Talks with ANC, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 May 1990, part 4). 
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Congress and the discourse of human rights played a practical and ideational role in 
the resistance to authoritarian rule. 
As a result of the fai lure of either the South African Defence Force or 
Umkontwe we Sizwe to win an outright military victory as well as the, contingent 
vacillations of the political settlement negotiated by political elites between 1989 and 
1994 (Wilson 1996), an interim justiciable Constitution came into force in South 
Africa on 27 Apri l 199413, establishing the framework for the Government of 
National Unity. The Constitution, which has been described as post-l iberal l \ contains 
a bill of rights, which is a chapter on fundamental human rights1S • From April 1994, 
hundreds of racist and otherwise oppressive statutory provisions were repealed by the 
Government of National Unity and others, such as section 277( 1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. 1977, the death penalty provision, were challenged as offending 
constitutional rights. Moreover, the postamble of the interim Constitution provided for 
the granting of amnesty to perpetrators of gross vio lations of human rights, where 
such acts were politically motivated, in exchange for telling the truth about such acts. 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act l6 was passed to give effect 
to the postamble by providing for the implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commi ssion, a quasi-judicial body that was to act as a forum for the hearing and 
mediazed distribution of narratives of victims and perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations. 
The political moment following the transition from apartheid to liberal 
democracy raises quest ions about the operation of law during this period: What legal 
acts have transforrnative significance? What is the relation between a state's response 
Il Section 251 of the Consti tution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 . 
14 Karl Klare argues that the South African Constitution "intends a not fully defined but nonethe less 
unmistakab le depanure from liberalism" (Klare 1998: 152) toward an empowered democracy, wh ich 
prov ides social as well as pol itical justice. Klare distingui shes the soc ial democratic aspirations of the 
Const itution - equality, redistribution and social securil)' - from other essential and not strictly liberal 
features such as multiculturalism, close auention to gender and sexual identity, emphasis on 
partic ipation and government transparency, environmentalism and the extension of democratic ideals 
into the public sphere. 
" Chapter 3. The Bill of Rights is intended to do more than place negative restraints on governmental 
interference with liberty. Positive duties imposed on the state include combat ing poverty and 
promoting social welfare, assisting people in authentically exercising and enjoying their const itutional 
rights and facilitating and supporting individual self· realisation. The final Constitution commits the 
government to promote democratic values, human rights and equalil)' (Preamble and sections I(a), 7(2) 
and 39( 1)(a» ; to overcome the legacy, speci fically the socio·economic legacy of apartheid and to adopt 
reasonable legislati on to ensure access to soc io·economic welfare in such areas as housing, healthcare, 
food, water, soc ial securi ty and child protection (sections 26, 27, 8 and 29) and to protect the 
environment (section 24). 
16 Act 34 of 1995. 
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to its repressive past and its prospects for creating a liberal order? What role can law, 
in South Africa traditionally a conservat ive institution legitimative of the status quo, 
play in radical and fast-moving transi tion given its imbrication and partial genesis in 
the values of the previous regime?17 Most importantly, what role can law play in 
effecting justice during this period and what is the nature of transitional justice? The 
legal responses analysed here occur within the bounded period following the 
constitutional settlement negotiated between the African National Congress and the 
National Party. the period between the operative date of the interim Constitution l8 
until the present day. Indeed, although this dissertation is not speculatory in scope, it 
seems unlikely that South Africa will emerge 'from political transition, however 
defined, for some time. The two cases to be reviewed here were decided within the 
ambit of operation of the interim Consti tution, a "deliberately and avowedly 
transitional instrument" (Du Plessis and Corder 1994: 1), effective during the period 
April 1994 to February 1997, when the final Constitution l9 became operative, My 
remarks are not limited to the period of operation of the interim Constitution, 
however, since even up to the present day South Africa experiences the material and 
nonnative volatility of the transition to democracy?O The transitional period 
delineated here has so far offered complex challenges in relation to law and justice, 
such as the problem of successor justice, the writing of successive constitutions and 
the rewriting of a manifestly unjust legislature and common law to bring it into 
conformity wi th the new liberal democratic order and its legal discourse of rights. 
These wi ll be among the issues addressed in this dissertation. 
In times of transition, law' s function is inherently paradoxical. In its ordinary 
socia l function, law provides order and stability, but in extraordinary periods of 
I' Klare assens in relation to post-apanheid legal practice that 
progressive V.S. lawyers find South African interpretative or jurisprudential conservatism 
puzzling. One has the indelible impression of a disconnect or chasm between the 
Const itution 's substantively transfonnative aspirations and the traditionalism of South African 
legal culture . ... jurisprudential conservatism (as defined here) may induce a kind of 
intellectual caution that discourages appropriate constitutional innovation. (Klare 1998: 170, 
171) 
11 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, which came into effect on 27 
April 1994. 
19 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which came into effect on 4 
February 1997. 
20 As Fiona Ross writes, "South Africans refer to the present as "the transition" , a time characterised by 
radical change and the anticipation of an end to it marked by the emergence of a qualitatively different 
kind of society from that which preceded if' (Ross in Wilson 2000: 92). 
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political upheaval, law maintains order even as it breaks wi th it, enabling 
transformation. In dynamic periods of political flux, legal responses generate a 
paradigm of transfonnative law (Teitel 1997) and with it a shift in the conception of 
justice. Transitional justice arises within a distinctive political context, a shift in 
political orders - 'j ustice changes its spots" (Krog 1998: 66) - culminating in South 
Africa in the miraculous advent of non-racial democratic government. Krog' s 
metaphor is an apt one: in transition the determinacy of meanings, representations, 
definitions, taxonomies and species within the old order open themselves to the 
creation of new meanings within the context of a new but not fu lly established order. 
In transition, existing class ifications and conceptions - institutional , political and legal 
- revealed through political struggle as privilegings or preferences which are neither 
natural nor neutral, are suddenly subject to review and reversal. 
The operat ion of post-apartheid liberal legality cannot be separated from 
quest ions of nation and nation-building. The Constitution and the Constitutional Court 
judgements construct and enforce nation-building and provide it with operative effect, 
even as discourses of nationalism provide law with efficacy (Fitzpatrick 1995). Law 
serves as an instrument of nation-building, subordinating particular orders to the 
genera li ty of the nation, whilst the myth of the liberal nation provides modem law 
with an existent ial purchase which is nonetheless compatible with its transcendent 
generality. Law also denies a ground to other forms of authority which could derogate 
from the state by either prohibiting them outright or having them operate "subject to" 
the law. 21 South Africa's transitional regime inherited a debilitated state suffering 
from a legitimation crisis, with unstable and impaired institutions.22 In constitutional 
terms, the cri sis was manifested in a general and well-founded scept icism concerning 
rights discourse, the judiciary and the infrastructural potential of the courts to respond 
to the demands of the new rights-based political dispensation. These problems were 
exacerbated by the bureaucratic character and power base of the new South African 
state. Programmatic nation-building has provided the exercise of state power with a 
degree of legi timation by identifying the exercise of such power, which occurs in 
21 Although Gramscian nalions of hegemony, in which law is seen as an ideology that expresses and 
maintains structures of inequality, might seem appropriate in relation not only to Afrikaner nationalism 
during apartheid but also 10 current nation-bui lding, the relationship between state law and local nonns 
in South Africa cannot simply be polarised in tenns of dominance and resistance. Wilson (2000: 86) 
points out that loca l law (admi nistered by township courts) in certain cases co-operates with state law, 
so that the re lationship is rather one of "shifting patterns of dominance, resistance and acquiescence". 
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large measure through legal channels, with popular conceptions of culture and 
community In order to construct metaphors of unity and to cement collective 
moralities. For example, African nationalism and human rights discourse are 
conjoined in the term ubuntu2J , which features not only in the interim Constitution, 
but also in the judgement of the Constitutional Court as a prominent justification for 
its decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty. Moreover, in the quasi-legal 
proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, discussions of truth led 
naturally into questions of reconciliation, nalional unity and nation-building. Law's 
complicity in the discourse of nation-building should not be uncritically adulated 
however. Stephen Toulmin notes that in the twentieth century the systems of logical 
structure and political organisation underpinning nationalism have become "unfruitful 
and dysfunctional" since they are insufficiently adaptive to the relations between 
s.c iences and states. Toulmin argues that: 
a belief in the omnicompetence of the autonomous sovereign nation often 
works for the benefit of the current rulers, and against the interests of those 
who are "subject" to those self-appointed betters. Worse, those who develop a 
consciousness of "nationhood" late in the day are open to a pathological 
nationalism, which insists on anachronistic fonns of unqualified sovereignty. 
(Toulmin 1990: 185. 195, emphasis in original) 
I am not suggesting that disenchantment with the nationalism of post-independence 
African regimes should detract from the significance of liberation struggles carried 
out in the name of nationalism. However, it is necessary to be open to the possibility 
that oppression is inherent in nationalist structures and discourses, such as law, which 
construct them.24 Nation-building's discursive manufacture of consensus and 
22 The criminal justice system continues to be in crisis, lacking legitimacy and far from competent 
(Sarkin 1 996a). 
n Ubunllt has been interpreted in many ways and is for this reason rhetorically malleable. In human 
rights discourse it refers to such concepts as humanity, mutuality, community and compassion. It is no 
doubt impossib le to provide an all-encompassing definition, in the sense that it is used by different 
language games differently, however the following definition has a broad application: "Ubuntu is seen 
as a benign express ion of the community, representing a panicularly reified and romanticised vision of 
the "Rural African Community" based on reciprocity, respect for human dignity, social welfare, 
empathy and so lidarity" (Wilson 1996: 11). 
24 Panha Chatterjee makes the point that by transforming nationalism into a new state ideology, 
poslcolonial countries subjected themsel ves 10 a global process of rationalisation based on external 
nonns. a process governed by the logic of global capita lism dominated from the top by a few leading 
industrial countries (Chatterjee 1986). In V.S. Naipau l's A Bend in the River ( 1979), the triumph of 
nationalism in the third world is represented as not only suppressing very real tensions but also of 
eliminating the last hope of resistance to it. I shall argue that where nationalism manifests as 
domination, the authority of nation-building discourse in its legal articulation - in the constitution and 
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solidarity, incorporating the idea of the nation as a liberatory horizon with the populist 
resonance of a claim to justice, is in dramatic tension with differences between 
individuals and groups within South Africa. What is required is a reading of legal 
texts which incorporates nation-building rhetoric in a way that elucidates the 
operative tension ... between the pedagogical and the performative ... the 
way in which structures of authorisation, as in the idea of the nation, or the 
idea of transformation ... are themselves consti tuted in and through forms of 
performativity which will question their grounds or their foundations. (Bhabha 
in Attwell 1993a: 110) 
In spite of the fact that the South African legal system both during and after 
apartheid aligned itself with a normative liberalism (Wilson 2000: 95), the transitional 
period cannot be captured with in prevailing theori sing about the role of law in the 
liberal state . The transit ional jurisprudence described in this dissen ation examines the 
way in which law, as a discourse of power, has mediated and constructed political 
transition, rather than simply enforcing and perpetuating an existing liberal state . 
Persistent dichotomous choices arise as to law's adjudicative and const itutional ro le in 
periods of political change: backward versus forward, retroactive versus prospective, 
continuity versus discontinuity, individual versus collective, law versus politics. I 
shall demonstrate the ways in which the various legal mechanisms have mediated 
these antinomies, with a particular emphasis on the nature and role of constitutional 
interpretation and adjudication during this period. 
1.2 Modern! Postmodern 
There is another, broader sense in which South Africa faces transit ion. South 
Africa participates in a period of worldwide paradigmatic transition from modernity 
to postmodemity (Santos 1995; Toulmin 1990; Mootz 1993; Herwitz 1999; Hunt 
1990). In this regard, one can and should distinguish between several facets of 
postmodemism, a notoriously ambiguous concept.25 Postmodemism gives the 
in constitutional court judgements - may be resisted by challenging the determinacies of new 
representational systems. 
2j Cata loguing the various meanings of the tenn "postmodemism" throughout the immense profusion 
of literature in which it appears makes, as Kwame Anthony Appiah observes, "the task of pinning 
Kuhn's paradigm look like work for a minute before breakfast" (App iah 1992: 140). The difficulty is 
exacerbated by the refusal of figures, such as Richard Rorty, generally regarded as posrmodem to be 
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ImpreSSion of a certain chronological progressIOn, a temporal periodisation 
announcing the end of a previous stage, epoch or style, the culmination of modernity_ 
On the other hand, postmodemism claims to have overcome an historical period 
(modernity) or an epistemology (modem) or a cultural and historic movement 
(modernism). For the purposes of this dissertation, it is sufficient to distinguish 
between two meanings of postmodemism: the cultural era and the epistemology.26 
Firstly, postmodemism is the cultural era in which we live, the era of postmodernity, 
which is distinguished from an earlier era of modernity (Harvey 1989; Lyotard 1984). 
Postmodemity is identified with the mass fonns of communication and the 
commodi fi cation of intellectual products and symbolic forms. It is an era of mass 
culture and mediazation, in which culture and cultural artifacts are adapted to or 
created for the forms of mass communication. It features intensive mediazation of 
messages and symbols, lack of mass participation by individuals except as consumers 
of these symbols, and the effacing of substance by surface, fragmentation, and 
diffusion. Postmodem culture and technology is ethically ambivalent. The Internet 
serves as an example: it offers possibilities for lobbying, learning, participating in the 
struggles of others and permining timely and effective communication. On the other 
hand, the spread of "computer mediated communication" in developing countries 
such as South Africa produces an insidious English language corporate 
"MacCulture,,?7 The internet 's commercialism will continue to exist in dynamic 
tension with its pioneering role in supporting freedom s (Walch 1999). Globalisation is 
a facet of postmodernity which impacts on the potential for economic well-being and 
class ified as such (Cooper 1998: 61). In certain cases theori sts claim to be ignorant of the term 
'poslmodemism' . Foucault says: "But neither do I grasp the kind of problems intended by this term -
or how they would be common to people thought of as being "postmodem" ... I do not understand 
what kind of problem is common to the people we call "postmodem" or "poststructuralist" (Foucault 
1998: 448). 
26 James Boyle writes: 
it seems to me usefu l to distingui sh between postmodemism as a kind of arch cultural schtick 
and postmodemism as an earnest epistemology whose natural habitat is the Modem 
Languages Association annual conference. The cultural form. which I shall refer to as 
"pomo," is built on kitch qUOlalion and the night from ponderous sinceri ty, on the 
juxtaposition of contradicyory styles and modes so that each impliedly mocks the other. 
(Boyl' 1999: 497) 
27 The global export of that uniquely American unit of cuisine, the hamburger. as an example of 
postmodem colonialism is charted by the aptly named Rick Fanlasia (1995), who provides an 
interesting account of the trials and tribulations of MacDonalds's expansionism in France, including its 
successful resort to legal action . 
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social justice for countries like South Africa, which subsist at its perimeter?8 Certain 
narratives of giobalisation proclaim the struggle and triumph of the market economy, 
the achievement of advanced capitalism and technological innovation seeking a world 
free from restraints on the opportunity to invent and invest. Other accounts point to a 
darker side of giobaiisation, claiming that it represents a new and insidious form 
economic and cultural domination, what Susan Silbey calls "postmodem colonialism" 
(Silbey 1997). With the exportation of cultural, economic and legal forms, the West is 
able to shape the culture and economies of developing countries. 29 Silbey observes the 
following structural homology between liberal legal ism and contemporary accounts of 
globalisation: 
Indeed, the narratives of globalisation reproduce large pieces of liberal 
legalism's accounts of itself. Each relies on methodological individualism. 
They share a common conception of the world - markets, science and liberal 
law - as the cumulative outcome of individual will and agency. The narratives 
of the market and of liberal legalism also share the conceptual logic of the 
commodity form. (Silbey 1997: 230) 
The South African Constitution is an amalgam of the written constitutions of the 
United States and Europe and was heavily influenced by constitutionalists of 'first 
world' countries. Liberal legality provides legal forms as an infrastructure for first 
world capitalists to create market economies for expansion of their wealth and power 
that accompanies modernisation and democratisation. The West shapes the culture 
and economies of developing countries by offering legal forms through which 
exchange takes place. This is not to suggest that Western constitutions might not be 
ameliorative for a country like South Africa, inasmuch as they facilitate social justice. 
The problem with importing Western legal forms is its seeming incommensurability 
with the opening statement of this chapter: that ethics and justice must be local. With 
the importation of foreign legal forms and concepts, local innovation becomes 
colon ised by market forces. Of course, it is not simply a question of colonial 
domination, since there is a variation and invention in local uses of uniform products. 
As Michel de Certeau observes, indigenous peoples make of "rituals, representations 
28 I follow Anthony Giddens's definition of globa lisation as "the intens ification of worldwide socia l 
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events 
occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens 1990: 64). 
29 For example, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank demand efforts at 
democratisation and fonnal appearances of the rule of law as conditions of their providing aid . 
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and laws imposed on them something quite different from what their ... [originators] 
had in mind" (de Certeau 1984: xiii), Even so, given the conservative approach of the 
current United States judiciary, with its chief spokesperson Justice Scalia advocating a 
"jurisprudence of tradition", wholesale adoption of these practices should be resisted 
as loO reactionary to facilitate transformation in South Africa (Balkin 1990).]0 
JUrgen Habermas (1992) refers to the colonisation of lifeworlds, the 
proliferation of media-produced images and messages which become the resources of 
ordinary people despite the fact that these images are independent of and at odds with 
people ' s daily lived experiences. People live in worlds in which their emotions, 
desires and rationalities are produced independently of their experience. Law is part 
of this symbolic communicative aspect of postmodem colonialism because the media 
are saturated with legal images and issues. American television drama, preoccupied 
with law and crime, is a staple of South African television entertainment, and the 
sexual subplots and struggles for power that animate its representation of legal 
practice are made without distinguishing the artificiality of the genre?1 The 
broadcasting in South Africa of CNN and BBC programming, with its extensive 
coverage of American and European trials, portrays a theatrical version of the legal 
process, a spectacle which bears linle relationship to reality and where, like 
Baudrillard 's simulations, the sign of justice is its own pure simulacrum (Baudrillard 
1983). Nevertheless, within South Africa the televising of the hearings of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission furni shed a more dramatic medium for theatricalising 
the new official history than the untelevised courtroom, and undoubtedly contributed 
to public participation in that process.32 
Theorists of the metropolis are deeply divided about the possibility of moral 
regeneration and just ice in the postmodem world. Geoff Mulgan (1997) provides an 
optimistic account of the postmodem world transformed through global 
communications, time-space compressIOns and the intensification of global 
capitalism. His concept of 'connexity ' captures both the consequence of globalisation. 
10 Nevenheless, the split between practitioners and academics, the laner group being theoretically far 
more radical , has meant that visiting United States academics like Frank Mitchelman and Karl Klare 
have provided some useful contributions by way of interpretative and adjudicative strategies. 
11 Broadcast of American series such as L.A. Law, Ally McBeaJ, Law and Order and lanerly The 
Practice has altered the public's perception of the civil and criminal justice system, so that these 
symbolic representations of law have become the common fonns of discourse and benchmarks of 
expectation about law among lay public. 
12 As Foucault remarks, "whatever one says, television has played a major role. People come to see that 
there is a new history , and so fonh" (Foucauh 1998: 456). 
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including the compression of space and time and the fact that OUT interdependencies 
must be the basis for a new moral order. Mulgan is optimistic in that he regards the 
proliferation of consensual relationships. longevity and lifestyle choice as enabling 
consensual self-organisat ion and participation. Zygmunt Bauman (1996), on the other 
hand, presents postmodemity as a dystopic moral collapse in which the metropolis is 
populated exclusively with dysfunctional types: the flaneur, the game player. the 
vagabond and the tourist. The moral vacancy of these characters causes Bauman to 
ask pessimistically " What chance of morality? What chance of polity?" (Bauman 
1996: 32). He is unable to imagine redemptive possibilities for the moral regeneration 
of the alienated subjectivities of the postmodem. However, J am re luctant to transpose 
uncritically either of these stances onto the regional conditions of South Africa. 
Neither theorist provides a sustained analysis of the systemic interdependencies of the 
first and third worlds and one suspects that the racial and economic specificities of 
South Africa render the typologies developed by Mulgan and Bauman unsusceptible 
to an easy grafting from metropolis to periphery. The possibility of justice in South 
Africa may well depend as much on doing things differently from the metropolis as 
simply following its lead.)] 
The second, theoretical sense of postmodemism has to do with its 
epistemological crit ique of Enlightenment metaphysics. The credibili ty of modern 
metanarrat ives, schemas that can claim ultimate truth at the end of enquiry. has faced 
profound challenges in the light of social. economic and cultural changes in the late 
twentieth century (Lyotard 1984, Smart 1992; Vattimo 1992). Lyotard notes that 
whereas modem philosophy attempted to legitimate discourses by appealing to 
metanarratives. postmodemity is characterised by a legitimacy crisis resulting in an 
"incredulity towards metanarratives" (Lyotard 1984: xxiii-xxiv). Following the loss of 
faith in metanarratives. discursive practices have been affected in two important ways. 
lJ Patrick Bond (2000) suggests "de-globalisation" as a strategy for breaking the ideological 
stranglehold that first world neoliberalism and its sponsors have enjoyed over third world countries like 
South Africa. Th is might involve 
the re lative del inking of African and other third world economies from the inlemational 
capitalist system. This was envisaged as a means of panial, tactica l withdrawal from a hostile 
international system, to enable weaker 'peripheral ' economies to escape the effects of 
exploitative 'core' capitalism, in the era of so-ca lled 's ingle integrated global economy ... the 
strategic ai ms in this proactive approach, through regionalisation, to transform current mode(s} 
of globa lisalion are: the defense of economic. social and cultural pluralism, the (re)creation of 
economic divers iry and revived independence withlin fundamental interdependence, and 
South-South and South-Nonh co-operation based on common interests. (Bond 2000: 302) 
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For a start, the discursive practices predicated upon the assumption that real fonns of 
existence are absolute and fixed have been challenged. The view that discourse can 
mirror reality by describing the essences of real existing entities is being dissembled. 
The deconstructive texts of various thinkers have seriously questioned the notion of 
representation and the effects this has on meaning and the "truths" people speak about 
themselves, demonstrating the way in which power operates through discourse and 
that representational determinacy constitutes domination (Foucault 1972 and 1990; 
Derrida 1976). Secondly, the modern view that a single fonn of reason could guide 
humanity towards social progress has been largely discredited. An uncoupling of one 
(European, androcentric, etc.) type of rationality has resulted from the various forms 
of rebellion to the multi-faceted subjugation of Western modernisation and a 
polyphony of oppressed voices - an "indefinable wail" (Krog 1998: 56) - has 
~uccessfu lly eroded a sustained belief in the purity of its reason (Nicholson 1990). 
Atrocities such as apartheid (and of course the Holocaust) , whose protagonists 
claimed to be rationalising society, have demonstrated the mercurial status of 
(Enlightenment) reason.34 Adorno and Horkheimer observe in the "dark" writers of 
the eighteenth century, especially Sade, this crucial feature of Enlightenment reason, 
namely that reason is "neutral as regards to ends", it stands at the disposal of any end 
whatsoever: "reason is - by virtue of its very formality - at the service of any interest" 
(Adorno and Horkheimer 1944: 87). A further effect of the noted scepticism towards 
metanarratives is its denial of universal ism. Stephen Toulmin notes that the "'modem' 
focus on the written, the universal , the general and the timeless - which monopolised 
the work of most philosophers after 1630 - is being broadened to include once again 
the oral , the particular, the local and Ihe timely" (Toulmin 1990: 186). In the 
postmodem conception, meaning is particular in accordance with Wittgenstein's view 
of language as comprising a variety of language-games, with the rules specifying the 
use ofterrns in these games differing significantly across and even within contexts. 
Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1991) has given 
ri se to great controversy and criticism. With vast historical sweep and theorising in 
the grand tradition, Fukuyarna argues for an implicit directionality to Western history 
and contends that its end point, liberal democracy, is utopian. Continuing' where Kant 
and G.W.F. Hegel left off, Fukuyama attempts to defend a coherent and universal 
J~ The likening of apartheid to Nazism was a frequent refrain during the heyday of apartheid (Dugard 
1997b: 284). 
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History of Humanity leading inevitably to liberal democracy. The arrival of liberal 
democracy marks the end of History: "the modem liberal democratic world is free of 
contradictions" (Fukuyama 1991 : 139) and "at the end of history there are no serious 
ideological competitors left to liberal democracy" (Fukuyama 1991 : 21 I). This 
dissenalion will have little truck with Fukuyama's brand of proselytising, nor with its 
racial and patriarchal affinities. Fukuyarna fail s to take his own advice that "we 
should be careful to distinguish transitional conditions from permanent ones" 
(Fukuyama 199 1: 2 11). Many perceive South Africa 's emergence as a liberal 
democracy with a similar sense of utopian finality; now that we have been informed 
that oppression has been removed from the legislature and that there is in place a Bill 
of Rights 'guaranteeing' liberty, socio-economic redistribution and social justice it 
might seem sufficient to allow liberalism to be completely implemented and further 
refined. However, whilst it is unlikely that anyone would deny that liberalism IS an 
improvement on apartheid, it is certainly not final or just in any absolute sense. 
The Enlightenment universal ism of liberalism, the political dispensation of 
post-Apartheid South Africa, purportedly unaffected by political context and insistent 
on the foundationalism of rationality (evidenced in Rawls ' "original position") cannot 
legitimate the discourses of political and epistemological transition. 3S Moreover, the 
modem conception of law and justice is both misconceived and inadequate to the task 
of providing a just transformation.36 The following formulation of justice is typical of 
the modem outlook, both in its proselytising tone and its abstraction from cultural 
particularity: 
The truth is - and it is a truth which will bear a great deal of reiteration - that 
it is of the essence of both notions of justice in particular and morality in 
general that to appeal to such considerations is to appeal to principles logically 
independent of all particular and group interests or tastes (Flew 1978: 114). 
l' "Berlin 1953. Budapest 1956, Czechoslovak ia 1968. Poland 1980 (I could mention others) refute the 
doctrine of historical materialism ... May 1968 [the Pari s student riots] refutes the doctrine of 
parliamentary li beralism. The passages promised by the great doctrinal syntheses end in bloody 
impasses. Whence the sorrow of the spectators in the end of the twentieth century." (Lyotard 1988: 
179-180) 
36 I am not, however, suggesting a complete abandonment of the Enlightenment project in favour of 
postmodem theory. No such radica l separation of these epistemoiogies is possib le. Against those whose 
writing indicates that the break between the modern and postmodern is as clear as night and day. I 
would respond that, like night and day, the difference is not clear where it counts - al the boundary. My 
task is to reject the objectionable facets of modernity and radicalise its use ful concepts. In this way 
poslmodem ism can avoid rigid conceptual poiarities and flat totalizations in its attitude to modern ity. 
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I want 10 argue against this modem fannulation, with its echoes of John 
Rawls' postulated Original Position, for the postmodem formulat ion of justice as 
contingent and particular. As Alasdair McJntyre argues, the search for transcultural 
and universal justice is doomed : 
Morality which is no particular society's morality is to be found nowhere. 
There was the-morality-of-the-fourth-century-Athens, there were the-
moralities-of-thirteenth-century-Westem-Europe, there were numerous such 
moralities, but wherever was or is morality as such? (Maclntyre 1984: 265, 
266) 
A similar claim is made by Michael Walzer: "Justice is relative to social meanings" 
(Walzer 1983: 312). I want to defend postmodernism (including poststructuralism) as 
an effective and viable theoretical resource in the radical project of transfonnative 
legality speci fic to South Africa. 
The European Enlightenment emphasised the capacity of SCience and 
rationality combined with faith in unilinear progress and liberal democracy, to lead 
towards the ideals of civilisation and the emancipation of humanity (Giddens 1990; 
Hall 1992). On this account, law is accorded a privileged position as the guardian of 
the boundary between state and citizens and between citizens infer esse, the 
boundaries constructed through the creation of legal rights. Law is state law, the 
expression of the sovereignty of the nation-state. Law is invested with a supreme 
rationality in order to eSlablish itself as a mechanism of social ordering by means of a 
value-neutra l procedure of adjudication which transcends the contingencies of 
contesting interests. Law is self-validating by virtue of its disassociation of itself from 
the originary violence of its imposition through a pedagogical reversal in tenns of 
which it is rhetorically reordered as an effect of the popular will. Once legitimated in 
this way, it is in a position to justify the const itutional arrangement of society's 
political institutions and offices. Law becomes entirely self-referential , its function 
imbued with values which arise internal to its own operations, as with Dworkin's 
Law's Empire, where the judge searches for values from within the legal tradition 
(law as integrity). Alan Hunt observes that in the discourse of the Enlightenment law 
has four interlocking projects: 
that of totality (the rational organisation and ordering of the whole of society); 
unity (the sovereignty of the nation-state); civilization (the supercession of a 
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dangerous and unordered past - law versus self-help and feuding); and finally 
the project of ' the subject' (the constitution of the subject as legal citizen and 
citizen as legal subject endowed with self-responsibility and legal liability). 
(Hunt 1990: 518) 
Law is invested with these roles both in apartheid and post-apartheid society. During 
apartheid. law performed all these functions and was only seen to be unjust because 
its founding violence was continually repeated through acts of violence which could 
not be hidden by rhetorical manoeuvring (Derrida 1987; I 992a). Postmodernism 
seeks to displace and decentre law's aspirations to totality, focussing on the plurality 
and particularity of social life. One might take, for instance, the construction of 
subjectivity by law during apartheid. Less than two decades ago, a white government 
minister solemnly infonned his colleagues that in the previous twelve months 518 
people formerly classified as 'Coloured ' became ' White ', two Whites became 
Chinese, one White became Indian and five Coloureds became 'African" all in 
accordance with Proclamation 46 of 1959 (Orrnond 1985: 24, 25), Such was the 
inexactness of this taxonomy that in 1984 one so-called White person was reclassified 
for a fifth time. Lest this be considered flighty but inconsequential, we should 
remember that such changes in classification might easily require a change of 
residence, partner and employment. All but the white minority were subjected, 
wi thout being subjects in the Kantian sense. 
Post-apartheid legality is equally concerned with totality (exemplified by 
phrases such as " I find it difficult to comprehend how, on any rational use of 
language ... " and " the rational and humane adjudicatory approach is entirely 
consistent with ... " (Makwanyane para's 194B-C and 382 A-B)); unity ("All 
constitutions seek to articulate the shared aspirations of the nation" (Makwanyane 
para 362 I-J)); civilization ("as a civilized society" and "actions must be infonned by 
the high values which reflect the quality of this nation 's civilization" (Makwanyane 
para's 203 I-J and 232 E-F)) and the constitution of the legal subject as citizen (the 
Preamble of the 1996 Constitution stipulates one of its main aims to be to " Improve 
the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person", thereby 
constituting not only citizenship but also the publici private divide). 
I argue contrary to these rhetorical assertions that rationality is social and 
instrumental; that it operates as a vehicle of power and is only totalising by virtue of 
its exclusions. The Constitution does not reflect the shared aspirations of the nation 
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but rather those of the elite who negotiated it. The law's civilising pretensions are 
undermined by the bogus evolutionary assumptions on which such a conception rests. 
The law's creation of the legal subjectivity may be deconstructed to reveal subjects 
who have rights but lack equality and material wellbeing. 
In fact , far from ensuring freedom, the rules, structures and mechanisms of 
legal modernism such as rights litigation and the rule of law are revealed by 
postmodernisrn to be conduits of power and mechanisms of subjection and 
domination.37 The law operates in part as a mechanism of legitimation of the state in 
the "New South Africa". Postrnodemisrn questions traditional resort to indeterminate 
systems of rights and adversaria l procedural remedies. Rights discourse has not only 
fai led historically to deliver on its transformative promises, but it also ignores the 
institutionally pervasive and systemic nature of oppression.38 
1.3 Colonial! Postcolonial 
The appropriateness of the absorption of postmodemism, an essentially 
European discourse, into South African legal theory must be tested against the 
ethically and politically fraught circumstances of South Africa's transition. 
Postmodem theory, if it is to be effective in South Africa, must respond to the unique 
contours of its regional context as differentiated from its metropolitan sources.39 In 
short, we must understand postmodernism in the light of South Africa ' s 
postcoloniality. The reception of postcolonial theory into South Africa announces a 
third transition (after apartheid-post-apartheid, modern-postmodern): the transition 
from colonial to postcolonial.4o Where colonialism tracks the incursion of imperial 
17 Although. as lan Law argues: "The utilisation of the capacities and ideas of modernity have 
faci litated both racism and anti-racism. Slaves. free blacks and many other groups have developed 
emancipatory strategies based on appeals to reason and rights" (Law 1999: 207). 
31 In a comprehensive survey of the fie ld, Gera ld Rosenberg is of the (rather extreme) view that "courts 
can almost never be effective producers of significant socia l change" (Rosenberg 1991 : 338). 
)9 David Attwell, seek ing to differentiate postmodemism of the metropolis from a postmodemism of 
the South remarks in this regard "there is postmodemism and there is postmodemism" (Attwell 1993b: 
22). See also Her.witz 1999. 
40 The social fonnation of apartheid South Africa was regarded as "colonialism of a special type": 
At the heart of this concept was the theoretical and strategic assumption of the (latent) unity of 
the posl-1910 South African nation . Soulh Africa was approached in struggle as a late-co lonial 
society in which coloniser and colonised inhabited and be longed to a shared political and 
geographical terrain without assuming that the coloniser had a home elsewhere. (Gerwel 2000: 
278) 
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European senlers into South Africa and their subsequent conquest and control of the 
indigenous populations, postcolonial theory engages in a retrospect of exclusionary 
forms of reason and universality composed by Western modernity and complicit with 
imperial expansion and colonial rule . Postcolonial theory contests the authority of 
colonialism's systems of domination, decyphering systems of representation designed 
to validate institutional subordination and silence the voices of the colonised. This is 
not to fix the moment of introduction of the postcolonial with the transition from 
apartheid to post-apartheid.41 South Africa's history is interpellated by narratives of 
colonialism, with apartheid featuring as a recent incarnation of practices undertaken in 
many parts of the colonial world. 
The postcolonial orientation with which this dissertation is concerned, relies 
on strategies derived from postmodemism (and poststructuralism) in order to argue 
for the historical contingency of colonial forms of knowledge, such as the currently 
dominant liberal legal discourse. For example, a Derridean critique of the binary 
underpinnings of legal discourse may be used to elucidate and relativise the 
metaphysics of colonial modes of thought which run through it. Through resistance to 
ethnocentric determinations and intervention in the mechanics of the colonial 
constitution of the other, poststructuralism may be utilised to recuperate agency for 
the subaltern and reintroduce forms of knowledge (traditional African jurisprudence 
for example) marginalised or "damaged" through the epistemic violence of the 
coloniser. I would suggest that a deconstructive, or to use Gayatri Spivak's tenn, 
"catachrestic", rearticulation of the dominant legal texts (the Constitution and the 
judgements of the Constitutional Court) will force a reconsideration and fracturing of 
current forms of legal knowledge and social identitities authored and authorised by 
Western modernity. 
1.4 Qualifications, Objections, Supplements 
So far I have suggested that the jurisprudential approach appropriate to South 
Africa's transition be one that responds directly to its defining and combining 
features: a jurisprudence sensitive to the political instability of post-apartheid society 
41 Nicholas Visser is at pains to point out that "[t]he transition that occurred in South Africa between 
1990 and 1994 is not the only. not even, for those who not subscribe to eST, necessarily the most 
convincing occasion for dating the end of colonial rule over South Africa" (Visser 1997: 83). 
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and incorporating the insights of poslrnodemism and postcoionialism. It chans the 
quest for a new jurisprudential paradigm which is politically radical but at the same 
time avoids the deficiencies of the "old Left". This approach to legal analysis is 
philosophical not in the sense of imposing an ahistorical, transcendental discourse 
which claims to articulate criteria of validity for the legal system, but rather in an 
attempt to articulate the possibility of law's furtherance of justice within the historical 
and cultural context of South Africa. 
Praclicallnlervemjon 
Legal philosophy which suggests the possibility of intervention in political 
and/or legal processes will only have value if it contains certain practical injunctions 
~r strategies which if pursued could lead to change. Since one of my stated ambitions 
is to suggest the possibility of and means to achieve socio-Iegal transfonnation, it 
must accordingly be practical. This work will attempt to be practical in the sense in 
which Stephen Toulmin speaks of philosophy relating direct ly to matters of practice: 
matters of life and death, guilt and innocence, specifically in the legal system. 
Toulmin writes: 
Taking ' philosophy ' in this practical sense, as a contribution to the reflective 
resolution of quandaries that face us in enterprises with high stakes - even life 
and death - .. , it is time for philosophers to come oul of their self-imposed 
isolation and re-enter the collective world of practical life and shared human 
problems. (Toulmin 1988: 352, emphasis in original)" 
My approach will also attempt to intervene in the practical dilemmas of law in a 
"timely" fashion in the sense in which Toulmin, following Aristotle, notes that "our 
chance of acting wisely in a practical field depends upon our readiness ... to take 
decisions pros (on kairon - that is "as the occasion requires" (Toulmin 1990: 190).43 
42 Toulmin goes on to argue "nor is it an accident that more and more philosophers are now being 
drawn into debates about environmental policy, or medical ethics, judicial practice or nuclear politics 
.'. one might argue that these practical debates are, by now, not "applied" philosophy but philosophy 
itself' (Toulm in 1990: 190, emphasis in original). 
43 Against critics who argue that although some philosophy has the potential to intervene practically, 
postmodem philosophy, including deconstruction , by virtue of any of the objections set out in the later 
section of this chapter does not include this practical possibility, Derrida 's responds: 
I would say only this: If it were true about deconstruclion, why have so many people been so 
anxious and angry about it for such a long time? They cou ld have said ' well, its OK, it's 
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Objections 
Having described the three senses in which South Africa could be regarded as 
being in transition, and having set Qut what I want to call transitional jurisprudence 
(that is. not a comprehensive theory of law-in-transition, but rather a mode of reading 
and understanding existing texts to trigger politically transfonnative possibilities), 1 
want now to raise and rehut potential objections to my project. Objections range from 
blanket refusals to countenance "any theoretical orientation prefixed by post- whether 
hard or soft, strong or weak, excessive or moderate" (Visser 1997: 94) and absolute 
disavowals to the effect that "postmodemism in a poslcoioniai context such as South 
Africa, burdened by cleavages of race and class and the historical inheritance of 
Western imperialist control , is a mora) dead end" (Rich 1984: 389), to more 
sophisticated criticisms. The most frequently bruited charge against postmodemism is 
that it is politically disabling, a charge raised by political progressives and most often 
by Marxists. The following charge of Terry Eagleton' s is typical : 
[Postmodemism] has almost nothing to say about the great liberal motifs of 
justice, equality and human rights, since these sit uncomfortably with its 
nervousness of the 'autonomous subject' and fetishism of difference .... And 
if there are no longer autonomous subjects, then there can be no talk of justice. 
All the vi tal questions over which classical political philosophy has agonised -
your rights aga inst mine, my struggle for emancipation against yours - can be 
simply dissolved away. (Eagleton 1994: 8,9)44 
In fact , postmodemism has a great deal to say about justice, equality and 
human rights, claims about which can be made without positing the autonomous 
subject of liberalism. Attacks of the kind made above are nothing more than fevered 
somelhing good for the library, for Ihe universiIY'. But I think they are so nervous aboul it 
because Ihey realise Ihal Ihere is some practical injunction here - an injunction Ihat is 
sometimes difficult to understand, sometimes very difficult 10 translate. but that makes 
everyone uneasy. 1 think this is very practical , very political (Derrida 1999a: 285). 
44 Peter Oews likewise expresses the inherenl limitalion of the politics of postrnodemism as exhibiting 
a "continuing lack of clarity aboul the political consequences of its characteristic positions ... [and] 
linle attempt to think Ihrough the ultimate compatibility of progressive political commitments with the 
dissolution of the subject, or a totalizing suspicion of the concept of the truth" (Dews 1987: xv). 
Perhaps even marc worrying is the attitude to postmodemism of Edward Said, who refers without 
disapproval to .. ideas like post-Marxism and poststructuralism, varieties of what the Italian 
philosopher Gianni Vatimo describes as "the weak thought" of "the end of modernity" (Said 1993: 
399). 
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figments of foundationalisl paranoia which seek to construct a straw man in order to 
gamer support for an ai ling and untenable foundationalist project.4 5 Far from 
undermining political commitments, I will argue in the following chapters, 
poslstructuralist views of subjectivity. identity and human agency actually help and 
promote them (see Butler 1993, 1994). Against Eagleton's claim that postmodemism 
has nothing to say on the question of emancipation, Derrida notes: 
I refuse to renounce the great classical discourse of emancipation. I believe 
there is an enormous amount to do today, in all domains and in all areas of the 
world and society ... there is no ethico~political decision or gesture without 
what I would call a ' Yes' to emancipation, to the discourse of emancipation 
and even, I would add, to some messianicity. (Derrida 1996: 82) 
There has been a paucity of discussion on postmodem theory in South African 
legal discourse: no mention of it in the judgements of the Constitutional Court and 
very linle in the legal academy.46 What discussion there has been often reflects an 
alanning misapprehension of postmodemisml poststructuralism's methodologies and 
aspirations in the legal arena. Dennis Davis, in many ways an admirable and 
politically progressive legal scholar, argues that deconstruction "can become an 
excuse for a form of arcane analysis that squeezes politics out of any such enterprise" 
and (more bizarrely) " it becomes a home for positivists of yore who wish to give 
politics as wide a berth as Le Steyn advocated some 30 years ago" (Davis 1999: 178, 
179). Moreover, Davis ' ironic characterisation of poststructuralist discourse as a 
"model of clarity" implies that deconstruction's avoidance of political engagement is 
bolstered by the opacity and obscurantism of its lexicon and discursive style. 
I want to deal separately with each of Davis ' objections: that it is non-political, 
that it is a haven for positivists. and that its unclear style detracts from whatever force 
it can muster. I take Derridean deconstruction as an example of poststructuralism, 
since deconstruction is the bun of Davis ' remarks.47 Davis is one of a long line of 
commentators who have accused postmodemism and deconstruction of moral 
4 ~ Foundationalism is. broadly. the view that verifiable knowledge can be established when reality is 
observed from the 'correct ' epistemological position. 
~6 It is not untypical for legal theory as traditionally politically and philosophically reactionary as South 
Africa 's 10 lag behind the main flow ofimellectual development. To a certain degree legal theorising in 
the academy has become more radical since 1994. This work is an attempt to accelerate its 
development still further . 
n Deconstruction names the activity employed in order to open up a text, by activating ambiguity, 
inconsistency and indetenninacy to reveal both what it contains and what it excludes. 
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agnosticism and political indifference that borders on the reactionary. On the contrary, 
however, deconstruction has been responsible for the acknowledgement that the 
assumptions, principles and aims of institutions such as law are structured and 
delimited by the terms that they employ and the assumptions that gU'\lfantee and 
legitimate them. This critique is inherently political since it formulates the task of a 
progressive intervention in the operation of the law and so in the workings of state 
and private institutions. The aim of deconslruction is to utransfonn the modes of 
writing, approaches to pedagogy, the procedures of academic exchange, the relation 
of languages, to other discipl ines, to the institution in general, to its inside and its 
outside" (McCarthy 1989: 17). And as Paul Jay points out, since this touches on the 
material structures and relations of power in institutions of Western culture, it must be 
understood as a political practice. He claims further that 
deconstruction is always invoked or used by someone with a political point of 
view, and it is in this sense that it cannot be kept pure from such appropriation 
... there is no way that 'deconstruction' can exist outside of the political, since 
there is no 'deconstruction' that can exist outside of our arguments about what 
it is and how it might or might not function, and toward what ends. (Jay 1992: 
70) 
This means, as Jay concedes. that "how deconstructive thinking is exercised. and to 
what ends, is ultimately dictated to by the politics of each critic" (Jay 1992: 91).48 
This means that deconstruction can be used in the service of just about any political 
stance against any other, a realisation which has spurred certain Marxist critics to 
demonise deconstruction on the grounds that it may be used against Marxism. 49 
Equally, however, deconstruction has been appropriated by Marxists, such as Spivak, 
and by socialists, such as Nancy Fraser. Furthennore, and to anticipate arguments 
made in the following chapter, a Derridean approach to democratic adjudication 
emphasises the undecideability of decision-making: undecideability is required to 
make possible the concepts of political decision and ethical responsibility. Chantal 
Mouffe remarks that in this sense deconstruction is "hyperpoliticizing" in that the 
intenninable choice of the political decision is essential to deconstruction's 
48 In relalion 10 the de"construction of legal lexts, J.M. Balkin nOles that "deconslructive readings of 
legal texts can be a 1001 ror analysis for the right as well as for the left" (Balkin 1987: 782). 
49 Aijaz Ahmad asserts "in its unconditional war against political Marxism, in its antipathy towards 
working·class organisations and against organised politics of the Left, and in its advocacy of a global 
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conception of democracy (Mouffe 1996: 9). Derrida insists that deconstruction does 
not correspond to a "quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical 
quest ion of justice" (Derrida 1992a: 19). Deconstruction is not nihilistic, neither does 
it ignore politics; on the contrary it posits the greatest, most unattainable, infinite duty 
to the other. so 
Davis complains that "deconstruction should lead to a more fruitful enquiry 
than playing like Derrida" (Davis 1999: 179). Deconstruction does observe and 
activate the disconnection of the signifier from the signified and thus in turn sets the 
sign adrift (hence the concept of "play" (Derrida 1978) to appear in different contexts 
(hence " iterability" (Derrida 1988a» in which it appears to bear different meanings.SI 
But it is a myth that postmodem theorists are simply engaged in a release of 
jouissance and a Nietzschean affinnation of amorality. Deconstruction incorporates 
an ethics of alterity which prevents it from simply being viewed as inconsequentially 
ludic. s2 As Comell remarks "deconstruction keeps open the 'beyond ' of currently 
unimaginable transfonnative possibilities precisely in the name of justice" (Comell 
1992a: 182). I would suggest that exactly these possibilities of the imagination would 
be re levant to South Africa in transition - a "philosophy of the limit" that recognises 
henneneutics of suspicion , it Ideconstruction] unwiningly contributed to openings for resurgence of a 
fully fledged right-wing intelligentsia" (Ahmed 1994: 97, emphasis in original). 
so Derrida writes: "The fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. We may see in this a stroke of 
luck for politics. for all historical progress" (Derrida 1992a: 14). And as Charles Yablon e laborates "the 
indetenninacy of legal language must be used as a way of revealing and analysing the power exerted 
and the pain innicted by legal processes, not as a way of denying that power and pain" (yablon 1992: 
262). 
11 Derrida asserts: 
This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it 
is finite. that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field. as in the classical 
hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions .... One cannot detennine the center and exhaust 
tota lization because the sign which replaces the center . .. is added, occurs as a surplus, as a 
supplement. The movement of signification adds someth ing, which resu lts in the fact that there 
is always something more, but this addition is a floating one because it comes to perform a 
vicarious function, 10 supplement a lack on the part of the signified. (Derrida 1978: 289, 
emphasis in original) 
S2 George Steiner emphasises the ludic nature of postmodem gaming when he writes: "We are in a 
cosmic casino. Nothing but rhetorical games, more or less amusing, more or less profound" (Ste iner, 
interviewed in Le Monde, I1 January 1991). In Sou th Africa, however, the stakes of th e game are high. 
The casino is Sun Ci ty: upwards of five hundred slot machines whirring twenty-four hours a day, 
benevo lently accepting the sacrifices of worshippers at this magnificent temple of Mammon and a 
resounding slap in the face of the poor who occupy the lands for miles around. Dirk Klopper has noted 
the irony of Thabo Mbeki addressing a session of the OAU Conference of Ministers at Sun City in a 
speech titled " We have Come Home" in 1995 (Klopper 1999: 24-26). 
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the inevitable nature of the restrictions we face, yet at the same time takes seriously 
the possibil ity of transgression. 
Contrary to popular belief, there is no necessary contradiction between the 
postmodern perspective and the practical implementation of a radical politico-legal 
agenda (Hunt 1990; Binder 1991; Hutchinson 1992). Although postmodemism 
eschews universal, essential or ahistorical grounds on which to anchor epistemic 
justification, this does not mean (as is sometimes concluded 53) that this is the end of 
the theoretical enterprise. Whilst postmodemism rejects the metaphysical privileging 
of grand theory, which is in any event inappropriate to transitional circumstancesS4 , it 
does not deny the value of politico-legal theorising. Rather it insists that such 
theorising pay attention to the structural circumstances of the social milieu it is 
considering. The postmodern account of politics and law must grapple with extant 
forms of power, in the knowledge t~at the construction of social reality is itself a 
construct of power. With the identification of the operations of power lies the 
possibility of resistance. Because the postmodem subject has no unified essence, but 
is instead a plurality of contingent social , political and epistemic relations, 
subjectivity is alterable through the rearticulation of these relations. Agents are only 
contingently allied in more or less stable arrangements. Opposition is always possible 
since hegemony is never stable (Deutsche 1991: 20,21; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 27-
30).55 Moreover, postmodernism cannot capitulate or retreat from the task of 
struggling towards the experience of justice. The postmodern theories of justice 
discussed in this work provide non-foundational means with which to theorise the 
turbulence of change and in particular, conceptions of justice whose example acts as 
an inspiration for transforrnative efforts. Against modernist protestations that to 
attempt transition and transformation without a hegemonic narrative leads to 
arbitrariness, contingency and the possible recurrence of tyranny and oppression, it 
~ 3 Anthony Giddens, for example, writes of postmodemism that "moral questions become complete ly 
denuded of meaning or relevance in current social circumstances" (Giddens 1991: 207). 
~4 As Roederer observes: "Each society's transfonnation is in some sense a unique response to its 
unique past and present situation. Thus it is doubtfu l that a grand theory of transition will emerge from 
the field and if one did emerge it is doubtful that it wou ld be very useful to soc iety's in transition" 
(Roederer 1999a: 78). 
~~ Postcolon ial theory, especially its poststructuralist guises, mostly rejects totalising abstracts of power 
as falsifying situations of dom ination and subordination. In Homi Bhabha's theory of power and 
contest, for instance, the process of procuring the consent of the oppressed and the marginalised to the 
existing structure of relationships through ideological inducements, necessari ly generates dissent and 
resistance, since the subject is conceived as being constituted through incommensurable so licitations 
and heterogenous social practices. 
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should be noted, following Hutchinson, that " there will never be a guarantee against 
tyranny - nothing can deliver us from that" (Hutchinson 1992: 790)." 
I can only attribute Davis' charge that deconstruction is cornplicit with legal 
positivism to a serious misreading of Derrida and postmodern theory generally. One 
of the obvious aspects of postmodemism is its attack on all aspects of posi tivism 
(Douzinas and Warrington 1994). As Alan Hunt explains 
The most important implication of postmodemism's epistemological challenge 
to legal scholarship is that it confronts the central preoccupation of legal 
positivism, the dominant strand within liberal legalism, with the search for 
tests of legal validity ... In challenging the very possibility of grounding the 
validity of law, the epistemological critique mounted by postmodemism thus 
goes to the very heart of the project ofl iberallegalism (Hunt 1990: 520) 
Postmodemism calls on legal theorists to be reflexive and to confront "the ways In 
which their own analytic and literary practices encode and conceal value positions 
that need to be brought to light" (Agger 1991 : 121). POSlmodemism wants to insist 
that legal positivism misrepresents social reality , or privileges a certain representation 
to the exclusion of others, so that it is political whilst all the while denying its politics. 
Except to say that. for instance, Derrida's idea of justice is something apart from the 
rights and remedies available under the existing legal system (since justice is an 
ethical relation that cannot fully be encoded under the existing legal system, that is, 
under existing statutes, rules and precedentss7) is incompatible with positivism, I will 
say no more about postmodemism's divergences from positivism here; I deal with it 
in the next chapter. 
Davis's third objection is to the effect that the work of postmodemism' s major 
figures and those directly influenced by them is so dense and obscure that it is largely 
inaccessible to all but the dedicated or masochistic, and this prevents postmodem 
theory from achieving a broad and political influence.s8 Even worse, this leads to a 
:!6 To transpose this insight into the activity of adjudication: there is always a choice, ethical and 
political between options, better or worse. To deny that this ethical choice exists at all, as positivists are 
rrone 10 do, is itselfan ethical stance. 
7 Derrida observes that "between sc ience and the act itself, the decision, there will be a gap, there is a 
heterogeneity between knowing and going" (Derrida 1999a: 280). 
jl It has become de rigellr for anal ytically minded theorists to criticise poststructuralist discourse for its 
rococo formulations and linguistic prolixity. Brian Palmer, writing in a tone which forcefully suggests 
his insistence on discursive clarity, asserts: "Much writing which appears under the designer label of 
poststructuralism/postmodcmism is quite bluntly crap, a kind of academic wordplaying with no 
possible link to anything but the pseudo-intellectualised ghettoes of the most se lf-promotionally avant-
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charge of elitism stemming from the paradox of postmodemism' s insistence on giving 
a voice to the previously marginalised, and not privileging the voices of the powerful 
over the voices of the powerless, but then writing in a [ann and style largely 
inaccessible to the powerless. Barbara Christian argues in this vein that 
[p Joststructuralism' s technical language - its graphs, its algebraic equations, 
its exegetical drive - has often at least one immediate effect upon Third Word 
readers for whom the latinate compounds of deconstructive tenninology evoke 
the horrors of the missionary education and its interpellation of subordinate 
subject ivity: and that is to silence them in their work as theorists. (Christian in 
Slemon and Tiffin 1989; xi) 
Arguments in favour of the dense postmodemist style include, first, the contention 
that it is more responsive to the complexity of what is being addressed and, second, 
that it is worthwhile being deliberately playful, because this enables readers to assume 
a central role in making sense of the text, releasing the subject from the prison of 
language, to provide the opportunity to construct or read the text differently and to 
resist power! knowledge detenninations. More specifically, cenain strands of 
post colonial theory draw on the indeterminacies of language in order to present 
colonialism as transactional rather than merely conflictual by breaking down the 
binary opposition coloniser/ colonised in recognition of a heterogeneity of forms of 
power. 
Whilst I am sympathetic to the arguments in favour of linguistic and semantic 
complexity on the basis that it addresses the heterogeous quotidianity of South 
African social experience. and whilst I think that the best postmodem theorists 
(among whom I include Derrida and Lyotard) make productive use of it, I would 
concede that much postmodern theory is gratuitously obscure, incoherent and 
undisciplined. $9 Part of the answer for the legal arena, 1 will argue in Chapter Three, is 
to re-educate practitioners and academics to provide the kind of knowledge necessary 
to read and participate in the language of postmodem theory. As Spivak observes, 
garde enclaves of that bastion of protectionism. the University" (Palmer 1990: 199). For further 
examples of this kind of objection, see Michalowski 1993 and Katz 1999. 
59 For discourse to adopt a mode of address which, because of its sty le or register, has the effect of 
confusing its audience cannot in itself be just. Justice, Derrida insists, requires one to address oneself to 
the other in the language of the other; to foreswear one's own way of thinking, talking and looking at 
things in order to understand the other in all her singularity and uniqueness. Accordingly, if one is 
addressing a group of acadcmics familiar with poststructuralist vocabulary one might justly adopt a 
morc complex style. Since, however, political commitment requires one on certain occassions to 
address non-academic audiences, it is only just to adopt a different, simpler register. 
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postmodem theory "asks for. as it were, to use a very old term, a transformation of 
conSCIOusness, a changing mindset" (Spivak 1990a: 20), a new curriculum in 
education and otherwise. Nevertheless, education does not prevent pretentious 
opacity. I would argue, however, that the substance of poslrnodem themes may be 
separated from the elitist style of certain poststructuralists (though perhaps not 
completely successfull y and not the without semantic changes that translation 
necessitates). This work represents such an attempt. 
Synopsis 
At this stage I would like proleptically to advert to the key themes of the 
following chapters. Chapters Two and Three are explicitly expository, whilst chapters 
four and five interrogate two texts of post-apartheid law to determine what insights 
the application of post-apartheid theory might elucidate. Rejecting comprehensive 
programmes and universal positions, Chapter Two compares modem legality 
generally and legal positivism specifically with two postmodem, poststructuralist 
theories of justice (those of Derrida and Lyotard) and what one might term a theory of 
injustice (Foucault) .60 Thereafter, the compatibility of these postmodem theories with 
the doctrine of the rule of law is investigated, demonstrating in addition that liberal 
justification functions to legitimate and disguise the exercise of power, and that the 
rule of law, operating in tandem with the liberal fiction of popular consent, may 
structurally legitimate the current government, rather than presenting opportunities for 
transformation. I nevertheless seek, contrary to the arguments of many postmodem 
theorists, to develop a postmodem formulation of the rule of law which both 
incorporates rule· following and provides for the possibility of change. 
A postmodem approach to constitutional interpretation is developed in 
Chapter Three. in the light of issues of indeterminacy and contradiction, and is 
contrasted to the approach to interpretation historically and currently taken by the 
South African judiciary. In accordance with the professed requirement of practicality 
and timeliness, the chapter will begin with a description of modem modes of 
interpretation in order to demonstrate the "shift in consciousness" which a 
6/) The homogenising of these theorists under the banner of poststrucluralism is not unproblemalicai, 
but I follow Spivak (1990a: 18) in doing so here. 
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transformation to more epistemological ly progressIve interpretative modes 
necessitates. 
Chapters Four and Five will provide a rereading of two Constitutional Court 
judgements61 , chosen not only because they are regarded as paradigm ca~es of post-
apartheid adjudication, but also because their range of themes and concerns spans the 
spectrum of South Africa's transition: life. death, public opinion, democracy, nation-
building. interpretation. amnesty, foreign jurisdictions, love, the future, the past, 
punishment, politics and much else besides.62 These themes traverse a number of 
different and contradictory judicial "moods" - intrepidness, anxiety and ambivalence 
- as the court interprets the constitution to give content to a new chapter in South 
African common law. 
Chapter Four will investigate the issues surrounding law' s mediation of 
successor justice and the Truth and Recpnciliation Commission, including the 
ConstitutionaJ Court ' s ruling in Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others", in the light of postmodem 
justice theory. It examines the manner in which the TRC has provided a forum in 
which viclimage could be addressed by the inclusion of previously marginalised 
narratives which tampered with the authority of apartheid's dominant story-lines by, 
in Spivak's words, "reversing, displacing and seizing the apparatus of value-coding" 
(Spivak 1990b: 228). I argue that the TRC has potentially the effect of shifting the 
positi on of the oppressed from victim to participant in the structures and processes of 
post-apartheid society. 
Chapter Five deals with the Constitutional Court ' s abolition of the death 
penalty in S v Makwanyane and Anolher64. Death represents for South Africa the 
violence of the past and the extreme experience of the turbulence of the future and in 
abolishing capital punishment the Constitutional Court confronts the ethics oflife and 
death amidst the anxiety of political turbulence. In the course of my examination of 
6 1 I do not mean by this that I intend to provide a deconstructive reading of these texts in the sense of a 
Derridean reading, replete with imaginative play and enticing neologisms. I am not able 10 provide 
such a reading convincingly. Moreover, 1 would tend to agree with Rorry that "Derrida seems 
inimitable: I have yet to read a Derridean reading of anything, written by somebody other than Derrida 
himself, that was not contrived, wooden and humourless" (Rorry 1998: 329). 
62 Ironically, the guilt and innocence of the litigants are among the themes omitted from the court's 
deliberations, this issue having been decided by the court a quo. Nevertheless, guil! and innocence do 
feature prominent ly in both judgements, in the form of group gui lt and innocence . 
., 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC). 
.. 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
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the court's interpretation of the Constitution, I shall suggest not only that the 
Constitution could have been interpreted differently (which certain of the judgements 
deny), but also that there may be reasons for the judgements which are suppressed 
beneath the romanticism of nation-building and humanism. 
Above all, I wish to show that modem jurisprudence, and in particular the 
formalist application by the South African judiciary of purportedly neutral rules both 
during apartheid and subsequently, is incompatible with the normative complexity 
and contingency of the transitional period. In certain important aspects, reflected in 
the cases under analysis. the judiciary recognised that this was so. Moreover, I want to 
demonstrate that postmodemism, in combination with postcoioniai theory, is of 
relevance to a theorising of South Africa's transition and, perhaps most importantly, 
that the postmodem ethics of alterity, the duty to give voice to the marginalised 
(colonised) other, might be seen as a much needed means of infusing law (legal 
theory and practice) with ethics. 
Literary Supplements 
During the course of my analysis I refer from time to time to literary texts, 
prose and poetry, in an attempt both to supplement imaginatively the rhetorical 
exclusions of legal discourse and to problematise its oppressive systems of 
representation. Although my discussion of literature is proportionately small, perhaps 
len pages in all , I feel obliged to justify its inclusion in view of two vociferously 
stated objections: that literary discourse is separate from and irrelevant to philosophy 
and that it is separate from and irrelevant to law. The roots of the first objection go 
back to Plato's Republic, which banished poets for their fai lure to promote virtue. 
Thereafter, philosophers of a scientific bent, such as Kant and Husserl, have sought to 
exclude literary modes from philosophical discourse on the basis that literary 
language is dangerously vague and confused and that its rhetorical flavour serves to 
obscure or derai l completely rational argument. Other philosophers such as Nietzsche 
and Kierkeg"aard have availed themselves of literary styles, a practice justified by 
arguments to the effect that the literal and metaphorical are inseparably admixed, so 
that purging language of the metaphorical is a doomed project and second, that 
scientific discourse is itself a rhetoric competing for allegiance. I believe imaginative 
descriptions contained in literature can provide a window of possibility through which 
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philosophers can gaze in their explorations of the ramifications of philosophical 
positions. Moreover, philosophers often run up against the limits of language and, to 
use Wingenstein's expression, turn their spades. Contrary to positivism, what cannot, 
Wingenstein argues, be said - the ethical - may perhaps be most closely alluded to in 
poetry. From the Derridean perspective philosophy becomes one articulation of 
textual traces or differences among others, so that, as David Wood (1990) points out, 
if philosophy' s distinctness is understood in terms of its other modes of writing, its 
relation to other literary texts becomes more central.65 
The objection that law and literature arc separate disciplines and have little to 
do with onc another refers to a polemic similar to that in the philosophy and literature 
debate. At one extreme, stand legal theorists whose ambition it is to transform the law 
into a science by ridding it of aesthetic and rhetorical tropes. On the other end of the 
spectrum law and literature scholars. argue that literary works not only reflect and 
register contradictions in law, they imaginatively reshape them. American realist 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and the law and economics school that succeeded him wanted 
to deny a moral foundation to the law and sought instead to base it on social realities. 
Holmes attempted to develop a science of law which would dislodge the supposedly 
timeless principles of moral philosophy and he argued against the traditional 
humanists· view that literary works provide a foundation of eternal values (Holmes 
1899). Subsequently Richard Posner has sought to differentiate law and literature by 
arguing that whi le law is a science, a "technique of government" (Posner 1986: 1392), 
literature is a distinct and quasi-religious realm of the humanities, devoid of 
instrumental or didactic purposes, whose only significance for law is its masterful 
deployment of linguistic style. What early legal pragmatists like Holmes failed to 
address is the rhetorical nature of scientific discourse or the representative makeup of 
the scientific communities pursuing truth. In Holmes' day, for example, racial 
inferiority was a matter of consensus in the scientific community and justified the 
reasonableness of cases such as Plessy v Fergusson66. However, for James Boyd 
White, a law and literature scholar, the study of literature "can lead us to a new kind 
6) It is a mistake to conclude that Derrida reduces philosophy to literature or vice versa, an accusation 
that Derrida himself(1996: 79) finnly denies. 
66 This is a United States case in which the infamous "separate but equal" doctrine was affinned . 
Scientific rationality acted as a justification for legalised racism throughout apartheid. The tradition of 
scientific racism is present as a contemporary aspect of the academy. Certain theorists in socio-biology, 
although avoiding words like "superior" and "inferior", make invidious comparisons between the races 
33 
of criticism of law, based ... upon a literary and rhetorical interest in the kind of 
community this language and its practices constitute". This kind of criticism is only 
possible if 
it is recognised that the judicial opinion is a fann of life - a manifestation of 
character and an establishment of the community - that can be judged 
ethically and politically : as authoritarian or democratic; as recognising or 
erasing the experience of others; as open or closed to the possibility of other 
voices, other languages than its own. (White 1989: 2046, 2047) 
Literature is able to transform imaginatively historical contradictions and so as a 
representational activity has a performative aspect (Thomas 1991: 537). Brook 
Thomas observes: 
Literary paradoxes ... have the potential to stimulate an audience to generate 
new ways of constructing evidence, evidence that does not easi ly fit into 
accepted public opinion, evidence that is not deemed admissible in existing 
courts of law. If accepted, such evidence can alter a society's sense of justice. 
(Thomas 1991: 538) 
have in the selection of literary texts in this work privileged dialogical over 
monological texts, as an antidote to the single-voicedness of legal determinacies. I 
include these text only as supplements to my discussion of legal theory but as 
supplements which point to the inability of any particular representation, including 
my own, to be truly representative. 
Exclusions 
1 want to conclude this introduction by saying what this work, brief forays 
aside, will not be or be about: it will not anempt to lay down a blueprint in accordance 
with which law may successfully steer South Africa through a multi-faceted and 
difficult transitional moment. Postmodem theory anyway rejects attempts to create 
large-scale totalising theories in order to explain or create social phenomena. It rejects 
the notion that there is a complete and coherent ' real world ' waiting to b~ discovered 
by theory. Instead, the legal theory set out in this work has a much more modest task 
based on a biologically based hierarchy. Astoundingly, these theorists continue to pass editorial muster 
and be published (Fairchi ld 1991). 
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- uncovering assumptions. illuminating contradictions and making contextual 
suggestions for law's contingent improvement. 67 I want to offer provisional remarks 
which might present new ways of reading current practices to address the limits and 
potential 'oflaw as a fann of social ordering, a critique which could be embraced as a 
corrective to the over-investment in law characteristic of the Enlightenment and the 
discourses of liberal ism. Accordingly I resist the temptation to provide closure, which 
is contrived, arbitrary and generally conducive to established power relations 
(Hutchinson 1992). 
Nor will this work be about the injustice of the law during apartheid and the 
evil of the judiciary during this period. That is to say, it is not my intention to stand on 
the shore of the new South Africa to vituperate against the receding tide of apartheid's 
legal practices. Obviously, in the course of an analysis of a transition from point A to 
point S , it would be unreasonable not say something about each of these subtending 
markers. There are moments where I cannot avoid, for instance, excoriating the 
attitude of the judiciary during this period - its cynical pennissiveness and its 
complicity with injustice. But on the whole I have attempted to concentrate on the 
transfigural possibilities of post-apartheid legal practice, rather than engaging in an 
analysis of the ethical deficiencies of the old legal system. This is, I realise, a difficult 
position for a critic arguing for an ethical transfonnation in the law to defend, but 
there it is: I am more interested in the potential of present conditions to foreground 
justice in the future - not unlike, I suspect, many South Africans. 
67 As Alan Hutchinson remarks, "Jurists are not the grand architects of law; they are more its humble 
odd-jobbers" (Hutchinson 1999: 216). 
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Chapter 2: Modern Lawl Postmodern Justice 
"When we discover that we have in this world no earth or rock to stand or walk upon 
but only shifting sea and sky and wind, the mature response is not to lament the loss 
of fixity but to leam to sail" (White 1984: 278). 
There is at present a renewed interest, evident both in the j udiciary and the 
academy. in the role of values in law. Since 1994 there has been an increasingly 
persuasive call for a return to ethical values and moral principles in all aspects of 
South African life and legal theory. Even as the legal system experiences a 
transformation in form, with the introduction of a written Constitution, a 
Constitutional Court and various new fora and mechanisms to resolve in novel ways 
the disputes left over from the previous regime, there emerge a variety of attempts to 
revitalise the operations of the legal system. As Alfred Cockrell writes, "the explicit 
intrusion of constitutional values into the adjudicative process signals a transition 
from a 'formal vision of law' to a 'substantive vision of law' in South Africa" 
(Cockrell 1996: 3). It is hardly surprising, given the judiciary's perceived lack of 
discretion in interpretation under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
minimisation of the role of values under the modernist jurisprudence of positivism 
followed by the judic iary during apartheid, that the judiciary has since 1994 exhibited 
profound confusion as to the source of values in accordance with which the 
Constitution is to be interpreted. In general the court has adopted a somewhat 
monolithic communitarian view, arguing that the Constitution encapsulates the shared 
ethics of the South African nation. Judge Mokgoro, for example, has said: " In 
interpreting the Bill of Fundamenta l Rights and Freedoms .. . an all-inclusive va)ue-
system, or common values in South Africa can fonn a basis upon which to develop a 
South African human rights j urisprudence" (Makwanyane, para 307). Sachs J states in 
the same vein, "[i]n broad terms, the function given to this court by the Constitution is 
to articulate the fundamental sense of justice and right shared by the whole nation as 
expressed in the text of the Constitution" (Makwanyane para 362 C-O). 
Such Hegelian appeals to the community do supply a grounding and substance 
for ethical judgements, but it should be recognised that a community ex ists by what it 
rejects as well as what it includes. The community is a totality in the sense that it 
excludes those who do not fit the categories in which it demands that its members be 
36 
classified - women, ethnic minorities and others, "those that are 'other' to the 
established norms of the nomos" (Douzinas and Warrington 1994: 201). As Drucilla 
Cornell (1992) shows, for Hegel to construct a community with binding ethical 
standards, it is necessary to construct a "logic of identity", a 'home' which, 
necessarily and violently, excludes those who do not conform. Since the appeal to 
community consensus has the effect of excluding, I want to argue that another 
formulation or source of ethics for law needs 10 be evolved. 
It is a central argument of the first half of this chapter that the incarnation of 
modem law hegemonic during apartheid cannot morally reanimate South African 
legal theory. I specifically argue against those proponents of positivism who assert in 
spite of the apartheid experience that positivism does allow for the infusion of 
morality into post-apartheid law (see, for instance, Cockrell 1996; Fagan 1999) and 
that, even if I were wrong about this, the kind of morality that positivism is 
compatible with is insufficient to meet the requirements of the South African 
transition. The jurisprudence of positivism, which based the legitimacy of law on the 
formalism of legality and consequently reduced the significance of ethical 
considerations, contributed to, even facilitated. law's construction of and complicity 
with apartheid (Dugard 1971 ; 1978; 1981; Davis 1985; Dyzenhaus 1991; 1998)68 
Positivists from Austin to Hart attempted to exclude or minimise the influence of 
moral values and principles in law. Positivism concerns itself with the development of 
a science of law, based on empirically verifiable phenomena, devoted to questions of 
validity. and presenting law as a coherent, closed and formal system guaranteed 
internally through the logical interconnection of norms and externally through the 
rejection of value and content as non-systemic. Where morality is pennined a role in 
the positivist conception of law, it is present only contingently, by accident of history, 
61 Lalu and Harris describe law' s collusion with injustice as having taken place under the rubric of "a 
positivist and reductively ahistorical metalanguage" (Lalu and Harris 1996: 26). Legal positivism has 
its roots in the Enlightenment project of rationalisi ng society through the universal application of 
purponedly neutral rules. However as Peter Fitzpatrick notes, the origins of racism lie in the same 
En lightenment project, with its claims to universality which exclude others as qualitatively different. 
The colonised were placed beyond the equation of universal freedom and the universalism of the law, 
which proclaimed its innocence of racism, was based on this exclusion (Fitzpatrick 1987: 119). Legal 
positivism empowered the judic iary to panicipate in the oppression of a silenced majority, facilitating 
the construction of Apartheid South Africa's dual system of common law, Roman-Dutch law and 
African law, embodying racist evolutionary narratives. Whites married freely , once and forever: 
Africans boughl and sold wives. Whiles exercised sovere ign, individual rights over land: Africans held 
collectively and as subjects. And so on. (Chanock: 1995). 
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rather than mandating the necessary incorporation of morality. Under the positivist 
conception law retains its sanctity by denying the moral and political nature of its 
operation. Alan Paton's description of law and its relation to justice reflects exactly 
this conception: the law is represented as a moral enterprise because it excludes 
morality from its operation.69 Douzinas and Warrington characterise positivism as 
exhibiting a 
distrust of administrative discretion and of judicial creattvIty; the antipathy 
towards administrative tribunals; legal pluralism and non-judicial methods of 
dispute resolution; the insistence on the declaratory role of statutory 
interpretation and the 'strictness' of precedent~ the emphasis on the 'literal' 
rule which allegedly allows the exclusion of subjective preference and 
ideological disposition. (Douzinas and Warrington 1994a: 4) 
I am prepared to concede that this description of positivism does not cover every 
variety of positivist theory or at least that some positivists might dispute the definition 
on the basis of its generality. On the whole, though, I believe that the passage captures 
the features of positivism during apartheid. many of which linger on in new guises. 
My argument is that the sense of outrage that follows the injustices of the legal 
system during apartheid must be related to the radical divorce that modernity decreed 
under the guise of positivism between law and ethics, legality and morality, justice as 
process and justice as substance. The question is whether a contemporary critical and 
reconstructive concept of justice can be developed for the South African legal system 
after the end of the grand narratives of modernity and all attempts to ground justice as 
a principle of universal application. That is to say. can a concept of justice be found to 
mediate between the various conceptions of the good or of ethical action after the 
modem attack on the Good and the postmodem attack on the absolute power of 
reason?70 I believe it can. The discrediting of the modem view that a single form of 
69 I investigate Paton's conception of law and justice briefly in the final section of this chapter and 
more fully in my discussion of Cry, The Beloved Country in Chapter 5. 
70 I reject the modem conception of natural law as a source of values: the claim that there is a small 
number of fundamental principles, universals, ideals or standards that every posited legal system ought 
to in clude. Classical teleology has become historically exhausted and religious transcendence today 
fails to command widespread or uni fonn acceptance. Christine Sypnowich, for example, argues that 
"the thick conceptions of mora lity deployed by anti-positivists, such as some idea of natural law set 
moral cri teria which is (sic) imrinsically contentious" (Sypnowich 1999: 192). As Douzinas et al 
observe: 
Natural law and natural rights theories per se are not of great purchase in late modernity. They 
retain their place in the curriculum mainly on account of their age, infinite manipulability and 
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reason could guide humanity towards social progress marks the beginning of an 
ethical awareness of the need to postulate a non-foundational concept of justice which 
will provide the scope to criticise current legal practice, whilst being all the time 
historically contingent and particular. I suggest that the postmodem theories of justice 
of Derrida and Lyotard influenced by Emmanuel Levinas's ethics of alterity 
consti tutes such a concept of justice. 
1.1 Positivism 
In the first half of this chapter. 1 criticise the various strands of positivism in 
order to demonstrate their collective unsuitability as a jurisprudence for contemporary 
South Africa. I shall then briefly discuss Foucault's critique of legal modernity in an 
effort to show that, despite the arguments of certain positivists, the introduction of a 
liberal rights-based juri sprudence does not necessarily provide the structure for a just 
legal system. Thereafter I investigate the contributions of Derrida and Lyotard as 
attempts to formulate a concept of justice which would avoid the pitfalls of the 
modern conception. Although Foucault points to the dystopic underside of modernity 
rather than advancing a theory of justice per se, I have included an analysis of 
Foucault alongside Derrida for reasons alluded to by Rorty in the following passage: 
As ... Foucault helped us to see, today ' s chains are often forged from the 
hammers that struck off yesterday's ... this sequence of hammers into chains 
is unlikely to end with the invention of hammers that cannot be forged into 
chains - hammers that are purely rational , with no ideological alloy. Still the 
chains might, with luck, get a little lighter and easier to break each time. 
(Rorty 1998: 320) 
pedagogical usefulness. Their latest mutation in the theory of fundamental human rights is of 
great ideological and rhetorical force, but of little specific content. (Douzinas et al 1991 : 
19,20) 
Recently natural law has been used as a basis for acts of violence against school children in South 
Africa in contravention of relevant legislation. In March 1999, the principle of a private Christian 
school defended hi s continued illegal assaulting of pupils at his school, remarking "Who is more 
important? The Bible teaches us that God is ultimate even over the government" (Pete and Du Plessis 
2000: 98). This natural law justification was to form an important basis for subsequent constitutional 
challenges against the legislation prohibiting corporal punishment in schools. Many of what are taken 
to be unimpeachable sources of natural law are seemingly incommensurable with with justice. As J.M. 
Balkin observes in another context, "Jesus might have advised his followers to turn the other cheek and 
10 have their enemies, but this approach is not necessarily what justice requires or a particularly good 
strategy for ach ieving a just resu lt" (Balk in 1994: 1164). 
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If the value of Foucault is his demonstration of the ubiquity of power and oppression. 
Derrida and Lyotard point (albeit in different directions) to means of resistance 
whereby oppression might be lessened over time. 
Mindful of John Dugard's persuasive arguments In the 1970s and 1980s 
illustrating that positivism's separation of law and morality enabled his complicity 
with apartheid - Dugard rightly argued that positivism was committed to a 
mechanical or phonographic theory of the judicial function - the judiciary and 
academics alike have tended. with notable exceptions (Cockrell 1996; Fagan 1999) to 
reject positivism in favour of a value·orientated approach, albeit poorly conceived and 
vaguely defined. In Marinkinca v Council of Stare, Republic of Ciske;,r Heath J 
referred to "the outdated legalistic or positivistic approach" (at 408G).This stance was 
echoed in S v Mhlungu 72 where Sachs J referred disparagingly to "a purely technical, 
p.ositivist and value-free approach to the post-Nazi Constitution in Gennany" (para 
1 L 913G).73 Against this general disavowal of positivism, residual positivists reply by 
claiming, first. that posi tivism never intended to separate law from morality and only 
ever insisted that law is not necessarily connected to morality and moreover, now that 
South Africa has a written Constitution, with a Bill of Rights and a political climate in 
which there are genuine efforts to include morality into the law. positivism is 
sanguine about law's inclusion of values (Cockrell 1996: 32, 33; Fagan 1999: 95). 
Second, argue the positivists, positivism does not insist on a mechanical and 
discretionless approach to legal interpretation and positivism pennitted judicial 
discretion and jurisgenesis all along (Cockrell 1996: 35; Fagan 1999: 85). In what 
follows I analyse various positivist theorists in order to argue that positivism either 
attempts to exclude morality or else renders morality fennal rather than substantive, 
and that any discretion that positivism allows is far more an exceptional and reluctant 
concession than the rule. 
For John Austin (1954), law is the command of the soverelgn backed by 
sanctions, stressing the subjection of persons by the sovereign through coercion, a 
conception of the law particularly resonant in considering the role of the law during 
apartheid. In attempting to define legal leons, Austin establ ishes an empirical model 
of a legal system which presupposes a single logical system in which value plays no 
" 1994 (4) SA 472 (Ck) . 
72 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC). 
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part. It is the legal system 's exclusion of substant ive values which legitimates it, 
which supposedly makes it just. Just how narrowly Austinian jurisprudence could be 
interpreted is evidenced by the dictum of Austin 's most successful editor, lethro 
Brown: 
Justice as a concept in jurisprudence, is confoffiling to [positive] law - if not 
conformity to established rules of law, or to the spirit of the law in its totality, 
then according to a law which judges make and apply retrospectively_ (Brown, 
cited in Sugarman 1991 : 47) 
Hans Kelsen expl icitly adopts the epithet "science" for his study afthe logical 
hierarchy of legal norms, a coherent, closed and formal sys tem which comprises a 
legal grammar guaranteed internally by the logical interconnection of norms and 
externally by the rejection of non-systemic material such as content. value and history 
(Kelsen 1934). Kelsen ' s formali sm74 is clear from the idea that at the base of the 
pyramid of norms is posited a grundnorm which sets out the conditions of all other 
nonns, which are accordingly qualified as valid and objectively legal. H.L.A. Hart 
too. constructs his theory as a discourse of truth and as a system of formalist 
coherence. Law is separated from both morality and coercion and presented as a 
coherent and self-referential system of rules; rules refer to other rules and their 
systemic interdependence determines the existence and normative value of any 
particular term . 
Hart. diverging from Aust in, defines the law not as commands, but as a system 
of rules75• thereby achieving the final transi tion from a morality of value to the 
legal ity of a nonn. Hart seeks to demonstrate that law is disti nct from other forms of 
social ordering such as morality and coercion. Advanced systems of law arc 
accordingly neutral toward all political regimes and whi lst morality and polit ics may 
determine the content of law at any particular moment (so that, as Cockrell and Fagan 
13 For academic arguments in favour of the abrogat ion of posi tivism, see Botha 1994, Van Reenan 1995 
and Devenish 1998. 
74 For the sake of clarity, I define formalism as an approach to law which advocates a mechanica l, 
syllogistic application of law (0 facts, in accordance with which the application of a legal rule leads to 
determinate results due to the constraints imposed by the language of the rule (Schauer 1988). 
n Hart writes: 
"There are ... two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence ofa legal system. On 
the one hand those rules of behav iour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of 
validity must generally be obeyed, and, on the other hand, its ru les of recognition specifying the criteria 
of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common 
public standards of official behaviour by its officials (Hart 1961: 113). 
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point out, the Constitution represents the distillation of a particular moral and political 
compromise), neither morality nor politics can determine or effect its underpinning 
structure. Justice, for Hart, is not directly involved with moral rules and so not 
substantive. Justice is identified with the formal equality of treatment of similar cases 
and with the application of the same general rule to the various cases without 
prejudice or interest. The self-referentiality of Hart' s rules also enables the possibility 
of ' pure ' procedural justice since an outcome is just if it conforms to the process 
defined by rules as constituting a just form of adjudication. What moral content the 
law does contain. what Hart refers to as the "minimum content of natural law", is 
characterised by its extreme formalism ; it comprises simply what Hart regards as the 
basic standards of civility needed for species survival. 
Dworkin takes positivism a complex and sophisticated step further. For 
Dworkin. law is not just about rules as Hart suggests, but includes principles and 
policies, and its operation involves the interpretative actions of judges who creatively 
construct the " right answer" to legal problems. Judges develop and apply political and 
moral theories that present a law in the best possible light. Legal tradition is assumed 
10 possess an internal integrity and this allows the construction of principles of 
morality which can then be used to resolve hard cases. Contra Hart, judges do not 
ever have interpretative discretion: judges determine the right answers to "hard cases" 
by finding a " fit" between possible interpretations and the principles of the legal 
community. Dworkin seems to be prepared to reintroduce moral considerations into 
the law, but instead his theory represents a juridification of morality - his assert ion of 
the moral legitimacy of the law witnesses a separation of legality and morality. Ethics 
are banished to the realm of the private and subject ive, with the normative discourse 
of the public realm filled by law. Moreover, as Warwick Tie (1999) argues, politico-
moral facts exist as facts by virtue of their consistency within a particular cultural 
context. Individuals are free to pursue their particular conceptions of the good only 
with in the hegemonic conceptions of those institutions. Although Dworkin claims to 
be able to imagine a form of law beyond the existing legal system, one which guides 
"the impure present law gradually transforming itself into its own purer ambitions ... 
better in each generation than the last" (Dworkin 1986: 406), the existing social 
context "continues to apply a non-negotiable background against which the 
subjectivity of Dworkin ' s super-judge decides the right answer" (Tie 1999: 46). 
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I now return to the earlier responses of Cockrell and Fagan to the abrogation 
of positivism: that positivism can and does factor morality into its operations (insofar 
as "the rule of recognition can incorporate as criteria of legal validity conformity with 
moral principles or substantive values" (Hart 1958: 250)) and that positi,vism, or at 
least those strains of Hart and Joseph Raz, permits discretion in rare cases of 
arnbiguity. 76 My response to the first assertion is that it is not sufficient for law to 
incorporate accidentally whatever moral criteria may exist for identification of the 
law. I disagree strongly with the positivist assertion that there is no necessary 
cormection between law and morality. Positiv ism's aspirations toward neutrality tend 
to make the law complicit with a hegemonic morality (or immorality) even as it 
pretends to hold no moral stance at all. The argument that the new constitutional 
dispensation has "delivered positivism from evil" is simply false since the new 
constitutional document requires interpretat~on. The argument that the Constitution 
contains values does not address the central point that the words and rules of the 
Constitution need to be interpreted to give effect to them in adjudication. Moreover, 
the interpretative process is inherently moral and political in that there is always more 
than one possible meaning or rule which can be applied in any particular case, so that 
choice (Derrida's "undecideable") is a defining political feature of interpretation. Hart 
and Raz argue that in the majority of cases both words and rules are tools with clear 
meaning and application. I disagree. In all cases there is undecideabiIity: a choice to 
be made between rules and meanings, wh:ich can obviously not be made with 
reference to values in the constitution which is itself the subject of interpretation. 
Legal interpretation must aspire to justice and this requires in each case having 
recourse to values outside of the law: this is what gives justice its necessarily critical 
character. But it is precisely the area outside of the law that positivism' s intemalism 
wants to reject as being none of its business. However, for those who want to 
76 Hart asserts: 
There will be points where the existing law fails to dictate any decision as the correct one, 
and to dec ide cases where th is is so the judge must exercise his law-making powers. But he 
must not do this arbitrarily: that is he must always have some general reasons justitying his 
decision and he must act as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to his own 
be liefs and values. But if he satisfies these conditions he is entitled to follow standards or 
reasons for decision which are not dictated by the law and may differ from those followed by 
other judges faced with similar hard cases. (Hart 1958: 250) 
Raz also concedes that law will on occasion be indeterm inate, failing to identify a ' right answer' to a 
par1icular legal question (Raz 1979: 70-79). 
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challenge the dominant political theory with which positivism is infused, for the 
unrepresented and excluded from the community from which law purports to draw its 
va lues. for those who experience law not as rationality and rights but as victims of the 
exercise of power and as the recipients of legal force, positivism has no place. For 
those people the cheerful communitarianism of Law's Empire does no j ustice to the 
misery of exclusion.77 In the next section 1 suggest that it is this assumed positivity of 
positive law, the sense that law is necessarily a medium which will provide j ust ice, 
that postmodemism denies. 
1.2 Post modernism 
In this section examine the ideas on law and justice of three postmodem 
(poststructuralist) theorists: Michel Foucault, Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques 
l>errida. These theorists contribute to what has been termed postmodem 
jurisprudence: the anempt to create the conditions of possibility for reason(s), ethics 
and law once all the strategic moves of modem philosophy and jurisprudence to 
ground them on some single principle, form or meaning have been discredited 
(Douzinas et al 1991: 18). Space does not permit me to include other theorists who 
have contributed to debates on law and justice and who might also be labelled 
postmodem, such as Nietzsche and the neo-pragmatist communitarian Richard Rorty. 
I have decided to include Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida because they cumulatively 
point to the central flaw of the Enlightenment concept of law and justice, its violent 
exclusions and marginaiisations, and (in the case of Derrida) to a strategy for its 
resolution. 
Foucoult 
77 Dworkin 's positive attitude to law is reflected in the following passage: 
What.is law? ... Law 's empire is defined by attitude, not territory or power or process ... It is 
an interpretive se lf-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest sense. It is a 
protestant attitude that makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his society'S public 
commitm ents to principle are, and what these commitments require in new circumstances ... 
Law's attitude is constructive: it aims, in the interpret ive spirit to lay principle over practice to 
show the best route to a better future, keeping the right fa ith with the past. It is finally a 
fraternal attitude, an express ion of how we are united in the community though divided in 
project, interest and conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the people we want to 
be and the community we aim to have. (Dworkin 1986: 413) 
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Foucault points to the failure of the legal system as conceived by the 
Enlightenment to live up to the failure of its own emancipatory pretensions. He 
depicts the legal system of modernity as a "negative utopia", a seemingly humane but 
ultimately coercive product of Enlightenment rationality gone awry. Foucault 
challenges the idea of progress in law, the idea for instance, that South African law, 
by its adoption of a Bill of Rights and the judiciary's self-professed quest for 
humanitarian values, is becoming increasingly humane and less coercive. Foucault 
argues to the contrary that the rights to privacy. dignity and autonomy are rendered 
ineffective by a ubiquitous system of coercion and discipline. Foucault challenges the 
"classical juridical theory" of the social contract theorists, who view power solely in 
teons of stale power and ignore the way in which power is exercised non-centrally "at 
the capillaries". According to social contract theorists, of whom Hobbes is Foucault 's 
main focus. the exercise of power by the state is justified as a product of the free 
choice among individuals in a state of nature. On this model the state is the result of a 
contract, so that the state is legitimate to the extent that it satisfies the mandate of 
individuals who participate in the contract. Power comes to be understood only in 
tenns of the state over the individual; in all other realms the individual is free. But for 
Foucault the individual is not free; following Nietzsche's argument against the 
ex istence of the coherent subject beneath the individual's attributes, Foucault heralds 
the "death of the subject" (Foucault 1994). There is no subject that pre-exists the 
imposition of power through legal and other social discourses. 78 
For Foucault, social contract theory is not primari ly concerned with individual 
freedom but with social control. A Foucauldian analysis of the South African tradition 
to liberal democracy would run as follows. Under apartheid, a centralised goverrunent 
socially engineered and divided its citizens through the operation of Roman-Dutch 
law overlaid with positivist theory which for the most part denied judicial discretion 
and separated law from morality. Domination mostly took place through a web of 
criminal laws, harsh punishments such as the death penalty, and extra-legal exercises 
of force. Parliament was sovereign and it was easy to view power as largely 
repressive. Under the classical juridical model, with the change of government, the 
78 According to Foucau lt "[m]y object'ive ... has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which in our cuhure human beings are made subjects" (Foucault 1982b: 208). What Foucault's 
genealogy reveals is that "The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an "ideological" 
representation of society; but he is also a reality rabricated by the specific technology of power that I 
have called a discipline" (Foucault 1979: 194). 
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individuals in South Africa. in accordance with the free social contract. vest the new 
government with authority to repeal offensive racist legislation and to create new civil 
and criminal laws, set up schools, build houses, roads and other infrastructure, 
provided always that its actions are legitimated only inasmuch as they accord with the 
provisions of the Constitution. Law is equivocal in this maner: it speaks of individual 
freedom but tends to legitimate state power. The social contract model has undergone 
various pemlUtalions. but its formulations have always been placed in the service of 
slate interests: 
Finally, in the eighteenth century, it is again this same [juridico-political] 
theory of sovereignty, reactivated through the doctrine of Roman law, that we 
find in its essentials in Rousseau and his contemporaries, but now with a 
fourth role to play: now it is concerned with the construction of parliamentary 
democracy. (Foucault 1980: 103) 
Foucault"s claim is that rights discourse operates as a way in which the individual can 
be coerced or dominated by the state. The liberal state and its legality are mechanisms 
whereby large numbers of people are rendered docile so that they can be classified, 
organised and dominated not only by the state but also by private interests (as is the 
case, for instance, when clients are obliged by corporate institutions to submit to 
biometric analysis). 79 Rather than the fundamental human rights set out in the Bill of 
Rights acting as trumps against state interference, Foucault claims that the legal 
system, even (perhaps especially) one that incorporates liberal rights, legitimates the 
use of state power: 
The system of right, the domain of the law, are permanent relations of these 
relations of domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Rights 
should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but 
in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates. (Foucault 1980: 86) 
Legal rights may be both a fonn of domination and a smokescreen for domination -
power, in order to be effective. must disguise its operation. According to Foucault 
current political theory remains mired in a premodem notion of power as a repressive 
force by the state, wrongly assuming that the absence of state power translates into 
freedom for the individual. For Foucault, power must be reconceived not as 
79 For a discuss ion of the invasiveness of this kind oftechno!ogy, see Macguire 2000. 
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repressive state power but as disciplinary power consisting of normalising techniques 
and disciplinary strategies issuing from a plurality of sources including hospitals, 
schools, schools, factories, prisons and the military. This network of power relations 
is a seem less and omnipresent web that positively constitutes the individual as 
subject: "In fact power produces~ it produces reality; it produces domains of objects 
and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him 
belong to this production" (Foucault 1979: 194). 
Whilst South African jurists were busy establishing the formal rights of liberty 
and equality, on a Foucauldian reading the disciplines have and will continue to erode 
these formal liberties by creating a carceral society, a "panopticon" in which the 
individual is monitored.80 Schools, hospitals and military barracks come to resemble 
prisons. all of which share a common interest in shaping the subject. But whereas 
premodem law worked by virtue of a sanction, the disciplines and their regulatory 
apparatus work through normalisation.81 The disciplines shape a person in a way the 
law is incapable of doing, by continually subjecting the individual to normalising 
modes of regulation. Not that Foucault argues that law is replaced by the disciplinary 
system; rather, law begins to conform to and become part of the disciplinary system, 
which is itself encoded in the form oflaws and regulations: 
I do not mean to say that law fades into the background or that the institutions 
of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law tends to operate more and 
more as a norm and that the juridical institution is increasingly incorporated 
into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative and so on) whose 
functions are for the most part regulatory. (Foucault 1990: 144) 
I will describe in Chapter Four how the law's co-operation with the disciplines 
(religion and other forms of administration) combine in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which appears, from a Foucauldian perspective, to be a regulatory 
mechanism by which the construction of emergent subjectivities has taken place as a 
function of the combined discourses of law, religion and nation-building. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission also reflects the Foucauldian insight that with the 
10 The altemative sentence to murder, subsequen t to .the death sentence being abolished in Makwanyane 
is of course a long teoo of imprisonment. 
'1 For example, the Constitutiona l Court in Christian Education South Africa v The Minisler of 
Education 1998 (12) BCLR 1449 (CC) declared unconstitutional the continued resort to corporal 
punishment in schools, in defiance of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. For a discussion of 
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increasingly regulative and administrative nature oflaw, it becomes consequently less 
punitive. The granting of amnesty in exchange for ' truth ' can be seen as an example 
of thi s trend, as is, I will argue in Chapter Five, the abrogation of the death penalty. 
Both of these examples take place under the guise of a hwnanitarian impulse on the 
part of the judiciary and operate to legitimate both the law and the new regime. But 
for Foucault, humanism is merely a fa9ade for the imposition of power through the 
law. 
foucault ' s central argument is that, paradoxically. jurisprudence should not 
focus so heavily on law, that is, on legislation and juridical proclamations, and should 
rather examine the way in which modem law has been melded with the disciplines, 
enabl ing the expansion of both law and the disciplines. For this reason, in my 
considerat ion of the AZAPO and Makwanyane cases, I have tended to move from an 
analys is of the judgement 's text to a broader exploration of the political context and 
attendant social thematics in order to invest igate not only the meaning(s) of the 
judgements but also how the normative rhetoric of the court compares with and stands 
up to existing modes of social performativity. 
While I certainly bel ieve that Foucault' s analysis generates insights into the 
law in post-apartheid South Africa, I must ask further whether it provides normative 
grounds for a program of legal reform. On the whole, a Foucauldian analysis would 
seek to show that while South Africa's transi tion from apartheid to liberal democracy 
seems like political progress (the introduction of democracy and a written 
Constitution containing a Bill of Rights. the provision of an apparatus for dealing with 
"the conflicts of the past". the humanitarian reform of penal policy), but is in fact an 
excuse for repress ion and discipline. That is, the social changes made in the name of 
humanity (and freedom, equality and truth) have led to the creation of a society which 
is just as coercive as the unsubtle coercive practices of apartheid, though the 
domination is more nuanced. In relation to judicial practice, it may be asserted that the 
jurisprudence of positivism was during apartheid a technology of power which 
facilitated state oppression by e liminating ethics from its practices and so leaving the 
state to its own designs. The vague and directionless value-centred approach of post-
apartheid legal theory seems to reintroduce morality into law, but the unclarity of the 
approach leaves the judiciary free to apply new form s of oppression conducive to 
the various litigious challenges to section 10(2) of the South African Schools Act, see Pete and Du 
Pless is 2000. 
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specific forms of nation-building and social reconstruction. In some moods, Foucault 
seems only to be pointing to the possibility of oppression ("My point is not that 
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous" (Foucault 1982a: 23 1 )). However, 
the scope of Foucault's suspicion is so wide-ranging that it attaches not only to 
rational ity (the instrumental ity of rationality, following Adorno and Horkheimer) but 
also the idea of justice: 
1 wi ll be a little bit Nietzschean about this ... [I] t seems to me that the idea of 
j ust ice is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different 
types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power. 
(Foucault 1984: 6) 
Liberal democratic legality suggests that resort should be had to the Constitution and 
the legal system to provide limits on the extent to which the individual can be 
controlled and dominated. However, Foucault's point is that one cannot use judicial 
mechanisms and principles such as the law or the Constitution specifically as a 
defence against discip line because the law is part of the disciplinary network. For 
Foucault, resistance must take place in accordance with a ' new form of right ' that is 
neither disciplinary nor based on juridical principles. Foucault's suggestion is an 
ethics of self-mastery in which the subject recreates herself through an aesthetic 
process: " we have to create ourselves as a work of art" (Foucault 1982a: 351).82 
Foucault stipulates the polit ical implications of this strategy as follows: 
The political, ethical, social and philosophical problem of our days is not to try 
to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's mechanisms but 
to liberate us, both from the state and from the type of individualisation which 
is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through 
82 There are examples of this kind of aesthetic se lf-sty ling in post-aparthe id South Africa. Performance 
artist Steven Cohen recreates the parameters of identity po litics that is both public and private by 
exhibiting aspects of homosexua l sex ual practices in public . In a radical politicisation of aesthetics, he 
challenges inherited social norms and representations, as well as the rhetorical assurances of 
constitutional righ ts by styling himself in a way radically at odds with conventional modes of 
representation. Virginia Mac Kenny notes: 
Steven Cohen is testi ng the veracity of the ideal. In his piece Crawling, Flying, VOling (1999) 
he spent fi ve · hours in the queue crawling to the voting station garbed in a ' little black 
number', diamante necklace, full make-up, a feather headress and fetish shoes endowed with 
gemsbok horns which rendered walking impossible. He was not just making a spectacle of 
himself, he was testing if the system could accommodate the di versity it claimed - testing 
"what identity you have to present to officialdom", cha llenging his own and others' 
cowardice. (Mackenny 2000) 
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the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for 
several centuries. (Foucault 1982b: 216) 
Foucault's analysis often seems to verge on defeatism, in that it seems to overstate the 
ubiquity of oppression.8) Colin Gardon acknowledges that readers often get the 
impression of "a paranoid hyper-rationalist system in which the strategies -
technologies - programs of power merge into a monolithic regime of social 
subjugation'· (Gardon 1980: 246). However, for Gardon, this is a misreading since 
Foucault distinguishes a disciplinary society from the fantasy of a disciplined society 
"populated by docile obedient normalised subjects". Foucault ' s assertion concerning 
the ubiquity of power should not be misconstrued as suggesting the omnipotence of 
power. Wherever dominance is imposed, resistance will inevitably arise: .. there are no 
relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective 
because they are formed right at the point where the relations of power are exercised" 
(Foucault 1980: 142). However. since resistance cannot take place through recourse to 
juridical principles (since law is part of the disciplinary network), resistance takes 
place at the point of the application of power: the body. Foucault suggests an "ethics 
of the self" an aesthetics of existence at the level of the ethical as "an antidote to the 
normalising tendencies of modem societies" (MacNay 1994: 142).84 Although 1 can 
only focus briefly on the efficacy of Foucault's ethics of self-stylisation as a strategy 
of resistance in detail , my chief concern is that its normativity (its advocation of 
rigorous rules of conduct and stipulation of sartorial and other existential requisites) is 
in conflict with the performativity of many forms of life in South Africa.8s That is to 
say, the modes of subjectivity constructed through discourses prevalent in South 
13 According to Jose Merquior. foucault 's "cratology" tends towards pancratism: it reduces all social 
practices to unspecified patterns of domination . so that disciplinary power is conceived as a fully 
installed discip li nary force (Merquior 1991). 
54 Arts of existence are: 
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, 
but also seek to transfonn themselves, to change themselves in their singu lar being, and to 
make their life into an a:uvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic 
criteria . (Foucault 1985: 10, 11 ) 
FoucauJt's exemplum of embodied aesthetic self-fashioning - the Baudelairean dandy - is a radical 
construct, an individual who rejects established models in order to create someth in g radically new. 
"What must be produced" urges Foucault "is something that doesn't yet exist and about which we 
cannot know how and what it will be .. . the creation of something entirely different, a total innovation" 
(Foueault 1991 : 121 , 122). 
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Africa are seemingly incompatible with or precluded from the project of radical self-
transformation suggested by Foucault. Because Foucault installs "a direct unequivocal 
relation between subjection and subjectification" (Dews 1984: 87), it is difficult to 
imagine how the agency required to effect an aesthetics of resistance might be 
attributed to the most oppressed in South Africa, the black working c1asses,86 As 
Rainer Rochlitz argues, Foucault seems to retreat into an elitist and amoral 
aestheticism, u a project for all privileged minorities, liberated from the material 
reproduction of society" (Rochlitz 1992: 255). " 
In any event, although a Foucauldian analysis usefully alerts us to the 
possibility of continued repression in South Africa, he does not suggest a programme 
of legal reform, through the inclusion of an ethics uncontaminated by Enlighterunent 
conceptions of reason, law and justice. Since it is to the recognition of oppression and 
the possibi lity of its resistance wit~in legal theory and practice that his work is 
devoted, I turn now to Jacques Derrida's theory of law and justice. 
Derrida 
What emerges as a distinctive feature of positivism, particularly in its South 
African articulation, is its denial of any necessary relationship between law and its 
infinite others. Modem jurisprudence attempts to define law by excluding the non-
legal. the other of law. It describes the essence of law, construct ing a unified and 
coherent system, which is rooted in the metaphysics of truth rather than the politics 
and ethics of j ustice. Meaning is determinate and truth is linked to empirically 
observable facts. The proclaimed unity of law is linked with the legitimation of 
power. Power is legitimate if it fo llows the law and if the law follows reason. Law is 
simply positive law and only has contingent connections to human morality and 
ethical standards. As Douzinas and Washington suggest, what this in fact entai ls is a 
S5 On the distinction between normativity and performativity, Schlag (1990) argues that in many cases 
the location of indiv iduals within particular language games precludes their susceptibility to normative 
arguments. 
86 Although, as I argue in a subsequent chapter, Judith Butler ( 1993, 1994) suggests the 
roststructuralism can indeed effect agency and so the polit ical project oflTansformat ion. 
1 Just as it is difficult to imagine an affirmative response from the black proletariat in South Africa to 
Foucau lt 's "[b[ut couldn ' t everyone's life become a work of art?" (Foucault 1984: 350). it is likewise 
difficult to see how Foucau lt's complementary strategy of dissolv ing the limits of discursive thought 
and its ord inary modes of experience through transgressive physical experiences (epreuves) might be 
useful to the politically oppressed, to whom Foucault 's advocation of sadomasochistic sex and 
hallucinogenic drugs as "limit~experiences" would surely be incompatible with political resistance . 
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collapse of justice and law in legal thinking: although it envisages a separation 
betv.reen what is legal and what is just, it also manages to conflate the two, reducing 
the discourse of justice to the discourse of law (Douzinas and Warrington 1994b: 
412), reflected in Brown 's fonnulation of justice set out above. Justice becomes 
nothing more than law. Critical theories of law - Realism, Critical Legal Studies, 
feminism, race theory - have demystified the positivist mentality of neutrality in law: 
law cannot be apolitical or amoral because it so clearly represents a dominant view, 
the colonisers over the colonised, the oppressors over the oppressed. However, a 
distinction can be made between these theories, whose major concern has been 
internal critique, the politics of positive law (which often contains arguments 
concerning the foundations of the legal system, for example, that constitutional 
supremacy has a greater potential to realise justice than parliamentary sovereignty), 
and the postmodern legal space, which has been labelled the "jurisprudence of 
idenlity" (Douzinas and Warrington 1994b: 412) and which denies the possibility of 
foundations altogether. This postmodem jurisprudence is partly metadiscursive, not 
only about the nature of law, but also about the way in which discourses of law and 
legal theory shape our understanding of law. More radically, though, it is concerned 
with absolute olherness or alterity as the focal point for an ethical understanding of 
law and justice. Derrida maintains that law is an element of the process which is 
calculable, while justice is incalculable. Justice cannot simply be enshrined in a rule, 
because it demands a relation to the other, not just an appropriation of it; justice is 
Ihoroughly particular (Derrida I 992a). 
Derrida develops a concept of justice that relates and contrasts positive law, 
and more particularly the concrete rules of law with the transcendent (or quasi-
transcendent) mystery of justice. But before examining Derrida's work on law and 
justice, a synopsis of Derrida's deconstructive method, with which it is inextricably 
bound, is required and follows hereafter. Having extended Saussure's structuralist 
insight by claiming that words signify relationally, Derrida concludes that meaning is 
never full y present and enclosed within rigid boundaries, since each term leaves 
"traces" in related terms. Accordingly meaning is diffuse, "disseminated", open-
ended. All terms get their meaning by "differing" from other terms, so meaning is 
always "d~ferred" (a play on the terms "differ"/"defer" (Derrida 1982)). As a result, 
meaning is always in flux or "play": "Essentially and lawfully, every concept is 
inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other 
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concepts, by means oflhe systematic play of differences" (Derrida 1982:1). There can 
be no closure to a text (defined broadly, to include, for example, the "text" of Western 
philosophy). Instead of closure there is " intertextuality" in which texts refer to other 
texts; hence Derrida's famous dictum that " there is nothing outside of the text" 
(Derrida 1976: 15&). Derrida condemns the belief that the full meaning of a term can 
ever be fully present. enclosed and mastered. which he terms " the metaphysics of 
presence", Dcrrida uses the term "logoccmricism" to describe the Western tradition's 
obsession with the metaphysics of presence, the idea that the Truth can be grasped 
completely by naming it with the correct terminology, a tern) which accurately 
describes the modem approach to constitutionalism (Derrida 1976: 10-15). He 
characterises logocentricism as the search for a "transcendental signified" , an absolute 
end point where meaning is fully determined forever. Against this, Derrida argues that 
any closure achieved is fallible, temporary and constructed and therefore 
"deconstructible·'. Also, terms are "iterable"; they can appear repeatedly in different 
contexts giving ri se to new meanings (hence the difference in the meaning of "man" 
in "humankind", "manhood" and "manly"). Derrida argues that the logocentric project 
of searching for the transcendental signified is involved whenever a theory is 
constructed around rigid hierarchies and binary oppositions such as subject/object, 
male/female. speech/writing, rational/irrational and so on. Since most , if not all , 
theories are constructed on the basis of these opposing concepts, such theories or texts 
may be deconstructed, read against themselves to challenge their structural 
hierarchies because 
we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence [of binary terms] but rather 
with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other ... or has the 
upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all is to overturn the 
hierarchy at any given moment. (Derrida 19& I: 72) 
In Force of Law: The ··Mystical Foundations of Authority" ( 1992a), Derrida defends 
deconstruction against the charge that it is indifferent to political and ethical issues, 
particularly justice. Unlike positivist jurisprudence, which errs by conflating positive 
law with justice. deconstruction views justice as being beyond the legal system, 
something apart from the rights and remedies avai lab le under the existing legal 
system. Justice is an ethical relation that cannot be fully encoded in the form of 
statutes. rules and legal precedents. What requires to be determined is whether the 
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rule of law as previously defined (the constraining of judges' adjudicative activity by 
authoritative sources of law such as statutes and common law precedents) IS 
completely incompatible with Derrida' s theory of law and justice and, if 
incompatible, whether a new formulation of the rule of law could meaningfully be 
advanced instead of abandoning the doctrine altogether. 
Justice. for Derrida. is the aporetic duty to recognise and treat the other on the 
other' s terms, even though this demand is "incalculable", excessive and infinite and 
so incapable of fulfilment. This ··call for justice" (Derrida 1992a: 16) in the face of the 
other has Levinasian overtones, a debt which Derrida acknowledges on the issues of 
the infinity and incalculability of the debt to the other. In contrast to justice, positive 
law is a system of rules, which is used in the process of calculating the legal merits of 
competing claims, the particularities of which are subsumed under general rules. 
Derrida follows Pascal (himself following Montaigne) in the notion that the legal 
system is founded not upon reason or justice but upon an interpretative act of 
violence. Montaigne recognised that law is nomos (convention) and hence derives 
from custom, whose grounds are invisible. It may be asked of any particular law, what 
its authorisation is. It may be answered: "The Constitution", which leads to the 
rejoinder "What is the authority for the Constitution?", and so commences an infinite 
regress, as the chain of authority is followed backwards in time. It must finally be 
admitted that law is based on nothing other than custom. The founding law (for 
instance the South African Constitution) is merely a construct installed by an act of 
violence. Law is self-grounding in that it arises by means of an "autobiographical 
fiction", a perfonnative act which is a "coup de force" (Dcrrida 1992a: 13). The 
Constitution, as legitimator of all laws, cannot itself be lega lly legitimated: it is 
neither legal nor illegal, rather it is extra-legal, which is to say, in the South African 
case, that there was no legal authority for the constitutional negotiations which took 
place between 1989 and 1994, within the historically specific domain formed by the 
prevalent relations of power. Rather, the Constitution came about as a resolution to 
the longstanding and violent struggle for political power between opposing political 
forces. Derrida has pointed out elsewhere that there is a tendency for the creative 
establishing act to be forgotten, so that a higher moral justification (God, reason, 
natural law) is thought to ground the state and the law within it. This may constitute a 
failure to realise that law is groundless (or self-validating) and self-perpetuating 
(Derrida I 992b: 191-94). As a result there is an illegitimate tendency to collapse 
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justice into positive law. Law' s foundation is groundless and "mystical": "Here the 
discourse comes up against its limit: in itself, in its performative power itself. It is 
what I here propose to call mystical. Here a si lence is walled up in a violent structure 
of the founding act" (Derrida 1992a: 14). There is no point at which justice has been 
reached and so a judgement can never be said to be just. Justice is an aporia, an 
"experience of the impossible" (Derrida 1992a: 16) against which the legal system 
may be measured. 
Just ice can never be fully served by judging in accordance wi th existing rules 
of law. since such a decision wi ll fail to observe the demands of the other. However, 
this does not mean that existing law must simply be disregarded; rather, law and 
justice converge at the moment of judgement in an impossible anempt to translate the 
infinity of justice into the finity of law. Justice is experienced as the negotiation of 
three aporias, subsets of the aporetic impossib.ility of facilitating justice in accordance 
with positive law. The first aporia is the "ephokhe of the rule" (Derrida 1992a: 22). 
which arises because a judge must follow the law in accordance with precedent but 
must also be free to decide each case on its own merits and so to reject precedents, to 
suspend rules which restrict the judges choice to decide justly. Consider by way of 
example whether two provisions of the interim Constitution' s bill of rights, section 9, 
which provides for the right of every person to life, and section 11(2) which provides 
that no person shall suffer "cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment", render a 
statutory provision pennitting the death penalty unconstitutional. In fact, these 
provisions could be interpreted ei ther way, depending on the interpretation that the 
deciding court places on the provisions in question.88 But whichever way the court 
interprets, such an interpretation, if it is legally correct, will be an interpretation of the 
words in the two provisions. Two judges who make contrary decisions on this issue 
will nevertheless both be following the same rules , As Derrida argues: 
To be just, the decision of a judge, for example, must not only fol low a rule of 
law or a general law but must also assume it, approve it, confinn its value, by 
a reinstituting act of interpretation, as if nothing previously existed of the law, 
as if the judge himself invented the law in every case, (Derrida 1992a: 23) 
88 The Constitutional Coun decided the question of the constitutionali£), of the death penalty in S v 
Makwanyane and another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), interpreting these const itutional provisions as 
being contradictory to the death penal£),. I ana lyse this judgement in some detail below. 
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A fresh interpretation is required in every case because every case is different and 
cannot be subsumed under the generality of an existing rule. Law is contingent and 
particular, not general: 
Contingency is the limit of legal j udgement and the limit of its reason. While 
contingency may be subject to laws it must always escape legality. The 
contingent is particular: it is accident or change ... and its reason is finite , 
mutable and only ever probable. (Goodrich et al 1994: 1) 
The constitutional provisions referred to only defer the question of justice, in the 
sense that the constitution was itself, in a sense. t~e outcome of a litigation between 
two parties, an "out of court" senlement in the face of increasingly costly 
proceedings. The Constitution is based on nothing other than the violence of 
resolution as opposed to justice. Just as the constitution constituted a choice based on 
historical contingency. so justice is deferred to particular interpretations of it, 
endlessly deferred. It is perhaps possible to say that rules are determinate without 
determining any particular decision, since it is in the interpretation of the rule at the 
moment of decision that justice and the law come together. 
The second aporia is "the ghost of the undecidable" (Derrida 1992a: 24). 
Legal judgement involves dividing an issue (legal/illegal, right/wrong) on the basis of 
learning, reading, understanding and interpreting a rule and a calculation, a weighing-
up of competing outcomes. There is undecidability between two or more possible 
significations or two or more contradictory and determinate rules, but also because 
there must be a bridging of the gap between justice - infinite, incalculable and 
without rules - and law, which is finite, contingent and rule-bound: "they are two but 
they are one ... law must be inspired by justice, it is part of its concept, and justice 
must command the production of determined laws" (Derrida 1999a: 284). Since 
justice resists formulas, no particular form of law can be just. Nevertheless. a 
judgement is called for. 
The third aporia is "the urgency that obstructs the horizon of knowlededge". 
Justice is required immediately at the moment of dispute. and whilst judgement takes 
place on the basis of a calculated determination, in order for justice to be rendered the 
decision would need to be based on infinite information and unlimited knowledge. 
Since time is constrained. deliberation must be interrupted and the decision wil l 
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always be premature. Derrida quotes Kierkegaard: "The instant of decision is a 
madness" (Derrida 1992a: 26), a "leap into the decision" (Derrida I 999a: 281). 
Deconslruction, Derrida assures , is emancipatory : 
each advance in poiiticization obliges one to reconsider and so to reinterpret 
the very foundations of law such as they had been previously been calculated 
or delimited ... Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical 
emancipatory ideal. We cannot attempt to disqualify it today, whether crudely 
or with sophisticat ion, at least not without treating it too lightly and fonning 
the worst compl icities. (Derrida 1992a: 28) 
The deconstructive project becomes to "reinterpret the foundations of law"; 
justice will involve focusing attention on the limits of given discourses, or language 
games and is as such concerned with negotiating the being of an age (Comell 1992a). 
By permitting the voices of the marginal and by exposing the subordinations of the 
unheard, one is better poised to determine present discursive limits and to expose new 
horizons of justice. The law can be changed so that its foundati ons more adequate ly 
reflect the demands of j ustice. This is evident in South Africa: with the passing of the 
Statute of Westminster in 1931 , the South African parliament became sovereign, a 
development described as "a revolutionary break with the past, with [colonial] 
subordination" (Hahlo and Kahn 1960: 150). Under the Westminster constitution, 
successive South African governments facilitated, through the sovereignty of 
parliament, the disenfranchisement of the majority and the opprobrious policies of 
apartheid. Parliamentary sovereignty continued to operate until the demise of the 
tricameral constitut ion and the inception of the interim Constitution and later the final 
constitution. First, the sloughing off of colonial domination, then the abolition of 
apartheid. Derrida says of South African constitutionalism: "there is a history of law 
and hopefully progress ... I think that the abolition of Apartheid is, of course, not the 
end of things, but the beginning of something else, a process, an endless process" 
(Derrida 1999a: 284). Moreover: 
it is in the name of justice that you are improving your constitution, and it is 
because these constitutions are inadequate to justice that you will have to 
improve them, to adjust them to the social progress of this country [South 
Africa). (Derrida 1999a: 284) 
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South Africa is for Derrida. an example of a country that produces constitutions, 
legislation and judicial precedents, and, aware of residual injustice in each, revises 
them, to exorcise them of racism and inequality, in furtherance of justice. The law is 
constantly being deconstructed. There is "a deconstructive force - which compels 
you, compels us, to adjust the law, adjust the constitution, to do justice, to experience 
the infinite gap" (Derrida 1 999a: 285). Decisions are made and constitutions are 
constructed in the name of justice. 
Lyorard 
Lyotard agrees that the application of justice is thoroughly particular. The 
breakdown of grand narratives and the failure of bureaucratic capitalism has resulted 
in a "legitimation crisis" in relation to the universalising discourses of modernity such 
as law, which has left in its wake a diffuse and complex web of small narratives, or 
language games as Lyotard (following Wittgenstein) terms them. Like Derrida. he 
insists that subjectivity is constructed by and through discourse. The individual is 
constructed by her participation in these language games.89 Each of these games has 
its own set of rules and its own concept of justice and no set of rules ought to apply 
beyond the scope of its own local game.90 We might say for instance that apartheid 
constitutes one language game and liberal democracy of post-apanheid South Africa 
another, and that each have their own rules (Lenta 2000). Justice is local and 
imminent within each game and there is no transcendental principle of justice that 
applies to all language games all of the time. Rather than a single hegemonic principle 
of justice (such as the Rawlsian decision procedure) we should instead embrace the 
idea of a "multiplicity of justices. each one of them defined in relation to the rules 
specific to each game" (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985: 100). Paradoxically, however, the 
multiplicity of language games is ensured by a single overarching principle of justice. 
which operates as a referee to ensure that no single principle of justice is hegemonic: 
' ·And the justice of multiplicity: it is assured paradoxically by a principle of universal 
value. It prescribes the singular justice of each game" (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985: 
19 There are many diffcrenl language games - a heterogeneity of elements. They on ly give rise to 
institutions in patches - local determinism ... Each of us lives the intersection of many of these." 
(Lyotard 1984: xxiv) 
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100). This prescription is paradoxical since Lyotard has already denied that there is a 
metadiscourse covering all language games.91 In view of the above, it is difficult to 
imagine him approving of any state legal system (which he would view as a 
metadiscursive or metalinguistic dictatorship) except perhaps if its laws were so 
minimalist that the only universal law was that of the multitude of language games. 
The modem approach, exemplified by Kant and Rousseau, relies on a grand 
narrative of autonomous subjects freely reaching consensus in a social contract. 
Lyotard rejects this approach on the grounds that people are not free and autonomous 
but are instead detennined by the narratives in which they are situated.92 Accordingly, 
:'[t]his implies the very opposite of autonomy: heteronomy ... It also implies that it is 
not true that a people can never give itself its own institutions" (Lyotard and Thebaud 
1985: 34) Indi viduals (judges for instance) are free to make changes within the 
context of their narratives, but are not autonomous in the sense that they could "step 
out" of their narratives to create institutions independently of the language games in 
which they are situated, simply through the use of their reason. Importantly, Lyotard 
observes that justice consists in "working at the limits of what the rules permit, in 
order to invent new moves, perhaps new rules and therefore new games" (Lyotard and 
Thebaud 1985: 100). Deconstruction is also exactly about working at the limits 
(Derrida would say "margins") of what the rules permit, to determine possibilities 
which exist in discourse. so that these possibi lities may be articulated in the name of 
justice. 
Justice does not revolve around issues of truth and reason for Lyotard and so 
choice must rather be based on opinion. Since there are no grounds for jUdging, 
Lyotard concludes that when a person makes a normative judgement, she judges 
without criteria. This is so because the prescriptive and the descriptive constitute 
different orders of discourse, and the prescriptive cannot be deri ved from the 
90 Some postmodemists have argued that the modem regulatory state has become dysfunctional by 
interfe ring with or dominating the functioning of other subsystems or language games (Luhman 1986: 
Lyotard 1984). 
91 The paradox is acknow ledged in Lyotard 's laughter at his new role as " the great prescriber" (Lyotard 
and Thebaud 1985: 100). 
92 Lyotard compares people in society to members of the Amazonian Casinahua tribe, whose lives are 
framed by shared narratives. The teller of the narrative reveals his name on ly after the end of the story, 
so that the story comes before the individual ; the self is constituted as a product of the collective ly 
shared narrative. This is also true today, where television news reporters give their names at the end of 
the report. 
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descriptive.93 For example, the prescriptive claim that "the death penalty ought to be 
enforced" does not follow from the descriptive claim that "the death penalty has the 
assent of the people" .94 There is no overarching principle of justice and so, like 
Derrida, Lyotard concludes that decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis. The 
idea that there are no criteria for justice. does not mean that there are no rules 
however. For Derrida. there are existing rules, but these are not criteria for justice; 
these ru les need to be interpreted afresh for each new decision. Likewise Lyotard 
admits that there are existing rules which regulate language games, but that justice 
consists in inventing new moves, new rules and new games. Western philosophy 
consists of a multitude of rules developed over centuries, many of which are 
contradictory. Lyotard 's selective appropriation of certain rules over others (parts of 
Aristotle ' s theory of judgement, Kant 's aesthetics and Levinas' ethics) and the 
appearance of those rules, modified and in new combination, suggests that he has 
made use of rules - although the rules Lyotard relies on do not lead inevitably to his 
conclusions. Lyotard 's conclusions are surely the result of a judgement leading from 
the existing rules in the text of Western philosophy. Accordingly, in positive law there 
are rules and prescriptions, but on their own these rules are insufficient to provide 
justice. For both Lyotard and Derrida, although there exist discursive rules, there are 
no rules re lating to the use of discursive rules which would lead to justice. This is 
because justice does not only come from rules. but from an ethical confrontation with 
the other. As Derrida says, "justice exceeds law and calculation" (Derrida 1992a: 28). 
For Lyotard, positions are ungrounded, lacking in justification: the different positions 
must battle it out in "agonistics" against other positions. It is for this reason that the 
giving of reasons by judges is so important; it enables the dialectic of opinion to 
continue. 
If there IS no overarching principle, then on what ethical grounds can a 
decision be made? Lyotard, following Levinas (as Derrida does), suggests that the 
individual is the addressee of a prescription, without knowing the source of the 
obligation. We experience an imperative "Be just!", a call to do justice to the 'other' 
'l I think Lyotard is rather too positivist about this. John Searle ( 1964) argues that strict adherence to 
the separation of the descriptive and the prescriptive is wrongheaded since prescriptive phrases are not 
arrived at by logical infe rence but by custom. 
94 The issue of majoritarianism versus justice arose in S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR. 
where the coun rejected an argument that public opinion was dispositive of the issue. The coun, 
following Acting Justice Kentridge. held at paragraph 200 that it "would be abdicating from its 
constitutional function [if it were] simply to refer to public opinion". 
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which cannot be grounded in a descriptive claim. The obligation is "contentless": it 
does not provide criteria or subjective grounds for our choices but simply tells us that 
we must decide. ludgement must be exercised not through reason, but through 
opinion guided by an ethical commitment to do justice to the other.95 
In The Differend (1988), Lyotard retains the idea of a multiplicity of language 
games advocating incommensurate political solutions, such as apartheid or liberal 
democracy. There is no overlapping consensus for choosing between these language 
games. Within and between these language games there is little rational dialogue, hut 
rather "agonistics", a kind of verbal jousting. Differing conceptions of justice, local to 
each language game, are heterogenous, so that the hegemony of one version over 
another will lead to the silencing of the party dominated by the controlling narrative. 
Once one rejects any reasoned appeal to a consensus of truth-seeking interests in the 
socio-political sphere, (on the basis that such notions belong to an outmoded -
'enlightenment I - metanarrative of reason, progress and truth), it is not at all 
farfetched to suggest that in South Africa, apartheid and the liberal democracy that 
has followed it constitute two disparate language games, with heterogenous 
conceptions of justice. The apartheid legal system, a positivist legal framework 
underpinned by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, required the judiciary to 
interpret and apply statutes and not to question its authority. This system served as a 
normative political tool to further a Social Darwinist vision of justice based on racial 
subjugation. In the post-apartheid Constitutional legality, it is the Constitution (or 
more accurately the constitutional court), rather than parliament, that is supreme,96 
with the judicial review of the constitutional court determining the constitutionality of 
legislation through the liberal discourse of rights. 
Lyotard is careful to point out the danger that consists in denying an individual 
a forum and/or a language in order either to voice a grievance or to defend a claim 
that a grievance has been commined. For example, the wrong perpetrated against 
people of colour in South Africa during apartheid does not merely consist in the fact 
of segregation and systematic (and often violent) oppression, which constitutes 
violation under the law, but also in the fact that legal discourse denied victims the 
95 "There is no politics of reason. neither in the sense of a totalizing reason nor in that of a concept. 
And so we must make do with a politics of opin ion ." (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985 : 82) 
96 Constitutional supremacy is estab lished by section 4 of the interim Constitution which provides as 
follows: "This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act inconsistent 
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words in which to express their claims. Victims were excluded from having a voice 
that could be heard on tenns which the system would understand. Lyotard describes 
the case of a differend as "the case where a plaintiff is divested of the means to argue 
and becomes for that reason a victim" (Lyotard 1988: 9). This is not a comprehensive 
definition, however. since a defendant could just as easily he denied a means to argue. 
Therefore: "3 differend would be a case of conflict, between at least two parties, that 
cannot be equitabl y resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable 10 both 
parlies" (Lyotard 1988: 9 emphasis added). A differend must be distinguished from a 
litigation which is a dispute occurring between individuals participating in the same 
game of justice, so that damages can be proved or' disproved in a litigation under law. 
Where there is a dispute involving two heterogenous concepts of justice, the differend 
is silent because it cannot be recognised (as law reduces the differend to a kind of 
mute silence because it cannot be recognised by those who caused it to exist in the 
first place). The possibility of such a differend arose in the context of South Africa' s 
political transition, in the question of whether and to what extent the apartheid 
government and its agents could be held accountable for acts committed in pursuance 
of a conception of justice radically at odds with that of the successor regime. The 
prosecution of perpetrators of apartheid atrocities in accordance with the discourse of 
human rights constitutes the domination of one game by another. For Lyotard the 
task is to voice the differend, to find its elusive formulation and to encapsulate it in 
words: 
In the differend, something "asks" to be put into phrases, and suffers from the 
wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away ... This state includes 
silence, which is a negative phrase but it also calls upon phrases which are in 
principle possible. (Lyotard 1988: 13) 
The quest is to give voice to the silenced claims of the oppressed and marginalised. 
However, without criteria and with only the prescription to preserve the purity of each 
game. how is judgement to be conceived? Lyotard relies on Kant 's notion of the 
reflective judgement, where a particular representation seems to evade criteria and 
categories, sending the mind into a free play of faculties, where the imagination and 
understanding attempt to bring order to the experience. When the Sublime is 
with its provision shall , unless otherwise provided express ly or by necessary implication in this 
Const itution , be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency." 
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experienced there is a feeling that cannot be easily put into words. The feelings 
triggered in the reflective judgement are subjective. but they can also be held in 
common by an idealised community of people who can compare judgements with 
each other. Maners of taste cannot be formulated by a determinate standard, but one 
can still discuss aesthetics in the absence of objective criteria. Lyotard's aesthetic 
conception of judgement seems far removed from the law and politics,97 
There are many differences between Lyotard 's and Derrida' s formulation of 
justice and its relationship to positive law. Derrida thinks that the rules of positive law 
may be used to pursue justice (although the two will never reach equivalence), whilst 
Lyotard 's irreducible pluralism is disparaging of positive law's pretensions as a 
metadiscourse: "'justice' ... can only be in spi te of the law" (Lyotard 1988: 30).98 In 
liberal legality, claims are assessed by a supreme "tribunal" in relation to whether 
damnum is to be permitted to becoJ!le injuria. The determination takes place in a 
discourse of rights, in which "right" is that which is prior to the good, the universal 
which precedes and presides over contingent particularities. To translate all claims 
into the language of rights is already to have performed an act of reduction and to 
have affirmed the authority of this discourse to contain all other phrases; hence the 
differend, where the discourse of the other is excluded. Whereas for Lyotard, the 
challenge is to "activate the differences" in order to produce an endless proliferation, 
rather than a selective refinement, of language games and visions of the just. 
1.3 The Rule of Law 
Nearly all commentators in the field of transitional studies assume that 
adherence to the doctrine of the rule of law is required for a successful transition to 
9J This concept has provoked the indignation of many posl-Kantians, particularly those with Hegelian, 
Marxist or rationalist lTaditions of thinking justice, who regard the posrmodernist and poststructuralist 
interest in the aesthetic as a metaphor for or supplement to politics as pointing as pointing to its lack of 
credentials, if not to its latent aestheticisation of politics. Herwitz (1999: 19) describes Lyotard 's 
politicisation of aesthetics as an "adulation of opacity .. . which is the object of overcapitalisation". 
Eagleton (1990: 398) comments on Lyotard 's argument as follows: "Thus suspended in vacant space, 
the prescriptive or political is left to the mercies of intuitionism, decision ism, consequential ism, 
sophistry and casuistry." 
91 Lyotard rejects in law the possibility that it can funher justice since he sees it as a metadiscourse that 
that acts as a tribunal for judging the claims of other language games. This is necessarily unjust since it 
imposes the justice of one language game upon others in violation of the 'multiplicity of justice'. 
Derrida observes, however, that such radical pluralism might lead to injustice: "one cannot, for all that, 
plead simply for plurality, for the mobility of screening places or of the subjects who occupy them. For 
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democracy (Kritz 1995; Mendez 1997; Teitel 1997; Orentlicher 1991 ; Halmai and 
Schepple 1997; McAdams 1997).99 The rule of law is depicted as an ideal which 
rei ntroduces and maintains order during the political turbulence of transition from 
prior oppressive and violent fule. loo The rule of law is often conflated with justice, 
inasmuch as without it transformation will be compromised by unfettered and 
obstreperous political and social pressures. Neil Kritz, for example, writes: 
The rule of law requires an independent judiciary isolated from political 
pressures. This generally means that judges are nOl removable from their 
posts. Even if judges were easi ly purged, it might take years to train a 
qual ified class of new lawyers and judges to replace them on the bench. (Kritz 
1995 : xxv-xxvi) 
In what follows, I investigate the doctrine of the rule oflaw to determine whether it is 
compatible with the transitional jurisprudence as I defined it in Chapter One and 
specifically whether it is compatible with the postmodern theories of law and justice 
that I have discussed in the previous sect ions of this chapter. It is my concern to reject 
the idea of the rule of law as "antipolitics", which although setting the law at a 
remove from the immoral political values of apartheid, also removes the law from the 
values required not only to change the law, but also society in general. I want to 
suggest that the rule of law cannot be set apart from political values, so that all that 
remains to be decided is which values to incorporate. I agree with Dyzenhaus that 
"[t)he idea that the ru le of law can be conceived as anti poli tics is then thrown into 
question because the choice of conceptions of the rule of law for South African judges 
during apartheid was so obviously a political one" (Dyzenhaus 1998: 22). 1 shall 
argue that the concept of the rule of law as antipoltics only makes sense within the 
positivist approach. 
The notion of the rule of law is at the core of modem political self-
understanding and has its genesis in ancient Greece, thereby implicating much of the 
Western tradition of legal and political philosophy. The antimony between justice and 
certain socio-economic forces might once again take advantage of the marginalisations and this 
absence of general form" (Derrida 1992c: 99, 100, emphasis in original). 
99 By trans itional studies, I mean the study of and theoretical contribution to debates surrounding the 
~estion of successor justice as I have defined it in chapter one. 
1 The rule of law is one of the 'founding values' in chapter one of the fina l Constitution. Section I 
reads: "The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following 
values: ... (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law". The sections that follow might be 
viewed as an anempt 10 provide ajust interpretation of "the rule of law" as it appears in this provision. 
64 
the rule of law are evident in the contrasting visions of political order in Plato's 
writings. In Plato's Republic, justice is realised in the rule of philosopher-kings. 
however in Plato's Laws a rule-governed society is presented. The rule of law was 
later to emerge as a mainstay of liberalism. 
The idea of the rule of law is that the substance and application of the law 
should meet certain standards. At its most basic level , it refers to rule by law rather 
than force; agents of the state must act in accordance with the law. However, the rule 
of law was also extended to include obedience of subjects. which has often been used 
to justify absolute obedience to the state and the limitless authority of the state to 
eliminate disobedience. Traditionally the rule of law has been linked to the ideas of 
due process, procedural justice and legal formality, all of which refer to the idea that 
justice should meet certain procedural requirements so that the individual is able to 
obey the law. For John Locke, an early e,:,ponent of the rule of law, the chief 
advantage of civil society over the state of nature is the assurance of "established, 
settled, known law", applied by a judge who is both "known and indifferent", who 
does not produce judgements that are "varied in particular cases, but to have one rule 
for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough (Locke 
1980: 75). 
In liberal democracies in ordinary times, the ru le of law entails that the actions 
of government in general and judges in particular are constrained by authoritative 
sources of law such as statutes and common law precedents. 10] F.A. Hayek writes that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how 
the authority will use its ... powers in given circumstances and to plan one's 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. (Hayek 1944: 72) 
Hayek argues that the focus of the rule of law on procedural rather than the 
substantive justice keeps state interference to a minimum so as to enable individuals 
101 Margaret Jane Radin describes the philosophical underpinning of modem approaches to the rule of 
law as consisting of the following assumptions: 
(I) law consists of rules; (2) rules are prior to particular cases, more general than particular 
cases, and applied to particular cases; (3) law is instrumental (the rules are applied to achieve 
ends); (4) there is a radical separation between government and citizens (there are rule givers 
and appliers, versus rule-takers and compliers) (5) the person [applying the rules] is a rational 
chooser ordering her affairs instrumentally . (Radin 1989: 792) 
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to make private economic decisions in accordance with capitalist efficiency. The rule 
of law requires that legislation do no more than provide a fannal framework for 
private initiatives, and it is most vulnerable when the welfare or socialist state 
threatens to "engulf the private sphere". For Hayek, the redistribution of wealth 
requires discretionary powers on the part of the government which makes for 
arbi trariness in the law (Hayek 1960: 214-216). 
In the eighteenth century, particularly in the work on Montesquieu, the rule-
governed nature of legis lative authority was enhanced through the separation of the 
powers of government into the legislative. executive and judicial branches. In the 
nineteenth century the linkage of the rule of law doctrine with the separation of 
powers found its most influential expression in A.V. Dicey's An introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution. in which it was argued that the rule of law was 
dependent on the guaranteed autonomy of the judiciary. 102 
Does the rule of law's emphasis on the formal and procedural conflate justice 
with form and procedure and play into the hands of positivists? Or can the rule of law 
incorporate a substantive idea of justice? Objections to the rule of law have been 
raised on the basis of the ideological role played by procedural justice. On this view, 
procedural justice is not only protected at the expense of substantive justice but 
provides an ideological justification for it. I raised this objection in my earlier critique 
of positivism. The rule of law, proclaiming the morality of procedures, thereby 
occludes (or at least sutures) the inclusion of substantive morality (Sypnowich 1999: 
183). Certain positivists, Hobbes for example, emphasised the procedure and 
fonnality of the rule of law to such a degree that the notion is not regarded as setting 
out standards for the law to meet, but as the standard imposed by law that, regardless 
of moraJ content, individuals must obey. Such authoritarian versions of positivism 
have been displaced in the more recent formulations of Hart and Raz, who permit the 
intrusion of morality on an exceptional basis; nonetheless, the positivist idea that law 
is empty of any necessary moral content remains. Indeed, Justice Scalia of the United 
States Supreme Court uncompromisingly suggests that .. there are times when even a 
bad rule is bener than no rule at all" (Sealia 1989.: 1179). 
102 Dicey, a dogmatic positivist contended th at members of parliament are not by nature outrageous 
people who would abuse their posit ion and noted further that outrageous laws would not be obeyed in 
any event (Mootz 1993: 275), all of which is completely contradicted by the apartheid experience. 
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The application of the rule of law doctrine during a period of radical political 
change raises dilemmas. During this period South African society struggles to 
transform its political, legal and economic systems, while at the same time 
legitimating its exercise of state power through adherence to existing rules of law. The 
recent history of newly liberal and democratic societies like South Africa shows that 
adherence to the rule of law can facilitate general domination through positivist 
commitment to a theory of adjudication mandating the mechanical application of 
determinate rules of law to particular cases. But if the rule of law requires adherence 
to settled law, to what exteIll are periods of transition compatible with the rule of law? 
In such periods what does the rule of law mean? Part ofliberalism's answer is to draw 
a line under apartheid legality at the inception of the Constitution. IOJ However, the 
rule of law requires observance of previous rules, created and utilised under apartheid 
for illiberal purposes, many of which ~onstitute South Africa's common law. Here the 
value of legal change is in tension with the value of adherence to settled precedent. 104 
The interim Constitution, unlicensed by the rules of the previous system is contrary to 
the rule of law, whilst, paradoxically, liberal legality revives the doctrine for its own 
political ends. 
The tension between the rule of law's adherence to rules created in the past 
and the requirement of a break with the past is exemplified in a debate between E.P. 
Thompson and Morton J. Horwitz. Despite conceding on one hand that law serves as 
an instrument of domination and in a more particular Marxist vein, that it reinforces 
class relations, Thompson argued famously that if the rule of law is to have an 
ideological function, camouflaging substantive injustice, it must be seen to, and 
therefore must actually, further values which are in fact valuable and which are 
capable of being realised in however partial a fonn. Thompson argued that law 
103 Although it would be a mistake to regard South African liberalism as viewing the interim 
Constitution as closing the door on the past. Contrarily, the interim Constitution is intended to provide 
"an historic bridge" which promises to span the temporal gap between apartheid and the country's 
increasingly uneasy celebration of its newness. Indeed if the constitution is to act as a barrier to the 
evi ls of the past. then it is a ··porous or rather chiasmalically invaginated temporal frontier" (Dawes 
1997, 10). 
1(1.1 The ideal of the rule of law as legal continuity is captured by the principle of stare deCisis, a 
predicate of adjudication in Ihe Roman-Dutch legal system which continues 10 be applied. The duty to 
follow precedent continues 10 apply under Constitutional legality and was reiterated in Shabalala v 
Attorney-General of Transvaal 1994 (6) BCLR85 (T) 95 C-E. Liberal judges during apartheid found 
the rule of law frustrated their efforts to provide justice. In Nxasana v Minister of Jus/ice and another 
1976 (3) SA 745 (D), Judge Didcott lamented: "Under a constitution like ours, Parliament is sovereign 
... Our courts are constitutionally powerless to legislate or veto legislation. They can only interpret it 
and then implement it in accordance with the interpretation of it" (at 747G). 
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mediated against class domination through legal forms, common law rights, which 
could be utilised by the working class against the ruling class. Consequently 
Thompson concluded that "the notion of the rule of law is itself an unqualified good" 
(Thompson 1975: 267).'05 In reply, Horwitz argued that the rule of law thwarts social 
change: 
I do not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as 'an 
unqualified human good ' ! It undoubtedly restrains power but it also restrains 
power's benevolent exercise ... [I]t ratifies and legitimates an atomistic 
conception of human relations. (Horwitz 1977: 566) 
In order to determine the worth of the rule of law doctrine to South Africa's 
transformatory aspirations. it is necessary to examine various formulations of the rule 
of law with a view to establishing a progressive formulation. 
During apanheid the judiciary followed a ' thin ' version of the rule of law, 
equivalent with the principle of legality. This positivist formulation demands clear 
and fixed rules and strives to maintain a sharp demarcation of the judicial and 
legislative authority. This is not so much an amoral stance as a moral position that 
defends a legalism of strictly rule-bound adjudication as the most morally defensible 
account of the judicial function. It celebrates the systemic virtues of regularity, 
predictability and certainty over concerns with substantive values. It argues that the 
rule of law should be understood as being about the application of rules and that all 
that is required is conformity with past decisions. The role of the judges in upholding 
the rule of law involved ensuring that officials who implement a statute do so in 
accordance with the legislator' s intention as set out in the public record (Dyzenhaus 
to, There have been examples in South African legal history both prior to and during apartheid of the 
courts reaching the most just of the possible decisions open to them. In the 1920 Appellate Division 
case, Dadoo. Lld v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530, the issue to be decided was whether 
an Indian could evade a statutory provision in an 1885 law of the Transvaa l legislature prohibiting 
Indians from owning property in the Transvaal. The majority of the court held that Dadoo 's device for 
evading the prohibition , fonning a private company to own land, was legitimate. Chief Justice Innes 
held : " It is a wholesome rule of our law which requires a strict construction to be placed upon statutory 
provisions which interfere with elementary rights. And it should be applied not only in interpreting a 
doubtful phrase. but in ascertaining the intent of the law as a whole" (p552). Moreover, the constitution 
of the rule of law as legality has resulted in a judicial prevention of the legislature from circumventing 
fonnal legal processes - to substantive effect. In Harris and Others v Minister of the Interior and 
Another 1952 (2) SA 428 (A), the Appellate Division held that parliament had failed to legislate in 
accordance with the formal processes prescribed in the South Africa Act of 1909. (At issue was the 
attempt by the National Government to remove coloured persons from the common voters' role by 
enacting a statute by a simple majori ty at separate sittings when the South Africa Act required a special 
procedure for such a removal). 
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1991: 57; 1998: 16,17). Under this conception of the rule of law it is possible, as in 
apartheid South Africa, for the legal system to comply with the rule of law and still be 
undemocratic and unjust in general and in particular instances (Hutchinson 1999: 
199). 
Some formulations of positivism adopt 'thicker' versions of the rule of law. 
arguing that while rules and their objective and impartial application are crucial, law 
consists of more than rules. On this account, the existence of pre-announced, 
objectively knowable and impartially applied rules must be supplemented by a 
substanti ve account of justice. Forjurists such as Dworkin, behind and within rules is 
a political morality that guides and constrains judges. The primary task of j udges is to 
detect and cultivate the politico-moral principles which are to animate legal rules. 
Accordingly, judges are authorised to deal with substantive values, but only provided 
that they do so in a neutral and objective way, which separates the personal and the 
political: " law .. . is deeply and thoroughly political ... but [it is] not a maner of 
personal or partisan politics" (Dworkin 1984: 146). 
Positivists, whether committed to a ' thin' or ' thicker ' version of the rule of 
law. generally adhere to the formalist belief that "rules can rule" in the sense that 
legal reasoning is a sufficiently detached and determinate enterprise which is 
capable of generating correct and predictable answers to social disputes in a 
way that marks it off in a non-trivial and meaningful sense, from open-ended 
political wrangling ... [since] without adequate determinacy in legal discourse, 
judicial arbitrariness will become the order of the day and adjudication will 
collapse into a series of ad hoc and unprincipled encounters. (Hutchinson 
1999: 200) 
It is my contention, however, that in justifying the exclusion of substantive morality 
from the adjudication process, positivists postulate a false antithesis: the mechanical 
application of determinate rules versus unprincipled anarchy , What is required is a 
formulation of the rule of law that provides for judges to have recourse to rules of 
law, whi le still taking into account substantive moral values; this is a formulation that 
is both procedural and ethical. It is with the intention of discovering or formulating 
such a version of the rule of law, that I return to postmodem theories of justice. 
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1.4 Postmodernism and the Rule of Law 
A feature of much postmodem legal thought, panicularly its poststructuralist variant, 
is its flat rejection of the rule of law. Many postmodem scholars view language as 
indeterminate and social practices as historically contingent. Consequently, it is 
sometimes concluded, there is no firm foundation upon which a theory of rule· 
governed behaviour can rest. The rule of law is seen as a casualty of postmodemism 
to the extent that it requires determinate objective rules that function as guides for 
insular and secure interpretative subjects (Mootz 1993: 251).106 In this section I 
examine whether it is necessarily the case that postmodemism requires the 
abandonment of the rule of law, or whether the rule of law can be salvaged (that is, 
reconceived in a way consonant with postmodem thought) by re-examining the 
operation of rules and rule-following. I again look to Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida 
for inspiration. 
Foucault conceives of the law as a discourse of domination and consequently 
cannot be said to be in favour of the rule of law: 
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives 
at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; 
humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds 
from domination to domination. (Foucault 1984: 85, emphasis added) 
Foucault's antipathy towards legal rules is echoed by certain Marxist and 
socialist critics and mare recently by the Critical Legal Studies movement, which no 
doubt derives its inspiration in part from Foucault. Allan Hutchinson, a critical legal 
scholar, argues: 
The Rule of Law is a sham; the esoteric and convoluted nature of the legal 
doctrine is an accommodating screen to obscure its indeterminacy and 
inescapable element of choice. Traditional lawyering is only a clumsy and 
repetitive series of boolstrap arguments and legal discourse is only a stylised 
version of political discourse. (Hutchinson 1989: 40) 
106 Mootz (1993) argues that the rule of law is compatible with postmodemism on the grounds that 
there is no conflict between Gadamerian henneneulics and the Rule of law. However, Gadamer's 
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Critical legal scholars conclude that while the ideal of a government of laws. not 
persons, has appeal . rules cannot and do not rule. They argue instead that the rule of 
law provides ideological cover for the fact that rules can never impose sufficient 
constraints on judges and that adjudication will always be an exercise in 
arbitrariness. I07 In other words , adjudication is more about reason in the service of 
power than power in the service of reason. On this account. rules do not constrain 
judicial decisions but merely provide "a variety of rationalisations that a judge may 
freely choose from" so that "the ultimate basis for a decision is social and political 
judgement" (Kairys 1984: 244-247). 
For Lyotard also, the rule of law fails in its ambitions to provide justice. Law's 
pretensions to be metadiscursive and to resolve competing but incommensurable 
claims fails. since there is always a remainder that could not be represented within the 
discourse of law: the differend. Lyotard observes: 
The plaintiff lodges his or her complaint before the tribunal, the accused 
argues in such a way as to show the inanity of the accusation. Litigation takes 
place. I would like to ca ll a differend [differend] the case where the plaintiff is 
divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim .. . A case 
of differend between two parties takes place when the " regulation" of the 
conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the panies while the 
wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom. (Lyotard 1988: 9) 
The case of a differend arises in law, where a legal tribunal forces the litigants to a 
dispute to recount their versions in accordance with the idiolect of the law, which can 
recognise the claims of one party only. Consequently: 
The victim does not have the legal means to bear witness to the wrong done to 
him or her. If he or she or his or her defender sees "justice done, " this can 
only be in spite of the law ... The justice which the victim calls upon against 
the justice of the tribunal cannot be unered in the juridical or forensic 
hermeneutics unacceptably contains vestiges of Enlightenment metaphysics; he is an historicised and 
es alitarian Hegelian . 
1 Duncan Kennedy argues: 
It is true that there is a distinctive lawyers' body ofknow)edge of the rules in force. It is true 
that there are distinctive lawyers' argumentative techniques for sponing gaps, conflicts and 
ambiguities in the rules, for arguing broad and narrow holdings of cases, and for generating 
pro and con policy arguments. But these are only argumentative techniques. There is never a 
"correct legal so lution" that is other than the correct ethical and political so lution to that 
problem. (Kennedy. quoted in Price 1989: 276) 
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discourse. But this is the genre in which the law is uttered. (Lyotard 1988: 30, 
emphasis added) 
In short, law's professed status as a metalanguage does violence to the heterogeneity 
of phrases and so cannot provide justice, which insists on a plurality of language 
games, with no language game dominating any other: a multiplicity of justices and the 
justice of multiplicity (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985: 100). [t is not that Lyotard has a 
problem with rules or rule-following; it is more that he insists that different rules 
apply to different language games and that rules from one language game should not 
dominate the rules of another language game. I08 
To summarise: both Foucault and Lyotard regard the rule of law as a form of 
domination. With Foucault, law is a discourse of domination, a vehicle for the 
operation of power alongside the disciplines, with their polymorphous technologies of 
power and form s of inst itutionalisation. For Lyotard, the rule of law is the domination 
by one language game Uuridical and forensic) of others, and so always involves the 
injustice of exclusion. And so we find ourselves between the scyJla of positivism's 
procedural and formal legality, with its denial of value and judicial agency at one 
extreme, and the charybdis of Foucault and Lyotard's resolute disavowal of the rule of 
law as a domination or exclusion at the other extreme. Positivists strive to complete 
the foundationalist project of demonstrating that legal rules and their adjudicative 
application are based on something less contingent than the circumstances of a 
particular case and the political views of the jUdiciary. Lyotard and Foucault, taking 
the opposite view, throw out legal rules altogether. I have already asked whether there 
is a less dichotomised position which permits legal rules and rule-following, and 
allows for judicial discretion, which posits procedure and allows for the intrusion of 
substantive values, and which acknowledges the violent nature of law, but suggests a 
means of its amelioration. I suggest that Derrida provides such a formulation. 
Like Foucault and Lyotard, Derrida is quick to acknowledge the violence of 
law. The choice inherent in decision-making is "violent, polemical, inquisitorial", 
whilst the idea of law contains within it the notion of "enforceability", an act of force 
which gives law effect (Derrida I 992a: 4, 6). There is a violence at the origin of law: 
108 This is not to suggest that Lyotard believes that justice can be achieved simply by following rules. 
He speci fically warns: "Justice here does not consist merely in the observance of the rules ; as in all 
games, it consists in working at the limits of what rules pennit, in order to invent new moves, perhaps 
new rules and therefore new games" (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985: 100). 
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The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying moment 
that institutes law implies a performative force, which is always an 
interpretative force: ... in the sense of law that would maintain a more 
internal, morc complex relation with what one calls force, power or violence 
. .. Its very moment of foundation or institution ... the operation that amounts 
to founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit) , would consist of a coup de 
force , of a performative and therefore interpretative violence that in itself is 
neither just nor unjust. (Derrida 1992a: 13) 
Law is inst ituted through a founding act of violence, which is itself neither just nor 
justified by law. Justice is deferred to each subsequent application of legal rules where 
"the same problem of justice will have been posed and violently resolved, that is to 
say buried, dissimulated, repressed" (Derrida 1992a: 23). There is violence in the 
origin of law, throughout its operation (acts of interpretation and decision and in its 
effects (Yab1on 1992; Cover 1986; Derrida 1992a). In Force oJ Law: The "Mystical 
Foundation of Authority " Derrida seems to acknowledge (though not by name) 
Foucault in his observation "that the essence oflaw is not prohibitive but affirmative" 
(Derrida 1992a: 7, 8) as well as Lyotard ' s differend: 
It is unjust to judge someone who does not understand the language in which 
the law is inscribed or the judgement pronounced, etc. We could give multiple 
dramatic examples of violent situations in which a person or group of persons 
is judged in an idiom they do not understand very well or at all ... The 
violence of an injustice has begun when all the members of a community do 
not share the same idiom throughout. (Derrida 1992a: 18) 
Law is violent, excluding and marginalising. However, argues Derrida, there is no 
possibility of justice without it: " It is impossible to think of justice without including 
in it the injunction to determine j ustice by the law, that is, to produce just laws" 
(Derrida 1999: 284). 
Although Derrida is adamant that a decision, if it is a "decision of the just .. . 
must follow a law or prescription, a rule" (Derrida 1992a: 23), there is a seeming 
inconsistency between the generality of legal rules (designed to regulate a multitude 
of heterogenous cases) and the specificity of justice: 
How are we to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern 
singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other, or myself as 
other, in a unique situation, with rule, nonn, value or the imperative of justice 
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which necessarily have a general form, even if this generality prescribes a 
singular application in the first place? .. .. justice always addresses itself to 
singularity, to the singularity of the other. (Derrida 1992a: 17, 20) 
To summarise once more: for Derrida, justice is to be pursued through the law. The 
law consists of rules (and norms and values). Rules must be followed, but they are too 
general to provide justice, which is contingent and particular. Legal rules are therefore 
necessary but insufficient for achieving justice. Judges must follow rules, but they 
must reinterpret these rules afresh in relation to each new case. Derrida states the 
ephoke of the rule as foll ows: 
I must be free and responsible for my actions, my behaviour, my thought, my 
decisions ... But this freedom or this decision of the just ... must follow a law 
or a prescription, a rule . In this sense, in its very autonomy, in its freedom to 
follow or to give itself laws, it must have the power to be of the calculable or 
programmable order, for example as an act of fairness. But if the act simply 
consists in applying a rule. of enacting a program or effecting a calculation, we 
might say that it is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps, by metaphor, 
that it is just, but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just ... To be 
just, the decision of a judge. for example, must not only follow a rule of law or 
a general law but must also assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by a 
reinstituting act of interpretation, as if nothing previously existed of the law, as 
if the j udge himself invented the law in every case ... each decision is 
different and requires an absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, 
coded rule can or ought to guarantee absolutely. (Derrida I 992a: 23) 
Can we say that Derrida is a proponent of the rule of law or that the Derridean 
conception of law and justice is compatible with the rule of law? If we answer in the 
affirmative, then a different account of what " rules rule" can mean must be advanced. 
For the undecideability in the interpretation of rules, the fact that rules may have 
many possible meanings, for instance, would seem to endanger the idea that rules 
themselves rule (that i:s, rule apart from interpretations of them in accordance with the 
traditional formulation) . J.M. Balkin observes: 
Most of us assume that the rule of law reqUIres that legal materials will 
essentially be determinate in meaning; that there will be a privileged 
interpretat ion of a legal text. If a text had many meanings, apd no one 
"authentic" or privileged meaning, it would be impossible to treat like cases 
alike according to general and knowable universal principles equally 
applicable to all citizens. Moreover if a text had many equally valid 
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interpretations, no interpretation would have an exclusive claim to legitimacy 
and command the respect of all citizens. (Balkin 1987: 777)'09 
For Derrida, while rules do not rule in the sense of existing as canonical directives 
whose meaning is available without interpretation and which, through their generality 
can impersonally dispose of particular cases 10 just result, judges are constrained in 
the sense that they cannot get completely outside of rules and exercise an entirely free 
choice. They are simultaneously unconstrained in the sense that they are not obliged 
to reach any particular decision as the result of a commitment to resolve disputes 
through rule-application. Judges do not stand outs ide of rules, but inhabit the rules in 
a particular way: they are constrained in the sense that their decisions must follow 
from existing rules. Judges do not have complete adjudication (their interpretation is 
of an existing rule which they "follow"), but the rule is not by itself completely 
determinant of a decision in a particular instance. Accordingly, judges "are freely 
restrained and restrainedly free" (Hutchinson 1999: 211 ). 
Judicial interpretation is not the literal or "common meaning" interpretation 
advocated by many positivists - the claim that words and rules have a core of 
meaning which resides in the text itself and which is elucidated by the interpreter. I 10 
For Derrida the interpreter must negotiate the aporia of the undecideable: the judge 
starts with the rule, but in interpreting the rule , in choosing between significations and 
different rules the outcome of which will determine the case, the judge must negotiate 
the unbridgeable gap between legal ru les (calculable and finite) and justice, the 
incalculable and infinite duty of responsibility of the other. Justice is 
109 Balkin argues that the rule of law is not only compatible with, but also dependant upon 
deconstruction. on the basis that "the Rule of Law presupposes that texiS rule, and not the persons who 
created them" (Balkin 1987: 783). This is so because authorial intent does nol constra in poss ible 
interpretations of the text in wh ich the rule appears. Therefore it is the rule that rules rather then the 
person that drafted the rule. From the Derridean observation that " It is the text as read, not the text as 
written, that becomes law", Balkin concludes that "the Rule of Law presupposes that texts rule, and not 
the persons who created them" (Balkin 1987: 778, 779). However Balkin does not deal with the 
objection that it is the indetenninacy of lega l texts which prevent rules from ru ling, since it is the 
agency of the interpreting judge which dctennines which rules are to be chosen and which meanings 
are to be accorded 10 the rules. A possible circumvention of this objection, I suggest, is to redefine what 
··rules rule" means. to rule away from the liberal conception of the rule of law to which Balkin is 
bound. 
110 1 criticise the "ordinary meaning" approach to interpretation in the next chapter. For a recent 
example of this approach, see Fagan 1999: 95, 97 ("I intend to say just what these words ordinari ly 
mean, given the convention of the English language"). My criticism is along the lines that meaning is 
contexlual and changes according to the context ("iterability alters"). The so-called "conventional 
meaning" of words in a panicular context is the result of a consensus reflecting a dominance of power 
which has the effect of excluding. Fagan wishes to deny the play of meaning, the fact that meaning is 
intenextual . 
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infinite because it is irreducible. irreducible because owed to the other, owed 
to the other before any contract because it has come, the other' s coming as the 
singularity that is always other ... its demand of gift without exchange, 
without circulation, without recognition or gratitude, without economic 
circularity, without calculation and without rules, without reason and without 
rationality. (Derrida I 992a: 25)"1 
Dcrrida draws heavily from Levinas in seeing justice as an ethical relation between 
persons. Simon Critchley states this idea of justice well: 
The other person stands in a relation to me that exceeds my cognitive powers, 
placing me in question and calling me to justify myself .... Justice arises in the 
particular and non-subsumptive relation to the other, as a response to suffering 
that demands an infinite responsibility. (Critchley 1996: 32, 34) 
Derrida's substantive conception of the rule of law reflects a movement away from a 
purely Greek conception of the law as based on the omnicompetence of scientific 
rationality, defined by its quest for absolute truth, which overtakes the concrete 
situation of ethical responsibility in the same gesture, Justice as responsibility for the 
other unfolds face to face, outside the rational order - that is, outside the Greek social 
order where men walk side by side and do not meet face to face. In Greece. 
responsibility is no longer a personal affair. It is institutionalised and defined by 
conformity to civil law. Responsibility is a question of obeying the city's laws -
Plato's Crito bears witness to this. On the Greek version of the rule of law, the 
individual is no longer bound to welcome the widow and the orphan, or the stranger in 
her midst. The Derridean conception of justice incorporates the responsibility to the 
other, the higher law within civil law, both Greek and Jewish.1I 2 Justice mandates two 
III Alan Hutchinson, in what is otherwise a strongly Derridean account of adjudication , suggests that 
ethics enters adjudication if judges observe the "requirement to act in good faith" (Hutchinson 1999: 
212), a limited and indeterminate ethical injunction to "do the right thing" (Hutchinson 1992) which 
allows for the infusion of ethics, but does not compel particu lar outcomes: it too requires to be 
interpreted. 
112 The dependency of the Jewish on the Greek reflects, as Geoffrey Bennington notes, "the 
unavoidable necessity of speakng alterity in the philosophical language of the Greek logos: if Jewish 
thought is other than Greek thought, it cannot be absolutely extemal to it, but folded, along the 
non enveloping figure of invagination into this nonidentical same which has been one of our most 
constant themes" (Bennington and Derrida 1991 : 303 , 404). Rorty comments "one might ask whether 
the only way ... out of the metaphysics of presence is to become, as Derrida puts it, jewgreek and and 
greekjew" (Rorty 1998: 342). 
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duties: the duty to "'the Law" which is the subject of Mandela ' s admiration (Dcrrida 
1987) and the duty to pursue it through positive law. I ]3 
Unsurprisingly, the judiciary in post-apartheid South Africa have been vocal in 
its support of the doctrine of the rule of law (Cameron 1997; Goldstone 2000).' i4 The 
tenor of these urgings to respect the rule of law is that South Africa is now a liberal 
democracy with a constitution which provides a "framework" within which justice 
may be pursued. I think that, provided that it is not suggested that justice is 
instantiated within the Constitution or that the duty of the judiciary and the citizenry is 
to uphold the law rather than or at the expense of justice, the rule of law is to be 
supported in South Africa. Judges ought to decide cases with reference both to legal 
rules and to the idea of justice. In relation to South Africa's transition from repressive 
rule, what is just and appropriate has depended, and will continue to depend, on the 
contingent demands of the society which follows prior injustice. The rule of law has a 
valuable role to play in facilitating South Africa's transition and "rather than 
grounding legal order. it serves to mediate the normative shift in justice that 
characterises these extraordinary periods" (Teitel 1997). Indeed, I agree with 
Hutchinson that " it might be that, in certain circumstances of crisis and upheaval, the 
judiciary are temporarily best placed to effect large-scale changes in a potent and 
te lling maMer" (Hutchinson 1999: 2 16). A Derridean formulation of the rule of law 
113 Does Derrida' s distinction between justice as a higher law and positive (human) law make the 
Derridean conception a version of natural law? Certain commentators have argued that that Derrida's 
idea of justice is Platonic in the sense of being a transcendent standard against which positive law may 
be compared (Balkin 1994). According ly justice makes itself present as a transcendent (yet 
occasionally immanent) standard by which one can judge. Merold Westphal ( 1994) argues that Derrida 
is a natural law theori st who envisions this Platonic concept of justice as a Kantian regulative idea, 
shorn of the metaphyical and epistemic warrants in wh ich the Platonic and Kantian concepts have been 
mired. Westphal believes that Derrida successfully divests his concept of justice of unwanted 
metaphysical claims. Justice so conceived is quasi-transcendental in that it does not exist wholly apart 
from various contexts, yet it remains categorically binding, infiltrating itself into the act of into the act 
of judging: 
Still, the idea of justice in itself functions as a quasi-regulative idea for Derrida. It is not 
something that exists outside of every human context, and it is not an ideal essence to which 
we can give a fixed and final meaning. I1 is a bit like what Kierkegaard had in mind when he 
spoke of "thoughts which wound from behind". Though we cannot get them out in front of us 
where they are fu lly present to us and we can master them, they nevertheless insinuate 
themselves into our thinking, disturbing its complacency in ways that we can neither predict 
nor control. They ambush our absolutes. On Derrida's view it is precisely as deconstruction 
that the idea of. justice in itse lf wounds our legal systems, both as theory and practice, from 
behind. (Westphal 1994: 252) 
11 4 Furthennore, in the final years of apartheid certain members of the judic iary advocated compliance 
with the rule of law on the basis of law's transfonnative potential - sometimes, ironically. by sealing 
off the judiciary from the pressures of politics (see, for instance, Chaskalson 1989). 
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provides for form and procedure (to ensure "fairness") whilst at the same time 
insisting on the intervention of ethics from outside positive law, thereby allowing for 
transformation of the law. I IS 
1.5 The Myth of Liberalism's Rule of Law 
What is the relationship between a Derridean formulation of the rule of law 
and the version included in currently dominant liberal theory in South Africa? The 
liberal (modem) fannulation of the rule of law is a myth, or rather it is a myth within 
a myth (Mootz 1993; Schlag 1997). The rule of law is one of the mythic devices of 
liberal self-presentation and argwnent which is in fact discordant with liberalism's 
self-advenisements as a freely chosen enterprise. The popular narrative of the liberal 
democracy with a written Constitution, such as South Africa's, recounts a story of a 
sovereign people who, in a foundational moment, establish their own state by setting 
out in a written Constitution the powers and limitations of their government. In turn, 
the authority of the Constitution stems from the consent of the people. This narrative, 
expressed in the constitutional mythology of liberal justification, revolves around 
central ontological identities: "The Constitution"; "The Founding"; "The People" and 
"The Consent of the People" (Schlag 1997). The consent of the people is the mythic 
fact of consent to the constitution and so to a limited government that provides 
legitimacy to the liberal state and its actions. In South Africa the consti tution is the 
paramount nonn, hierarchically superior to any other authori ty, and invoked in many 
ways - as icon, symbol, argument and most importantly rule - to perfonn many 
actions that inspire, control and justify. The rule of law in the narrative functions as a 
chain of consent, so that each successive rule mechanically devolves out of and is 
justified by the constitutional grundnorm. 
While the abstract, disembodied subjects of liberalism (Rawls' people in the 
original position) may consent of their own free will to liberal governance, actual 
citizens must be induced to consent, or rather coerced to confonn to the mythic 
IU Derrida writes in relation to the opposition to the unjust positive law of apartheid: "To oppose the 
law, to then try and transform it: once the decision is made, the recourse to violence should not take 
place without measure and without rule" (Derrida 1987: 39). It is not the case that an unjust system of 
law must be abandoned complete ly, as Wacks ( 1984) suggests, but rather that it must be reformed. 
Derrida's idea of justice ofTers the ethical stimulus for transformation which is, of course, denied to 
positivists. 
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representations of liberal justification, I 16 The consumer of liberal justification must 
come to view the mythic subject as a fitting representation of herself and thus come to 
view the Constitution and the legislation and judicial precedent emanating from it, as 
something to which she chooses to submit. How is such consent obtained? Schlag 
observes that liberal rhetoric "will by turns frighten, shame, seduce and even romance 
the consumer into taking on the identity and the perspective of the liberal subject" 
(Schlag 1997: 26). A recent example of liberal justification in South Africa, 
employing all of these rhetorical devices in support the rule of law, is provided by 
High Court Judge Edwin Cameron (Cameron 1997). Cameron refers with approval to 
Alan Paton's poetic definition of liberalism as 
a generosity of Spirit, a tolerance of others, an attempt to comprehend 
othemess, a commitment 10 the rule of law, a high ideal for the worth and 
dignity of man, a repugnance of authoritarianism and a love of freedom. 
(Paton, cited in Cameron 1997: 504, emphasis added) 
Patan, however, despite being a liberal, is also a positivist, whose equation of law and 
justice echoes the most conservative "justice as procedural legality" stances of the 
apartheid judiciary. The following quotation from Cry, the Beloved Country serves as 
an example: 
The judge does not make the Law. It is the People that make the Law. 
Therefore if a Law is unjust, and if the Judge judges according to the Law, 
that isjllslice. even if it is not just. It is the duty of a judge to do justice, but it 
is only the People that can be just. Therefore if justice be not just, that is not to 
be laid at the door of the judge, but at the door of the People which means at 
the door of the White People, for it is the White People that make the Law. 
(Paton 1948: 136, 137, emphasis added) 
The passage is as succinct a summary of postivism 's internal contradiction as one 
could find anywhere: the law is just even it is not. Consequently the judiciary does not 
have to attempt to be just in order to be just, ergo the authority and legitimacy of the 
unjust laws of apartheid are established. 117 For Paton and for traditional liberal theory 
116 The interim Constitution was negotiated and agreed between the African National Congress and the 
National Party, neither of which were democratically elected. This notwithstanding, the preamble of 
the interim Constitution nevenheless contains the phrase "We the People". 
117 I discuss Paton 's brand of liberalism and liberal legality in greater detail in chapter five. 
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the rule of law implies a duty to positive law, which is vested with sanctity 
independently of whether or not it acts to promote substantive justice. 
Cameran justifies the liberal concept of the rule of law on the basis that 
without law there would he no way to curb the " tide of criminal depredation" and 
"violent crime" (Cameran 1997: 505). He anempts to frighten readers into accepting 
liberal legality. liS The rhetoric obscures the weak and unargued move that there is 
equivalence between legality and the rule oflaw, in other words, that allegiance to the 
rule of law means allegiance to positive law. The version of the rule of law Cameran 
advocates is exactly Patan's 'justice as procedural legality' , in contrast to the 
Dcrridean formu lation outlined above which incorporates procedural legality and 
recourse to justice that is external to the law. Cameron is convincing not because his 
argument is convincing, but because his rhetoric strikes fear into the reader's heart (in 
the form of the ever-present threat of crime) on the one hand, while offering 
"freedom" on the other. 
It is not difficult to appreciate why liberal rhetoric should be so convincing to 
South Africans after a lengthy and violent struggle that stopped just short of civil war. 
Apart from fear and shame, liberal justification also employs a political romance 
which enacts a narrative of reconciliation. Liberal justification promises to resolve a 
series of binary oppositions which have permeated philosophy, politics and life itself. 
It promises to reconcile the individual with the community, the concrete with the 
universal , reason with authority, ethic with interest and ' is' with 'ought ' (Schlag 
1997: 29). Furthermore, liberal justification promises reconciliation not just 
conceptually. but politically in institutions, socially in culture, and emotionally in our 
personal lives. It promises to reunite liberal citizens with each other. Liberal 
justification promises to reconcile these oppositions through the rhetorical trope of 
self-rule or self-government: "In the liberal justification, the paramount norm is 
ruling. It rules us. But, it has been chosen by us. In a fundamental sense the 
paramount nonn is us. We are in short ruled by ourselves" (Schlag 1997: 29). 
Liberalism's romanticised promises of reconciliation are captured in the postamble of 
the interim Constitution : 
lit Cameran must nevertheless keep si lent about law 's own violence. By railing against crimina l, that 
is, non- or il-legal. vio lence, law pretends "to exclude any individual violence threatening its order and 
thus to monopolise violence, in the sense of Gewalt, which is also to say authority. Law has an "interest 
in a monopoly of violence" ... This monopoly doesn't strive to protect any just and legal ends 
(RechfS\t.-ecke) but law itself' Derrida 1992a: 33). 
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This Constitution provides a historic bridge between a past of a deeply divided 
society characterised by strife, untold suffering and injustice. and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights ... [t]he pursuit of national unity. 
the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation 
between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society. The 
adoption of this const itution lays the secure foundation fo r the people of South 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the pasl...These can now be 
addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but 
not for victimisation. 
Since the interim Constitution is shown in its preamble to be a declaration of 
"We the People", it is rhetorically suggested that the citizens of South Africa have 
consented to its contents. including its reconcil iatory sentiments and the granting of 
amnesty. The effect is to convince citizens about something that has already taken 
place, namely the fiction of their consent. The choice for the liberal state must appear 
the reasoned choice of a coherent, self-directing, autonomous individual subject. It is 
therefore ironic that the addressee of liberal justification must be frightened, seduced 
and romanced into compl icity. The consumer of liberal justification is already 
ensconced in the circles of liberal justification, a construction of the liberal text: she is 
herself already a mythified construction. The effect of the liberal version of the rule of 
law is to extend the myth of consent forever into the future. 
Derrida does not so much reject liberal democracy as simply refuse to 
instantiate justice in any currently existing liberal democracies such as South Africa 's 
(although he does not dismiss it either). There is a gap between any currently existing 
liberal democracy and its mythological constructions (successive constitutions and 
ru les of positive law, necessary and violent stabilisations in the play of meaning that 
is the flux of history 1l9) and a democracy guided by the futural or projective 
transcendence of justice - la demacratie a venir (Derrida 1996: 83) - an ethical 
concept of justice always still to come, partially present in the public realm but never 
119 Douzinas et al observe: 
Not that DClTida denies that we do need truths - we always need our fictions. He never 
promises us the end of the age of truth and metaphysics ... Derrida's pos ition is one of 
vigilance . He keeps examin ing the fields of emergence of our truths and reminding us that 
th ey should never be allowed to pass as natural, eternal or normal. Deconstruction suspects 
that 'deep truths are purchased by deep violence, by excluding what contaminates the system 
of truth, by dislurbing what disturbs its unity, by swatting away Ihose who trouble the 
guardians of truth with bothersome questions' . (Douzinas et a l 1991 : 51) 
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fully so. Allegiance to the rule of law is the commitment to positive law's quest to 
instantiate justice more fully, to narrow the gap in South Africa between law and 
justice, between existing social condi tions and myth. Deconstruction issues the 
injunction for rules, procedures and institutions to become more representative and 
democratic (Derrida 1992c) so that romantic and fear-inducing rhetoric will become 
less necessary. 
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Chapter 3: Just Is? Constitutional Interpretation 
"[Supreme Court Justices] have not been reading their Derrida" (Schaucr 1990: 231). 
Interpretation is translation. Words in the Constitution, generally abstract and 
indeterminate. are explained with reference to other words, which effect a move from 
the abstract to the concrete and from the universal to the particular. Interpretation is a 
declaration of significance. but also contains connotations of conveyance and 
transformation and of motion, meaning being added or subtracted and the status quo 
ante being transformed,l 20 J. Hillis Miller observes that etymologically (from 
lrans/erre. trans/alio) translation means to be "transported across the borders between 
one language and another" (Miller 1996: 206). Sanford Budick similarly asserts that 
translation <'necessarily marks the border crossing where, if anywhere, onc culture 
passes over to the other, whether to inform it , to further its development, to capture or 
enslave it, or merely to open a space between the other and itself" (Budick 1996: 11). 
Although constitutional interpretation does not involve the transfer of words and 
meanmgs between different languages (it is intra- rather than inter-lingual 
translalion12 I) , it does involve a translation between idioms and contexts as it 
substi tutes new words to give effect to existing words in new contexts, disturbing and 
reconstructing the rhetoric of the original in a manner which both undermines and 
recreates its logical systematicity . If social conditions (including identity) are 
constructed through language, then interpretation 'S additions or subtractions of 
meaning have the potential performatively to transform social conditions, to cross 
borders temporally and materially and to effect agency (Spivak 1993 : 179). 
This chapter will investigate the manner in which the current interpretation of 
the Const itution, the linking of signifiers to signifieds by the judiciary, however 
temporary, might be transformed to effect, to a greater degree, justice. This will 
involve steering a course between two poles of interpretation theory. At one extreme, 
adherents to ' literal interpretation' are of the view that the words of the Constitution 
120 As Barbara Johnson points out, translation "has always been the translation of meaning" (Johnson 
1985: 24, emphasis in original). The idea that interpretation can be faithful to the original, thin is, mean 
the same thing, ignores the heterogeneity that contaminates "pure meaning" from the start, occluding 
the prospect of faithful interpretation (fidus interpres). 
121 In his famous essay on rransIation , "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", Roman Jakobson 
classifies translation into three types: intralingual , intersemiotic and interlingual. Constitutional 
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have a single, consistent and uni vocal meaning which, in the absence of manifest 
ambiguity and contradiction, the interpreter can read off straightforwardly and 
. 12" Th . unproblematlcally. · e oppostte view, which may be tenned the ' radical 
indetenninacy' thesis, holds that the words of the Constitution have no particular 
meaning and there fore may be given any meaning at all: interpretation is an 
expression of the Nietzschean will to power. The interpretative approach of the 
judiciary during apartheid was a variant on ' literal interpretation', an 
epistemologically conservative approach reflecting, because on its own terms 
constrained hy, apartheid politics. The ' radical indetenninacy' approach, by contrast, 
. might at first seem the antidote to the strictures of'literal interpretation in that it offers 
a j udiciary attempting to span the divide between the constitutional document and 
social justice. the freedom to do so, It allows critics the opportunity to unmask legal 
doctrine for the social construct that it is, and it asswnes that in the absence of a 
formalist view of language as an a-contextual reference to social reality, law can only 
funct ion as an expression of political power. 
I believe the indeterminacy critique to be only partly correct. It is true that the 
neutrali ty and objectivity which decision-making under the modem conception claims 
to provide is illusory. What the radical indeterminacy critique misses, however, " is 
the stubborn fact that our way of being-in-the-world is - contingently - to construct 
certainty all over the place" (Winter 1990: 1449). Not only do lawyers rely on rules, 
but the rules are determinate of outcomes, often violently so. Given this, I want to 
argue that although rules are in some sense determinate, their meaning is not final or 
settled, and that they may therefore be differently interpreted to direct or resist their 
imposition of force , I therefore reject both the belief that meaning has foundations in 
objective correspondence with reality and the opposite view that meaning can be 
nothing more than the result of arbitrary and unconstrained subjectivity. Legal 
meaning is possible because of a temporary stabi lity of context, which is the result of 
situatedness within history, tradition and community, The temporary stabilisation is in 
fact a violent halting of the play of meaning in the flux of history, a violence which is 
naturalised as neutral and apoliticaL Within this temporary stabilisation, the epistemic 
interpretation is an exam ple of intralingualtranslation, wh ich Jakobson defines as "an interpretation of 
verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language" (Jakobson 2000: 114). 
m Like Han and Raz, Frederick Schauer argues that there can be ' li teral' meaning and a-contextual 
reference, so that law may be conce ived in formalist tenns (Schauer 1988: 509), These jurislS ignore 
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and the political are mutually entailed in a manner which disguises the law's own 
constructedness and so is imperceptible to the participant - hence the ' literal' or 
'common meaning' approach. 123 
I shall argue, as I did in the previous chapter, that an interpretation is always 
"or' a text , where "or' suggests some kind of non-trivial link (provided through 
history, tradition, context and otherwise) between the text and its interpretation. In 
other words. the words of the Constitution will always bear more than one 
interpretation. but not an infinite number. Judges are free to interpret the words of the 
Constitution in a number of ways, but they are also constrained by the words 
themselves. In order to argue this, 1 shall begin with the literal language approach 
favoured during apartheid and progress through what I consider to be increasingly 
progressive theories of interpretation, arriving finally al a version of the 
indeterminacy thesis which allows for,political transformation, without succumbing to 
the nihilism with which the radical indeterminacy critique has been charged. I do not 
want to argue for the radical indeterminacy approach, since, as I have indicated, the 
jUdiciary is always and rightly in some sense constrained. The chapter will conclude 
with some practical suggestions about the manner in which the approach to 
interpretation I suggest might be given effect. 
3.1 Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa 
South Africa 's negotiated senlement included a written constitution and the 
promulgation of a justiciable Bill of Rights, a bridge l24 accross which, it is hoped, the 
the fact that culturally relative values and culturally relative assumptions - the values that undergird 
imperialism for instance - have combined to produce 'literal ' meaning. 
I2l The seem ing neutrality of the 'common meaning ' approach provides its adherents adherents with a 
defense against the charge of ideological bias, something that everyone has, but few are prepared to 
admit to. As Eagleton points out "nobody would claim that their own thinking was ideo logical just as 
nobody would habitually refer to themse lves as Fatso ... Ideology like halitosis is in this sense what the 
other person has" (Eagleton 1991: 3). Eduard Fagan, in the course of defending the 'ordinary meaning' 
approach , avers: 
I had thought that my note was concerned merel y with the importance of respecting the 
ordinary meaning of language , even if (particularly if?) that language is contained in the 
Constitution. I was therefore a little surprised to discover that I was in the process 
propounding an ideology which would be welcomed by 'conservative practitioners' and used 
by ' those with more mysterious motives' (at 51 I). (Fagan 1997: 173) 
I would respond to Fagan that the 'common meaning' approach to interpretation is ideological whether 
or not he intends it to be so: ideology is inadvertent as much as it is considered. 
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transition from authoritarianism to democracy will be facilitated .12S As the then 
Deputy President, Justice Mahomed wrote in Makwanyane, referring to the interim 
text: 
The South African Constitution ... represents a decisive break from and a 
ringing rejection of, that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, 
authoritarian, insular and repressive and a vigorous identification of and 
commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally 
egalitarian ethos, expressly articulated in the Constitution.126 
Edouard Fagan describes the impact of the introduction of the Consti tution In 
similarly enthusiastic terms: 
The Constitution represents and embodies within it the fundamental 
transformation of South African society. It replaces the policy of apartheid and 
introduces for the first timt:: in the history of the country, a democratic order 
based on a universal franchi se. (Fagan 1998: 261) 
The possibility of j ustice within South Africa's legal system lies mainly. for better or 
for worse, with judges. t 27 One consequence of the choice of constitutional supremacy 
over parliamentary sovereignty t28 has been an increase in the power of the judges. 
Constitutions arc not self-enforcing and depend on the judiciary to give them content. 
The increased participation of the judiciary in the creation of political nonns makes 
for a judiciaJisation of politics, whilst the new role of the judiciary makes serious 
inroads into theories which argue for law's autonomy from politics: there is a 
politicisation of the judiciary (Carder 1994; Du Plessis and Carder 1994: 7 1; Sarkin 
1997), perhaps even, if taken to extremes, a "juristocracy" (Davis 1995: 104). What 
distinguishes the transitional constitutional paradigm is its constructive relation to the 
polit ical order in nux. To the extent that the interim and final Constitutions reflect a 
IN The metaphor of a bridge appears in the postamb le of the interim constitution and is extended by 
Mu reinik in his discuss ion of that document (Mureinik 1994). 
m Dennis Davis observes that the 1993 Constitution "heralded a legal revolution" (Davis 1996: 509). 
126 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para 262. Simi larly Justice Kriegler has observed that 
"the Const itution ushered in the most fundamen tal change in the history of our country. It made 
everything new" (S v Mhfungll 1995 (3) SA 867 at 832). 
m Karl Klare notes that " (a]djudication uniquely reveals the ways in which law-making and, by 
extension, legal practices generally, are and/or could be a med ium for accompl ishing justice" (Klare 
t998 : 147). 
128 Etienne Mureinik writes "Parl iamentary sovereignty teaches that what parliament says is Jaw, 
without the need to offer justification to the courts. In South Africa, si nce parliament was elected was 
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critical response to the legacy of apartheid, transitional constitutionalism provides an 
opportunity for justice.129 Substantive justice depends on the judiciary as much, if not 
more, than the legislature, and there is an urgent requirement for the judiciary to 
produce an endogenous jurisprudence commensurate with the demands of the 'New 
South Africa' .130 Since the power of the Constitutional Court J31 vests, in accordance 
with constitutional theory, in the manner in which judges read, determine, interpret or 
otherwise understand the Constitution, it is vital to comprehend this process. A 
number of questions present themselves: What does it mean to read the Constitution? 
What is it that judges do when they interpret the Constitution? Why is there so much 
controversy over how it should be interpreted? What is the relationship between the 
intention of the drafters of the Constitution, the Constitution as text, and the meanings 
ascribed to it? Consti tutional interpretation is the subject of great controversy, not 
only within the academy and legal profession, but also publicly as it appears on the 
front pages of the evening news, where the ethical issues relating to the new political 
order - capital punishment lJ2, amnesty for apartheid criminalslJJ, universal legal 
representation lJ4, corporal punishment l3S, pomography l36, sexual preference ]37 - are 
retried. To some extent, disagreement with the Const itutional Court ' s decisions is 
··simply a case of whose ox has most recently been gored" (Tribe in Adams 1988: 
176), but this is onl y to point to the significance of constitutional interpretation: unlike 
literary interpretation, constitutional interpretation has immediate material 
consequences for litigants; it is literally a matter of li fe and death (Cover 1986; 
Derrida 1992a; Yablon 1992). Even the most ' civi lised' orders do violence in their 
day to day operations: meaning is frequently written " in the medium of blood" (Cover 
1983: 47). 
elected only by a minority, the doctrine taught also that what Parliament sa id was law, without a need 
to justify even by those governed by the law" (Mureinik 1994: 32). 
129 Sarkin remarks that the newly conferred power of judicial rev iew enables the courts to limit the 
power of the State, including the manner and degree to which the organs of government intrude on the 
lives of the citizens (Sarkin 1998: 642). 
I l O Alfred Cockrell notes that "the Constitutional Court has been faced with the task of creating a 
theory of consti tutional rev iew from noth ing" (Cockrell 1996: I). Similarly Currie notes that the 
Constitutional Court "presides over a record of constilUtional jurisprudence that it has created itself' 
(Currie 1999: 144). 
I II The Constitutional Court was inaugurated in February 1995. ", • S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
13l Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President o/the Republic a/South Africa and 
Olhm 1996 (8) BCLR 10 15 (CC). 
I l 4 S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC). 
I3S S v Williams and Another 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC). 
I l6 Case v Minister afSafety and Security (1996 (3) SA 617 (CC). 
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A central question for legal agents in the transitional period IS how most 
effectively to orchestrate a program of transformative constitutionalism, 
a long term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement 
committed (not in isolat ion, of course, but in a historical context of conducive 
polit ical developments) to transforming a country's political institutions and 
power relationships in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction. 
(Klare 1998: 150) 
One commentator has remarked that the introduction of the Constitution has enabled a 
transition from a formal vision of law to a substantive vision of law in South Africa, a 
paradigm shift which introduces a new legal context in which considerations of justice 
may consciously and j ustifiably be included in legal texts (Cockrell 1996: 3,9,10). 
This may be so, but only provided it is acknowledged that the Constitution is nothing 
apart from interpretations of it , so that for transformative constitutionalism to become 
a reality, the activity of interpretation must be carried out in accordance with the 
demands of transfonnation and, above all , justice. 
Constitutional Court judges are confronted by the competing demands of 
interpretative freedom and interpretative restraint. On the one hand there is a 
promising constitutional text , redolent with expansive phrases and magnificent hopes 
o f overcoming past injustice and moving towards a democratic future. On the other, it 
is argued that the meaning of the Constitution is not infinitely malleable and open-
ended, and that there must be some constraints on the interpretation of the text. It is 
argued that judges must be unfettered in their pursuit of justice, but equally that they 
must act " in accordance with" the Constitution. This tension is reflected in the 
following statement by Acting Judge Kentridge in State v Zuma: 
While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the Constitution, 
it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. I am well aware of 
the fallacy of supposing that general language must have a single 'objective' 
meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one' s personal intellectual 
and moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the 
ConstifUlion does not mean whatever we might wish it (0 mean.l3s 
The starting point of the debate on constitutional interpretation, perhaps the 
only one on which all disputants agree, is that for all interpreters. the words on the 
Il7 National Coalition/or Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 0/ Justice 1999 (I) SA 6 (CC) . 
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pages of the Constitution are the same. Thereafter, however, controversy rages. In 
addition to the aims I have already mentioned. this chapter shall seek to identify the 
institutional restraints that operate within legal interpretative practice in South Africa; 
to examine the way in which the tradition of interpretative activities influe~ces current 
practice; and to investigate the assumptions and values of those who confer authority. 
The importance of understanding the historically and culturally contingent contexts in 
which interpretation is possible cannot be overstated, especially in the current liberal 
era, in which the idea of the free and autonomous interpreting individual and the 
"common-sense" or "plain meaning" view of language are dominant elements of 
liberal ideology worldwide (Balkin 1990).139 Against this conception of interpretation, 
I am particularly interested in claims made about the indeterminacy of language and 
the impact of this indeterminacy on constitutional discourse. ]40 
Although I alluded to the effect of the indeterminacy of language on the rule 
of law in the previous chapter, it is as well to provide a summary here. In a liberal 
democratic society dedicated to the virtues of the rule of law. a central jurisprudential 
concern is that of unelected judges imposing their political understanding on society. 
This is known as the counter-majoritarian dilemma. J4J The legitimacy of the judicial 
lJK Slale v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 40 1 (CC) at para 17 (emphasis added). 
Il9 J.M. Balkin , referring to current trends in American consti tutionalism, writes that 
the federal judiciary and in particular the Supreme Court of the Un ited States - appear to be 
more conservati ve than they have been for many years, and indeed are likely to remain so for 
the foreseeable future ... Its intellectual leader, Justice Scalia, has even called for a 
const itut iona l jurisprudence of tradition, coup led with a return to an interpretative theory of 
plain meanings for statutes and original intention with respect to the Constitution. (Balk in 
,990,,866) 
The conservatism of the US judiciary and the theoretical bifurcation between the judiciary (most 
epistemologically conservative) and the legal academy (most ly epistemologically radical) is also 
documented by Steven Winter (1990: 1443 - 1447). The charge of judicial conservat ism is equa lly 
sustainable in Great Britain (Douzinas and Warrington I 994a). Indeed, the denial of context in the 
creation of meaning by advocates of the "common meaning" approach in South Africa (such advocates 
have often studied in Britain) reflects how Britain, without its empire can still maintain cultural 
authority in postcolonial soc ieties and the ways in which Eurocentric assumptions about race and 
rationality return time and again to haunt the production of legal writing in postcolonial seu ings like 
South Africa. South African articu lations of current Anglo-American interpretative conservatism 
abound. Ziyad MOIala, for example. warns that "judges should not, when faced with a text that is clear 
on its face, project their own preferences or values, nor create fringe meanings, but must instead uphold 
what the constitution requires" (Motala 1997: 153). 
140 Singer exp licates the requirements of determinacy and the features of indeterminacy in the 
following words: " A legal theory or set of legal rules is completely determ inate if it is comprehensive, 
cons istent, directive and self-revising. Any doctrine or set of rules that fails to satisfy anyone of these 
requirements is indeterminate because it does not fully constrain our choices" (Singer 1984: 14). 
141 Dennis Davis writes that U[wJithin this conception, a judicial system which is empowered 10 test the 
validity of legislation approved by the majority in terms of substantive constitutional values is viewed 
as profound ly anti-democratic . It represents the politics of an unelected and unaccountable judicial elite 
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process turns on the power of the law 10 constram, direct and limit judges in the 
exercise of their power according to the law. This in turn depends on the capacity of 
language (featured in the Constitution, common law precedents and statutes) to 
constrain, direct and limit judicial decision-making. However, according to the radical 
indeterminacy thesis. language is indeterminate. unstable and incapable of expressing 
rules and principles that constrain judges. 142 The capacity for indeterminacy is 
exacerbated by the generality and level of abstraction of the language of the 
Constitution. As Jeremy Sarkin observes, 
[w]ords used in a Bill of Rights are often vague, and the interpretation of 
expressions such as 'life'. 'liberty', 'equality'. 'security of person' and 'equal 
protection' by individual judges is greatly affected by the judge's economic, 
political and social values. (Sarkin 1996b: 72)'43 
Consequently, conclude proponents of the radical indeterminacy thesis, the doctrine 
of the rule of law fails. 144 Rules themselves do not guide, determine or direct what 
results flow from them; the judge does. In short we do not have rule by law but rule 
by the politics of judges: the cat is out of the bag (Levinson 1982). As I argued in the 
previous chapter, I believe the radical indeterminacy theory is wrong about judges not 
in some sense being constrained by rules, and wrong about indeterminacy eviscerating 
the rule of law, resulting in nihilism and anarchy. However, indetenninacy, in the 
qual ified form that I propose (perhaps I should refer to it as undecideabili ty l4s) , 
presents opportunities for change and transformation. 
immune from the wishes of the majority" (Dav is 1994: 103). J return to the counter-majoritarian 
dilemma and point 10 its possible resolution in Chapter Five. 
I~2 Legal texts, particu larly constitutions, are frequently shot through with apparent and actual gaps, 
unanswered questions, conflicting provisions, ambiguities and obscurities. 
14) Sarkin quotes as authority Michael Mandel : "You do not have to read the thousands of pages of 
contradictory judicial op in ions on their meaning to realise that the words of the Chaner neither restrain 
nor guide the judges" (Sarkin 1996b: 73). 
IoW Singer writes: "Detenninacy is necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, fo r both theorists and 
judges. It is the on ly way judges can appear to apply the law rather than make it. Detenninative rules 
and arguments are desirable because they restrain arbitrary judicial power" (Singer 1984: 12). 
I~S Deconstruction found its first adherents in the legal academy among members of the critical legal 
studies movement. who were already commined to the radical indetenninacy critique and who mistook 
Derrida's notion of "the play of relative indetennination" (Derrida 1988a: 144) for radical 
indetenninacy, an interpretation of deconstruction Derrida explicitly refused: 
I do not be lieve I have ever spoken of " indetenninacy", whether in regard to "meaning" or 
anything else. Undecidabi li ty is something else again .... [U)ndecidabilty is always a 
delerminate oscillation between possib ilities (for example of meaning, but also of acts). These 
possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for example, 
discursive - syntactical or rhetorical - but also political, ethical etc.). They are pragmatically 
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South African judges have not, until very recently, showed much awareness of 
indeterminacy or its effect on the interpretative process and even when they have, its 
effect has been largely misunderstood or underestimated. The most common response 
to indeterminacy in South Africa has been denial. The theory of statutory 
interpretation developed by Justice L.C. Steyn (1981) and the South Africanjudiciary, 
adhered to by South African jurists until recently , is literalist-cum-intentionalist in 
nature. According to Steyn, interpretation of statutes is an exercise in determining the 
intention of the legislature (the drafters) as manifested in the words of the text: if the 
language is clear and unambiguous, the intention of the legislature is also readily 
ascertainable. Departure from the literal or "plain" meaning is only possible if 
language is ambiguous or obscure, in which case interpretative aids over and above 
the linguistic constituents of the text, (for example the intention of the legislature at 
the time of enactment), may be invoked. This methodology became known as the 
"golden rule" of statutory interpretation. 146 In S v Marwane, Miller JA had the 
following to say about the interpretation ofBophutatswana's l47 Bill of Rights: 
Whether our Courts were to regard an Act creative of a Constitution as it 
would any other statute or as an Act sui generis, when construing a particular 
provision therein, they would give effect to the ordinarily accepted meaning 
and effect of the words used and would not deviate there from unless to give 
effect to the ordinary meaning would give rise to glaring absurdity; or unless 
there were indications in the Act (considered as a whole in its own peculiar 
setting and with due regard for its aims and objects) that the legislation did not 
intend the words to be understood in their ordinary sense. 148 
Moreover, according to Galgut J in Government of Ihe Republic of Bophwatswana v 
Segale: 
deteml ined. The analyses that 1 have devoted to undecidability concern just these 
detenninations and these definitions, not at all some vague 'indetenninacy'" (Derrida 1988a: 
148). 
Derrida 's description emphas ises the pragmatic limitations of interpretation produced by institutional 
restraints such as grammar, politics and ethics. 
146 The golden rule requires that the literal meaning of words of a statute must be adhered to unless this 
would lead to an absu rdity of the same son or is at variance with the intention of the legis lature (Du 
Plessis 1986: 109). 
147 Bophutatswana was fonnerly an "independent homeland" created as such by apanheid architects to 
provide fo r supposed se lf-detenn ination by blacks within designated areas (approx imately 13% of 
South Africa's total geographical area was allocated to approximately 80% of the popu lation for this 
purpose). As part of race-based segregation, the idea of homelands died with apartheid and these areas 
have now been reincorporated into South Africa. 
141 S v Marwane 1982 (3) SA 717 (A) at 749 D-E. 
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The task of the Courts is to ascertain from the words of the statute in the 
context thereof what the intention of the Legislature is. If the wording of the 
statute is clear and unambiguous they state what that intention is. It is not for 
the courts to invent fancied ambiguities and usurp the functions of the 
legislature. 149 
Dyzenhaus (1991) characterises the interpretative approach of judges during apartheid 
as the "plain fact" approach. According to this approach, the judicial duty when 
interpreting a statute is to look to those parts of the public record that make it clear 
what the legislators as a matter of fact intended. In accordance with positivist theory, 
this allowed judges to determine the law as it is, without permitting considerations of 
b 
. ... 150 su stanUve Justice to Intervene. 
In the 1970s and 80s, John Dugard (197 1,198 1) argued that the judgements of 
South African courts in politically controversial cases contained unarticulated 
political premises which tended to confirm rather than subvert the apartheid order. 
Dugard criticised the judiciary for their unduly narrow approach to their interpretative 
function - a "mechanical" or "phonographic" approach that denied the creative role in 
judicial law-making (Dugard 1971 : 182). Many judges of this period professed to 
being constrained from adjudicating justly by what they regarded as clear and 
unambiguous language to the contrary in statutory provisions. Indeed it seems as if 
the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach to interpretation, which as far as possible 
rejects choice in favour of the formalist application of the rule itself (the rule as 
meaning prior to interpretation), could lead to a diremption of the judicial function 
149 1990 (1) SA 434 (BA) at 448G. 
m Dyzenhaus suggests as an example of the "plain fact" approach , Minisfer of the Inferior v Lockhaf 
1961 (2) SA 587 (A), in which the Appellate Division declared valid a proclamation dividing the city 
of Durban into group areas. Whites were allocated the best areas while only poorer areas were available 
to Indians. Although the coun a quo upheld the challenge on the grounds that there was no explicit 
authorisation for the treatment of different races on an unequal footing, the Appellate Division per 
Judge Holmes found that such authorisation was "clearly implied". According to Dyzenhaus, the court 
drew this necessary implication from what it considered the intention of the legislation 10 be: 
the judge supposed himself to be legally required to decide a comroversial case of statutory 
interpretation in accordance with the intentions which in fact explained the statute, whatever 
his personal and moral views about the statute. This understanding of the judicial duty is 
ultimately based in a political theory about the relationship between judiciary and legislature. 
That theory says that judges act appropriate ly when they defer to cenain facts of the matter 
about legislative intention and thus they should adopt interpretative tests which seek to find 
such facts before resoning to other sources of legal authority, most notably in the common 
law. (Dyzenhaus 1998: 19) 
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and the pursuit of justice.ISI For many judicial adherents of positivism, justice was the 
business of the legislature alone. and the task of the jUdiciary was simply to declare 
the intention of the legislature. Mr Justice Munnick, commenting on the " total 
onslaught" thesis of the 1980s stated that 
the law may appear 10 be unjust. for example, in relation 10 detention without 
trial , but judges have to assume that factor weighed against the demands of 
what was referred to as the supreme law - in other words, the safety of the 
State,I 52 
In his rejection of positivism, Dugard and other left wing commentators (Du Plessis 
and Corder 1994; Corder 1984; Davis 1985) demonstrated that context has an effect 
on interpretation; that the ascription of meaning is context specific and value laden. 
In its first judgement, S v Zuma and others,H] the Constitutional Court 
rejected the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach to interpretation, arguing, somewhat 
confusedly, in favour of a generous approach to interpretation. The majority of the 
Constitutional Court in the subsequent case of S v Mhlungu and othersH4 rejected the 
literal meaning approach in favour of a purposive approach, correctly arguing that a 
literal approach might produce unjust, perhaps absurd, results . In that case, Justice 
Mahomed averred. "my interpretation is to be preferred because it gives force and 
effect to the fundamental objects and aspiration of the constitution [and] because it is 
less arbitrary in its consequences" (at 815). Nevertheless, Justice Mahomed' s 
judgement was not unanimous and, in a minority judgement, Justice Kentridge held 
that "when language is clear it must be given effect, ... I find it difficult to see what 
meaning other than that w~ich I have suggested, can reasonably be given to the 
language used" (at 828). The divergence of opinion between these two judges reflects 
the current ambivalence of the judiciary towards questions of interpretation. Indeed, 
the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach is still on occasion followed by the judiciary. 
ISI As late as 1992, the Appellate Division stated authoritatively that an appeal court "does not enquire 
whether the trial was fair in accordance with ;nolions of basic fairness and justice'" (Stale v Rudman 
1992 (I) SA 343 (A) at 377B, per Acting Justice Nicholas). The Constitutional Court recently 
overturned this judgement. observing that section 25(3) of the interim Constitution requ ires "criminal 
trials to be conducted in accordance with just those 'notions of basic fairness and justice'" (S v Zuma 
1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
m The Argus, 12 May 1981 
on 1995 (4) BCLR401 (CC). 
,~ S v Mhlungu t 995 (3 ) SA 867 (CC) . 
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In Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health / 55 McCreath J resolved to 
make a detcnnination on the basis of the meaning of the word "everyone". In coming 
to the conclusion that the word "everyone" should be given the same meaning 
wherever it appears in the legislative text, the court was concerned to ascertain the 
intention of the drafters of the Constitution. IS6 
3.2 From Literalism to Hermeneutics 
Central to the rejection of positivism and formalism is the recognition that 
social phenomena have meaning for social agents who are constantly interpreting the 
situations in which they find themselves (whereas the positivist-scientific model 
presupposes a subject whose activities can be generalised and understood as context-
free operations (Rabinow and Sullivan 1979». This has resulted in the revival of a 
hermeneutic approach to human action, calling on social science to acknowledge the 
claim that explanation of human behaviour must include interpretation of the 
meanings of social actions from the perspectives of those performing them. 
Philosophers who had earlier in the twentieth century claimed that human sciences 
were interpretati ve endeavours - Dilthey, Collingwood, Heidegger and especially 
Wittgenstein - were sources of influence, emphasising that an understanding of social 
phenomena should be concerned with explicating the historical or cultural context or 
"form of life" through which such phenomena have meaning. In particular, German 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer has been influential in pointing to the limitations of 
human horizons and the prejudices and preconceptions that shape individuals' 
understanding of others, casting doubt on whether "texts" can ever be grasped on their 
own terms (Gadamer 1979: 103). As Giddens asserts, "the recovery of the 
henneneutic tradition is one of the most significant occurrences in recent trends of 
development" (Giddens 1987: 56). However, if access to reality is conditioned by 
specific beliefs about counts as knowledge, then modern epistemology, conceived in 
Kantian terms as the search for apodictic grounds for universally applicable 
knowledge. appears to impossibility. 
The shift to interpretation in social enquiry challenged key premIses of 
rationalist epistemology. For the Enlightenment, and particularly for subjectivist 
'" 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T). 
156 At 11228. 11 22F·G and 11 23 8·C. 
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rationalists like Descartes and Kant, knowledge and truth were grounded on the self 
conscious and reflecting subject who has the ability to perceive reality itself. They 
claimed that rational consciousness has privileged access to the content of reality and 
can thus develop a set of criteria, rules and categories for distinguishing ~alid from 
invalid truth claims in an absolute, non-contextual manner. Consciousness transcends 
the contingencies of history and culture and is declared the legislator of its own 
eternal rules that arc the foundation of knowledge and truth. In this conception, 
objectivity and reality can be approached only by a subject able to transcend the 
contingencies of history and context and to achieve a neutral viewpoint. 
Current philosophy' s suspIcion of Enlightenment epistemology and 
metaphysics has motivated an 'interpretative turn' in legal scholarship, however many 
commentalors on South African jurisprudence (A. Fagan 1995, 1999; E. Fagan 1996; 
Motala 1998) and practitioners alike adhere to the 'common-sense' view of language. 
According to this view "words are essentially names of things and the meanings of 
words are securely fastened ... onto things the words denote" (Gralf 1982: 405). 
Modem jurisprudence has consistently regarded legal discourse as a neutral medium 
which merely reflects social events. This is only possible given a conventional 
understanding of language as a transparent vehicle for expressing meaning. Such an 
understanding is not only associated with the apartheid legal system, but is, as I have 
mentioned. more widely linked to the conservatism of the western liberal judiciary 
worldwide. 
The traditional view of language is that linguistic categories have a direct 
correlation to that to which they refer. The ' common sense ' or ' plain meaning ' 
approach to language suggests that representational terms - signifiers - have a direct 
correlat ion with the concepts presented - their signified meaning. Increasingly 
however, legal theorists have been compelled to acknowledge that the idea that 
meanings reside in language is mistaken. Linguists and literary theorists alike have 
demonstrated that words are only conventional symbols or sounds that bear no 
necessary relation to the " real world" of objects, and that language constructs rather 
than reflects reality. In the 1960s Saussure theorised language as a synchronic system 
in which the relationship between the word and its referent was arbitrary and the 
meaning of signs arose not from their relationship to the external world, but from its 
relationship to the signs in that system (Saussure 1966). Contrary to the subjectivist, 
phenomena logical understandings of language as an instrument in the hands of 
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conscious subjects, structuralism favoured an objectivist understanding of language as 
preceding and defining the characteristics of the conscious self. Linguistic theory 
proved influential in the development of a new framework to replace discredited 
epistemological claims, a framework explicated in tenns of a social inter-subjectivity 
constituted by and through language (Rorty 1979; Habennas 1984). Wittgenstein 
persuasively argued that arbitrary symbols. governed by arbitrary rules. serve to 
create meanings that appear clear and certain, but only to those who accept the 
conventions of the language game in which those systems and rules operate 
(Wingenstein 1953). Wingenstein viewed language not as a hennetic system in which 
meanings are generated but rather as integral to and constitutive of "forms of life". 
Legal realists were perhaps the first to reject the fonnalist claim that the legal 
system could produce neutral decisions because the judiciary were involved in an 
apolitical exercise - the interpretation of plain meaning of words in the law. Realists 
recognised that there was no literal or plain meaning and that language was 
contextual , a view which seems to be accepted by most commentators on South 
African legal theory (Dugard 1971 , 1981 ; Davis 1985, 1996, 1998; Sarkin 1997; 
Klare 1998; Naude 1999). On the contextual approach to interpretation. the judge who 
purported to apply the plain meaning of a word would be "committing the fallacy of 
reification - abstracting meaning from its context and purpose and treating it as 
though it were an external thing, capable of value-free investigation" (Boyle 1985: 
711). According to many legal realist accounts of law, the seeming interpretative 
decisiveness of judges (in deciding the interpretative questions of which law is 
relevant to a particular case, how that law is relevant and how the evidence. 
precedents and law themselves are to be understood) is itself arbitrary. Judges 
interpret the meaning of laws, precedents and the texts of the constitution in line with 
their personal political prejudices, or even in line with temporary whims and feel ings. 
However, the shift from ascertaining the plain meaning of words to ascertaining the 
purpose and intention of the legislature can be equally reified. It should be recognised 
that it is not possible look to purposes and intentions without delving into the political 
struggles which produced the law. 
The rejection of positivism in legal scholarship has caused legal theorists to 
rethink the nature of interpretation. Owen Fiss recognises that adjudication is 
interpretation, but defines this as the process in which the judge comes to understand 
the meaning of a text (Fiss 1982: 739). Although he acknowledges the potential for all 
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social activity to be interpreted, and while he promises that links could be developed 
between law and the social sciences in this regard, Fiss insists that, rather than 
exploring these links, judges are "to read the legal texts, not morality or public 
opinion, not. if you will, the moral or social texts" (Fiss 1982: 740). This approach 
seems to exclude many areas of interpretation: oral arguments of lawyers, the 
testimony and demeanour of witnesses, inspections in loco and community standards 
and morals. In other words, there are many texts to be interpreted during the course of 
adjudication and meaning cannot be confined to anyone text: there is intertextuality. 
It becomes apparent that a text cannot have onc single "correct" or plain meaning 
from the fact that different witnesses give different accounts of the same facts, and 
that different judges, hearing the same case, often give radically divergent 
judgements. Judges and witnesses have to choose between different perceptions of the 
same facts; not between truth and false:hood, but between alternative accounts. 
The central dilemma in the theory of legal interpretation today is related to the 
proposition that words have no "plain meanings" or objective referents and that 
meanmg IS therefore indeterminate. However, there is a serious concern amongst 
practitioners and jurists that indeterminacy is bad for business. By abandoning 
formalism and positivism, the twin spectres of nihilism and subjectivism are raised, 
thereby threatening the legitimacy of adjudication and ultimately the rule of law itself. 
Michel Rosenfeld writes: 
In the broadest terms, the cnSlS affects a loss of faith concernmg the 
availability of objective criteria permitting the ascription of distinct and 
transparent meanings to legal texts. Moreover, this loss of faith manifests itself 
in the intensification of the confl ict among the community of legal actors, the 
dissolution of any genuine consensus over important values, the seemingly 
inescapable indeterminacy of legal rules and the belief that all dispositions of 
legal issues are ultimately political and subjective. (Rosenfeld 1992: 152) 
Sanford Levinson (1982) observes that traditionally, law was viewed as a science of 
extricating meaning from words which enabled one to believe in law as a process of 
submission to the commands of authoritative texts (the rule of law), rather than the 
creation of wilful interpreters (the rule of men). For example, the authority of the 
written, stable Constitution, which controls and transcends political activity because 
of the fixed but abstract nature of its language, is now a paramount fixture of South 
African political thought. Although within legal theory there is a rejection of 
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originalisl constitutional interpretation (the notion that legal texts may be interpreted 
by recourse to the meaning intended by the drafters to be placed on the language), 
legal scholars are loath to abandon the belief that there is something in the text which 
may be extracted through the correct methodology. This view results largely from a 
failure (and sometimes wilful refusal) to take into account developments in 
philosophy and literary criticism which suggest the radical instability and 
indeterminacy of the meanings of texts at all times. This indeterminacy results in a 
gap between transformatory jurisprudential theses and the language of judicial 
opinions (Schauer 1990: 23 1). iS7 
Quests for essential or privileged meanlOgs of texts have been increasingly 
abandoned by theorists who view interpretation as construction in which the reader 
plays an active role in creating a meaning or meanings which the text does not have 
prior to a reading of it. Postmodem theorists such as Derrida. reject the idea that 
meaning is discovered and view the search for truth as an error which presumes 
privileged foundations. For these theorists, there is no finality in interpretation and 
there can be no finally determined meanings. 
Sanford Levinson suggests that indeterminacy renders an interpretation merely 
an exercise of power; legal texts can be read to serve political purposes. For Levinson, 
this is alarming in that '"the principal social reality of law is its coercive force vis-a-vis 
those who prefer to behave other than as the law ' requires '" (Levinson 1982: 386). If 
many interpretations of the Constitution are possible, then it must be recognised that 
judges, in choosing one out of a number of interpretations, are (however subtly) 
espousing their political visions in their judgements. Fiss argues, against adherents to 
the radical indeterminacy thesis, that theorisations which recognise indeterminacy are 
nihil istic and incommensurable with justice: 
The nihilist would argue that for any text - particularly such a comprehensive 
text as the Constitution - there are any number of possible meanings. that 
interpretation consists of choosing one of these meanings and that in this 
selection process the judge will inevitably express his own values. All law is 
In I discuss the Constitutional Coun's sometime rejection of philosophy in Chapter Five. There have, 
however, been occasions where the coun has been prepared to discuss philosophical considerations, 
though mostl y in an unsatisfactorily cursory and piecemeal fashion. Examples include the judgement of 
Ackennan J in Ferreira v Levin NO: VryenhoeJr. v Powe/J NO 1996 (I) SA 984 (CC), quoting at length 
from Isaiah Berlin's Four Essays 0" Liberty ( 1969), at paragraphs 52 and 53 and quoti ng from Karl 
Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies (1962) in footnote 36 and footnote 56. Mahomed J quotes 
Kant in Azania" Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v President of the RSA and others (at para 
2IG-H). 
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masked power ... il is impossible to speak of one interpretation as true and the 
other as false. It is impossible to speak of law with the objectivity required by 
the idea of justice. (Fiss 1982: 740-742) 
As Stanley Fish observes, the debate is polemically cast as a choice between 
positivism - or the idea that meaning is embedded in texts and can be read without 
interpretative subjectivism - and the idea that because texts have many meanings (or 
none). the judge is free to impose or invent whatever meaning serves her partisan 
purposes (Fish 1984: 1325). 
Much legal scholarship has been directed at the threat of indetenninacy and 
towards developing a hermeneutic lS8 approach to issues of interpretative justice, 
attempting to discover within the processes of legal interpretation, a set of constraints 
that can lift a judge' s understanding of the law above the level of the personal and 
subjective. 159 Fiss' solution to the dilemma of indeterminacy is to posit "disciplinary 
rules" as a source of constraint for the determination of meaning. Disciplinary rules 
intervene between text and reader and derive from the institutional setting of the 
interpretative activity. These rules permit a measure of objectivity required by the 
idea of law, where the interpretative community recognises such rules as authoritative 
and thus confers authority on them. Objectivity is therefore limited to the 
interpretative community, but, so the argument goes, this is the only kind of 
objectivity that can be hoped for. It should, however, be noted that the idea of an 
interpretative community does not provide a politically neutral referent. Paul Brest 
(1982) argues that objectivity is an illusion - since the legal interpretative community 
is predominantly male, middle-aged and relatively wealthy - supposedly cultivating 
"our" public values, It is for this reason vital that cognisance be taken of the 
relationship between the composition of the dominant legal interpretative community 
(the judiciary) and the outcomes of its interpretations. 
In post-1994 South Africa, Consti tutional Court judges are appointed by the 
President "in consultation with the cabinet and the Chief Justice". I60 The first four 
post-apartheid judges were appointed from within the ranks of the existing judges and 
l~. Hermeneuein, a Greek word, means to interpret, to understand the meaning of texts. The tenn 
derives from Hennes, the messenger of the gods, the mediator between the divine and the secu lar, 
whose tasks included interpreting the wishes from the fonner to the laner. Hermeneutics in a general 
sense is the theory and practice of exp lication and interpretation. 
159 As Hutchinson puts it: "Constitutional scho lars have become absorbed in the quest for the 
henneneutic grail - namely the search for an appropriate set of methodological principles with ethical 
principles" (Hutchinson 1989: 165). 
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represent the "more progressive sector of the old judiciary". whilst the five new 
appointees were also "progressive lawyers" (Sarkin 1997: 136,137) and supporters of 
the African National Congress. It is not surprising perhaps, that the various 
judgements of the Constitutional Court indicate its willingness to allow parliament to 
determine policy with linle judicial interference (Sarkin 1998: 644). This is not 10 
suggest that the judiciary has been cynically panisan in following government policy 
contrary to what it believed to be just, but merely that judges are prefigured by, and 
constituted through, their position within a variety of language games. Language 
games have rules and judges are similarly positioned concordant with government 
policy within the various games (economic, social and ideological) which constitute 
them. It is understandable that their common positioning might lead judges to reach 
consensus or near consensus on the determination of meaning and to agree on a 
politics of justice similar to that of the government I am not suggesting crude 
psychological determinism, but simply that judges and other individuals do not 
autonomously choose either their political beliefs or determinations of meaning. 
Judges with similar political views and legal training are likely to agree on a 
determinate meaning of a rule. They are more likely 10 agree that a certain meaning is 
the common or plain meaning and that a rule may be neutrally applied. Language 
games are infused with relations of power, forces which are constantly shifting and to 
which the subject is necessari ly subjected.161 A language game is a site of struggle, 
where certain rules and articulat ions are preferred or privileged over others, so that 
such privileging will seem natural and neutral to the subjectivities constructed by and 
dominated through them. 
The point is that interpretative conventions, such as Fiss's rules themselves 
reflect the background and experience of those privileged to constitute the legal 
interpretative community and serve to isolate interpretative judgements from public 
scrutiny.162 Joel Bakan notes that the judicial internalisation of disciplinary rules 
merely validates the authority of the legal elite because conventions of legal cultures 
160 Section 99(3) of the interim Constitution . 
161 "There are two meanings to the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, 
and tied to one 's identity by a conscience or selr-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power 
which subjugates and makes subject to" (Foucault 1982b: 212, emphasis in original). 
162 Hugh Corder, who traces the role and attitudes of the South African Appellate judiciary from 1910 
to 1950. notes that a critic of the judiciary in South Africa is faced with the following obstacle: "the 
sensitiviry displayed by South African judges and authorities ... and the aura of infallibility, which in 
the eyes of many observers surrounds the South African judiciary, fonn considerable inhibitions for the 
South African researcher" (Corder 1984: 2) 
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reflect their perspectives which are invariably those of dominant social groups with an 
interest in maintaining the status quo. It is impossible to insulate the judiciary from 
socially contingent practices and forces. As Balkin (1991) notes , the apparent 
univocality of legal texts is often a function of the ideological instanti~tion of the 
interpreter. Moreover, interpretative communities do not exist a priori but are 
continually constituted and reconstituted in a process of ongoing ideological struggle. 
Such communities are themselves divided and dissensus may be the norm. 
A further operation of the hegemonic process is the creation of cultural 
traditions. Resort to cultural traditions and effective histories of texts as a source of 
constraint for interpretation of legal texts share the inadequacies of looking to 
contexts and language games in that they efface the social struggle involved in the 
construction of these boundaries. Ronald Dworkin's henneneutics suggests that the 
ideal judge (Hercules) should make reference to the community's political and legal 
principles - its traditions - which will constrain the judge's interpretation of what 
justice and fairness mean in that context (Dworkin 1986). Dworkin makes an analogy 
between the task of legal interpretation and that of writing a chain novel , a work of 
collective authorship, with each chapter being written by a different individual author. 
He correctly points out that attempts to fathom or understand authorial intentions 
cannot constrain interpretation, since authorial intention is complex, manifold and is 
itself subject to multiple interpretations. Instead, each author is constrained by the 
previously written chapters and must ensure that the chapter she writes "fits" with the 
preceding chapters and contributes to the preservation of the integrity of the novel. 
"Fit" implies that the chain novelist must find an interpretation of the meaning of the 
text that can cover all or most of the elements of the text under study and show how 
they all work together to compose a unified whole. Of course, it may happen that two 
interpretations of the text fit equally well. As a standard for adjudicating between 
these two equally fitting interpretations, Dworkin introduces the standard of "best 
light": the interpreter must decide which interpretation reveals the work or practice to 
be the best instance it can be of the "fonn or genre to which it is taken to belong" 
(Dworkin 1986: 52). The crilerion of fit and the standard of "besl lighl" constitute 
Dworkin's concept.ion of law as integrity, which means for the judge that she must 
look for the continuity of principle that underlies the different decisions in the history 
of the legal tradition, and that she must choose between different possible 
interpretative principles by finding that principle or set of principles that allows legal 
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practice to be the best it can be. Of course, judges may differ in their views of what 
makes past decisions and precedents the best law it can be, such differences issuing 
from the judges' moral and political values. Hence, though political differences will 
enter into legal judgements. our legal interpretations will be as constrained and 
objective as they can be. 
Dworkin ' s approach is intertextual and while it is formal and procedural, it is 
not purely abstract since the substantive values of the community of legal actors 
cannot simply be severed from the process of interpretation, Under closer scrutiny 
however, Dworkin' s theory of law as integrity fails to provide an acceptable solution 
to the interpretative crisis of indeterminacy. One reason for this failure is that, as Alan 
Brudner has pointed out, the criterion of fit is too indeterminate to allow Dworkin' s 
principle of integrity a sufficiently concrete meaning (Brudner 1990: 1156,1157). The 
requirement of fit and integrity is reducible to an appeal to coherence made in an 
interpretative universe that has been stripped of intelligible criteria and coherence 
(Brudner 1990: 1158). Furthermore, Dworkin's allegiance to the legitimacy and 
binding authority of tradition fails to provide room for any critical reflection on the 
construction of that tradition or the legacy of those principles, rendering it 
" impervious to the ways in which coercive and non-reciprocal relationships within a 
society shape its culture" (Brenkman 1987: viii). 
The hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer has been heralded as offering a 
particularly postmodem solution to indeterminacy in translation (DaUmeyr 1992; 
Mootz 1993; Feldman 1994). Gadamer emphasises the role of context in the shaping 
of parameters within which meaning is appropriated from a text. It is impossible to 
read meaning ' out of a text apart from the assumptions and prejudices of the 
interpreter, since these undertakings both enable and constrain it. The context in 
which the reader approaches the text conditions the reader's grasp of it. The context is 
historically and culturally contingent and includes historical and social, rather than 
subjective and voluntaristic factors. The context in which the interpretation of a text 
takes place includes the historical growth and transmission of that text: interpretation 
is tradition-bound. Judges are not free to read what they want into or out of a legal 
text; their current context, present needs and the history of legal interpretation 
cumulatively act to constrain their interpretation (Hoy 1985: 141). 
For Gadamer it is not the case that judges impose their subjective political 
visions in interpretation; rather, interpretation changes in accordance with the change 
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In historical and cultural factors that influence and constrain the judge's readings. 
Interpreters do not simply choose a meaning from numerouS possible meanings 
engendered by the text; it is rather that the text engages with the reader's 
understanding of the world. Gadamer's metaphor for this process of mediation is the 
"fusion of horisons", a process of 'coming-ta-understand' which is not a matter of the 
unprejudiced appropriation of a text, but a fusion of one's horizons of meaning and 
expectati on with that of the text. 
On this version, tradition IS an unshakeable ethical bond constraining 
interpretation. Moreover, Gadamer does not deny that some authentic and firm given 
(text or law) is the basis of all interpretations. Although new interpretations are 
always possible, they are linked to the truth of tradition. Under the Gadarnerian 
conception "the self same and unchanging truth can always be understood differently 
and there are no grounds for saying . that it is understood better by one of its finite 
bearers than it is by any other. The absolute never assumes absolute and canonical 
form" (Caputo 1987: 111 ). Despite Gadamer's arguments, tradition is not a seamless 
web and values are not shared; instead there is dissensus and polyphony. 
Stanley Fish emphasises cultural and historical context as limiting (or 
defining) the interpretative process. Fish argues that there is a level of observation or 
discourse at which meanings are obvious or indisputable and that these are not 
properties of the world, but propenies of the world as it is given to us by our 
interpretative assumptions. What we see is a product of our mental and verbal 
categories, categories which are the very possibility of our perception and so seem to 
be pan of the world itself. Moreover, interpretative assumptions are historically and 
culturally contingent. The interpretative act is performed at so deep a level that it is 
indistinguishable from consciousness itself (Fish 1979: 245). For Fish there exist no 
texts or meanings in texts independent of or prior to our interpretation. What is in the 
text is a function of interpretative activity. There is no need to look to external sources 
of constraint in legal interpretation, such as the disciplinary rules posited by Fiss. The 
fear of unbridled interpretation upon which this search is based is groundless because 
to be inside a context is " to be already and always thinking with and within nonns, 
standards, definitions, routines and understood goals that both define and are defined 
by tha' context" (Fish 1984: 1332). The assumptions and categories of understanding 
embodied in the practice of legal interpretation, internalised through training and 
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socialisation for that practice, already constrains the interpreter who only apprehends 
the text in the light of these. 
In Fish' s view, the shared understanding of the general purposes of the legal 
enterprise and its underlying rationales will ensure both rational adjudication and 
readings of legal texts that yield determinate results. Of course, this does not mean 
that institutional interpretations of a given text must have one tendency rather than 
another (Fish 1983: 275). Rather, a picture of legal practice is presented that gives 
central place to tradition. and which both limits and permits transformation. 
Disagreements about meaning are possible not because a text has any number of 
meanings, but because different persons may be reading according to the assumptions 
of different circumstances. These conflicts, however, are always being settled and 
··the means of settl ing them are political. social, institutional in a mix which is itself 
subjecI to modificalion and change" (Fish 1984: 1336). 
What are the means referred to? On what basis are the merits of competing 
claims decided? Not all concerns within religious, political or moral groups have a say 
in the evaluation process. Following both Derrida and Lyotard, certain voices are 
excluded or at least marginalised so that they will not be valued equally with others. 
To say that the interpretative process is regulated by institutional assumptions is to 
recognise the struggle generated by competing conceptions and particular forms of 
social experience. 163 In legal interpretation the legitimacy of certain articulations is 
affirmed at the expense of others. To conclude resignedly that the interpretative arena 
is constructed through competing political claims, as Fish does, is to concede the right 
of those whose privilege and might has permitted them to participate and dominate 
the interpretative process, to continue to do so. What is required is not only the 
admission that meaning is contextually constructed, but also an investigation of the 
historical and cultural contingencies of such contexts. 
The problem with Fish's account is that context takes on a rigid and 
monolithic form. Postmodemism suggests that discourse is neither singular nor 
consensual. Context is not a singular structure but a dynamic of multiple and 
competing discourses; context does not present itself neutrally with one voice. 
Instead, individuals are located in a world of multiple, overlapping and often 
L61 Davis observes that the interpretation of a legallext is dependant on "political struggle and po litical 
experience [which] introduce new and different contexts, themes and meaning inlo the work" (Davis 
1996,508). 
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contradictory discourses. Context does not, as Fish suggests, present a stable referent 
in which meaning appears self-evident, obvious and a matter of common sense. 
Contexts are multip le and multivalent, reflecting the claims and demands of 
competing audiences and making divergent sense of the texts under interpretation, so 
that confrontation with contradiction and ambiguity is unavoidable. M.L. Pratt notes 
that 
there is always doubt, conflict, disagreement, because interpretations are 
always there in multiplicity, denying each other the illusion of self-
containment and truth ... People and groups are constituted not by single 
unified belief systems, but by competing, self-contradictory ones. Knowledge 
is interested, and interest implies conflict; to advance an interpretation is to 
insert it into a network of power relations. (Pratt 1986: 52) 
Context does not provide consensus. On the contrary, context reflects dissensus and 
plurality, which must be confronted by all judges, regardless of training, institutional 
constraints and the governing conventions that they accept. Interpretations may 
reproduce conventions and assumptions which make interpretation possible, but this 
does not exclude the possibility of the continuous potential for transfonnation that 
interpretation provides: there is always more than one voice and one possibility to 
choose from. For Derrida this possibility provides the impetus for the intervention of 
deconstruct ion, in which the excluded or marginalised possibility may be recognised. 
For Lyotard, however, to speak of privileging the other is not really to face the 
irreducible pluralism of the postmodem: interpretative dissensus and plurality are 
closer to the mark. 
Brian Langille (1988) presents an important account of legal interpretation 
based on the later Wittgenstein 's theory of language and rule-following. Arguing 
against critics who cite Wittgenstein as authority for the proposition that language 
itself cannot constrain interpretation because it is always malleable and open to the 
politics of context, Langille maintains that " in Wittgenstein 's world, indetenninacy is 
not the result because our language has ' the detenninacy of an activity'" (Langi lle 
1988: 488). The recognition of indetenninacy does not require a reference out to 
political context, since meaning (determinacy) is a function of the use of language 
within a language game, the idea of practice as "bedrock". Language only has 
meaning within language games and the "fonns of life" in which these games are 
embedded. Understanding is likened to an activity or technique, and the criteria for 
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understanding lies in behaviour; the use of language within a particular language 
game. There can be no (external) foundations for understanding because interpretation 
involves language and language is an activity. For Wittgenstein, obeying a rule is not 
a product of thinking or conscious choice, but of acting: "When I obey a rule, I do not 
choose. I obey the rule blindly" (Wittgenstein 1953: para 2 I 9). In the end knowledge 
of rules is simply knowing in what manner to act, and explanations simply run out. 
Wittgenstein writes, 
[hJow am 1 able to obey a rule? - if trus is not a question about causes, then it 
is about the justification for following the rule in the way I do. If I have 
exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. 
(Wittgenstein 1953: para 117). 
This is not a point about "community consensus" or "custom" regulating the way in 
which rules are followed. It is a grammatical point about the necessary background 
conditions for the existence or use of concepts at all. What makes language games 
possible and permits rule-following, is not simply agreement in definitions, but 
"agreement. . . in judgements" (Wingenstein 1953: paras 241 , 242). Wingenstein ' s 
" linguistic naturalism" (Pears 1986: 179) may be seen to promote a form of 
conventionalism, but, argues Langille, it is neither arbitrary nor a matter of consensus 
of opinion. Wittgenstein's conventionalism is prior to any form of conscious 
agreement. What makes language games, like legal practice, possible is not simply 
agreement in definitions, but agreement in judgements; not in opinions but in forms of 
life. Agreement in judgements is a necessary precondition of language; it is the 
background which makes language possible. Langille concludes by observing that the 
Wittgensteinian idea regarding rule following, and thus human rationality as being 
grounded in the bedrock of practice, is central to the understanding of law and is at 
the core of the recent non-sceptical "turn to interpretation" . 
The problem with Langille' s account is that it provides no reason for being 
sanguine with respect to the determinacy of judicial activity or the bedrock of 
adjudicative practice. That the ossification of meaning within context is cause for 
alarm escapes Langille, who is content to retreat into the quietism of stasis: "This is 
just the way things are" (Langille 1988: 493). Wittgenstein provides the following 
description of rule-following: 
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Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule? - Let me ask 
this: what has the expression of the rule-say a sign post-got to do with my 
actions? What sort of connexion is there here? - Well , perhaps this one: I have 
been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to 
it . 
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that 
we now go on by these signposts; not what this going by the sign really 
consists in. On the contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by a 
signpost only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. 
(Wingenstein 1953: paras 198, 199) 
This would indicate that judicial action upon encountering a rule, a sign-post say, is 
explained by the fact that judges have been trained to react to the sign in a particular 
way and that judges go by these signposts only in so far as there exists a custom; rule 
following is therefore, not a mental process but a fonn of activity. However, to say 
that legal rule foll owing is a form of act ivity, something that lawyers do, explains 
nothing about the nature of the activity in question or its possible consequences. 
Moreover, discourse, language games, support particular configurations of power and 
facil itate practices of domination. l64 For instance, legal language games have reflected 
and reinforced understandings of the human which posit the white male as the norm 
and the language that privileges this agent as neutral , objective and universal. l65 
Liberal legal discourse shares the logocentric bias of western philosophy; it presumes 
a Cartesian " truth" of human nature, an ontological transparency, present to one' s 
conscIOus: 
We can think of a system of law as a community's attempt to realise human 
ends. This presupposes a description of the good and the bad in human nature: 
what people want from their lives and what their limitations are. The 
description necessarily involves privilegings of certain aspects of human 
164 The point is forcefully made by Foucautt in the discuss ion between Foucault and Chomsky in 
"Human Nature : Justice versus Power" in Elders 1974 at 135·197. 
16} An interesting ex.ample of thi s kind of normative racist Eurocentric ity is em bodied in the lega l 
fiction of "the reasonable man", the prevaili ng jurisprudential yardstick for lega lly acceptab le 
behaviour. Although South African law has identified the reasonable man as a South African indiv idual 
(despite approving references to the English definition of the reasonable man as "the man on the 
Clapham omnibus"), the standard applied has been predominantly a gendered and ethnocentric 
construct that implic iHy naturalises a white, masculine perspective and correspondingly denigrates 
anything directly or analogously assoc iated with a feminine or black position, a standard se lf·ev idently 
inappropriate to South Africa's multi·cu ltural soc iety. Here the linguistic form of absolute neutrality 
and clarity determines what is real for us. This domain unfolds as the soc ial order under the authority of 
the neutralised " reasonable man" . Who is this reasonable man? We cannot see him; he is faceless 
though no less authoritative. 
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nature over others. Later we justify OUT system by claiming that it is the best, 
given the natural constraints of the human condition. (Balkin 1987: 76~) 
Contrary to the Cartesian conception, however, it has been argued that subjectivity is 
constituted within discourse - a terrain in which power is always contested and 
shifting - and subjectivity IS created and recreated in this context. The 
' ·conventionalism" to which Wingenslcin refers is culturally and historically 
particular and so contingent, in the sense that things could be and have been 
di fferenL I66 It is precisely the contingency of current social practices which allows for 
the possibility of reform, since refonn derives from other forms of life and from the 
margins of society as the means with which' to challenge and destabilise the 
"common" or "obvious" in existing language games. It is not sufficient to declare 
passively with Langille that "[tJhis is just the way things are. There is as much 
stability as there is" (Langille 1988: 493), since what is. can be and should be resisted. 
Where norms and customs achieve social predominance in a given historical period, 
they seem to be common-sense assumptions, and the fonn of life for which they are 
framework conditions, constitutes an hegemony. However, hegemonic structures are 
contingent and unstable. Social relations are constructed and transformed through 
discourse which is never complete and never totalising. Opposition is always possible 
within alternative practices, structures and spaces (Deutsche 1991: 20; Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 30). 
If rationality is social in character167 then it is also political. A " form of life" 
comprises the social experience of equality and domination and thus any use of 
language can only be understood within the framework of domination and oppression 
in which the language concept or rule is embedded (Coombe 1989: 640). This means, 
if one is commined to justice, that resistance is required together with an 
understanding of how "the use, the context, the activity. the purpose, the game which 
is being played" (Langille 1988: 4%), exacerbate rather than alleviate suffering, 
disparity and disempowerment. Resistance may only take place through an experience 
166 Eaglelon remarks that Wingenstein cannot avoid metaphysical illusions merely through recourse to 
the context of soc ial life. If the point is that language is internally related to its soc ial conditions, then 
the poli tical character of those conditions is contai ned in language. Eagleton remarks that 
"Wittgenstein 's philosophy is reactionary not in its re ferring of be liefs and discourses to soc ial activity, 
but in its assumption that such referring constitutes a liberation from the metaphys ical" (Eagleton 1986: 
107) because metaphysics is established exactly al the level of social discourse where objectification, 
reification and logocentricism are practised and experienced. 
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of alterity, a recognition of onc's duty to the other and an attempt to understand those 
who are rnarginalised. 
Justice involves focussing attention on the limits of legal discourse, and 
thereby negotiating with the being ofan age. By permitting the voices of the marginal 
and the voices of the unheard, it is possible to break through present discursive limits 
and expose new horizons of justice (Pavlich and Ratner 1996). Whilst it is true that "it 
is only within a practice, culture and fonn of life that meaning is possible" (LangiJIe 
1998: 501). justice is possible because there are not only discourses other than law, 
but also differentiations within legal practice: meaning is never singular and 
transparent, but multivalent; it is always contextually and therefore socially specific. 
Therefore, although Langille correctly insists that there is no critique beyond the 
current "form of life" from which concepts can be critically analysed, critique does 
not depend on a transcendental obseryation point because "the fonn of life in which 
we are si tuated is not a singular hermetically sealed system, but a constellation of 
shifting conjunctures of multiple discourses which itself provides resources which 
make criticism bOlh possible and meaningful" (Coombe 1989: 642). 
3.3 Detcrminacy and Indeterminacy in South Africa 
Daniel Herwitz ( 1999) makes a strong case for determinacy in his persuasive 
appeal for binding rules and criteria to enable the reconstruction and development of 
institutions and other material conditions of life in South Africa. Although Herwitz's 
focus is on socio-economic rules rather than legal rules, his arguments on the related 
issues of rule-following, determinacy and indetenninacy are instructive for the 
treatment of these issues within the locality of South Africa. This section investigates 
Herwitz 's scepticism towards (though not total abandonment of) the application of a 
postmodem epistemology in South Africa and attempts to address some of the 
concerns raised. 
Herwitz argues that "the epistemic norms of poststructuralism, played out in 
their postmodem context of their northern practice, exhibit a deficit of direct 
relevance to the question of a southern venture" (Herwitz 1999: 24). Furthermore, 
language games of justice in the South should be concerned with reconstruction and 
167 Peter Winch correct ly notes that "human rationality is essentially soc ial in character" (Winch 1972: 
60). 
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transformation of the material conditions of forms of life in areas such as education, 
jobs and housing. All of this requires construction, rational planning and rules, which 
need to be determinate in order to be efficacious. Wingenstein is cited as authority for 
context-re lated detenninacy. Hervtitz writes: 
"Stand exactly here and get the job done", we might remark in the spirit of 
Wittgenstein. South Africa must speed up (development) time and set clear 
and achievable efficiency criteria, not slow it down and resist these 
delenninations on life. (Herwitz 1999: 26) 
The point seems to be that the North, in which the social rationality of modernity has 
ensured development of superior institutional and economic conditions, makes the 
mistake of taking for granted developed material conditions and rejects the rationality 
(deterrninacy) which made it possible. The South, however, does not have this luxury, 
since what is required is that people obey rules and rebuild 168 , although Herwitz does 
concede that South Africa needs postmodernl postructuralist theory "to provide 
mUltiple readings and responses ... to explain the nature of. .. [South African 
developmental] policy and to articulate styles of critique and resistance to policy" 
(Herwitz 1999: 29). 
Unda Hutcheon expresses a similarly sceptical vIew of the conflation of 
postcolonial reconstruction and postmodem critiques when she writes: " those radical 
postmodem challenges are in many ways the luxury of the dominant order which can 
afford to challenge that which it securely possesses" (Hutcheon 1995: 131). Indeed, 
some critics view postmodernism as itself the dominant Eurocentric, neo-universalist 
imperial discourse, despite postmodernism 's complicity with postcolonialism in its 
characterisation of modernism as elitist, imperialist and totalising (Hutcheon 1995). 
Material conditions and their relationship to questions of ideology and 
representation are at the heart of the most rigorous debates in recent postcolonial 
theory. Inasmuch as language is deployed to theorise the colonial encounter, the 
material and experiential worlds have receded and the structures of colonialism and 
strategies for its opposition are registered representationally in the contradictions and 
indeterrninacies of its enunciations. This trend has elicited considerable protest from 
168 According to its crit ics, the reason poststructuralism cannot help in the Southern enterprise is that it 
purportedly undermines the social consolidation that must take place if we are even to be able to speak 
to one another about standards of justice. This is an important charge. one which an argument 
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those who point to disparities between the structure of language and fanns of social 
practice, arguing that the discourse of text-based postcolonial theory presents the 
World according to the Word (Mohanty 1984; Ahmed 1995; Miyoshi 1993). In that it 
seems to recommend change at the level of discourse and consciousness, rather than 
at the level of material - economic and social - circumstance. poststructuralism IS 
perceived to be open to the charge that it is politically conservative because it IS 
insufficiently dialectical; because it refuses to discriminate between "world" and 
"text", between the "material" and the "discursive", it might be argued (as I think 
Herwitz does) that it lacks theoretical purchase on the interdependence and mutual 
conditioning of the two (Soper 1994}.169 However, these arguments themselves have 
no purchase on a position which eschews the vocabulary of materialism and idealism. 
There is simply no common discourse and all one can do is to charge poststructuralist 
"idealism" with lacking the conceptual apparatus for making distinctions between, or 
changes to, the various modalities of social life. 170 However, whilst I concede that 
poststructuralism cannot do all the theoretical work in the formulation of rules for 
development its capacity for conflict and resistance, its introduction of the ethics of 
humanity and othemess, provide supplements to determinate on which justice 
depends. 
I agree, with certain qualifications. that South Africa requires modernisation 
and reconstruction and that rules and criteria (including legal rules and criteria) are 
necessary for this purpose. I find it difficult to embrace uncritically the suggestion that 
" the subaltern must gradually become more completely part of the fabric of modem 
life: more familiar with its gadgets, involved in its institutions, brought into its 
schemes, enfranchised under the umbrella of its goods" (Herwitz 1998: 98). For one 
thing, the suggestion connotes an element of subsumption and western imperialism. 
The fabric of modem life, it strikes me, is in places tom, worn out and shabby - cloth 
unfit for postmodem development workwear. Take technology for instance: 
advocating poslsrructura list theory in the South cannot ignore. I deal with it towards the end of this 
chapter. 
169 Nancy Fraser also challenges what she calls "the limitations of fashionable neostructuralist models 
of discourse analysis that dissociate "the symbolic order" from the political economy, and so lack the 
bivalency required to integrate the soc ial and cultural and the economic and discursive" (Fraser 1997: 
5,6). 
170 Furthennore, as Geoff Bennington argues, "any philosophy which gives itself world and language as 
two separate realms separated by an abyss that has to be crossed remains caught, at the very point of 
the supposed crossing, in the circle of dogmatism and relativism that it is unable to break" (Bennington 
and Derrida 1991: 103). 
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television, film and the internet operate cumulatively as potent vectors of such values 
as individualism, hedonistic self-grat ification. consumerism and shallow-thinking. 
The gadgets, institutions, schemes and goods of modernity can operate either as 
implements of western imperialism l 71 (and so perpetuate in Andre Gunder Frank's 
now famous phrase ';the development of underdevelopment") or as potent tools of 
developmenLI72 It all depends on whether these facets of modernisation are utilised in 
a manner faci litative of human enhancement and this depends on an ethical 
interrogation of the use to which these instruments wi ll be put. 
Periods of paradigmatic transition are periods of fierce competition among 
rival epistemoiogies and knowledges, periods of radical thinking which are both 
reconstructive and deconstructive. Not only are meaningful rules being created within 
contexts, but the very contexts themselves are being contested. The "bedrock" of 
practice experiences seismic shifts, and is constituted and reconstituted in accordance 
with the vacillat ions of political transition. Context is always contingent, but in 
political transition of the kind faced by South Africa, context is itself being interpreted 
and negotiated at an extraordinary rate, its cultural and historical contingency all too 
apparent. Since meaning is contextually specific it is also socially specific. The 
meaning of"stand exactly here" depends upon where exactly one is standing. 
The effects of the legal system for persons who are privileged enough to 
participate in them are not the same as those which these practices have for persons 
who merely endure or are victimised by them. Contexts and communities adduced to 
serve as foundations for law are not simply given but produced by exclusions of the 
constructions of meanings and significance that the marginalised give to their 
experience. Context is not a self-present source of meaning but the derivative effect of 
171 E. Roy Ramirez remarks thal il is important "nOI IO confuse it [developmentJ with modernization" 
and attempts to forge a new concept of development characteri sed by a "constant vigilance not to let 
fonns of oppression pass fo r liber1y, commercial pseudo-cuhure and the consumption of fantasies for 
superior culture, diverse manifestations of plunder for progress .. . economic inequalities for justice or 
fear fo r peace" (Ramirez 1986: 25). 
In Ramirez also offers an ethical critique of and alternat ive to what he ca lls "technological 
detennin ism '·. the belief that technology - whether imported or produced nationally - is both 
necessary and sufficient for deve lopment: " In the same way that development cannot be restricted to 
economic growth . so development cannot be reduced merely to a technical matter. It involves a 
culture's identity, self-confidence, important degrees of independence, the search for its own answers, 
the satisfaction of basic needs, an openness to the future , social and mental changes that transform 
members of a society capab le of sustaining, at its own pace and by its own means, more human forms 
of life" (Ramirez 1988: 48). In addition, Partha Chatterjee comments in relation to post-colonial 
countries that "no matter how skill fu lly employed, modem statecraft and the appl ication of modem 
technology cannot effecti vely suppress the very real tensions which remain unresolved" (Chanerjee 
1986, 147). 
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representational practices in which some elements of social life are said to constitute 
context to the exclusion of others. Gary Peller writes: 
The metaphysics of contextual presence accordingly reverses the metaphor of 
subjective priority into one of objective priority. Thus meaning doe's not flow 
intrinsically from the words or intent of the subject, but extrinsically from 
factors which are outside the subject which seem to constitute subjective 
meaning. The inside, the text, is seen to originate in the outside the context. 
The outside as a self-present and undifferentiated source or origin thus is taken 
as a transcendental object, existing prior to and separate from the social 
construction of the context. (Peller 1985: 1224, 1225) 
Peller correctly observes that context is a discursive construction of situated social 
agents , and that rhetorical strategies shape the way "context" is defined in the 
discourse concerning legal interpretation. The contexts of South African constitutional 
law and politics are being constructed -through the rhetorical strategies of 
constitutional theorists and judges. some of which I unpacked in Chapter One. South 
Africa requires reconstruction of its practices and institutions through rules, but these 
rules must be deconstructed to reveal the contingency of their own construction. 
3.4 Poststructuralistl Deconstructivel Postcolonial Interpretation 
Foucault and Derrida, abandoning hermeneutics proper, focus instead on how 
institutions, power and practices work and what their effects are on "the generality of 
our lives, so as to alert us to the cost of the practices and open us to the possibilities of 
change" (Dreyfus 1984: 81). Understanding is not a series of rules but a set of 
strategies and tactics. Deconstruction suggests that there is no authentic reading or 
meaning of a given text. Deconstruction questions the grammar of reading and 
interpretation. Derrida's critique suggests that every «identity" necessarily suppresses 
an alternative identity_ All meaning has a "surplus", that which is oppressed along 
with that which is articulated. All meaning is deferred; there is never a conceptual 
closure because language can never offer a "total and immediate access to the 
thoughts that occasioned its utterance" (Norris 1991: 44, 46, emphasis in original). 
What strategy of. reading and interpretation does deconstruction propose? 
Deconstruction "is a matter of taking a repressed or subjugated theme ... , pursuing its 
various textual ramifications and showing how these subvert the very order that 
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strives to hold them in check" (Norris 1991: 39). Deconstruction strategically 
activates the meaning. hidden or suppressed by the rhetorical flow of the .text by 
reading it against the grain and so denying and subverting privileged discourses: 
"Deconstruction tears a text apart, reveals its contradictions and asswnptions" 
(Rosenau 1992: xi).i7J 
For Derrida. the distinction between hermeneutics and postmodernl 
poststructuralist interpretation is the difference between rabbinical and poetical 
interpretations (Derrida 1978: 64-78). Hermeneutics is rabbinical in that it emphasises 
the Book of Law that has been handed down; as commentary and elucidation, 
interpretation is always secondary. Poetic interpretation is "the joyous affirmation of 
the word and the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without 
fault , without truth and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation" 
(Derrida 1978: 292). For all herrneneutics, the work itself is privileged as a material 
and semantic self·referential totality , complete in itself and distinct from what is 
outside. Furthennore, interpretation as the dialogue between present and past 
presupposes a theory of historical continuity, and coherence is a sign of the desire for 
presence. Foucault, Hayden White and Paul Ricoeur have demonstrated that modern 
history as continuity and progress is a construction of scattered events into a narrative, 
the introduction of plot and story into disjunctive occurrences. History is a rhetorical 
creation, an act of fiction constructed in relation to a discontinuous series of events. 
Consequently the effort to derive ' truth ' and ' meaning' from history and tradition 
seems problematical. 
In poststructuralism. the text as intertext replaces the sovereignty of the work; 
it is created through a continuous affinnation and denial of other texts. The text is a 
shifting tissue of signs and every text opens up to every other text, which it both 
affirms and denies. Every text is infiltrated by codes, conventions, conscious and 
unconscious practices, and opens itself to a poetic interpretation which can never be 
solely semantic. Interpretation is not the retrieval of authorial intention, of the 
immanent meaning of a text or of the meaning given in tradition or context. It exploits 
every connection, "every associative bond. every phonic. graphic, semiotic and 
semantic link, every relation of whatever sort that exists among signi fiers, in order to 
set forth the powers of repetition in all its productivity, inventiveness and freedom" 
173 I provide a fuller account of the theory of poststucluralism and Derridean deconstruction in the 
previous chapter and so do not repeal it here. 
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(Caputo 1987: 192). Authorship and inlent ionali ty cannot be used as principles of 
unity and coherence for the text, since the text, as a collection of material traces, is cut 
off from its authorship. Iteration renders intention disjointed and never fully present to 
the actor. These characteristics are necessarily present in the law as text. 
Henneneutics has moved some way towards a non-metaphys ical tradition by 
accepting the linguistic nature of all understanding and experience. Hermeneuts, 
having made this important discovery. view language as a depository of meaning. a 
site of dialogue and shared understandings. For Dcrrida, difference and <tracing' 
which give language meaning also prevent such meaning from ever being final: the 
sign as a mark of presence/ absence gives language the ability to communicate, but 
also prevents any fina l closure of meaning. There can never be consensus because 
there is always a lack or an excess which cannot be retrieved by an act of 
interpretation that looks only to sem~tic completeness. Lyotard, of course, rejects 
any reasoned appeal to a consensus of truth-seeking interests, which "do violence to 
the heterogeneity of language games" (Lyotard 1984: xxv). For Lyotard, the 
community which endows language with meaning is an obstreperous illusion. In his 
reformulation of the sublime there is a demand for community, but not the projection 
of a particular form of community as if it were universal: "the universality called for 
by the beautiful and the sublime is only an Idea of the community for which no proof 
will ever be found , that is no direct presentation, but only indirect presentations" 
(Lyotard 1988: 242). The imposition of a particular meaning on society would amount 
to what Lyotard terms terror, the domination of one language game by another. 
Derrida, at least, does not deny that society requires determinate meanings -
these are necessary fictions. However the various versions of presence and 
detenninacy in the law - written constitutions, statutes and common law precedents -
are only partial stabi lisations in the temporal continuum of history, which is not a 
single or general history, history as meaning but rather "histories different in their 
type, rhythm, mode of inscription - intervallic, differential histories" (Derrida 1981 : 
58) which cannot be totalised. Derrida encourages determinat ions of meaning, 
recognising that judging is essential; at the same time he is vigilant, examining the 
emergence of truths, and warning that they should not be allowed to pass as natural, 
eternal or normal. Deconstruction is not simply an interpretative method which seeks 
only to destabilise meanings by systematically unveiling contradictions embedded in 
writing and inverting binary oppositions that circumscribe texts. Contrarily, the 
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deconstructive process implies an ontology of the unbridgeable gap between self and 
other (or at least the infinite postponement of the complete reconciliation between self 
and other), which is supplemented by an ethic of inclusion of and care for the other -
an ethic which "must always be anempted and renewed but which can never be 
satisfied because the meaning of inclusion and of care can never sufficiently be 
determined to the extent that the self always remains somewhat estranged from the 
other" (Rosenfeld 1992: 158). 
Although for deconstruction, meanmg is never permanently fixed, it is not 
arbitrary (in the sense of being the capricious result of unconstrained subjectivity) 
either. because its ontological and ethical features are inscribed in history, leaving 
their mark in a succession of concrete historical formations - successive written 
constitutions, judgements and commentaries for instance - which constrain the range 
of possible legitimate meanings without ever imposing a single, fully determinate 
meaning. Hence, ontology and ethics "constantly open and close possible paths of 
interpretation without ever settling on any single, distinct, clearly articulated and 
exhaustively circumscribed meaning" (Rosenfeld t 992: 159). Intertextual 
interpretative practice does not culminate in aimless conflict and hopeless 
indeterminacy; it cannot avoid conflict but instead reveals particular conflicts which 
invite a finite range of possible solutions. Deconstructive practice certainly leads to 
indeterminacy, but does not justify every conceivable meaning. The indeterminacy 
that results is a constrained indeterminacy that results from the interplay between 
semantic path openings and closings guided by the actual historical succession of 
intertextual forms of attempted reconciliation between self and other. 
Poststructuralist textual analysis and deconstruction is, as I have mentioned, 
important in South Africa's postcolonial context. The postcolonial interpreter must be 
wary of essentialist colonial and anti-colonial narratives, both in the Constitution and 
legal judgements, and must deconstruct them to show their complicity with the 
master-slave narrative of imperialism. This is especially crucial at this juncture of 
South Africa' s history when the myths fostered in relation to reconstruction -
tradition, nationhood and citizenship - are invoked to suppress existing heterogeneity. 
In this way. the postcolonial interpreter is called on to rewrite the colonial and 
poslcoionial situation, to uncover the ideological and discursive construction of 
difference, and to evoke a conception of interpretation which shatters the coherence of 
the 'original' and the ' invariable identity of sense' . Postcolonial interpretation, in 
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Derrida's words, "will not be readings of a henneneutic or exegetic sort, but rather 
political interventions in the political rewriting of the text and its destination" (Denida 
1985: 32). Deconstructive interpretation in the postcolonial context involves an act of 
reading which links the past and the present, rather than being a simple forgetting of 
the past; it invokes what Benjamin would call "citation" and not "absolute forgening". 
Consistent with deconstruction, the pre-transition South African judiciary's 
"plain meaning" approach to legal interp~etatjon (the ascription of distinct and 
transparent meanings to texts) is both misplaced and dangerous, since a text is not a 
pure presence that immediately and transparently reveals a distinct meaning intended 
by its author.174 One can appreciate that meaning often does seem indisputable but 
this is to ignore that every writing contains an anempt, only partially successful, to 
reconcile identity and difference, unity and diversity, self and other. A text might give 
the impression of rendering plain or obvious meaning, but such impression is the 
product of ideological distortion, suppression of difference and subordination of the 
other. 17s In fact, there is no such thing as ' plain meaning ' . Judges are situated within 
the context of legal culture which takes as its 'objective' what is only conventional 
and contingent. Moreover, resort to the jurisprudence of original intent, whereby the 
meaning of legal texts can be determined by reference to the transparent, self-evident 
intention of the framer of the text, can only lead to reification which prevents genuine 
intertextual determination of legal relationships. Equally, the singular adulat ion of the 
supposedly self-present purpose of a text results in an unwarranted isolation of a 
particular \vriting so as to sever the intertextual links which are the indispensable 
precondition of the generation of meaning. 
Hermeneutic anempts at overcoming indeterminacy in legal interpretation are 
unsuccessful , or at least inadequate. Fiss's claim that interpretative rules can be 
developed by reference to the inlcrsubjective perspective of an interpretative 
community is only possible through the suppression of difference and the 
subordination of the dissenting other. The interpretation of interpretative rules in 
liberal legality celebrates and validates the authority of the legal elite because the 
m There is a connection between this nai vely representational theory of language, based on the 
classical conceptions of author, meaning and tex t-as-mimes is and the "civ ili sing" ideology of liberal 
humanism (Niranjana 1992: 51). 
l7S Klare writes that " if cultural coding sets limits (however implicit or unconsc ious) on the types of 
questions lawyers ask and the types of evidence and arguments they deem persuasive, surely this sets 
limits on the type of answers legal culture can generate?" (Klare t 998: 168). 
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conventions of legal culture reflect their perspectives, which are invariably those of 
dominant social groups with an interest in maintaining the statuS quo, 
Henneneuts such as Stanley Fish and other neo-Wingensteinians argue that 
determinacy is contextual. Dworkin and Gadamer are of the view that consensus of 
meaning is possible through a dialogue between the interpreter and the tradition of the 
text (the history of legal precedents). Assuming that these theorists are correct about 
the role of context and tradition in producing meaning, it is worthwhile evaluating the 
context and tradition of the South African legal system. John Dugard writes: "The 
apartheid order was a legal order. Most of the injustices perpetrated by successive 
governments between 1948 and 1990 were committed in the name of the law" 
(Dugard 1997b: 270). These injustices included deprivation of citizenship and 
imprisonment, influx control laws, mass arrest and imprisonment, detention without 
trial and racial prejudice in all areas of social life. The judiciary under apartheid, 
containing many judges openly sympathetic to the National Party, colluded with the 
dictates of the oppressive regime. 176 Even where the judiciary was not sympathetic to 
the government, the hegemonic conception of law - conservative and premised on the 
belief in law' s autonomy from politics - allowed political values to influence the 
judicial process in an unexamined manner. 177 Nearly all social relations were invested 
with legal significance through statute and the dynan1ism of common law, a web of 
legal relations which enabled apartheid. Meaning appeared determinate in this context 
but, following Fish, plain meaning was "made" - fashioned or contrived - through the 
force of rhetoric, which is to say that legal context itself is a rhetorical construct. The 
manufacturing of plain meaning also involves a dynamic process of incorporation and 
rejection. So, context is politically and historically contingent, happily so, since this 
acknowledges the possibility of alternative choices and of change. It could have been 
otherwise and it still can be, Similarly, the appeal to dialogue with tradition as a 
source of the production of meaning should. as Raymond Williams observes, be 
tempered with the recognit ion that 
176 "In the inlervening thirty years, the courts and the organised legal profession subconsc iously or 
unwittingly conni ved in the legislat ive and executive pursuit of justice.,. There were, nevertheless, 
many parts of the profession that actively contributed to the entrenchment and defence of aparthe id 
through the courts" (TRC Report : Volume 4, Chapter 4, p 101, Paragraph 33). 
177 In certain cases South African judges were prepared to agree that equal concern and respect was a 
commendable ideal , but concluded that it was outweighed by other considerations, including public 
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[w]hat we have to see is not just 'a tradition' but a selective tradition: an 
intentionally selective version of a shaping past and pre-shaped present, which 
is then powerfully operative in the process of social and cultural definition and 
identification. (Will iarns 1977: 11 5) 
Williams argues that the selection of certain meanings and the concomitant exclusion 
of others is presented and successfully passed off as the tradition or the significant 
past and is thus one of the decis ive processes within any hegemony. Hermeneutic 
approaches engage in the construction of "a cultural tradition in the guise of a unified 
realm of meanings and values separated from social relations of domination and 
power" (Brenkman 1987: viii) . South Africa' s legal tradition, the history of its 
legislative practices and common law precedents, is replete with constructed 
meanings which reflect the values of apartheid politics. 
I am not suggesting that context and tradition be ignored in the practice of 
legal interpretation. On the contrary, they present fruitful points of departure from 
which transition may take place, provided they are addressed in their historical 
specificity, rather than as idealist devices that repress history and the voices of its 
antagonists. I?8 Legal texts produced during apartheid need to be deconstructed to 
reveal their privilegings and rewritten in an attempt to reconcile self and other in 
accordance with the ethical demands of justice. We need to rewrite the past in the 
present with an eye on the future, which contains the possibility of justice. In this 
sense deconstruction is both emancipatory and utopian, in the sense of "using the 
imagination to explore new modes of human possibility and styles of will and to 
oppose the necessity of what exists on behalf of something radically better that is 
worth fighting for and to which humanity is fully entitled" (Santos 1995 : 573). Once 
rewritten in the present, newly determinate rules must be deconstructed again, since 
the promised reconciliation of self and other is infinitely postponed, Detenninacy is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for reconstruction: it is necessary to have rules 
and criteria to direct reconstructive efforts, but these rules wi ll be provisional and 
deconstructible. Adomo remarked in Minima Moralia that " it is part of morality not to 
safety (lhe protection of a racist stalUs quo). For an example of this kind of reasoning, see Omar v 
Minister of Law and Order & Others, 1987 (3) SA 859 (A), . 
178 As Justice O'Regan pointed out in Prins/oo v Van der Linde in relation to the interpretation of the 
equali ty clause in the Constitution, "given the history of the country we are of the view that 
discrimination has acquired a particular pejorative meani ng relating to the unequal treatment of people 
based on anributes and characteristics anaching to them. We are emerging from a period of our history 
during which the human ity of the majority was denied" (Prins/oo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 101 2 
(CC) a. para. 3 1). 
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be at home in one's home.'- (Adomo 1978: 39). It is in this sense that deconstruction 
offers transitional justice: we are always in transit to the promised utopia; the mistake 
is to think that we have arrived. The process of transition is a busy one -
deconstruction followed by reconstruction followed by deconstruction - so that as 
Santos remarks "the other parI of morality is 10 be at home in what is not one's home" 
(Santos 1995: 575. emphasis in original). 
I take seriously warnings about the Southern application of poststucturalist! 
postmodern theory developed in Northern climes (Herwitz 1999; Santos 1995; Said 
1993). As a cultural metaphor, the South is a product of colonialism and expresses all 
forms of subordination and suffering brought about by capitalist modernity: 
exploitation, suppression, si lencing. The North, on the other hand, is the seat of 
imperialism, and its rationality reflects a discontinuity with the South. 179 Edward Said 
argues that resistance to European theory, which universalises even as it excludes the 
South. can take place, first , through a reorientationl rewriting of history that sees 
Western and non-Western experiences as connected and so mutually defining, and 
second, by an imaginative and perhaps utopian vision which reconcelves 
emancipalOry theory and perfonnance and third, by engaging in a "sort of migratory, 
and ant i-narrative energy" (Said 1993: 337). Santos, who takes up Said's suggestion 
by positing the three utopian lO"pO; of the Frontier, the Baroque and the South, argues 
that it is necessary to learn to go South, to side with the victim, but morc than that, to 
become the victim. Postmodernism of the South must allow the South a voice, since 
what most prominently identifies the South is that it has been silenced. The 
epistemicide undertaken by the Nonh was accompanied by linguacide, so that the 
South was doubly excluded from discourse in being presumed not only to have 
nothing to say, but no language to say it in. Only once the South has been given a 
voice through which to articulate its suffering can the moment of continuity of 
oppressor and victim, formulated by Hegel and later Gandhi, occur. Such a 
179 Jurgen Habermas, asked if his theory could be of any use to soc ial ist forces in the Third World and 
if, on the other hand, such forces could in tum be of any use to democratic socialist struggles in 
advanced countries replied: "I am tempted to say 'no' in both cases. I am aware of the fact that this is a 
Eurocentric limited view. I would rather pass the question" (Habermas 1985: 104). Santos reads this 
ambivalence as an indication that Habermas' communicative rationality, in spite of its pretence at 
universality, excludes four-fifths of the world population (Santos 1995: 579, 580). In addition, Said 
notes that despite the seeming universality of theoretical application of the work of French theorists, all 
but Deleuze and Guauari, Todorov and Derrida have been silent on questions of racism, anti-
imperialist resistance and oppos itional practice in the Empire. This raises suspic ions "that they 
[European theorists other than those just mentioned] are part of the same invidious 'universalism' that 
connected culture with imperialism for centuries" (Said 1993: 336, 337). 
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reconciliation is not possible except by developing a new ethics, an ethics not 
colonised by science and technology. but rather a new ethical principle. " the caring 
that puts us at the centre of all that happens and renders us responsible for the other" 
(Santos 1995: 581 ). 
3.5 Practical Suggestions 
Following my earlier argument for the need for intervention in legal praxis, I 
shall make two practical suggestions which would help to create the conditions 
necessary for the kind of interpretation I have proposed in the previous section of this 
chapter. My suggestions are, first . that judges must, apart from giving as full a 
consideration to the issue as possible 180, also set out in full the reasons for their 
judgements. Second, if judges are to .interpret legal texts deconstructively, they will 
need to be educated as to the means and the manner in which a deconstructive 
interpretation would be carried out. This section expands on each of these 
suggestions. 
Comprehensive Reasons 
Judges must be encouraged to provide, as comprehensively as possible in the 
written texts that fonn their judgements, reasons, in accordance with the new "culture 
of justification - a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be 
justi fi ed" (Mureinik 1994: 31). The fuIlest possible provision of reasons wiIl provide 
the fullest possible opportunity for unearthing relations of power through 
deconstructive activity. Currently, however, in certain circumstances, South African 
courts may refuse a litigant who approaches it, relief, without such litigant being 
given a hearing and with no reason being given for the refusal, a practice recently 
upheld in Mphahlele v First National Bank of South Africa LimitedIB'. lain Currie 
defends the Constitutional Court 's current "decisional minimal ism", its approach to 
180 The idea that j udges should give as thorough consideration as poss ible to the issues under 
adjudicat ion is more contentious that it sounds. Scan Altman (1990) argues that although judges should 
always be candid (that is, not duplicitous), introspection in the act of judging renders law less 
constraining and subject to a greater degree to legal "houdinis" who view legal rules as deconstructible 
binds that rarely limit discretion. I think Altman may well be right about this, although un like Altman , I 
believe that this is, subject to certain qualifications, a good thing. 
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adjudication which avoids, where possible, first order reasoning and large scale 
theorising. In defence of decisionai minimalism, Currie cites Cass Sunstein as 
follows: 
When people disagree on an abstraction - Is equity more important than 
liberty? Does free will exist? - They often move to a level of greater 
particularity. This practice has an especially notable feature: it enlists silence 
on certain basic questions as a device for producing convergence despite 
disagreement, uncertainty, limits of time and capacity, and heterogeneity. 
Incompletely theorised agreements are a key to legal reasoning. They are an 
important source of social stability and an important way for people to 
demonstrate mutual respect, in law especially but also in liberal democracy as 
a whole. (Sunslein, ciled in Currie 1999: 149) 
To me, nothing could be more misguided than decisional minimalism or the 
consensus manufactured at the cost of avoiding existing dissensus.182 For 
poslslructuralists like Derrida and Lyotard, avoidance of inevitable conflict is counter-
producti ve and pernicious. The production of silence is generally achieved through 
exclusion of dissent and otherness, for which the political history of apartheid acts as 
an example. Moreover, if dissensus operates to destabilise the social stability in a 
liberal democracy, this is only problematic ifliberal democracy is regarded as the end 
of history. If competition of reasons activates latent inconsistencies in a liberal 
democratic society, then so much the better. Judges make value-laden choices in the 
routine course of legal interpretation and are responsible for the social and distributive 
consequences of their choices. 18) It is only through judges providing in their reasons 
the political values which motivate their decisions, that open agonistics between 
conflicting positions can be ensured. As Hutchinson observes, " the existence of 
II1 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC). In this case the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the Supreme 
Court's practice of refusing petitions for leave to appeal without giving reasons for the appeal. 
182 I agree with many of the arguments that Roederer advances in defence of comprehensive reason-
giv ing in his response to Currie's article. Roederer observes that "the sha llower a decision is, the more 
difficult to determine whether a judge really has responsibly engaged the issue" and responding 
directly to Currie: " In his article, Currie is flirting with the idea of a culture of under-justification, of 
n01 giving full reasons. These are the beginnings of a culture of judicial insulation ... To the extent that 
that anitude is proposed for judges, lawyers and/or aspiring lawyers at the leve l of judgement, I think it 
is wrong-headed . If this attitude is instilled. it cuts off even the possibility of communication" 
(Roederer I 999b: 494, 511, 5 12). 
183 Section 39(1)(a) of the final Constitution provides that the judiciary must, in interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, "promote the val ues that underlie an open and democratic soc iety based on human dignity, 
equa lity and freedom". Section 35( 1) of the interim Constitution contains an almost identical provision. 
The injunction is both indetenninate and potentially contradictory - equality and freedom, for instance, 
make notoriously uncomfortable bedfellows. The provision does not specify what the values that 
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disagreement need not always be a fearful sign of democratic crisis; it might simple 
represent a productive exchange over democracy" (Hutchinson 1999: 218). Chanta1 
Mouffe continues in the same vein: 
Indeed. the specificity of liberal democracy as a new political form of society 
consists in the legitimation of conflict as the refusal to eliminate it through the 
imposition of authoritarian order. A liberal democracy is above all a pluralist 
democracy. Its novelty resides in its envisaging the diversity of conceptions of 
the good, not as something negative that should be suppressed, but as 
something to be valued and celebrated. (Mouffe 1996: 9) 
My advocacy of judicial provision of reasons should not be viewed as an 
advocation of the ideas of reason and rationality shared by Enlightenment theorists. 
Although postmodemism (at least the variety I have been defending) denies the 
availabi lity of an Archimedean point such as Reason, that transcends particular modes 
of argumentative enunciation, this does not mean that reason-giving should be 
abandoned. On the contrary there exists all the more reason to give reasons. 
Traditionalist jurists are simply mistaken when they assert that non-foundationalist 
accounts of law and adj udication "reject reason-giving altogether. puning in its place 
power, or play, or conventions" (Sunstein 1992: 779). Postmodem jurisprudence 
opens up a clearing space for reasons. once the strategic moves of legal modernism 
have been dispensed with.ls4 
Stephen Toulmin (1990) cogently argues that this "scientific rationalism" or 
logical rationality, typical of the second phase of modernity, was intellectually 
perfectionist, morally rigorous and humanly unrelenting but " left too linle room for 
cultural or personal idiosyncrasies" (Toulmin 1990: 200). As opposed to this often 
pernicious concept of rationality, Toulmin advocates recovery of an ideal of 
rationality that was current before Descartes. a conception embraced by Renaissance 
humanism, whose central demand was that all thought and action be reasonable. 185 
underlie an open and democratic society are. This provision. rather than guiding the interpreter one way 
or another, primarily operates to alen the interpreter to the inevitability of interpretative dissensus . 
.... Alan Hutchinson rightly assens that "adjud ication is based on reason in sofar as it is constructed in 
and through the very judic ial arguments that it is intended 10 guide" (Hulchinson 1999: 2 11 ). The fact 
that reasons are expressions of power only adds to the urgency of their provision, in order that they 
may be analysed, followed in the future or resisted as unjust. 
1" Critics of posnnodemism. who charge it with rejecting reason tout court, fail 10 recognise that there 
is more than one concept of rationality and reason. Terry Eagleton, for instance. remarks that "the 
activ ity of arguing the toss over what we are unsure of is known as reason , for which postmodemism 
has in general a somewhat low regard" (Eagleton 1994: 10). 
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Reasonableness on this understanding means both developing modesty about one's 
capacity, and self-awareness in one' s presentation - a practice completely alien to the 
judiciary prior to 1994 - and toleration of social , cultural and intellectual diversity. 
Consequently, provision of reasons will evidence the degree to which the judiciary 
speaks to the condition of the parties before it and lis/ens to the condition of such 
parties with equal care (Toulmin 1990: 199). Since proving reasons is inherently 
practical and humane "'we enter into a realm of legitimate uncertainty, ambiguity and 
disagreement"' (Toulmin 1990: 200). In general , the legal profession needs to be more 
candid with itself and society about the politics of interpretation: it needs to be more 
reasonable. 186 
An example of the salutary effects of reason-giving by the Constitutional 
Court is the judgement of Ackerman J in Ferreira v Levin NO/8 l . Although 
Ackennan's reliance on the "comprehensive liberalism" of Kant is unconvincing, it is 
a comprehensively reasoned and argued judgement, with which commentators are in a 
position to critically engage. Roederer observes this feature of the judgement: 
One virtue of Ackerman J' s opinion is that whether or not we agree with him, 
we know where he stands and it is easier to identifY in what respects, if any, he 
has gone right and in what respects he has gone wrong. His colleagues on the 
Court know his views and so do lawyers, academics and citizens (should they 
wish to read the opinion). Perhaps he will change his views based on the 
responses he has received. Perhaps some will change their views based on the 
a'gumenls he put forward. (Roede,e, 1999b: 494) 
Education 
It might be objected that it is a ll very well to suggest that deconstructive 
readings might transform constitutional law into "the dynamic product of a 
relent lessly jurisgenerative process of social and cultural construction" (Winter 1990: 
1509). but that naive norrnativity (s imply suggesting to the judiciary that they should 
116 The Constitution explicitly insists on the supplying of reasons. Section 33( I) of the interim 
Constitution (section 36( I) of the final Constitution) provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may 
be limited only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable. In other words, the 
Constitution provides that the application (or non-application) of the fundamental human rights pivots 
on the question of reasonableness and depends on the judiciary to supply reasons for their dec is ions. To 
its credit the Constitutional Coun in Malm·anyane noted that "there is no absolute standard which can 
be laid down for detennining reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the 
application of those principles to particular ci rcumstances can only be done on a case by case basis" (at 
para 104 D-O). 
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change their practice) will be insufficient to actually change judicial practice. South 
AfTican judges, mired largely in a ' plain meaning' approach despite rhetorical 
gestures towards the value of context (and the value of value), are unlikely to be 
receptive to, let alone persuaded by, arguments on the basis ofindetennina.cy, whether 
they relate to the unascertainability of the framer's intent, the polysemous character of 
language or the contextual nature of meaning. The first reason for this is that the post-
apartheid judiciary is anxious (I develop the notion of "anxiety" in Chapter Five) to 
defend its actions in a transitional moment in which no value consensus exists. This 
leads to a tendency to appeal to meanings of words regarded as conventional by the 
majority of people likely to read or be affected by its judgements. Deconstructive 
method guarantees its own marginalisation because the homeostasis of judicial 
cognit ive modes is unlikely willingly 10 employ methods designed to effect radical 
destabilisation. And even if the judiciary wa~ prepared to do so, then it would need to 
be trained to read and write in a more deconstructive or philosophical mode. 
Accordingly, South African judges and lawyers need to be infonned and 
educated about the in sights of postmodemism and poststructuralism in relation to the 
plasticity of language, the intertextual nature of meaning, the emancipatory 
possibil ities of interpretation and the ethics of justice. Unselfconscious and 
unreflect ive reliance on the culturally available interpretative tools and insights 
received from the apartheid era, retard the actualisation of the judiciary 's professed 
ambitions for transfonnation. The main reasons for the ascendancy of the fonnali st! 
positivist approach in South African law are 
the emphasis on narrowly construed "private law" subjects in the training of 
law students; and aversion to the teaching of policy matters as part of the law 
syllabus at universities; a belief that good lawyering was largely a matter of 
textual exegesis and technical expertise ... and an oft cited judicial belief that 
matters of policy were more appropriately left for the legislature. (Cockrell 
1996: 7) 
In short, everything turns on education. The introduction of the constitutional text is 
insufficient to create a new legal context, as is evident from Sarkin's observation that 
the various Constitutional Court judgements indicate that the court is prepared to 
allow parliament to govern without judicial interference (Sarkin 1998: 644). The 
'" 1996 ( 1) SA 769. 
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postmodem insight that subjectivity is situated within and constructed through 
discourse. indicates that judicial subjectivity is constructed, amongst other ways, 
through education (Kennedy 1983).'88 Derrida advises: "As to South Africa, I would 
say that philosophy, provided it is taught in a certain way, is the most urgent thing 
today in this country .. . to know what the constitution is, and what it should be, is 
philosophy. an act of philosophising". Derrida goes on to recommend for South 
Africa "a new fann of teaching in which philosophy would be present in history, in 
literature. in law for certain, in medicine ... U (Derrida 1999: 285, 286, emphasis 
added). The Constitutional Courts' consistent rejection of the philosophical nature of 
interpretation and philosophy generally189 prevents it from reconceptualising its role 
and its ability to fulfil its own transformative ambitions. The rejection of philosophy, 
of which jurisprudence is after all a branch, is a failure not only to consider 
conceptions of justice in their fullness, but also to appreciate the philosophical 
construction of law historically, and so can only result in conservatism. Through 
education, at schools and universities, and through journals consulted by the judiciary, 
the approach of legal professionals may be transfonned. Judges should be provided 
with epistemologically radical theoretical tools which could enable them to provide 
reasoned justifications for politically progressive decisions. 
188 Kennedy is frustrated with the system of legal education in the United States inasmuch as it reflects 
and supports, in the manner of an auto-poietic subsystem, a hierarchy of power. Those who have power 
al each level in the hierarchy tend to bully those with less power. Students who have been ' educated' in 
this fashion become incorporated into and accepting of this hierarchy and tend to imitate their 
teachers's forceful and aggressive actions towards their underlings. Subjectivities constructed through 
this cycle are likely to be deferential towards the altitudes and beliefs of superiors and less critical 
toward accepted beliefs and anitudes with the legal field. Although I cannot illustrate it here, I believe 
Kennedy 's analysis to be correct in relation to the South African legal education, although it appears 
that the emphasis of legal education in South Africa is now changing. To produce judges who are 
willing to challenge current legal orthodoxies and are theoretically equipped to do so, requires a shift in 
the focus of legal education from black letter rote learning towards critical engagement and attention to 
writ ing ski lls (Motala 1996). long a deficiency in lega l education in South Africa. But cf. Woolman et 
al (1997) for a panial and qualified defence of South African legal education. 
119 Oavis notes that the formalist nature of South African legal education has resulted in little creative 
use of philosophy in South African legal scholarship (Oav is 1998: 132). More extremely, there has 
been considerable judicial hostility towards any recourse to philosophy in the law, notably by Justice 
Kriegler in Makwanyane (p. 51 above) and recently in Christian Lawyers Association of Sou rh Africa v 
Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 111 3 (T) where the court held "Nor is it the function of this court to 
decide the issue on religious and philosophical grounds. The issue is a legal one to be decided on the 
proper legal interpretation to be given to section 11 " (at 1118). 
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3.6 Interpretation as Violence 
In this chapter I have set Ollt a number of reasons for fundamentally rethinking 
the political nature of legal interpretation. Perhaps the most powerful statement about 
the politics of interpretation is made by Robert Cover who argues that the literature 
dealing with interpretative practices ignores the central fact that ~<legaI interpretation 
takes place in a field of pain and death" (Cover 1986: 1601 ): 
Legal interpretative acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon 
others. A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, 
somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life. 
Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has 
already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have finished 
their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn 
apart by these organised, social practices of violence. Neither legal 
interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart 
from one another. (Cover 1986: 160 I) 
Derrida has obselV'ed that interpretation is itself a violence (Derrida 1992a: 13), a 
wrenching of one signification apart from others. Charles Yablon. in his 
deconstruction of a legal summons, reminds us that although the language of a 
summons may be indetenninate, this does not mean that it lacks meaning or force 
(Yablon 1992). If I receive a summons and I ignore it, I can be arrested and 
imprisoned (if it is a criminal summons) or summary judgement may be taken against 
me (if it is a civil summons). Following Derrida and Cover, the indetenninacy of legal 
language must be used to reveal and analyse the power exerted and pain inflicted by 
the legal process, while at the same time offering more just alternatives. In the 
following chapters, I examine the legal language of two Constitutional Court 
judgements as examples of the force of law and its potential to effect not only pain 
and death, but also reconciliation, freedom and, perhaps, (always perhaps) justice. 
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Chapter 4: Corrective Justice: AZAPO and tbe TRC 
"Law, in whatever name, protects privilege ... The sole authority of the law is in its 
capacity to enforce itse lf. That capacity expresses itself in Trial. There could be no 
law without trial. Trial is the point of law. And punishment is the point of the trial -
you can' t try someone unless you assume the power to punish him. All the corruption 
and hypocritical self-service of the law is brought to the point of the point in the 
verdict of the court . It is a sharp point, an unbelievably sharp point".I90 
"Justice is truth in action".191 
4.1 Narrative and Corrective Justice 
E. L. Doctorow's The Book of Daniel is concerned, in part, with a trial and its 
aftermath; with the power oflaw as discourse and the legal system as institution. It is 
the story of and by Daniel Isaacson, whose Marxist parents were executed for treason 
against the United States, and who must somehow redeem or avenge their murder. It 
is a Bildungsroman - the story of Daniel's struggle for manhood - and a 
KimSllerroman - the story of a writer constructing an identity in conflict with his 
society. Daniel's narrative is an epistemology, a mode of knowing: telling leads to 
understanding. The knowledge that Daniel's narrative delivers is that reality is a 
function of power and the institutionalised discourses which constitute it. The book -
both a self-composition and an act of cultural hermeneutics - reflects an awareness 
that power must be challenged by (counter)narratives which disrupt the "official" 
account of events. Hence the book's often jarring disynchronicity and discontinuity, 
calculated to destabilise the linearity and totalising unity of official history. The story 
is Daniel's attempt to recompose history after a great wounding. Doctorow fictionally 
reopens Ihe real life case of the Rosenbergs (the [saacsons in the book) in order to 
provide a "rehearing" or " rewriting" of the case, exploring its subject-matter from 
multiple contexts: the New Left radicalism of the 1960s, the Old Left radicalism of 
the 1930's and the larger biblical story of the prophet Daniel and his struggle with 
exile and persecution. The central idea of The Book of Daniel is that only a 
190 E.L. Doctorow, The Book a/Daniel, London: Pan Books, 1971 , p. 190 
191 This remark was made by Benjamin Disraeli in a speech to the English House of Commons on 11 
February 1851. 
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deconstructed narrative can destabilise the hegemony of official history enough to 
open up new possibilities for interpretation. Indeed, that the book constitutes such a 
deconstruction shows Doctorow's passion for justice (Parks 1991 : 456). 
As with Daniel's narrative, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(hereafter "the TRC") is an attempt to engage with the past in order to understand the 
present. (The characters in The Book of Daniel represent the polemics of the South 
African debate on institutionalised negotiation of the past: the revolutionary, Artie 
Stemlicht, rejects the past in the name of the present and the future ; Daniel 's sister, 
Susan, lives too much in the past and dies for it; Daniel rewrites the past from and for 
the present) . In the TRC, equally, narrative seeks to disclose and challenge the 
hegemony of inst itutionalised discursive practices. The telling of narratives by victims 
and perpetrators in the TRC is a kind of locus of battle, as it were, for justice. It is a 
forum where the "regimes of power", as Foucault says, have been challenged. The 
function of the narratives of the participants has been to disrupt or dismantle the 
"regimes of truth", including their repressive effects on all areas of intersubjective 
relations in South African society. The narratives have prevented the power of the 
previous regime from monopolising the compositions of truth, and from establishing a 
monological control over contemporary culture, which would deny the existence and 
val idity of the "other" and of "difference". The TRC presents the opportunity for a 
culture of polyphony and conversation, because it allows for the speaking and hearing 
of the many voices which constitute culture. It is the dual function of these narratives 
to provide disruption and restoration (one of the many modalities of reconciliation), 
that permits us to view the TRC as an engagement with justice. 192 Derrida comments 
that " if the testament is always made in front of witnesses, it is also to open and 
enjoin, it is to confide in others the responsibility of a future . To bear witness, to test, 
to anest, to contest, to represent oneself before witnesses" (Derrida 1987: 37). 
Ironically, issues of narrative representation and its epistemological claims - I am 
thinking of historiographic arguments by Hayden White, among others, concerning 
the impossibi lity of separating "facts" from the acts of interpretation and narration 
that constitute them - mean that the notion of truth, understood in the absolute sense 
192 In October 1998, narrative polyphony and 'objecti ve hi story ' clashed after the TRC published its 
findings. The ANC's executive committee rejected the TRC's report and launched last-minute legal 
proceedings in an attempt to block the publication of the report and to have parts of it repressed. F. W. 
de Klerk s im ilarly applied to have certain sections of the report which were critical of him excised. The 
actions of both parties constitute an anempt to garner history for themselves. 
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of a direct correspondence between factual narratives and actual events, must be 
sacrificed. Instead, the TRe unravels narratives and attempts to give the subaltern a 
voice in history. It is a deconstructive resource that provides an alternative narrative 
of apartheid which exposes the fabrications and exclusions in the writing of the 
archive; it challenges the authority of the received historical record and restores the 
effaced signs of subaltern consciousness. I93 Accordingly the presence of "truth" in the 
TRe's title must be understood as referring to narrative disruption and restoration: the 
substitution of narrative for veridicality. 
Transitional justice in South Africa has required (and sti ll requires) an 
acknowledgement of and engagement with an unjust past, as society reconstructs 
itself through an opposition between present self and past other. In Chapter One, I 
explained that "transitional justice" for the purposes of this work signifies a 
conception of justice app licable to the full spectrum of intersubjective relationships 
and activities occurring during the period of South Africa ' s political and 
epistemological transition. This includes specific legal responses and solutions to acts 
of injustice past and present, whilst still allowing for focus on the transformative 
possibilities of legal discourse - broadly conceived to incorporate the TRC - for 
enabling a just and ethical future. Admittedly, this is a broader definition of 
transitional justice than most theorists will allow, since they would limit most of their 
theorising under this heading to the choices made, and qual ity of justice rendered, by 
leaders replacing authoritarian predecessors presumed responsible for gross human 
rights violations and other criminal acts. In the South African instance, the manner in 
which the successor (ANC) government has chosen to deal with those who committed 
atrocities under the apartheid regime is considered to be a facet of transitional justice 
by several studies in this area. Their dealings in this matter are, however, only one 
component of transitional justice as I have more broadly defined it. For the sake of 
clarity I shall term this facet of transitional justice "corrective justice", although, as 
wi ll become clear, this definition is discordant with various other definitions of 
corrective justice to date. 194 So be it : if transition is not quite revolution, it is a time of 
19) 1 leave open the vexing question of whether we can even speak about the subaltern as having 'a 
voice ' over and above the heterogeneity of its echoes for treatment in the next chapter. 
19-1 Many theorists prefer to refer to "restorative justice" rather than "corrective justice", presumably 
because corrective justice has come to be associated with the resolution of disputes through the formal 
adjudication of the couns. Charles Villa-V icencio, for instance, writes: 
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consequential and necessary change, constructed In part through a revision of 
taxonomy and nomenclature. Needless to say, I harbour no illusions about the 
potentially partisan significations to which the term "corrective justice" may give rise. 
In this chapter. I am primarily concerned with a close reading of the discourse 
and logic of the Constitutional Court in the case of Azanian Peoples Organisation 
(AZAPO) v Presidenr oJ the Republic oJ South Africa. The case is important for a 
number of reasonsl95 : it was the first to challenge a statute enacted by South Africa's 
democratically elected parliament; and it concerned an issue on which South African 
society is still deeply divided. The AZAPO judgement contains most of the principal 
ordering logics and arguments utilised in the South African correctional justice 
debate, which is concerned with the efficacy and justice of criminal prosecution and 
selective amnesty as a response to sufficiently serious, politically motivated crimes 
committed between March 1960 and May 1994.' 96 It is my contention that the court's 
approach and theoretical stance, although ostensibly consistent with the modem 
approach to rule-following and justice, is crucially contradictory ; and that it is through 
this fissure in the structure of the court 's reasoning that justice, conceived in ethical 
terms, makes its appearance unannounced. That, subject to necessary detailing and 
qualifications. is the primary conclusion of the present chapter. 
It is unsurprising that South Africa, like many new democracies, has been 
engulfed in controversy in seeking to hold the former, autocratic regime accountable 
for injustices perpetrated during its existence. Many survivors of such atrocities crave 
retribution against identifiable perpetrators and public acknowledgement of what 
occurred. Still others place a higher priority on moving ahead with their lives, 
rebuilding trust across previously divided groups and engaging in material 
reconstruction, including the strengthening of democratic institutions (Minow 1998: 
4). Many people have felt that a priority must be set on the punishment of 
Reachi ng beyond the confines of judicial punishment as an end in itse lf, truth commissions are 
essentially instruments of restorative justice. Restoration is aimed al victims, perpetrators and 
communities in a situation of political transition from undemocratic rule to the first phases of 
democracy and the affirmation of human rights. (Villa-Vicenzio 2000: 68) 
Although I see that the use of the term ' restorative justice' is an attempt to distinguish it from coun-
based or retributive justice, I have elected to continue to use the term 'corrective justice' and develop a 
speci fic fonnu lation of it . To retain the traditiona l term in a new context is to both rely on and 
challenge traditional meanings and pattems of activity. 
195 In Dugard' s opinion "AZAPO is the most imponant case to have come before the Constitutional 
Court to date - and here I do not exclude the death pena lty case" (Dugard 1997a: 268). 
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wrongdoers, whilst others argue that amnesty and absolution are required if nation~ 
building is to be regarded as an important social activity. 
This chapter constitutes a meditation on South Africa's constitutional, 
legislat ive, judicial and otherwise legal (or quasi-legal) response to the injustice of 
apartheid as the country negotiates its past. The chapter investigates the sufficiency 
and wisdom of South Africa 's solution, measuring it against a conception of 
correctional justice already alluded to and to be further developed in due course. I am 
mindful of an earlier reservation I expressed in Chapter One about pursuing closure 
on questions of j ustice, including correctional justice. No institutional response can 
ever adequately compensate for the manifold murders, acts of torture, abduction and 
other acts of extreme injustice. Closure is not possible on this question and even if it 
were it would no doubt be extremely insulting to those whose lives have been 
destroyed or irrevocably damaged. On the other hand, silence on this issue is also an 
unacceptable offence, implying, shockingly, that the perpetrators had succeeded in 
rendering contemporary complicit with an oppressive regime. Although legal and 
other institutional responses wi ll always be insufficient, inaction by institutions means 
that perpetrators have succeeded in paralysing the means to justice. As Baudrillard 
has written in another context U[f]orgetting the extermination is part of the 
extermination itself' (Baudrillard cited in Young 1993: 1). 
The South African response to the question of corrective justice, the TRC, has 
widely and correctly been characterised as a political compromise. It represents a 
middle path between the prosecution of apartheid criminals and a general amnesty for 
members and agents of the previous government. The TRC and the solution it 
embodies - a frank account by perpetrators of atrocities committed during, and in 
most cases in furtherance of, apartheid, in exchange for criminal and civil indemnity -
was profoundly influenced by the military stalemate between the opposing 
government and ANC forces (Bundy 1999; Roederer 1999a). The South African 
liberation movement did not succeed in removing the apartheid government by 
military means: the government retained control over a fonnidable police and military 
force and was able more or less, to contain the effects of ANC mobilisation. It was 
rather the international campaign to isolate South Africa by means of economic and 
other sanctions and boycotts that, while detrimental to all aspects of South African 
196 A period bounded by two key moments in South Africa's history: the Sharpevi lle Massacre and the 
inauguration of Ne lson Mandela as President. 
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life. placed the National Party under considerable pressure to change its policies. By 
the late 1980s the major parties to the South African conflict reaJised that maners had 
reached an impasse that only negotiations could solve. 
The agreement to grant amnesty to apartheid criminals has to be understood in 
the context of the political settlement arrived at between 1990 and 1993. The debate 
over amnesty impeded constitutional negotiations and it was only at the last moment, 
at the behest of a veiled threat from South African Police generals, that agreement 
was reached to include provision for amnesty as a postamble. It reads: 
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens 
and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and 
the reconstruction of society ... The adoption of this Constitution lays the 
secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions 
and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the 
transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and the legacy 
of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge ... can now be addressed on the basis that 
there is a need for reparation but not retaliation ... In order to advance such 
reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of 
acts , omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
commined in the course of conflicts of the past. 197 
The postamble also invested authority in parliament to determine, at its discretion, 
"the mechanisms, criteria and procedures" through and in accordance with which 
amnesty would be granted. Pursuant to the provisions of the postamble, parliament 
enacted the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 198 , which established 
the TRC and the procedures according to which it would facilitate " the granting of 
amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts associated with 
a political objective," hold hearings to establish the fate or whereabouts of victims, 
recommend "reparation measures" in respect of such violations, and fi nally compile a 
report which would include recommendations for the prevention of future atrocities 
(section 3( I )). 
Most commentators view the pursuit of justice and the discovery of the truth 
(which, in this context. may be said to mean the ascertainment of a fuller account of 
the past by incorporating narratives previously withheld, excluded or marginalised) to 
be two very different, mutually exclusive activit ies (Dugard 1997a; Mendez 1997; 
Wilson 1996; Minow 1998; Cohen 1995). The possibility of corrective justice In 
197 The postamble can be found after section 251 of the interim Constitution. 
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countries negotiating democratic transition is seen by most commentators as limited 
to the prosecution of perpetrators of gross human rights in the primary adjudicative 
institution of the (western) legal system, the courts, which are charged with meting 
out punishment to deserving wrongdoers. This is so despite the fact that countries 
emerging from late twentieth century authoritarianism have scarcely used their 
criminal justice systems to address the crimes of previous regimes (Siegel 1998: 432; 
Moellendorf 1997: 290). Conversely, although it is widely accepted that criminal 
trials wi 11 not match a well staffed and independent truth commission in finding out 
about a long and complex history ofteITor and that a truth commission' s quest for the 
truth may be beneficial to and facilitative of reconstruction and reconciliation, it is 
often assumed that by granting amnesty as an incentive, justice is traded for truth 
(Siege I 1999: 449). Traditionalists may even concede that justice calls for truth, 
insofar as truth is instrumental for a just detennination, but would then insist that it 
also and centrally calls for accountability. (What they really mean is punishment - the 
TRC's quid pro quo for amnesty is precisely the provision of an account). 
Accordingly debates in this area have been polarised around the twin issues of truth 
and justice: Should truth or justice take priority? If accountability is the aim of 
justice, does it require prosecution and punishment? I aim to show that truth and 
justice (as reconceived) are not mutually exclusive and that, contrarily, the concepts 
of justice I want to elucidate in relation to the aims and objectives of the TRC affords 
both an investigation into wrongdoing and an opportuni ty to court justice. 199 In order 
to illustrate this, I shall compare the merits of criminal prosecution with the TRC's 
mechanisms, in the light of a challenge to the constitutionality of the amnesty 
procedure of the TRe and various critical responses to the ensuing judgement of the 
Constitutional Court. Apart from the two questions above, my focus will be directed 
at answering the following: do the aspirations of the TRC represent "'second besC' 
goals in the face of practical constraints? Or do the TRC 's objectives signify an 
admirable, perhaps ethically preferable response? Is it possible that the TRC points to 
an inevitable residue of justice which exceeds the reach of the modern, formally 
constituted legal system? In what follows I intend to argue that the TRC affords 
greater benefits to South African society and the individuals in it than do trials. 
198 Act 34 of 1995. 
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4.2 AZAPO and Legal Modernity 
The argument that the TRe presented an unjust solution to the issue of 
corrective justice became the focus of judicial deliberation soon after the 
commencement of the TRC, when relatives of slain victims, enraged by the 
abrogation of their right to retribution, instituted legal action claiming that the 
amnesty provisions of the Promotion of N alional Unity and Reconciliation Act fell 
foul of their constitutional rights. In AZAPO, relatives of anti-apartheid activists -
Steve Biko, Griffiths Mxenge and others - sought to set aside section 20(7) of the Act 
(which provided for the granting of amnesty) on the grounds that it was inconsistent 
with section 22 of the interim Constitution, which stipulates that every person shall 
have the right to have justiciable disputes se~led by a court oflaw. The Constitutional 
Court held, in an eloquent judgement written by Justice Mahomed, that the postamble 
to the constitution, providing for amnesty, trumped section 22 of the interim 
Constitution and that references to "amnesty" in the Act should be given their widest 
possible interpretation and accordingly be construed as authorising criminal, civi l and 
state indemnity. The court expressed sympathy for victims' demand that acts of 
wrongdoers be "prosecuted and effectively punished for their callous and inhuman 
content in violation of criminal law" (para. 16) and noted further that "every decent 
human being must feel grave discomfort in living with a consequence which might 
allow the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the streets of this land with impunity". 
However, it decided that the need for punishment of perpetrators was outweighed by 
victims' right to "public investigation, verification and correction" (para. 17). With a 
fu ller account of misdeeds, the court held, victims would be able to expose their grief 
publicly and to receive collective recognition of their suffering, Mahomed DP also 
acknowledged that without a political agreement on amnesty. the continued prospect 
of retaliation would render nugatory continued efforts to effect democratic transition. 
Critics of the AZ4PO decision, both for and against the court 's final decision, 
have detected central inconsistencies in the logic of the judgement, contradictions 
which have been. regarded either as the inevitable result of the judiciary's 
199 David Dyzenhaus suggests that the TRC provides justice that is "reconstructive". a form of justice 
which seeks institutional transformation through an examination of the wrongs of the past and which 
"seeks to estab lish democracy in South Africa" (Dyzenhaus 1998: 6, 180). 
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development of an autochthonous jurisprudence Of signs of a choice of political 
expediency over justice, depending on where such commentators stand. on the 
amnesty issue. The court's upholding of the validity of the postamble in view of its 
inconsistency with the right to have a legal hearing seems curious given the fervour 
with which liberal rights discourse is currently adulated. For certain liberal 
commentators, resolution of such inconsistencies is clearly provided for in the 
Const itution~ more particularly, a right included in the chapter entitled "Fundamental 
Human Rights" (Chapter 3) must surely take precedence over another provision in 
the constitution which is not, after altfundamental.1oo Moreover, the court's almost 
cursory acknowledgement and final rejection of international law as a factor is 
regarded with some dismay by those who view South Africa's increasing immersion 
in circuits of infonnation and legitimation as a good thing, In some ways, I think that 
the judgement may be viewed as an implicit (it could obviously not be made explicit) 
acknowledgement that justice is not co-extensive with the foundationalism of modem 
jurisprudence. Indeed, it is precisely the need to provide a historically contingent, 
31lli-essentialist (in other words, postmodem) fonn of justice, which results in a 
rupturing of the modem register of the court's theorising. Those theorists who view 
the AZAPO judgement as an abrogation of the liberal theory of justice are basically 
correct; they are, however, mistaken in their belief that liberal legality is co-extensive 
and/or coterminous with justice. 
MoellendOlf's Critique of AZAPO 
One such theorist is Darrel Moellendorf. In a comment on the AZAPO case, 
Moellendorf (1997) questions the moral status of the court's reasoning. He begins by 
noting that to justify the granting of provisional amnesty simply by observing that 
amnesty assurances in the interim constitution were the result of a compromise, is 
insufficient to establish its ethical credentials. He goes on to observe, quite rightly, 
that fundamenta l legal and political decisions should be consistent with what morality 
requires; he 'and points to examples of the divergence of law and ethics during 
apartheid, and what Lyotard calls the difJerend involved when, during apartheid, the 
200 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines "fundamental" as "Of the goundwork, going to the 
root of the maner, serving as base or foundation, essential, primary, original, from which the others 
are derived" (emphasis added). 
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idiom of the courts precluded legal justification by liberation activists, 
notwithstanding the moral rectitude of their actions. All well and good so far. But 
immediately thereafter Moellendorf claims that, in the context of the AZAPO case, 
justice would amount to legal recourse by victims against perpetrators in accordance 
with the "fundamental rights ... IO seek redress [in the ordinary courts oflaw] for harm 
suffered" (Moellendorf 1997: 285). The claim is a startl ing one given the previously 
acknowledged separation of law and justice during apartheid. What Moellendorf - in 
an expression of triumphal liberalism - means is that although law and morality 
diverged during apartheid, the democratic inclusion of fundamental human rights in 
the Constitution has ensured their happy reconvergence. Moellendorfs other central 
claim, also stemming from broadly liberal concerns, is that the dictates of justice 
demand that wrongdoers should be punished. 
In an earlier discussion of the. South African legal system during apartheid, I 
mentioned that the hegemonic jurisprudence of positivism had based the legitimacy 
of law on the formalism of legality, hence the decline in the relevance of ethical 
considerations. The positivist understanding and explanation of the operation of law 
is logical ly and politically premised on the absence of morality~ indeed, the law as a 
whole is presented as a moral enterprise because it excludes morality from its 
operation. All of which provided successive apartheid governments with a 
justification for perpetrating grossly immoral acts (the Immorality Act will serve as 
an ironic example). Does the introduction of human rights reintroduce ethics into the 
law as Moellendorf thinks? Certainly not - as I believe the following re-examination 
of modernity 's delinking of law and morality reveals. Alastair Maclntyre (1984) 
observes that modernity has witnessed a profound "moral catastrophe", a radical 
breakdown in ethical concord and a systematic annihilation of the classical 
communities of value and virtue. With the absence of shared purpose, the modem 
concept of law combined freedom, reason and morality against the background of a 
polyphony of values. The genesis of modem law can be traced to the Cartesian 
meditations and the inward turn. For Descartes, while the phenomenal world of 
rea lity is external to the subject, it can be approached on the analogy of the subject's 
self-understanding. Behind every cogito (I know) there is an ego (I), "the 
apodicticaliy certain and last basis of judgement upon which radical philosophy must 
be founded" (Husserl 1967: 10). Kant searches for the universal preconditions of 
moral actions and discovers them in the free and rational action of the autonomous 
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agent who follows the law posited in the categorical imperative out of a pure sense of 
duty and respect: "Act in such a way that the maxim of your will will always be valid 
as the principle establishing the universal law" (Kant 1956: 30). Kantian autonomy 
makes man the law's subject in a double sense: he is simultaneously the subject that 
provides the law and subjected to the law. Within the legal system, laws are 
considered justified jf they are prescribed by those who are subjected to them. Duty 
and respect are equally important for both law and morality; moral action follows 
from the law of the universal imperative of reason and legality is obedience to the 
laws of the state. Kant views the social contract not as a historical covenant hut as a 
requirement of reason that lies behind state law. For Kant the metaphysical 
foundations of morality have no history, although, following their universal 
fonnulation, they seem to meet the condition and needs of modernity. 
The Kantian concept of autonomy and moral law depends for its 
concretisation upon a universal and rational community, a communis rationis, which 
acts as a heuristic principle and as the historical and empirical horizon for the 
autonomous subject. We are autonomous in the sense that we follow the law we give 
ourselves, but this law must be valid for all . However, readings of Paul de Man and 
others have shown (de Man 1979; Schlag 1997) that the contractual derivation of 
authority and the constitution is as fictional as individual autonomy; both are based 
on the rhetorical strategy of metalepsis (the reversal of cause and effect) in which 
what comes after (the subject) is presented as the source of law. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the community of reason - the "we" implied by the categorical norm -
can never be co-extensive with the community that legislates within the nation-state. 
The '·we" of the rational community to which the subject must refer becomes a 
mirage once any of the empirical characteristics of the legislator and subject are 
added to it. The requirement that law's subjects and subjected must be the same 
individuals cannot be satisfied. Nevertheless though, it would seem that one 
particular type of positive law, human rights, appears to satisfy the Kantian 
injunction that the law should represent the whole of rational mankind. Of course this 
is not the case, since abstract human rights, and the abstract human nature on which 
they rely, bear no relation to the concrete empirical fact of social reality. 
Moellendorfs ambivalence, if not scepticism, concerning the ethical status of 
the negotiated settlement as a whole, and in particular as a compromise - "there are 
compromises and there are compromises" (MoeUendorf 1997: 283) - reflects the 
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Kantian view of the social contract as the result not of a historical covenant, an act of 
violence, but as a requirement of reason that lies behind state law. Although 
Moellendorf seems to be in favour of compromise under certain circumstances -
"Some compromises are morally justified given the balance of forces and the moral 
costs and benefits of trade-offs. Others cannot be justified because of the costs 
associated with them . The latter may involve compromises to fundamental 
principles" (Moellendorf 1997: 283) - what he really means is that the compromise, 
if there is to be one, should provide for the right to adj udicate in court, since this is a 
' fundamental right ' which should not be compromised. But why is this a fundamental 
right? Why must this right take precedence over other rights, such as the right to 
' truth '? And is the right to litigate commensurate with the requirements of South 
Africa 's transition? Moellendorf claims to be sanguine about compromise, but refuses 
to do so where it is most important: in relation to competing rights and interests. 
Moellendorfs position is reminiscent of Kant 's preference for consistency over 
moderation or compromise and his (Kant's) deriding of " political moralists" who 
'debase' morality by making it serve partisan interests. Instead, he wants politics to 
serve moral ity, as Moellendorf does ("Fundamental legal and political decisions 
should be consistent with what moralily requires" (Moellendorf 1997: 284)}. For both 
Kant and Moellendorf. the "moral politician", or moral judge, is one who upholds 
fundamental human rights as the '·Iimiting condition" of what is legally and 
politically penniss ible. The result is to moralise politico-juridical relations by 
insisting that "a true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without 
firsl paying tribute to morality" (Kanl 1977 : 11 7, 118, 125). What Hegel criticises 
Kant for , and what I find objectionable in Moellendorf, is that this elevation of 
morality as the judge of law and politics translates into a kind of extremism that rules 
oul policies based upon the prudential reconciliat ion of interests (Smilh 1986: 128). 
Although Moellendorf claims not to oppose compromise, his fonnalist conception of 
justice renders him quite unable to do so. When he says that " legal and political 
decisions should be in accordance with what morality requires", "what morality 
requires" is exactly what is in question. Moellendorfs equation of morality/j ustice 
with formal rights, actionable only through litigation, means that for him people have 
the right of access to court no matter what the broader social concerns are, whereas I 
am arguing that justice must start wi th the broader social concerns and that what is 
moral depends on what these concern are. 
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Moellendorfs ahistorical view ignores the historical contingencies and 
practical requirements of South Africa's transition. As Dullah Omar, ANC negotiator 
during the negotiations and fanner Minister of Justice, explained "without an 
amnesty agreement, there would have been no elections" (Omar cited in van Zyl 
1999: 650). Furthermore, Moellendorfs equation of the protection of fundamental 
rights with justice completely ignores the structural nature of injustice in modem 
society. The South African Bill of Rights states that: " [e]veryone is equal before the 
law,,201 and ''"everyone has inherent dignity,,202. The claim is that human nature is 
abstract and universal and parcelled out in equal shares to everyone throughout South 
Africa. However, once empirical and historical material is introduced into this 
abstract human nature, the disparities between the abstract legal subject of Kantian 
discourse and the concrete human being in the world emerge. The discourse of 
human rights is seen for what it is: an indetenninate discourse20J of, first , rebellion 
and, later, legitimation that has little purchase as a descriptive tool of society and its 
bond (Douzinas and WarringlOn 1994: 148). The community of human rights is 
universal but always virtual; the humankind of universal nature does not exist 
empirically, a fact which some commentators regard as a simple failure to return the 
cat to the bag. Devenish. noting that "all men and women are ... created equal", 
wistfully notes: " it is regrettable that of all the noble principles of democratic 
philosophy, equality has proved the most intractable to convert from merely an ideal 
to the hard world of reality" (Devenish 1999: 56). It is both regrettable and inevitable: 
all men and women are not born equal and are subjected to the domination of power 
relations throughout their lives. Human rights. through abstract guarantees of liberty 
and equality, rhetorically mask the operations of power in South Africa and efface the 
current material strictures and inequalities. 
Moellendorfs equation of justice with the rights of individuals to seek redress 
through the courts of law for wrongdoing (Moellendorf: 285) is typical of modem 
jurisprudence. If modernity has been an era of profound " moral catastrophe", in no 
other field has the abandonment of ethics occurred so extremely as it has in law. At 
the same time, law is proposed as the main substitute for the absent value consensus 
and the emptied normative realm. In modem jurisprudence, the law is public and 
201 Section 9(1) of the final Constitution and 8(1) of the interim Constitution . 
202 Section 10 of the final Constitution. 
20] See the divergence of judicial interpretation of the " right to life" (Section 11) in Makwanyalle. 
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objective; rules ascertainable objectively, without the effects of individual preference, 
prejudice and ideology. Its procedures are technical and its personnel neutral. Any 
contamination of law by value will compromise its ability to turn social and political 
conflict into manageable and technical disputes about the meaning and applicability 
of pTe-existing public values. This insulation of law from ethico-political 
considerations allegedly makes the exercise of power impersonal and guarantees the 
equal subjection of citizens and state officials to the dispassionate requirements of the 
rule of law. And since adjudication is presented in common law jurisdictions, such as 
South Africa, as the paradigmaic instance of law, the demand for justice is equated 
with the moral neutrality of the judicial process. The modem conflation of law and 
justice lies behind demands by Moellendorf and others, that criminal prosecution be 
preferred (at least as a first choice) over truth commissions (Orentlicher 1991 ; 
Roederer 1 999a: Siegel 1998: 450). In the modern conception, justice becomes 
identified with the administration of justice and the requirements and guarantees of 
legal procedure and the " interests of justice" are routinely interpreted as the interests 
of adjudication (Douzinas and Warrington 1994: 151). In substantive terms, justice 
loses its critical character; it becomes an institution transformed from the utopian or 
··mystical" tool of denunciation of socio-political immorality into a legitimatory 
narrative of modern law. In modem jurisprudence, morality has vacated the 
normati ve universe, which is now exclusively inhabited by the prescriptions and 
decrees of legis lative institutions. Consequently, justice is not directly involved with 
values, a fact represented in the symbol of Ihe blindfolded goddess holding the scales 
of justice. Justice is presented as a "cold virtue, sometimes a cruel one" (Helier 1987: 
11) which "lacks the wannth of morality" (Lucas 1980: 63). The blindfold, which 
ostensibly guarantees impartiality, also precludes both s ight of and insight into the 
contingent circumstances of litigants and so reinforces the modem characterisation of 
the legal process as blind calculation from which the ethical relation between 
litigants, and the ethical relation of the adjudicator to the parties, is excluded. Indeed, 
it seems as though it is the scales, rather than the woman holding them that renders 
judicial decisions.204 That justice is rendered as a woman in this early symbol , used 
204 As Adomo observes "in [law], the principle of equivalence (the identity principle in other words) 
becomes the single overriding principle. Incapable of responding to dissimilarities. it becomes the 
surreptitious promotion of inequality" (Adomo, quoled in Van der Wait 1998: 81). 
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before women can vote or own property, let alone act as lawyers or judges, attests to 
the irrelevance of the corporeal person who holds the scales (Sypnowich 1999). 
Moellendorf s identification with the modem legal paradigm forces him to 
equate morality and liberal legality (fundamental human rights) - "such rights are 
fundamental to the just functioning of a legal system" (Moellendorf 1997: 287) -
which precludes his viewing truth (narrative polyphony) as anything but secondary 
and, moreover, as being without value outside of the context of legal formal ity: 
"Notice that the value of truth here is quite different than in standard courtroom 
cases. In such cases, the truth is instrumentally valuable because of its service to 
justice" (Moellendorf 1997: 287). Moellendorfs view of amnesty and punishment is 
equally Kantian. He observes: 
The moral argument that a policy like amnesty is justified by such goods 
[psychological goods for victims and perpetrators] must be a consequentialist 
one. The amnesty provision is necessary for the truth and the truth is valuable 
because of the great goods of well-being it yields. (Moellendorf 1997: 287) 
This assessment may be correct. Indeed, utilitarians like Bentham, for instance, are 
only in favour of punishment if its imposition results in an overall maximisation of 
happiness. Bentham begins his chapter on "Cases Unmeet for Punishment" in An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation by observing that "all 
punishment is mischief; all punishment in itself is evil" and that according to the 
principle of utility, punishment ought to be allowed only "insofar as it promises to 
exclude a greater evil" (Bentham 1970: 158). For instance, greater evil would be 
avoided "where the mischief that it produced [would be less than] what it prevented" 
(Bentham 1970: 155). For Moellendorf, the beneficial consequences of amnesty to 
post-apartheid society cannot justify the violation of the fundamental rights of 
particular individuals. He writes in this regard: "Although the achievement of the 
goal would be a great good, one cannot simply weigh that good against the violations 
of rights of individuals ... [q]uite the contrary, this right limits what might be done in 
pursuit of the; goa l (Moellendorf 1997: 287). Prevalent in Moellendorfs position on 
punishment is the extreme deontologism of limiting punishment, almost whatever the 
consequences, that is manifested in extreme observations such as the following: "it is 
difficult to imagine how a policy goal of promoting well-being could ever outweigh 
punishing those guilty of genocide" Moellendorf 1997: 287). These words closely 
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echo, perhaps unselfconsciously, Kant' s deontological rejection of utilitarian 
considerations in penology when he writes that the "law concerning punishment is a 
categorical imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths 
of a theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the 
criminal" (Kant 1965: 99). However, whereas Kant leaves open the possibility of 
imagining an advantage in the abrogation of punishment, Moellendorf more or less 
forecloses on any reasonable possibil ity of so doing. Indeed, it is anything but 
difficult to imagine that the goal of providing psychological and other consolation to 
apartheid victims through the facilitation of accounts of atrocities by perpetrators and 
victims might properly be preferred to punishment of the guilty. 205 
One might even say, remaining within rights discourse, that given the history 
of apartheid, victims have a right to know what happened and that, if through 
granting amnesty and receiving acco~nts of the past, these victims were enabled to 
negotiate the reconstruction of society and face the challenges of the future, amnesty 
should be grantcd.206 Moellendorf does recognise that fundamental rights are not 
absolute and that they "might be outweighed by other rights claims or if the 
background conditions of justice cannot be achieved without doing so" (Moellendorf 
1997: 287). Having made this concession he is unable presumably because of his 
deontological leanings, to take the acknowledgement to its logical endpoinL that 
justice cannot be the outcome of punishment when punishment is imposed only to 
M Chapter nine of volume five of the Report of the Truth and Reconci liation Commission documents 
the healing and reconciliatory effects of the narrati ves provided by both victims and perpetrators. Ms J 
Msweli testifies: 
I want the people who kil led my sons to come forward because this is a time for 
reconci liation. I want to forgive them, and I also have a bit of my mind to tell them. I wou ld 
be happy if they cou ld come before me because 1 don ' t have sons today ... I want them to tell 
who sent them and to come and kill my sons. Maybe they are enem ies, maybe they are not . 
So, I want to establish as to who they are and why they did what they did. (TRC Report, 
Vo lume 5. Chapter 9, p378) 
206 Rosemary Jolly and Derek Attridge (1998: 6) describe how in 
witnessing the proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commiss ion, one notices with 
interest that victi ms testitying are as anxious to know more about the detai ls of their 
victimisation as they are to request reparation from the state; in some cases, when asked what 
they wanted from the Commiss ion , those testifYing requested only information and not 
reparation. While retribution satisfies a certain sense of symmetry, the witnesses anxiety about 
their victim isers' motives and further details of crimes comm itted exceeds any closure 
retributive justice on its own can offe r. 
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satisfy the desert of the perpetrator207 , or to satisfy an abstract right of the victim, 
eschewing contemplation of the consequences of punishing or of granting amnesty. 
This is so because, in relation to any action with inherent ethical impact, 
consequences matter - which is not to say that the needs and wishes of individuals 
should necessarily be sacrificed for the common good. Far from it. I do not believe 
that the debate concerning the ethics of the TRC should be simplistically polemicised 
in deonto logical/utilitarian terms. Whilst Kantian claims to a transcendental realm of 
reason before and outside experience are unconvincing, the utilitarian concept of 
justice as the calculation of consequences is equally (albeit differently) unpersuasive, 
Uti litarianism mandated that competing versions of the good were to be translated 
into a common measure of pleasure and pain, confirming the reduction of all types of 
use and moral value into a system of universal exchange. Utilitarianism believed in 
the possibility of translating incommensurable claims. expectations and desires into a 
practical equation, a calculus of felicity, that would strive to achieve the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. Uti litarianism 's failures are well known; it suffices 
to say that the allegedly neutral calculus of diverse pleasures and pains became an 
excuse for the imposition of self-serving calculations by those who operated it. This 
is most powerfully portrayed in Dickens' Hard Times, in which utilitarianism is seen 
as imprisoning human beings in a dreary industrial landscape of brick terraces and 
foul chimneys where they are enslaved by machines and reduced to numbers?08 
The politically and historically contingent context of the South African 
transition must be influential over its success, so that to legislate in universalist tenns 
about the ethics of amnesty and punishment is not to do so in the spirit of justice, if 
justice is conceived as incorporating ethical relations and in turn ethical relations are 
recognised as subsisting between specific individuals faced with problems not 
(always) of their own making. The choices that individuals make are constrained by 
the limitations of discourse and context which prefigure them so that even to talk 
about the ethical dimensions of particular actions must incorporate an investigation 
into the particular context. Moreover, if questions of eth.ics exist only in relation to 
207 Following Kant. the criminal "must first be found to be deserving of punishment before any 
consideration is given 10 the utility of this punishment for himself or his fellow citizens" (Kant 1965: 
lOO, emphasis in original). 
201 The moment of recognition of the limits of ulilitarianism is poignantly played out in a scene in 
which Mrs Gradgrind, on her death bed, epiphanically becomes aware of the exclusion of value from 
her life which strict utilitarianism has effected - on ly to die before she has an opponunity to aniculalc 
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actual individuals in context, justice cannot be blind to the idiosyncrasies of their 
situation as it is in the modern conception. Situatedness is onc of the "background 
considerations of justice" (Moellendorf 1997: 287) as Moellendorf puts it. It may be 
that (as I am in fact arguing), in the circumstances of the South African tradition. the 
demands of victims that punishment be inflicted are outweighed by the needs of all 
individuals in society to engage in reconstruction (of institutions, subjectivities and 
ethical relations). The requisite co-operation between individuals may demand 
reinscription of the ethical in intcrsubjective dealings which the operation of the TRC 
went a good distance towards providing. Before J detail the ethical dimensions of the 
operations of the TRC, and then advocate a particular postmodern conception of 
justice furthered by it, I need to explain why the consequences of punishment (since I 
have said that consequences are important) are, on the whole, undesirable and, 
secondly, what are the implications of imposing the legal idiom on those who are not 
conversant in it and who have been victimised by their exclusion from the legal 
system. 
Penal jurisprudence has been the subject of philosophical interest since at least 
Plato, who in the Republic understands the presence of crime in society to be "the 
result of a defecti ve culture and bad breeding and a wrong construction of the state" 
(Republic VIII , 552e), and for whom punishment facilitates "correction, intimating 
that the penalty corrects or guides" (Protagoras 326 d-e). It is not my intention to 
provide an account of the history of the jurisprudence of crime and punishment from 
Plato ' s account of punishment as an educational remedy for the "evil condition of the 
soul", Aristotle 's proto-Kantian conception of punishment as the just desert following 
the voluntary assumption of wickedness, Hegel 's view of punishment as the symbolic 
negation of the crime, through to the consequentialist concerns of Beccaria. Bentham 
and beyond.209 Suffice to say that three primary purposes of punishment may be 
identified: the utility value of punishment as deterrence, the rehabilitative value of 
punishment, and punishment as retribution (Pauley 1994: I). The idea that 
punishment would deter future crime is incompatible with a wealth of empirical 
evidence to the contrary, to which the Consti tutional Court referred in Makwanyane 
this recognition (Dickens 1969: 225). Lewis Mumford remarks, not without irony, that in nineteenth 
century England. it was opium that became the religion of the workers (Mumford 1934: 179). 
l OO That account is more properly the subject of a separate study, one which has in part been carried out 
by Matthew Pauley (Pauley 1994) in his rigorous account of the jurisprudence of crime and punishment 
from Plato to Hegel. 
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in its rejection of deterrence as a justification of the death penalty. Neither is there 
forceful evidence to support the proposition that punislunent is a rehabilitative 
treatment for criminals. Indeed, if we are to take Foucault ' s Discipline and Punish 
seriously, we must acknowledge that the panoptic structure points to a disciplinary 
rather than rehabilitative purpose. Power anains its highest degree of intensity in a 
penal institution. Foucault observes that "[w]e still have in appearance, a legal system 
which punishes the criminal. In fact, we have a justice that proves itself innocent of 
punishing by pretending to treat the criminal" (Foucault 1990: 248). Louk Hulsman, 
professor of penal law at the University of Rotterdam, has advocated the abolition of 
the penal system on the grounds that it is constructive of delinquency and ends up 
incapable of realising the social finalities it supposedly pursues. For Hulsman, every 
refonn is illusory and the only coherent solution is abolition. Instead of punishment 
and shame, he argues, conflicts should be regulated through procedures of arbitration 
and non-judicial conciliation. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against both the retributivists and utilitarian 
advocates of deterrence is that they tend to view individual actors as fully responsible 
persons who have, and who freely exercise, the ability to choose between good and 
evil. On the poststructuralist view, this is simply mistaken; subjectivity is constructed 
through the modalities of power coursing through discourse. To be a subject is 
always to be subjected. Consequently to treat criminal action as the product of the 
autonomous will is not only unjust, it is a complete misdiagnosis of a problem 
resolutely inscribed in the social fabric. To its great credit, the court in AZAPO 
acknowledged that the evils of apartheid were the product of discourse and context 
when it noted that H[t]he wicked and the innocent have often both been victims" (para 
17h). 
On the question of the nature of modem legal discourse and the exclusory 
effects of the modem legal idiom, as it pervades legal proceedings, it should be noted, 
following Foucault, that legal language is crucial to the exercise and maintenance of 
power and domination (Foucault 1980). Its linguistic register exists to represent and 
preserve the special status and knowledge of particular groups and institutions - legal 
and legislative institutions - and as a consequence to devalue and exclude those who 
are unfamiliar with it. The exclusivity, distance and reification that characterises 
modem legal discourse can be seen as a system of "covert strategies to discourage 
opposition to the authority of legal meaning" (Higgins 1997: 362). Not only does 
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legal discourse employ an authoritative specialist register whose lexicon and syntaX 
reflect the historical influence of alien and obsolete dialects, it employs it in a 
hierarchically ordered, alienating institutional space - courtrooms. Modem legal 
discourse privileges selected terminologies and semantic forms which re~ults in an 
exclusive system of meaning. Moreover, given the essentially combative nature of 
both civil and criminal proceedings, one is tempted to agree with Foucault's assertion 
that 
the court, with its triple division into two disputing parties and the neutral 
institution, which comes to the decision on the basis of some concept of 
justice, which exists in and for itself, seems to me a particularly disastrous 
model for the clarification and political development of popular justice. 
(Foucault 1980: 29) 
It has been a frequent criticism of the western panern of triadic adjudication, 
particularly in its Anglo-American guise (adopted in South Africa), that it is far more 
preoccupied with winning and losing than with justice. Litigation is often either the 
result of or precursor to resentment and feuding . Minow observes: 
reconciliation is not the goal of criminal trials except in the most abstract 
sense. We reconcile with the murderer by imagining he or she is responsible 
to the same rules and commands that govern all of us; we agree to sit in the 
same room and accord the defendant a chance to speak, and a chance to fight 
for his or her life. But reconstruction of a relationship, seeking to heal the 
accused, or indeed, healing the rest of the community, are not the goals in any 
direct sense ... [which is to] seek the separation of the adjudicated wrongdoer 
from others through sentencing to prison or death. (Minow 1998: 26) 
In my view, the demands of reconstruction facing South Africa have necessitated an 
attempt at reconciliation rather than the creation of pariahs by parvenus. Not that it is 
necessary to be consequentialist in rejecting separat ion (the separation of 
incarceration) in favour of reconciliation since, as I intend to argue, the latter is, for 
other reasons, ethically preferable to the fonner. 
In the AZAPO judgement, Mahomed DP went further than simply upholding 
the granting of amnesty to perpetrators for criminal and civil liability. He also 
defended the inderimification of the state in respect of delictual claims against the 
previous state. The court's rationale was that the limited resources of the state could 
not be distributed on a basis preferential to the delictual claims of victims since this 
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would divert desperately needed funds from other areas of reconstruction, such as 
education, housing and health care, and that in any event the TRC would effect 
reparations on a more equitable and cost-effective basis. Moellendorf, who as we 
have seen, seems to equate injustice with the invasion of fundamental rights, asks 
"why, for example, would civil liability, within some upper limit, in cases of gross 
human rights abuses be inconsistent with the broader aims of reconstruction?" 
(Moellendorf 1997: 291). Again, !he question fails to take into account the 
circumstances of victims, most of whom are impoverished blacks, who cannot afford 
the exorbitant costs of legal services in South Africa: legal services are a privilege of 
the wealthy minority. Although the Constitutional Court has given full effect to the 
constitutional right to free legal representation for indigent accused in criminal 
triais21 0 (although most accused continue to be unrepresented), there IS no 
corresponding right to legal representation for civil litigants. Most victims would, 
therefore, not be able to afford legal representation and would be unable to claim 
compensation. Furthennore, injustice is not limited to gross human rights violations, 
nor can it be translated into existing delictual classifications. Victims of human rights 
violations are not the only victims of apartheid. Many of the lawfully prescribed 
practises of apartheid relating to systematic discrimination and persecution on racial 
grounds fall outside of the legal categories by virtue of which a claim is delictually 
actionable. Following Moellendorfs suggestion of compensation through the courts 
would not only incur huge legal costs, but would have the effect of preferring certain 
categories of persons, according to a taxonomy developed by an elite, and would 
exclude a victimised majority on whom the effects of oppression are most wide 
spread. 
Part of Moellendorfs fai lure to perceive the fundamental interconnectedness 
of corrective justice and redistributive justice - he wants corrective justice, in the 
form of civil and criminal litigation, to be unaffected by broader redistribution 
policies - presumably follows from an adherence to Aristotle's fonnal separation of 
political justice into the categories of distributive and corrective justice (Aristotle, 
210 Section 25(3) of the interim Const itution provides: "Every accused shall have the right to a fair trial 
which shall include the right ... (e) to be represented by a lega l practitioner of his or her choice or, 
where substanlial injustice would othenvise result, 10 be provided with legal representation at state 
expense, and to be informed of these rights". Section 35(2)(c) of the final Constitution contains a 
corresponding provision. In S v Ramuongiwa 1997 (2) BCLR 268 (V) the court held that the right was 
equivalent to the rule set out in S v Khanyile 1988 (3) SA 795 (N): that an accused has a right to 
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Nichomachean Ethics, Book V.vA, 28 1). To illustrate the unfeasibility of this fannal 
division of justice, I offer the contemporary legal fonnaJism of Emest Weinrib (1988) 
as an example. Weinrib defends and elaborates on the Aristotelian separation of the 
two fonns of justice. He indicates that the two forms are irreducible and that, 
according ly, particular juridical relationships come within the sweep of corrective or 
distributive justice but never both. As understood by Weinrib, corrective justice 
involves the award of damages which simultaneously quantifies the wrongdoing of 
one party and the suffering of the other party in a bipolar private transaction. The 
award of damages undoes, or erases, the interference of delicts. and purports to 
reinscribe the initial equilibrium between individuals, linked only externally through 
legal relations, rather than the internal interpersonal links such as those forged 
through an ethic of care. Corrective justice, argues Weinrib, deals wi th the immediate 
relationship of person to person and. is completely removed from politics, since it 
merely seeks to restore the initial equilibrium between a perpetrator and victim 
regardless of the actual wealth, merit or virtue of the interacting legal actors. 
However, whereas corrective justice is concerned with the recovery of the status quo 
ante, distributive justice requires the allocation of benefits and burdens of social co-
operation in proportions set by applicable criteria of distribution. Also, and consistent 
with Weinrib' s analysis, distributive justice, unlike corrective justice. can never be 
completely severed from politics, so that deciding on a criterion of distribution for the 
purposes of achieving equality requires a political decision. 
Applying Weinrib's forms of justice to the particularities of countries 
engaged in transition to democracy is impossible. Contrary to Weinrib's fonnulation, 
corrective justice in South Africa - the choice of criminal prosecution or other 
institutional modes such as the TRC - is a political choice as are the criteria 
according to which compensable and non-compensable claims may be distinguished. 
It is only by taking distributive and corrective justice to their highest level of 
abstraction that we can regard them as separate, since in context each does affect the 
other; as is the case where allowing delictual claims against the state detracts from 
the common store to be distributed by more equitable criteria of distribution. 
Corrective justice for Weinrib promotes the minimal hannony of mutual non-
interference through the spread of material equality between individuals linked 
representation , not in all cases, but in cases where "the ca ll for representation is most demanding and 
the lack of it most debilitating" (at 8150). 
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through external bonds of legal relations. The conception is of a static universe of 
purely abstract egos who remain entirely independent from each other and who 
scrupulously refrain from interfering with each other as a consequence of their 
adherence to a regime of negative rights and duties. This atomiSlic, apolitical vis ion 
of legal interaction is compared by Weinrib to the undeniably political features of 
distri bUlion to support the conclusion that the two fonns of justice are separate and 
different. In fact , it is only by suppressing alternate political visions of the proper role 
of corrective justice - by insisting on the external legal links between agents, to the 
exclusion of the internal ethical relations between actors and by promoting the 
minimal harmony of non-interference rather than the maximal harmony of the seWs 
ethical regard for the other - that Weinrib can insist that corrective justice is not 
political and that it is completely separate from distributive justice. Alan Brudner 
(\990) notes that Weinrib's formulation is problematic because it elevates one among 
many possible, historically grounded and ideologically determined versions of what 
is entailed by corrective and distributive justice as the universal and ahistorical 
essence of those forms of justice. Weinrib's depoliticisation of corrective justice is 
achieved through the enshrining of a particular ideological position which is not only 
subject to debate, but also actually incompatible with the contingencies of the South 
African transition, which is, of course, intensely political. Weiruib's insistence on the 
existence of an unbridgeable gap between corrective and distributive justice is not as 
universally applicable as he thinks; at least under some conceptions of justice there 
need be no insurmountable gap between corrective and distributive justice. It is only 
by asserting that corrective justice is concerned with a regime of negative rights 
(freedom from interference, for instance), and that distributive justice necessarily 
involves a positive respect for Kantian notions of equality and personhood, that he 
can regard the two forms as separate. However, nothing precludes the extension of 
corrective justice to cover a regime of positive rights or, in other words, a legal 
system in which private legal actors are charged with positive duties towards one 
another. Certainly, I am not suggesting that corrective and distributive justice are one 
and the same thing; there are differences between the two concepts, for example the 
former is backward-looking whereas the latter is essentially forward-looking. 
There is another sense, however, in which distributive and corrective justice 
may be harmonised under a unified system of justice or even under the ambit of a 
particular institutional mechanism which is "characterised by its possession of an 
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internal congruence and harmony that binds all its compact parts together in a simple 
whole which is greater than the sum of its parts" (Rosenfeld 1992: 187). Such an 
institution is the TRC, which aims to reconcile self and other within the realm of 
social relationships in South Africa, in order to promote the maximum hannony of 
engagement with othemess and (potentially) to facilitate these goals through 
payments from state funds - reparations - in order, ritualistically, to efface the 
encroachment of a wrongdoing self upon a suffering other. The corrective and the 
distributive become thoroughly entangled in the concrete task of reconciliation and 
redistribution. Neither the Kantian ethical fonnalism at the root of fundamental 
human rights nor the legal fonnalism of Weinrib have any persuasive force in relation 
to the contingent concerns of the South African transition, whether because the 
visions they offer are so highly abstracted that they are indetenninate when it comes 
to practical application. or because they offer an irreducibly arbitrary political and 
ideological account under the guise of universalism. 211 
Inlernational Law and 'Civilisation' 
It has been argued by certain commentators that the court in AZ4PO failed 
adequately to consider the ways in which international law bears on the granting of 
amnesty by successor regimes (Dugard 1997a; 1997b; MacAdams 1997) and, more 
radically, that its finding in favour of amnesty was actually in opposition to 
international law (Motala 1996). Whilst many internationa1 scholars argue that both 
international treaties212 and international law oblige a successor regime to hold its 
predecessor responsible for acts that constitute crimes under international law 
(Bassiouni 1992; Orentlicher 1991 ; Motala 1996; Ede1enbos 1994), in fact, the rules 
and rulings of international law are more contradictory and unsettled than might at 
first appear to be the case. Evidence in favour of the contention that international law 
mandates prosecution includes article 4 of the Genocide Convention of 1948, 
providing for an absolute obligation to prosecute offenders; decisions of the inter-
American court of the Commission of Human Rights, holding that the amnesties 
2 11 On the casting of a particular political and ideological formulation of law as universal , Anatole 
French once observed that the law forbids both rich and poor to steal bread and sleep under bridges. 
212 The treaties referred to in this regard include the Genocide Convention of 1948, the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973, the Geneva 
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granted by Argentina and Uruguay were incompatible with the American Convention 
of Human Rights; comments by the UN Human Rights Committee that amnesties 
covering acts of torture are "generally incompatible with the duty of states to 
investigate such 3Ct5,,;2 13 and various other declarations and statutes for international 
criminal proceedings promulgated by the United Nations. The court in AZAPO 
rejected the contention that international law prescribes prosecution: first , they found 
that article I (4) of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which related 
to armed conflicts in which people were fighting against racist regimes in exercise of 
their right of self-determination, was inapplicable to South Africa because the 
struggle of the South African liberation movements was for equality and not self 
determination (the court is surely mistaken here: the struggle was for both these 
things); and second. that international law not only fails to prohibit amnesty but 
rather encourages it. In support of the second point, the court cited Article 6(5) of the 
Additional Protocol Il of 1977, which seems to encourage amnesty by providing that 
"at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who participated in the armed conflict, or those 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the anned conflict, whether they are 
interned or detained" (para 300). 
From the above it should be clear that international law presents a 
contradictory and inconclusive set of rules governing the question of amnesty and 
prosecution. Also , silence on the question of amnesty in the most recent international 
legis lation, the Statute of the Internat ional Criminal Court adopted in Rome in 1998, 
means that the interpretation that international law currently permits amnesty is 
certainly possible (Dugard 1999). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that international 
law has not internalised and incorporated the approximate ly seventeen truth 
commissions established since 1974 (Hayner 1994) to enquire into the past of 
particular societies in transition to democracy - many of which have enjoyed marked 
success. I would refer to the following statement by Lord Lloyd in the Pinochet case: 
Further light is shed on state practice by the widespread adopt ion of amnesties 
for those who have committed crimes against humanity, including torture. 
Chile was not the first in the field. There was an amnesty at the end of the 
Conventions on the Laws of War of 1949 and the Convention Against Tonure and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 . 
213 General comment no 20 (44)(art.7) UN doc. CCPRlC2 1IRev J.lAdd3., para 15 (April 1992). 
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Franco-Algerian war in 1962. In 1971 , India and Bangladesh agreed not to 
pursue charges of genocide against Pakistan troops accused of killing about 
onc million East Pakistanis. General amnesties have become common in 
recent years, especially in South America, covering members of former 
regimes accused of torture and other atrocities. Some of these have had the 
blessing of the United Nations, as a means of restoring peace and .democratic 
government ... It has not been argued that these remedies are as such contrary 
to international law by reason of the failure to prosecute the individua l 
perpetrators. 2 14 
My view of international law largely echoes my comments on human rights 
above. International and supranational law, including international treaties and 
principles of human rights, potentially address all states and all persons individually 
and meaningfully. However, international law is a contradictory and indeterminate 
discourse of legitimation which retains what little relevance it has in late modernity 
mainly on account of its age, manipulability. and pedagogical usefulness. God. as the 
author of natural law, has been replaced in modernity by international law and 
institut ions as the source of fundamental natural rights. The international institutions 
that mediate between nations, such as the UN, despite their rhetorical affiliation with 
supranational loyalties, serve largely as conflictual arenas for ethnocentric 
vituperation and the promotion of parochial interests (Goulet 1995: 187). 
International law is, as Douzinas and Warrington note, «a species of regulation that 
attracts a healthy dose of suspicion as to its legal character" (1991: 20). International 
law is so indeterminate that applying it to particular si tuations, such as the question of 
amnesty, renders it capable of being construed in either way, for or against, so that I 
think it quite proper for it not to have been determining in this case.2lS The AZAPO 
court, ope rating within modem discourse, felt itself unable to suspend the rule and so 
simply opted for the interpretation which favoured its view of amnesty. 
A founding text of international law, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, 
was initially an attempt to make the discourse of universal rights part of the 
foundation myth of modem France. Thereafter, as Lyotard notes, it is difficult to 
know whether the law is French or pan-human (Lyotard 1988: 147). Through the 
Kantian notion of autonomy, premised on the power of the rational legislature to 
2 14 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate. Ex Parte Pinochet (1998] 3 WLR 1456 (HL), 
1490 B-C.) 
W Moreover, the Constitutional Court has recognised that in spite of the provision in section 35( 1) of 
the interim Constitution that recourse "may" be had to foreign case law, it is important to appreciate 
that this wi ll not necessarily offer a safe guide. 
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Impose its law on the universe, including the colonial third world, a gap is opened 
between the legislators/subjects and the colonial subjected. The empire expands the 
community of those subjected to the law of the nation and makes it co~extensive with 
the whole world. However, the colonised others, subjected to imperial law, can never 
become its legislators and so are never autonomous in the Kantian sense. The 
discourse of universality is necessarily a White Mythology: the postulation of 
autonomy as the principle of universal legislation is achieved only through exclusion, 
disenfranchisement and subjection without the subjecthood of the other (Derrida 
1982; Spivak 1987). Notice, for instance, the evaluative nature of Orentlicher's 
description of the purposes of international law, ~hus: "International law itself helps 
assure the survival of fragile democracies when its clear pronouncement removes 
certain crimes from the realm of certain countries' "internal politics and thereby 
places these crimes within the scope of universal concern and the conscience of all 
civilised people" (Orentlicher 1991 : 2540 my emphasis). How are we to understand 
this reference to "civilised people"? Civilisation is related to an early distinction 
between the civil and the savage: to be a civilised meant to be a citizen of the city, as 
opposed to the savage, outside it, or the more distant barbarian roaming the lands 
beyond. 216 It was in France that the concept of civilisation developed in its dominant 
Enlightenment sense of the secular development of modem society and an end point 
in the historical view of the advancement of humanity. Civilisation expressed the 
culmination of the process of "an achieved condition of refinement and order" 
(embodied in the people to whom Orentlicher refers) and the process itself (Young 
1995 : 32). Civilisation was allied with a particular concept of culture, developed as 
part of the Enlightenment stress on education as enculturation. This radical 
egalitarian position. traced back to Locke, underlies the Enlightenment claim of the 
equality of all men: if equality does not actually exist in the present, enculturation 
enables at least potential equality. Both culture and civilisation are invoked to 
describe what the African lacks.lt7 l.S. Mills' essay Civilisation, of 1836, fonnalised 
216 Eve r since the Roman empire 's Civis Rornanus sum, the idea of Romans and barbarians, superior 
self and inferior olher, is connoted by the word "civ ilised". Waiter Benjamin famously commented thal 
;' no document of civilisation is not at the same lime a document of barbarism" (Benjamin 1973: 258), 
referring not only to the barbaric acts of history done in the name of civilisation, but also to the 
necessary interdependence and entanglement between civilisation and barbarism that is supposed to set 
them apart. 
211 As V. G. Kieman comments in his study of European military, commercial and sp iritual 
domination, "colonising countries did their best to cling to a conviction that they were spreading 
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the categories of civilisation and barbarism as a hierarchy of the historical stages of 
man, bringing history and geography together in a generalised scheme of European 
superiority that identified civilisation with race. The pinnacle of this conflation came 
in Pritchard's theory of racial difference, in which he posited that the first people had 
been black and then identified the cause of subsequent whiteness as civilisation itself 
(Pritchard 1973). Civilising has become one of the great euphemisms of colonial 
conquest and the othering of the colonially subjected. c.c. cummings' 
characteristically astute evocation of American anti-Japanese sentiment engendered 
during World War Two through nationalistic othering in YgUDuh, ends: "Lidl yellah 
bas! tuds weer goin! DuhSIVILEYEzum" (cummings 1960: 52). Orentlicher 's 
equation of "universal concern" with "the conscience of civilised people", legitimates 
the agenda of the West, including colonial domination. International law is revealed 
as another discourse of colonialism ~d imperialism through which colonial Africa 
generally. and apartheid specifically. was constructed and sustained. 
Beyond Communilal'ianism 
It is tempting to suggest in the face of the colonial imposition of international 
law, that following communitarianism, any just negotiation of the past must be in 
accordance with the political values emergent in the South African community. rather 
than imposed from the outside. However, the idea of a single South African 
community is only a fictionalised reification, rhetorically constructed for the purposes 
of nation-building. Although justice must be panicular and contingent, the pluralism 
of South African society suggests multiple communities and dissensus rather than 
consensus, so that there can be no "subject that is authorised to say "we"" (Lyotard 
1985: 81 ).:m Furthennore, communities only exist by virtue of what they exclude -
through the world not merely order. but civilisation, which implied other peoples were not civilised yet. 
but were capable of becoming so" (Kieman 1988: 311). 
m One of the paradoxes of communitarian approaches is that communitarians fail to offer a convincing 
definition of community. as Raymond Plant (1998: 98, 99) has recently observed. Walzer seems to 
assume that the moral community, with its shared undetstandings is coextensive with the legal, 
juridical, national or political community; that, following Ga1ston, the community of shared meaning is 
co-extensive with the nation state. However, unlike countries like Iran and other nation states with a 
strong sense of community, in South Africa there is dissensus within' the society which fonns a 
juridical whole, "deep cleavages here which may not be resolvable by appealing to shared 
understandings" (Plant 1998: 99). 
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the oppressed and the marginalised - so that justice involves not only what is inside 
the community, hut what is outside of it. 
Nevertheless, it is disappointing that so many commentators would wrest 
debates about just solutions away from the forms of life to which they relate, in 
furtherance of "universal justice which transcends the requirements of political 
expediency" (Dugard 1997b: 287). Moellendorf, Dugard and fagan (1998) are 
doubtful about the justice of the negotiated political compromise and would instead 
see the issues of the day decided on the basis of ahistorical transcendental 
"principles". Although deconstructing discourses of power constructive of the status 
quo is, on my estimate, a pressing agenda, these theorists - who, like Orentlicher, 
would delink the issue of amnesty from its context - fail to recognise the situated 
nature of justice. which assumes different forms and different contexts.219 Such 
commentators, who seem to view compromise as the abrogation of principle, fail to 
recognise that justice is about hard choices between alternatives that are restricted by 
context; they do not acknowledge that compromise is often just and that failure to 
compromIse is one of the major failings of modernity. As Christopher Roederer 
explains 
it is simply not fair to CfltlCISe the South African compromise if the 
compromise resulted in the more just of the only two politically viable options 
available ... Sleeping with the enemy is not so condemnable if you are both in 
the hospital and there is only one bed. (Roederer I 999a:94) 
Compromise is the inevitable result of a politics of pluralism; it signifies consent only 
to the degree that difference must be accommodated within the polity.22o The problem 
with Dugard and Moellendorfs insistence on liberal principles acting as a foundation 
for South Africa's political transition, is a problem with the procedural formalism of 
liberal doctrine generally: it tends, as Stanley Fish observes in The Trouble with 
PrinCiple (fish 1999), to trivialise the actual cOnlent of passionately held positions 
and the manner in which disagreement may be resolved: through agonistic jousting, 
horse-trading, give and take. Fish dislikes principles for all the reasons that make 
them problematic for navigating the South African transition: they ar:e abstract, 
219 Comparing the merits of transitional courts and truth commissions, Roederer acknow ledges that 
"[m]uch depends on context" (Roederer I 999a: 92). 
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universal , neutral , formalistic and inflexible. 221 He also rightly insists that 
abstractions such as justice and equality must be further specified and concretised. 
This would enable rival concepts of justice to fight it out at the level of practical 
application.''' In fact , it might plausibly be argued by both the ANC and the National 
Party that neither compromised their principles. most of which - freedom, equality, 
justice - they shared. What were compromised were practical issues concerning 
amnesty, political representation and constitutional clauses. I would argue, however, 
following Fish, that it is only at this level that concepts like justice and equality have 
any relevance at al1. 223 
Thus far I have been concerned mainly with defending the decision (though 
not, in any unqualified way, its reasoning). I have defended the processes and 
methodology of the TRC, including the granting of amnesty over the (fundamental) 
constitutional right to prosecution and punishment and its rejection of international 
law as mandating prosecution. I have also argued that the court 's critics have based 
their objections on mistaken modern theory which, amongst other things, conflates 
law and justice and so equates prosecution with justice, and the TRC with injustice. I 
have advocated a postmodem concept of justice which is more ethical and accordant 
with the court 's decision. although not. I think, with its reasoning as a whole. My 
argument demands more than a defence of AZAPO and the TRC: in what follows 1 
provide a more detailed argument explaining why I believe the AZAPO court's 
judgement and the TRC to be just. Before I do so, I think it important to mention that 
another, less sympathetic reading of the AZAPO judgement is possible. Sarkin has 
argued that the judgement is one of "various judgements [that] indicate that the court 
will allow Parliament to detennine policy and govern with very little judicial 
interference" (Sarkin 1998: 644). Support for Sarkin's contention can be found in a 
m As Deborah Posel has pointed out, the TRC, "as itse lf the product ofa political compromise , .. was 
seen as a crucial vehicle in anempts to stabilise and reproduce the politics of transitiona l justice" (Posel 
1999: 5). 
l2I Notwithstanding this. I shall argue in the next chapter that principles do have a role to play in Soulh 
Africa's transition provided they are always futurol , rather than regarded as instantiated in present 
circumstances. 
m Chaskalson P comments in Makwanyane: "Principles can be established but the application of those 
Erinciples to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by case basis" (at para 104 D-E). 
2l Whilst I broadly agree with Fish 's anti-foundationa list epistemology, I wou ld distance myself from 
the conservative ends 10 which he enjoins himself. For Fish, the contingent cultural beliefs which 
constitute the self are elevated to lTanscendental a prioris in the sense that it becomes impossible to 
determine whether they are valid or useful and so to criticise any particular fonn of life. My 
understanding of context is that it is more multivalent and fractured than Fish allows and that critical 
self~distancing is actually part of the way in whichwe are bound up in the world. 
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dictum by Mahomed OP, where he observes in relation to the choice between 
prosecution and the TRC that " it is an act calling for a judgement falling substantially 
within the domain of those entrusted with law-making in the area preceding and 
during the transition period" (para 21 G). The identity of the law-makers referred to is 
confirmed as being Parliament when Mahomed subsequently opines that "the State is 
best equipped to determine what measures may be most conducive for the facilitation 
of such reconciliation and reconstruction" (para 3 1 G). I think it would be unwise to 
rush to the conclusion that this is a statement of unqualified judicial deference, rather 
than an acknowledgement of the powers and responsibilities of government. Certain 
of the court 's comments in the preceding Makwanyane judgement on the nature of 
the role of the judiciary as jurisgenesis (law-making), rather than being merely 
declaratory, render this verdict unlikely. It may well be that the court in AZAPO 
deferred 10 the wishes of the new government and that the Westminster system's 
separation of the powers of judiciary and executive is largely nominal. Complicity 
between these two branches of the state is, after all, nothing new. What the court's 
judgement does, at the very least , is justify the executive decision to choose amnesty. 
It might reasonably be argued that the equation made by the court between 
justice and prosecution is thoroughly modern in its nature and that it balances justice, 
so defined, against the need for the discovery of truth and reconciliation for victims 
and the well-being of society as a whole. Mahomed DP certainly seems to be 
insisting on a gap between justice and truth when he comments on the choice 
"between the need for justice to victims of past abuse and the need for reconciliation 
and rapid transition to a new future ... between a correction in the old and a creation of 
the new" (para 21 E-F). The alignment of justice with punishment and correction, and 
the implicit suggestion that reconciliation, transition and reconstruction, however 
worthy, are something other than just, is certainly in accordance with the modern 
conception of law and justice. However, to concede the court's allegiance to this 
conception is also to concede that its decision will be just: the modem conflation of 
law and justice insists that the outcome of technically correct legal proceedings is 
justice. But if the court's decision, on its own terms, is just, how can the abrogation 
of prosecution and punishment~ which the court has already defined as justice, be 
just? Logically, it cannot be just to be unjust. Finding in favour of the TRC cannot be 
conceived by the court as an injustice. No: either the court's reasoning is inconsistent 
(as its words suggest) or the TRC has always been a candidate for justice. The 
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judgement must, by implication, be an acknowledgement that truth (and amnesty) is 
at least in this case tantamount to justice224, and also that the liberal legality of the 
judicial process - in the fonn of prosecution - is not only not equivalent to justice; 
but in this case would be unjust. The implied acknowledgement by the court of the 
gap between law and justice and the concomitant recognition of the possibility of 
justice eXlemal 10 fonnal liberal legalilY (in the fonn of the TRC) - although 
admittedly authorised and legitimated by and through such legality - represents an 
exciting moment of judicial self-regard. In one sense, the judgement represents the 
modem legal system' s recusal of itself, in the face of a demand for a particularly and 
contingently arrived at justice: a triumph of justice over law, contingent over 
universal. In which case, it remains only to decide whether the decision is in fact just, 
or more just than the alternative. 
When I say that the legal system and .its judicial mouthpiece recuses itself in 
relation to the quest ion of corrective justice (that is, prosecution and punishment), I 
mean that it implicitly acknowledges both the crisis of legal form and the demand for 
ethics. The tragic diremption of law and justice during apartheid points to the failure 
of liberal legality as a tool of ethical transformation; the law at the moment of South 
Africa 's political and epistemological transformation reaches crisis, where crisis in 
this context denotes krinein, a turning to new directions in the law and jurisprudence, 
rather than any prophesied catastrophe of modem law's implosion.22s What the TRC 
represents, and what the AZAPO judgement confirms, is a change in legal form in 
relation to the law's construction and mediation of political transformation. Whereas, 
during apartheid, the political function of law was the separation of people on the 
basis of the sterile taxonomy of race, through the creation of dual legal systems, 
separate and unequal , political necessity now demands that law operate to the 
opposite effect: to reconcile those previously divided in order to create an atmosphere 
conducive to reconstruction. Judge Mahomed notes that "for the society traumatised 
by such conflict to reconstruct itself is a difficult task since the erstwhile adversaries 
of such a conflict inhabit the same sovereign territory. They have to live with each 
other and work with each other" (para 31 F-G). In order for the legal system to 
224 In relation to the equivalence between truth and justice, Roederer perceptively notes that "[if justice 
is thought to include the search for the truth of past injustices ... then in many cases truth and 
reconciliation hearings have a better chance of ... [facilitating justice) than would a nonnat coun of 
law" (Roederer 1999a: 93) . 
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reconcile the racially divided self and other. it has needed most importantly to 
abandon its self-declared impartiality and neutrality, and to involve itself wi-th legal 
subjects qua individuals with value systems, and ethical relations (or lack thereof) 
viewed internally between people. Justice has had to take off its blindfold, drop its 
scales and start paying attention to those features of legal subjects which make them 
human. The TRC is a manifestation of political exigency forcing the law to 
reconceptualise justice in ethical tenns; it is in the words of Justice Mahomed "an 
exercise of immense difficulty interacting in a vast network of political, emotional, 
ethical and logistical considerations" (para 21 F). 
In short, the AZAPO judgement is judicial recognition of the fact that modem 
legality, in the fonn of conflict resolution through litigation within the paradigm 
institution of modernity, the court, is not up to the task of reinscribing ethical 
relations in the intersubjective dealings which constitute political reconstruction. The 
legal system does not, however, perish. Just as apanheid's structure depended on the 
sanctions of law, so post-apartheid transitional South Africa experiences an equally 
pervasive colonisation of the social by legalised relations of power. A new fonn of 
law is born in the TRC. not only in the fonn of a new institution. but also in the fonn 
of a new mode of conflict and grievance resolution, which is designed to construct a 
new subjectivity for a new South Africa. The collapse of the legal expression of the 
public/private divide is evident as the public functionaries - the commissioners and 
their advisers - are commandeered from the traditionally private realm of worship 
and confession. Parliament ignores the distinction between rule and discretion, the 
hallowed basis of the doctrine of the rule of law. as it couches its delegation of 
authority to the commissioners of the TRC in wide tenns. notably in section 20(2) of 
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, which sanctions amnesty for 
"an act associated with a political objective." The range of actions which might be 
considered 10 have a political objective in this over-politicised country seems 
limitless. 
m Derrida describes the moment of JrJinein as "the dramatic instance of a decision that is still 
impossible and suspended, imminent and threatening" (Derrida I 992c: 31 , 31). 
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4.3 Justice, Reconciliation and the TRC 
I have already analysed in Foucauldian terms, the disciplining effects of 
punishment. I must concede, then, given the regulatory and nonnative nature of the 
Christian discourse of the TRC, the effects of this institution' s discourse as 
const itutive of a new subjectivity: how, through the discipline of the TRC, the 
reconstructed, reconstructing agent is produced. Foucault remarks that "power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of fruth. The 
individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" 
(Foucault 1979: 194). Modem law reflects "new methods of power whose operation 
is not ensured by right, but by technique. not by law but by normalisation, not by 
punishment but by control, methods trat are employed and in forms that go beyond 
the state and its apparatus" (Foucault 1990: 89). The TRC is evoked by all aspects of 
this description: its exclusion of rights in favour of more direct interconnection, the 
absence of punishment, its infusion of emotively nonnative religious admonition, the 
structural incorporation of the clergy. There is also the actively confessorial tenor of 
the TRC, encouraging the cathartic relation of buried narratives. Foucault tells of a 
trial which took place in France in 1978, where a rapist refused to respond to 
questions by the judge concerning his motive for commining the crimes. He admined 
his guilt and was willing to accept punishment, but refused to reveal his motives. 
Both the judge and the jury wanted an admission of depravity. When the accused 
refused to respond a juror cried out «For heaven's sake, defend yourself1 " (Foucault 
1988 : 125). As Foucault explains, much more is expected of him (the criminal). 
Beyond admission, there must be "confession, self-examination, explanation of 
oneself in relation to what one is" (Foucault 1988: 126). And so it might be argued 
that the non-punitive, confessional idiom of the TRC is a new form of domination, 
more subtle and insidious than the blunt repression once doled out by the all-powerful 
apartheid government, simultaneously repressive and constitutive of participants. 
Foucault's argument that the criminal justice system does not merely punish 
criminals, it creates them, could also be extended to the TRC - either that its 
discourse created "perpetrators" and "victims" and so fa iled to reconcile the two or 
else, according to Breyten Breytenbach, that it rewrites history as the emerging nation 
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requires. 226 This may be true in part, but it is not the whole story.227 Certainly there is 
an ontological fixity about the application of the two lenns. but it is temporary. 
Perpetrators who are granted amnesty testify about their wrongdoing in the past and 
then are free(d) to participate in the future, rather than punished to constitute 
themselves as criminals in overcrowded gaols. Victims narrate their suffering as past 
other rather than present self. Temporal disjunction and its mitigation are important 
individuating features of the TRC. Accordingly. I would question Foucault 's 
(normative as opposed to ontological) claims about subjectivi ty, in relation to social 
practices, such as the TRC, through which subjects are constituted. For Foucault, 
since processes of subjectivation are also processes of subjection, some people are 
authorised to speak authoritatively because others are si lenced. So for instance, ludith 
Butler, following Foucault, argues that the constitution of a class of authorised 
subjects entails the creation of a domain of de-authorised subjects, pre-subjects, 
figures of abjection and populations erased from view (Butler 1994). 
But is it really the case that no one can become the subj ect of speech without 
others being silenced? Is the TRC not exactly a counter-example, productive of an 
ontology based on the justice of alterity. a subjectivity created on the proximity of 
self to other, a reconstitution of victims and culprits in order "to become active, full 
and creative members of the new order" (para 18G)? I would argue that the subject 
authorisation of the TRC has in fact acted to ameliorate the asymmetries in current 
practices of subjectivation in South Africa. It is necessary to look elsewhere for an 
explanatory narrative of reconciliation and subjectivation as these concepts apply to 
the TRC. 
A trenchant Hegelian reading of reconciliation as it applies to the TRC has 
been provided by Daniel Herwitz (1998). The concept of reconciliation - conceived, 
226 Breytenbach, sceptical about the TRC's achievements, writes: 
Hardy meets and marries Kathy, the daughter of Alex Boraine, an old friend from earlier times 
when the struggle against injustice was noble. Alex is now one of the dogs of God; together 
with Archbishop Tutu he chairs the Inquisition called Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
misery and devastation and iniquity and treachery and pain are staged before a bench of the 
pure and beamed into the living rooms of the population. So that memory may be excavated, 
shaped and corrected, where needed to serve as backbone to the new history of the new nation . 
(Breytenbach 1998: 27) 
m This charge is open to the response that it is retribution rather than the TRC's granting of amnesty 
that is likely to manufacture victims and perpetrators, even if in reverse of apartheid identities: " If 
fonner victims don the mantle of victors and seek comprehensive ret ibutive justice in either its no-
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as it is in the TRC, in Christian terms - emerges in philosophy in Hegel, who views 
history teleologically as a dialectic of thesis and antithesis, identification and 
alienation, culminating in the harmony of synthesis. Hegel conceives of history as 
being about humanity acquiring knowledge of itself through conceptual development. 
In his parable of the master and slave, both derive identity dialectically and 
dependently. each in relation to the other. The master achieves his identity by 
positing himself as the slave's self-consciousness, depriving the slave of enjoyment 
of his 0\\11 work and constituting the identity of the slave, who exists 
" phenomenoiogically" only as other to the other, at the level of mere materiality. The 
master 's realisation of his dependency on the slave - that he is "slave to the slave"-
prompts a reversal in which each party, understanding itself to be incomplete, 
changes himself and his relation to the other, becoming more like the other. 
Reconciliation of master and slave is the result of self-awareness and mutual 
recognition, a higher state of consciousness. It is the happy culmination of modernity, 
the end of history, the formation of the nation-state. 
One is tempted. in the case of the TRC, to endorse a dialectical account of 
subjectivation over one in which subjectivity is constructed only through exclusion. 
Edward Said. comparing Foucault's account with that of Fanon' s distinctly Hegelian 
explanation of the relations between coloniser and colonised, notes that "Foucault 's 
work moves further and further away from serious consideration of social wholes, 
focussing instead upon the individuals as dissolved in an ineluctably advancing 
' microphysics of power' that is hopeless to resist", so that while Fanon pressses his 
philosophical arsenal into anti-authoratarian service, Foucault "swerves away from 
politics entirely" (Said 1993: 335, 336). Said is, I think, wrong about Foucault 
regarding power as irresistible: one only needs to think of Foucault's suggested 
redeployment of Greek aesthetic self-styling and Baudelairean dandysme , as well as 
his "queer theory", to be reminded that Foucault does advocate programmatic 
resistance to power. But, since in Foucault's 'cratotolgy' power manifests 
microphysically, so that resistance, also, takes place at the bodily rather than political 
level , Said is right about Foucault 's lack of engagement with the broader social 
nonsene revolutionary fonn or its liberal democratic fonn , then they may in stantly transfonn fonner 
perpetrators and beneficiaries into current victims" (Bhargava 2000: 65). 
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dialectics of West and South. coloniser and colonised.228 In addition, many writers 
who have analysed the oppressed consciousness, whether its cause is bound to overt 
colonialism, economic exploitation or racial discrimination (Fanon 1965; Mernni 
1991), reach the common conclusion that the oppressed acquire a vested interest in 
their own servitude. As a defence mechanism, the colonised internalise demeaning 
stereotypes thrust upon them by their colonial masters, so that in time their identity is 
constituted through such stereotypes, and this acts to reinforce the experience of 
oppression. Charles Taylor argues in a Hegelian fashion that 
non-recognition or misrecognition ... can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being. Beyond 
simple lack of respect, it can inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with 
crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human 
need. (Tay1or 1992: 25) 
Similarly, Axel Honneth has argued that the denial of recognition in the fonn of 
insult or degradation 
does not represent an injustice solely because it constrains the subjects in their 
freedom for action or does them harm. Rather such action is injurious because 
it impairs these persons in their positive understanding of self - an 
understanding acquired by intersubjective means. (Honneth 1992: 189) 
The TRC has been instrumental in expelling the internalised self-image, 
itself a long and painful process, evidenced by exhibitions of public grief and anger 
during the hearings. There was a palpable sense of ri tualistic cleansing in the 
hearings~ an excising and exorcis ing of an oppressively imposed identity of 
inferiority. This process has enabled those fonnerly considered objects to become 
subjects, deserving of equal inclusion within programs of distribution. Denis Goulet 
notes that in the case of dictatorships 
on both counts, voices and benefits, the majority of a nation 's populace is 
excluded. Not surprisingly therefore, the majority seeks to change both its 
political rulers and their development strategies. Hence new fonns of non-
elite participation in the transition ... become necessary ... the touchstone 
of development is whether people previously treated as mere objects known 
and acted upon, can now know and act upon, thereby becoming subjects of 
22S Foucaull has gone as far as denouncing any attempt to offer general diagnoses and general remedies 
for the ills o f society as "totalitarian" (Soper 1994: 16). 
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their own social destiny. People who are oppressed or reduced to the culture 
of silence do not participate in their own humanisation. Conversely, when 
they participate, thereby becoming active subjects of knowledge and action, 
they begin to reconstruct their properly human history and engage in 
process of authentic development. (Goulet 1995: 91 , 92) 
The TRC provides an opportunity for participation by the formerly excluded oon-
elites in the reconstitution of their humanity so that they can be included in 
development and reconstruction initiatives. 
There are problems with HegeJ 's account however. It is, as Herwitz remarks, a 
eurocentric 
fantasy of the West told by itself and for itself: a story written by the master 
in his own transparent and self-adulating script. In the actual world, the 
effects of reversal do not produce reconciliation or even solidarity. but instead 
the mere fact of recognition. (Herwitz 1998: 106) 
A similarly dialectical conception pervades Derrida' s view of the individual subject 
as someone who has no solid identity and is rather a bundle of heterogeneous and not 
necessarily coherent impulses and desires. Multiple forms of interaction with the 
world construct individuals as a "play of difference that cannot be completely 
comprehended" (Young 1989: 232).229 "Othernesses" are internalised within the self 
in a dialogical mode (Taylor 1994: 32). When victim and perpetrator, white and 
black, interact in the TRC, through the mutual relation of narratives, cross-
questioning and other verbal and non-verbal reactivity, they are caught in a game of 
constructing (race and gender) identities that has meaning only in terms of the social 
processes of identity construction and otherness, and that also bears the burden of 
historical construction. Individuals are heterogeneously constructed subjects 
internalising "othemesses" by virtue of their intricate relations with each other and 
the world. The TRC provides an institutional setting in which the shifting relations 
between self and other, understood dialectically, may be internalised, in appreciation 
of Derrida ' s call to render "delirious that interior voice that is the other of the other in 
us" (Harvey 1996: 356). The collection of narratives still emerging from the TRC has 
enabled the construction of a narrative identity, both at the level of history {and the 
m Hence the postmodem riddle of political su bjectivity in South Africa - what do a Christian 
clergyman, an ANC politician , an embezzler and a consumer have in common? They can a ll be the 
same person. 
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identity of the South African "nation") and at the level of the individual life. 
However, since so many slories, often contradictory. have been woven from the same 
material , identity is rendered somewhat unstable, and so able to accommodate 
contingency and revisability. Although certain narratives may be committed to the 
possibility of a certain closure of meaning and identity, each will inexorably and 
productively be breached through the play of difference and contestation. Narrative, 
and the meaning and identity to which it gives rise, is after all a representation of 
power, to be resisted through counter-narrative and contestation. Unlike Hegel ' s 
account, here reconciliation is only promised, never final. 230 In the TRC. sameness 
and difference between parties may be questioned, explored, but never finally 
resolved as "the logocentric rule dividing master from slave gives way and the 
borders constructed by the euro-tribe collapse - to sceptical result" (Herwitz 1998: 
106). 
The TRC directly facilitates the encounter between self and other, and through 
the ethical nature of the discourse of reconciliation, this contemporary legal or quasi-
legal institution negotiates the demand for justice. Martha Minow writes of truth 
commissions that "justice reappears in the idea that its pursuit is to heal the victims 
and reconcile opposing groups ... the individual needs to repair the basic ways of 
making meaning and bounding the self to others" (Minow 1998: 63 ,64). How does 
the TRC effect a reconciliation of self and other in the context of political transition? 
Perpet rators and victims, sitting facing each other, present their narratives to each 
other: previously unheard accounts and significations, suppressed connotation and 
denotat ions dangerously supplemental to the official truths propagated by the 
apartheid government. The TRC affords victims the opportunity to cross-examine 
amnesty applicants during hearings and so reverse their previous roles. The TRC also 
introduces the demands and expectations of third parties, commissioners such as 
Archbishop Tutu, who is , from the perspective of victim and perpetrator, a third 
person whose actions remove the dispute from the domain of interpersonal hostility 
210 Chantal Mouffe comments in this regard: 
To believe in the possibility of such a consensus even when it is conceived as an infinite task. 
is to postulate that hannony and reconciliation shou ld be the goal of a democratic society. In 
other words it is to transfonn the pluralist democratic ideal into a "self-refuting ideal", since 
the very moment of its realisation would coincide with its destruction. As condit ions of 
possibility for the existence of a pluralist democracy. conflicts and antagon isms constitute at 
the same time the condition of impossibility of its final achievement. (Mouffe 1996: 11) 
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and place it within institutional confines. The TRC is not concerned with just the "I" 
and "thou", hut also with the public aspect of the intersubjective encounter, which is 
mandated not only through televising the hearings231 (the viewing public, for whom 
the spectacle of the TRC is present to them while they are not present to it), hut also 
though the commissioners, who represent the public. The public aspect of the ethical 
relationship is created by the fact that the third party (commissioner) is other than a 
neighbour, whi lst herself a neighbour and also neighbour of the other. Thus, the 
ethical response to the other (faci litated through the proximity and positionality of 
victims and perpetrators) is also and inevitably an address to the community: "The 
other is first the brother of all other men" (Levinas 1991 : 158). Because the TRC 
facilitates the encounter with othemess, it is implicated in the attempt to act morally-
the processes of the TRC are implicated in the arising need for justice. 
Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, 
assembling order, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the 
intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a co-~resence on an 
equal footing as before a court of justice. (Levinas 1991: 157)" 
In the hearings of the TRC, individuals are both legal subjects - victims and 
perpetrators, claimants and respondents, with the right to testify, the right to hear the 
previously unspoken, the right to reparations and the duty to disclose - and 
individuals with irreducibly unique faces, names and stories, urged by religious 
leaders to forgive each other and to re-establish the bonds of neighbourliness once 
established by the Good Samaritan. Justice occurs in the processes of the TRC 
through the bringing together of the limited calculability and determinacy of rights 
and obligations and the ontological fix.ity of the legal nomenclature with the infinite 
openness and contingency of alterity. 
The TRe has attempted to provide, or at least begin the process of 
providing, what I shall now tenn corrective justice, which relates to the correction of 
imbalances not only in cultural representation and symbolism, but also in the socio-
HI Minow writes "the fact of the broadcast may enable viewers to share in the process of 
acknow ledgement, mourning and sympathetic listening ... If the broadcasting extends across the 
nation, it can create a shared experience for a much divided nation" (Minow 1998: 75). Foucault 
identifies publication as a feature distinguish ing trials from truth commissions. He says of the legal 
process that knowledge of it is limited to the judge and the immediate audience. so that the public 
remains ignorant of legal proceedings. Consequently. '1ustice is a secret" (Foucault 1996: 242). 
212 Lev inas here uses "justice" to refer to the legal process, where "law" wou ld refer to the Torah. 
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economic - material and institutional - sphere.233 Nancy Fraser (1997) draws a useful 
analytic distinction between two different understandings of justice. The first is 
socio-economic justice, which is rooted in the politico-economic structure of society. 
Examples include exploitation, economic marginalis31ion and the deprivation of 
adequate material resources and institutions. The second Wlderstanding is cultural or 
symbolic. Here injustice is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation 
and communication. Examples include cultural domination (being subsumed under 
panerns of representation, classification and interpretation associated with another, 
alien or hostile, culture). non-recognition and disrespect. Importantly, the distinction 
is purely analytical. In practice the two are intertwined: material economic 
institutions have a constitutive, irreducible cultural dimension in which significations 
and norms proliferate. Conversely, discursive cultural practices have a constitutive 
politico-political dimension - they are underpinned by material supports. Rather than 
being two separate spheres of justice, they are interimbricated so as to reinforce each 
other dialectically. Representations and interpretations unfavourable to some are 
institutionalised in the state and economy, whilst economic and material disadvantage 
impedes equal participation in the making of public spheres and in everyday life. 
According to Fraser, the remedy for cultural injustice is some sort of 
cultural or symbolic change, what she terms "recognition". I have argued that the 
TRC upwardly revalues disrespected identities by providing a forum in which 
identities established during apartheid may be destabilised and decentered, and new 
identities established and positively va lorised. The TRC in this sense enables 
recognition. The remedy for economic injustice is some kind of political-economic 
restructuring, which could include, in the South African context, red istribution of 
income, strategic provision of institutions and materials and community development. 
The problem is that claims for recognition and claims for redistribution seem to have 
contradictory aims. Claims for recognition promote group differentiation. These 
claims take the form of calling attention to, or in the case of the TRC, performatively 
creating through narrative, the putative specificity of some group (victims, blacks) 
and then affirming its value. Redistribution claims generally demand the abolition of 
m My conception is qu ite different from Ernest Weinrib's formalist concept of corrective justice as the 
promotion of the minimal harmony of non-interference by agents who are connected only through 
external links. My concept of corrective justice is political whereas Weinrib's is not. 
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economic arrangements that undergird group specificity, for example m calls for 
"colour-blind redistribution". 
Recognition is, of course, not the same as reconciliation. Reconciliation can 
only, I believe, take place through deconstruction. Deconstruction would address the 
question of respect by transforming the underlying cultural valuational structure. By 
destabilising individual and group identities and differentiations, deconstruction not 
only raises the self-esteem of currently disrespected groups, but by destabilising the 
binary black! white code which gives racial specifity its cultural significance, it 
changes everyone's sense of self and opens the door to the possibility of the 
reconciliation of self and other. Critical race theorists have objected that 
deconstruction, although usefully emasculating liberal subjectivity, equally 
undermines attempts to construct a subaltern subjectivity capable of agency. Henry 
Louis Gates Jr. objects to the disernpowering logic of subject-disavowal of 
deconstruction which would seek to deny the force of assertive black identity: 
The classic critique of our attempts to reconstitute our own subjectivity as 
women, as blacks etc. is that of Derrida ... [T]he Western male subject has 
long been constituted historically for themselves and in themselves. And 
while we readily accept, acknowledge and partake of the critique of this 
subject as transcendent, to deny the process of exploring and reclaiming our 
subjectivity before we critique it is the critical version of the grandfather 
clause, the double privileging of categories that happen to be preconstitUled. 
Such a position leaves us nowhere, invisible. and voiceless. in the republic 
of Western letters ... Consider the irony: precisely when we (and other Third 
World peoples) obtain the complex wherewithal to define our black 
subjectivity in the republic of Western letters. our theoretical colleagues 
declare there ain't no such thing as a subject, so why should we be bothered 
wilh Ihal? (Gates 1989: 15) 
Moreover. racial difference and racially specific subjectivity is not incompatible with 
Derridean deconstruction; diffiirance does not undercut racial specificity. Derrida 
questions any notion of a neutral human subject and he reserves no position of 
originary neutrality from which to rethink racial difference. What Derrida does argue 
is that the other, as the other race ('" 'blackness"), has throughout history been 
subsumed under logocentric identity. Blackness is made the other of the same. 
Deconstruction offers the possibility of disrupting the fixity of the (Western) 
logocentric classification, by problematising it through the reintroduction of traces 
supplemental to it. Arguments of critical feminist and critical race theory that 
169 
deconstruction forecloses on political engagement are based on a misunderstanding 
of poststructuralism as a disabling negative discourse that can only deconstruct but 
never reconstruct (see, for example, Carusi 1991). I want to argue for a conception of 
deconstruction which allows for an ethical subject who can recognise and 
problematise the tyrannies of identity (de Kock 1993; Radhakrishnan 1987). 
Deconstruction is not simply an undercutting of political agency and notions which 
further it instrumentally since, as Thomas McCarthy notes "while it is necessary to 
interrogate and revise received notions of liberty, equality, justice, rights and the like, 
to dissemble without reassembling them may be to rob the excluded, marginalised 
and oppressed groups of an important recourse" (McCarthy 1989: 157). 
Whilst I believe that the TRC has gone some way towards the 
deconstruction of logocentric identity and the reconciliation of racial self and other -
I emphasise again that such deconstruction is an ongoing process and that 
reconcil iation is never final - it cannot take place without material and economic 
redistribution. Redistribution, in the form of reparations, was intended, ritualistically 
and primarily symbolically, to obliterate the encroachment of a wrongdoing self upon 
a suffering other. I say "symbolically" because the reparations to be paid out to 
victims were as much symbolic of the new regime's intentions of economic 
redistribution as a payment in lieu of suffering. And so it has proved: the failure to 
pay reparations (except in isolated instances) has been mirrored, since 1994, by the 
ANC government's failure to redistribute income, by the cutting of its spending 
drastically and by its distortion and final abandonment of the Reconstruction and 
Development Program in favour of GEAR's neo-liberal policies. Indeed, it is difficult 
not to sympathise with sociologist John Saul when he writes: 
A tragedy is being enacted in South Africa ... For in the teeth of high 
expectations arising from the successful struggle against a malignant 
apartheid state, a very large percentage of the population - many of them 
amongst the most desperately poor in the world - are being sacri ficed on the 
altar of the neo-liberallogic of global capitalism.234 
The government 's abandonment of the RDP has signified a failure to effect 
"widescale land reform, massive employment creation through public works, housing 
and municipal services, enhanced social welfare [and] community development". The 
214 This p<lssage appears in an article by John Sau l in the Mail and Guardian, 23-29 June 2000 . 
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ANC government has done nothing to resist the ideological hegemony and economic 
stranglehold that neo-Iiberalism enjoys globally and has instead hoarded "for 
themselves the bulk of globalisations benefits" (Bond 2000: 117, 199), I recognise 
that it would be rash, in this "post-socialist" era, to equate justice with Marxism or 
with any other brand of socialism, which is underpinned by a metanarrative claiming 
to provide foundational grounding in a philosophy of history . I would suggest, 
nevertheless, that the door be left open for empirical narratives which are fallibile, 
revi sable and non-foundational , but still provide a historiography2]S which allows for 
questions of racial identity (sameness and difference) and reconciliation to be 
contested and resolved within a narrative which challenges the ideological and 
economic hegemony ofneo-liberalism, ifnot in the name ofMarx, then at least in his 
"spirit" (Derrida 1994)236 
The TRC has juxtaposed the official history of apartheid, promulgated by 
the previous regime, with alternative representations which foreground the 
postmodern epistemological questioning of the nature of historical knowledge. It has 
reintroduced excluded voices into history and problematised the identity of self and 
other and the relationship of each to the other. By the end of The Book of Daniel, we 
have witnessed many Daniels ~ Daniel the graduate student, Daniel the child, Daniel 
the sexual "tonnentor", Daniel the social theorist, Daniel the grieving brother. So too, 
the TRe has demonstrated the complexity and fracturedness of identity and 
experience. The Book of Daniel concludes with mUltiple endings: in one ending 
Daniel goes back to the house of his executed parents and finds in the poor quality of 
the life of the black inhabitants, a suffering that precludes his wallowing in personaJ 
pain. In another ending, he attends his sister' s funeral where Kaddish is offered for 
m I take this suggestion from Fraser and Nicholson (1989), who advocate it as a "m iddle position" 
between Critical Theory and Postmodemism, since it allows for progressive political commitment 
without succumbing 10 the pitfalls of foundationalism. Attempts at this kind of compromise have not 
received unifonn treatment by South African commentators. Whilst Leon de Kock advocates a weak 
form of postmodemism espoused by ludith Squires (de Kock 1995b: 69), Nicholas Visser regards these 
efforts to compromise as attempts to fonnulate "a postmodemism without the troubling presence of its 
serial figures and their most salient theoretical assertions" (Visser 1997: 87). It is perhaps unsurprising 
that a Marxist critic like Visser would insist on the auratic presence of a founding father penneating 
didactic theory. Visser's dismissal out of hand all strains of postmodemism, poslstrncruralism and 
postcolonialism occludes the pOIentially fruitful collaboration of Marxism and poststructuralism 
rursued by Spivak and others. 
J6 Derrida argues for ttie necessity of fighting "against a 'new censorsh ip', if I may put it in this way, 
that threatens liberal societies; to fight against accumulation, concen.tration and monopoly; in short 
against all quantitative phenomena that might marginalise or reduce to silence anything that cannot be 
measured on their scale" (Derrida I 992c: 99). On the whole, I agree with Richard Rorty when he says 
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the dead. In another ending, Daniel sits in the Columbia university library writing his 
dissertation. The book questions notions of closure, totalisation and grand narrative, 
suggesting that justice consists in, among other things, rethinking the representations 
by which we understand the world so that we can face the future. 
that "there is nothing sacred about either the free market or about central planning; the proper balance 
between the two is a matter of experimental tinkering" (Rorty 1987: 565). 
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Chapter 5: In Execution of Justice: Makwanyane 
For to the Judge is entrusted a great duty, to judge and to pronounce sentence, 
even sentence of death ... Because the land is a land of fear, a Judge must be without 
fear so that justice may be done according to the Law; therefore a judge must be 
incorruptible. 
The judge does not make the Law. It is the People that make the Law. 
Therefore if a Law is unjust , and if the Judge judges according to the Law. that is 
justice, even if it is not just. 
It is the duty of a judge to do justice, but it is only the People that can be just. 
Therefore if justice be not just, that is not to be laid at the door of the judge, but at the 
door of the People which means at the door of the White People, for it is the White 
People that make the Law. 
In South Africa men are proud of their Judges, because they believe they are 
incorruptible. Even the black men have faith in them, though they do not always have 
faith in the Law, In a land of fear this incorruptibility is like a lamp set upon a stand, 
giving light to all that are in the house?3? 
A judge knows everything. He's the vicar of the god of justice, as the priest is 
the vicar of God, he 's privy to the confessional of the court, where witnesses and 
experts and accused tell what Harald and Claudia would never have learnt. The 
knowledge. it' s the basis of justice isn ' t it? To know all is to forgive all? - no, that's 
fallacious. The man 's dead. shot in the head. He's here under the ground of the city 
where this court is the seat of justice. 238 
5.] Literary Representations 
In both AIan PalOn's Cry, the Beloved Country (1948) and Nadine Gordimer's The 
HOllse Gun (1998) the judicial dramaturgy of a murder trial and possible death 
sentence is played out against a backdrop of widespread social violence.239 The novels 
are written half a century apart and are, of course, products of their time. Paton writes 
in the heyday of white liberal optimism, at a time when race relations had not yet 
petrified into the intransigence of National Party politics. Paton' s novel offers the 
redemption of liberal humanism combined with the transcendence of Christianity as a 
solution to racism and social injustice, Gordimer, on the other hand, writes from and 
about post-apartheid South Africa, in which guilt, violence and punishment are 
suffused in fraught but indeterminate relations around the question of the death 
penalty, in a society in a state of what Adomo in 1959 called "coming to terms with 
the past" (Vergangenheitsbewti!figung). What are interesting in these novels for my 
2J1 Alan Paton, Cry, the Beloved Country, pp 136, 137. 
m Nadine Gordimer, The House Gun, P 26 1. 
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present purposes are their contrasting representations of law and justice, their 
differences pointing to a transitional shi ft not only in politics and in perceptions afthe 
legal institution, but also to variances in modes of representation generally. 
Patan is, as the above quotation reflects and as Stephen Watson has pointed 
out, for the law's absolute deification (Watson 1982: 32). He invests the legal system 
of his time with the inscrutable indubitability of a divine institution, presided over by 
God-like judges. Patan 's description of the law, justice and the judiciary bears all the 
hallmarks of liberal legality's ideal: the sanctity of the office of the judge and 
courtroom; judicial avoidance of engagement with incorrigible legislation and 
political expediency; the purported disinterestedness and impartiality of the jUdiciary 
as compensation for the substantive injustice of the law, finding expression in the 
oxymoron of unjust justice, a contradiction as mystically inexplicable as the Holy 
Trinity itself. 
It is because of his adherence to the liberal concept of the law that Paton is 
precluded from viewing it as a discourse of power whose multiple discursive 
strategies and binaries are constitutive of a racially divided and unjust society. As a 
consequence of his liberal individualism he is unable to appreciate the impossibility of 
a judiciary that is untarnished by the form of life in which judicial subjectivity is 
moulded. Unable to grapple directly with the systemic nature of racial oppression, of 
which he is profoundly aware, Paton turns inwards, creating a personal tragedy shot 
through with emotionalism and mysticism, out of what he correctly perceives to be 
the root of political tunnoil at that time: the detribalisation of blacks by whites and the 
lawlessness and moral corruption which this enforced social disintegration has 
caused. Paten's solution is an amalgam of Christianity and liberal humanism: 
brotherly love, which transcends racial boundaries and inequalities. However, as J.M. 
Coetzee has observed, inter-racial fraternal relations depend on the overcoming of 
oppressive power-relations: 
fraternity by itself is not to be had, no matter how compellingly felt the 
impulse on both sides. Fraternity ineluctably comes in a package with liberty 
and equal ity .... What price is to be paid? The very lowest price is the 
destruction of the unnatural structures of power that define the South African 
state. (Coetzee 1992: 97) 
m For Palon , the various stages of the trial are acts in a "drama" (p 170), while for Gordimer "justice is 
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Moreover, the values of the Christian VISion - humility, respect for persons, 
compassion, brotherly love - enable the oppressed to participate in their own 
subjection; Christianity is an institution whose values occlude political resistance. 
One might invoke Nietzsche's bitter invective against Christ ianity: 
Christianity [ ... ] knows that it is in itself a matter of absolute indifference 
whether a thing be true, but a matter of the highest importance to what ex/enf it 
is believed to be true ... Sufferers have to be sustained by a hope which cannot 
be refuted by any actuality [ ... ] - So that love shall be possible, God has to be 
a person [ ... ] Love is the state in which man sees things most of all as they 
are not. The illusion-creating force is there at its height, likewise the 
sweetening and transforming force. One endures more when in love than one 
otherwise would, one tolerates everything [ ... ] - so much for the three 
Christian values faith, hope and charity: I call them the three Christian 
shrewdnesses. (Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, quoted in Novak 1996: 114, 11 5, 
emphasis in original) 
Paton never disputes the authority of the law: it is always the capitalised "Law", its 
purity sustained by its artificial separation from the political process which give it 
content and efficacy. The death penalty consequently has the force of law and must be 
applied: 
There is nevertheless a Law, and it is one of the most monumental 
achievements of this defective society that it has made a Law, and has set 
judges to administer it and has freed those judges from any obligation 
whatsoever but to administer the Law. But the judge may not trifle with the 
law because it is defective. If the Law is a Law of a society that some feel to 
be unjust, it is the Law and the society that must be changed. In the meantime 
there is an existing Law that must be administered and it is the sacred duty of a 
judge to administer it (p 171). 
Despite its manifest contradictions - in what way can the administration of unjust law 
be considered sacred? Or rather: how can the formal and procedural be venerated at 
the expense of the substantive? - Paton 's exposi tion ofliberal legality and the judicial 
function was the dominant view of the legal system during apartheid. It insists on the 
disinterested neutrality of the judges as administrators, applying the law rather than 
interpreting it afresh on each occasion. Paton's concept is positivist in its denial of 
judicial agency and its ascription of legitimacy despite injustice. It is this that enables 
the liberal judge to acknowledge the link between " the disaster that has overwhelmed 
a performance" {p237}. 
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our native tribal society" (pI? I) and the accused 's act of murder, but at the same time 
exonerate himself from the duty to take this into account in sentencing. Paton's 
Christian compassion does not extend to a structural critique of the colonial institution 
of law. It cannot do so since it has throughout the colonial incursion been imbued with 
a Christian inviolability. Douzinas and Warrington explain: 
Traditionally the Establishment, especially in its specifically English 
manifestation, had assumed that the common law system was the greatest gift 
from God to the chosen people .. .. The results of wild imperialistic self-
aggrandisement - silence, deportation and death - were not permitted to 
destroy the serene countenance of the common law. (Douzinas and Warrington 
1994: 10, 11 , 237) 
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the judiciary was not 
il!lpartial ; that it was politically partisan (as any judiciary is) and that the law was 
responsible for the determination of unjust social relations. Gordimer' s The House 
Gun reflects not only the benefit of hindsight but also of a new written constitution, 
which locates the issues of murder and the death penalty within the wider locus of the 
physical and psychic violence of post-apartheid society. The novel is, in part, a 
reversal of the hierarchies of apartheid: the murder is perpetrated by a white man 
(Duncan) and rather than being directly politically motivated, it is a dostoyevskyan 
crime of passion in a society in which, as Gordimer says in an interview, "violence 
seems to seep through, like some kind of stain, so that it forms the connection of their 
lives" (Gordimer quoted in Kossew 2000: I). Where Paton's escape from injustice 
involves a moving inward - the sacred transcendence of the individual in his relations 
with the racial other - Gordimer moves outwards, from violence as an expression of 
personal trauma to the collective inheritance of a murderous past. Gordimer 
repeatedly acknowledges the systemic nature of violence. The psychiatrist appearing 
for the defence testifies: 
the act that the accused admitted he committed did not take place in a vacuum. 
Just as there may be the unconscious restraint which comes from the moral 
climate, there may be the unconscious sanction of violence, in its general use, 
general resort to it ... It is necessary to keep in mind this context in which the 
events which led to the act, and the act itself took place (p 227). 
And later: 
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But that is the tragedy of our present time, a tragedy repeated daily, nightly, in 
this city, in our country. Part of the furnishings in homes, carried in pockets 
along with car keys, even in the school-bags of children, constantly ready to 
hand in situations which lead to tragedy, the guns happen 10 be there (p 267). 
Gordimer also attests to the problematics of representation, the difficulty and 
necessity of interpret ing the individual actions that have multiple causes in order to 
apportion liability in a way that might be termed "just": 
there is no such act as the s imple act of murder. To kill is only the definitive 
act arising out of many · others surrounding it, acts of spilled words, 
presumptions, sexual congress, and, all around these, muggings in the streets 
(p 247). 
In The House Gun. Gordimer excoriates Paton's brand of liberalism in her portrayal 
of the impotence of Duncan's parents, Harald, who is a Christian, and Claudia, a 
doctor who represents humanism li nked with scientific rationality. They are, as Yeats 
would say, murderously innocent ' '' liberal-minded ' whites who were not racist but 
stood by whi le the crime of apartheid was perpetrated. not willing to lose their 
privileged place within that society"(Kossew 2000: 6). Gordimer's post-apartheid 
society reflects the uncertainty of transition: it is disturbed and dislocated, a society in 
which the former order of authori ty has been destroyed and is in the process of being 
replaced. It is characterised by "a struggle between speechlessness and speech" 
(Clingman 2000: 140) in which the range of identities and the enunciative modalities 
foregrounding them are being renegot iated: "the order of resemblance [is] reversed" . 
New forms of identity are reflected in syncretist constructions and imaginative 
oxymoron: Motsamai, the black advocate, is a " black diamond" (P202). He is also the 
"man who brings from the Other Side the understanding of people in trouble" (P207), 
and who "becomes the accused 's other self' (p210). Post-apartheid, postcolonial 
society refl ects a newness that is also an anxiety: sexual and racial identities are 
reconstituted in new combinations, as apartheid 's structures of representation and 
legitimating strategies - the exclusionary fonns of reason and universality composed 
by a Western modernity compliant wi th colonialist rule - are deconstructed to 
sceptical result. In short, Gordimer suggests "a world of new relationships growing 
out of the old; though they in some sense replicate the previous social structures. they 
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do so through significant differences or accents, requiring new forms of codification 
and understanding" (Clingman 2000: ISO). 
All of which sets the stage for a re-examination of legal discourse and its 
construction of social reality, wh.i ch never materialises. Gordimer, although she once 
referred to herself in the days of apartheid as a "radical" (a label of some validity at 
the time), now seems to be finnly located in the neo-liberal camp. Her description of 
the constitution as "the shared morality of the nat ion" merely echoes the rhetoric of 
the constitutional court: the idea of a moral consensus is incongruent with the 
heterogeneity of South African pluralism. Indeed, one wonders how this kind of 
nation-building discourse can be squared with earlier admonitions that the "essential 
gesture" of the white South African writer "can be fulfilled only in the integrity 
Chekov demanded: ' to describe a situation so truthfully [ ... ] that the reader can no 
longer evade it" (Gordimer quoted in Marais 2000: 159). 
In the end Gordimer echoes the logic and reasoning of the Constitutional 
Court in Makwanyane in its decision to abolish the death penalty. which is part of her 
subject matter. Both Gordimer and the Court are sceptical of public opinion, which 
Gordimer refers to as "talk-show democracy" (Gordimer 1998: 240) Both regard the 
constitution as the mirror of the nation. There is an acknowledgement of the inherent 
contingency of judging and the margin for error (the verdict is in some respects a 
misreading of the evidence). Both describe South Africa as a "civilised country", 
calling up the bogus evolutionary assumptions on which such a concept rests in order 
to suppress and si lence the expelled and excluded. Gordimer is careful to 
acknowledge the continuing social inequalities and whilst her perceived need for the 
rehabilitation of the murderous individual (the white colonial , the black freedom-
fi ghter) is admirable, it is unclear whether this rehabilitation is on the level of 
personal psychic rejuvenation, attunemcnt la neoliberalism, and the eschatology of its 
legalism, or whether there is any demand for resistance to the new detenninacies: a 
rehabilitation that is also a dehabilitation. In the wake of the Constitutional Court's 
pronouncement, Gordimer writes: 
The Last Judgement of the Consti tutional Court has declared the death penalty 
unconstitutional. The firm and gentle tone of the Judge President has the 
confidence of a man who while he is conveying a ruling arrived at after several 
months weighing scrupulously the findings of a bench of independent thinkers, 
178 
himself has been given grace. There is a serenity in justice. (p284, emphasis 
added) 
Here Gordimer seems to reproduce Paton's sacramentalising of the judicial process. 
She too venerates the judiciary, attributing to it "scrupulousness", "independence" and 
"grace". The description of the court's judgement as "The Last Judgement" is 
suggestive of the finality of a divine revelation, the judge interceding between God 
and his people to deliver the final word. "The Last Judgement" is for Gordimer no 
doubt symbol ic; but the instantiation of the symbolic in the literal, in the death 
sentence or a sentence contrary to it. is to make legal judgements prematurely just. 
Lyotard writes: 
These can only be symbols, like the last judgement. In what genre of 
discourse, in what phrase family would the supreme tribunal be able to render 
its judgement upon the pretensions to validity of all phrases. given that these 
pretensions differ according to the families and genres to which they are 
attached? A convenient answer is found in the use of citation (metalanguage) 
which makes all phrases pass under the single regimen of cognitives. (Lyotard 
1988: 31) 
5.2 Newness'! 
In S v Makwanyane and Anolher1.Jo the Constitutional Court struck down -
obliterated - the death penalty. The title of this chapter announces a triple genitive that 
will be my central focus: a three-fold functioning of the word "of'. First, it signifies 
the subjective or possessive genitive, indicating that the chapter will interrogate the 
particular mode of judicial activity in Makwanyane - the execution of execution - in 
order to determine what claims to justice may be made for it. Second, and related, I 
intend to investigate the claim that the court killed justice, in the sense of deciding in 
a way that signified its deliberate avoidance of public opinion~ in that it acted 
undemocratically and in so doing reached an unjust decision. Third, "execution of 
j ustice" recalls the technical and administrative functioning of the modem legal 
system against which I argued in the previous chapter: the balancing of opposing 
claims on a strictly procedural, purportedly neutral and manifestly non-ethical basis, 
denying contingency and the particularity of the litigants. and proclaiming the 
application of the general rule in a value-neutral manner. Finally. the title suggests the 
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physical event of execution, a violent termination of life and of meaning, which 
arrests inter-subjective conversation with undeniable finality. 
The court ' s judgement, though boldly contrary to "public opinion", evokes an 
ambivalence about the nature of judicial subjectivity and the judiciary 's role in 
constitutional democracy. It is at once a schizophrenic espousal of two concepts of 
justice. one ethical and one procedural, analogous to those evinced in AZAPO, set up 
in an awkward tension which elides the potential fruitfulness of their possi ble 
collaborat ion. The mood of the judgement is not simply one of ambivalence, there is 
anxiety too: anxiety in Foucault's sense of asking "by what right, by what acts and 
who are they, those who judge?" (Foucault 1996: 254), as the subjectivity of the judge 
after apartheid is counterpoised against that of the accused, each problematised, 
disputed and decentred as the legitimating criteria of old vanish like the ground 
beneath the feet of the condemned at the moment of hanging. The nature of the 
political transition means that, in many cases, yesterday's criminals are today 's 
heroes, just as yesterdays judges are today's viliains.241 Suspended in a space devoid 
of value consensus, the court concedes in token the fragility of judging without 
foundations but refuses to translate this concession into practice; it refuses to concede, 
in other words, the " madness" that is the moment of decision, the risky negotiation of 
the aporia of the undecideable. 
The judgement is in another sense a matter of anxiety. Homi Bhabha (1994: 
213) suggests that when we think of power-knowledge, the role of anxiety should be 
considered. Bhabha speaks of "a necessary anxiety in constructing a transformati ve, 
postcolonial knowledge" and of the representational doubleness of identity within the 
postcolonial world, which requires that 
the experience of anxiety must be incorporated into the analytic construction 
of the object of critical attention: narratives of the borderline conditions of 
culture and disciplines. For the anxiety is the effective address of 'a world 
[that] reveals itself as caught up in the space between frames~ a doubled frame 
or one that is split ' , (Bhabha 1994: 213, 214) 
Anxiety is a mode of transition and transfonnation, a transitive sensibil ity which 
incorporates a kind of vertiginous groping. When Lyotard discusses the possibility of 
new language games of justice "promoting justice with no models" (Lyotard: 1985, 
H' 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), 
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52-53), so that judging takes place on a case-by-case basis, I would think that 
judgement is anxious in Bhabha' s sense. Anxiety emerges from the judge's exposure 
to risk in the decision-making process. It may be a sign of danger, a sense of 
something being revived or destroyed (in Makwanyane both things occur), but it is 
also hopeful, a sign that something new is emerging (Sarup 1996: 113). What IS 
promised in Makwanyane is the possibility of neVo/lless, created through a 
transformation of a racist and phallogocentric adjudicative practice that IS 
underpinned by modem political foundations - scientific rationality as the basis of 
colonial legal practice, for example - into the subjective and political multivalence of 
radically plural democracy and the reintroduction of the previously marginalised area 
of power-knowledge: traditional African jurisprudence. Lyotard remarks that justice 
consists in inventing "new moves, perhaps new rules and therefore new games" 
(Lyotard and Thebaud : 100) and in Makwanyane as with Lyotard the possibilities of 
transformative moves and rules emerge as possibilities only - they are never 
activated. Instead, the judgement remains largely faithful to the positivist 
epistemology of the apartheid judiciary and its literal mode of interpretation, which 
although appealing to values, does so, on a Foucauldian reading, only to mask the 
operations of positivism, the judicial technology of power. 
The judgement, by turns daring and timid, proclaims a justice of alterity even 
as it denies the political and philosophical mode of its own undertaking. How is it 
possible to reconcile the following dictum of Judge Kriegler: 
In answering that question [the nature of constitutional interpretation] the 
methods to be used are essentially legal. not moral or philosophical ... The 
incumbents are judges not sages; their discipline is law, not ethics and 
certainly not politics. (para 207 E-A). 
and this comment by Judge Sachs: 
We are not called upon to decide between these positions [the various Slances 
on the death penalty]. They are essentially emotional. moral and pragmatic in 
character and will no doubt occupy the attention of the Constitutional 
Assembly. Our function is to interpret the text of the Constitution as it stands. 
Accordingly, whatever our personal views on this fraught subject might be, 
our response must be a purely legal one. (para 349) 
241 For an elaboration of the latter proposition, see Dugard 1978, Carder 1984 and Dyzenhaus 1991 . 
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with Mahomed J's observation that "the death sentence must in some measure 
manifest a philosophy" (para 271 I-J). Paradoxical exclusions of this kind are present 
throughout the judgement and emanate from a continued adherence to positivist legal 
tradition, inspired by the possibilities of formalisation and by the perceived success of 
the natural sciences. 242 Against the claim that adjudication is essentially 
unphilosophical, one might extend Schopenhauer's remark that "without death there 
would hardly be any philosophising" (Schopenhauer 1966: 463) to say that without 
philosophising there is not much one can say about death, or by association, about 
life, so that adjudication ~ the anempt to resolve competing claims from all facets of 
life - must be philosophical. That the constitutionality of the death penalty concerns 
and gives ri se to political and philosophical questions seems to me a relatively timid 
and uncontroversial claim, at least prior to the enunciation of particular questions and 
answers. In fairness the court does not deny that life and death are philosophical 
subjects, only that adjudication is not a philosophical activity. But to argue that law 
must blind itself to the ethical and phi losophical features (however contentious) of its 
subject-matter in order to engage in a complex but "blind" weighing up and still term 
the result "j ust ice" is, as I have argued previously, a non-sequitur characteristic of 
modem legality. 
The court generally excludes philosophical and political criteria from the 
adjudicative process and although there are moments where it reverses its 
denunciation, in these instances political and philosophical reasoning is marginalised, 
that is, such reasoning is not consciously and centrally included in the court's 
reasoning. As a result , the court's approach to life and death is philosophically rather 
anaemic, primarily reasoning as though life and death were polar opposites, their 
meanings inter-related only negatively by virtue of their mutual exclusivity. For 
example, whilst the court's reasoning reflects the relatively uncontroversial 
understanding of death as the absence of life in a physical and analytical sense, and 
that there can be no direct apprehension of death by the living - as Levinas asserts 
"Nothingness is impossible" (Levinas 1989: 42) - 1 would insist that life is lived in 
apprehension of the death of others?43 It is through witnessing the fact of death that 
we accept death as "the phenomenon which definitely circumscribes OUr finitude" 
242 This is suggested by. for instance, comments such as: "The described sources of public opinion can 
hardly be regarded as sc ientific" (Mokgoro J, para 305 G-H). 
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(Van Niekerk 1999: 409). "Death," as Gordimer wryly observes, "is the penalty of 
life" (Gordimer 1998: 139). Death also spurs interpretation, a hermeneutics of 
experience. Life is interpreted through death and in contradistinction to it and, rather 
than the two things denoting two distinct and incomparable modes - existence and 
non~existence - representations and interpretations of life are coloured by 
representations and interpretations of death and vice versa, not only thematically and 
at the level of the symbolic, but also as trace: "Wake. Wake!" (L1ewelyn 1990: 96). 
There is a point in the judgement at which apartheid's heroic dead are resurrected, not 
simply as corpses (although that too), but as spectral witnesses or perhaps litigants 
joined but not active in the adjudication, present as testimony to a gruesome past and 
as catalyst for the re-introduction of African jurisprudence. 
The decis ion of the court - its declaration that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional - is politically progressive, given that many established constitutional 
democracies, such as the United States resolutely stick to their guns (or electric chairs 
or lethal injections) in retaining capital punishment.244 Generally, where the 
judgement is at its most politica lly progressive it is at its most epistemologically 
reactionary, showing no awareness of the indeteffi1inacy of rights discourse and 
remaining steadfastly faithful to the Enlightenment concept of constitutionalism, with 
its metanarratives of rationality and progress, and the modern project of nation~ 
building. The judgement is at its most innovative in the judgement of Judge Sachs, 
whose intrepid reconstruction and incorporation of traditional African jurisprudence, 
going some way towards the decolonising of a eurocentric legal tradition, is 
strategically al igned with Enlightenment constitutionalism, nourished perhaps by its 
spirit of optimism. According to Sachs J 
const itutionalism was a product of the age of enlightenment. It was associated 
with the overthrow of arbitrary power and the attempt to ensure that 
government functioned according 10 establ ished principles and processes in 
the light of enduring values ... Constitutionalism in our country also arrives 
simultaneously with the achievement of equality and freedom, and of 
openness, accommodation and tolerance. (paras 389-39 1) 
l4) That death is an authentic characteristic of life is an insight central to Heidegger's analysis of 
existence as existence-to death ("Sei n Zum Tode") (Heidegger 1962: 274 - 3 11 ). 
2« Although certain states, such as California, have declared capital punishment unconstitutional. 
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The utopian ideal of the future is brought forward into the present without so much as 
a sideways glance at the social injustice and inequality which have manifestly evaded 
remedy by the new constitutional dispensation. Where continuing injustice is 
conceded elsewhere in the judgement, the means of its amelioration is treated as being 
simply a question of completing the rollout of democratic constitutionalism. LangaJ 
remarks: "It may well be that for millions in this country, the effect of the change has 
yet to be felt in a material sense. For all of us though, a framework has been created in 
which a new culture must take root and develop" (para 221 B-C). 
Concomitant with Enlightenment constitutionalism, South Africa emerges in 
Makwanyane as nascent nation, fostered by the court's proselytising discourse of 
nation-building, with its cultural signifier ubuntu, at once universal and particular, 
awash wi th significations. It is a signifier which does not so much float as is buffeted 
through the nebulous altitudes of the rights discourse of the ten judgements245 , 
simultaneously constituting the nation and evading capture, through the play of 
difference and deferral which finally eludes the unity and absolute presence of its 
meaning. 
As I did in the case of AZAPO, I intend to demonstrate that the reasons 
provided by the Makwanyane court were insufficient and unconvincing; its rejection 
of the concept of law as philosophical and political, despite the judgement's 
manifestation of a clear philosophical and political stance, suggests a lack of 
awareness and an insecurity about its ro le within a constitutional democracy and 
unwillingness to justify politically progressive decisions with a transformative and 
equally progressive interpretative strategy. To be fair, the court does in places 
concede the contingent status of judging, articulates a concept of justice as 
othemess246, and makes an innovative anempt to decolonise South African legal 
practice through the reintroduction of traditional African jurisprudence, encouraged 
by interpretations of the notion of ubuntu. My intention in this chapter is to elucidate 
the political phi losophy of the court through an analys is of its reasoning, in order to 
detennine, not only its weaknesses, but also its strengths, with a view to articulating 
its claims to justice and the potential of those claims to be convincing. 
W Judge Chaskalson's judgement is assented to by the other nine j udges, although each judge handed 
down a separate judgement, either accentuating facets of Chaskalson P's judgement or adding to it 
2~ 6 Judge O'Regan , for example, declares that the role of the jUdic iary in interpretin g the bill ofrighlS is 
"to protect those who are marginalised, the dispossessed and the outcasts of our society" (para 332 O-
H). 
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5.3 Marginality, Anxiety, Ex-centricity, Madness 
The subaltern enters the text of the judgement, perhaps inevitably. from the 
margins, or more accurate ly from beneath: the downtrodden enter from underfoot. It 
is in footnote 78 of the judgement of Judge President Chaskalson, who provides the 
court ' s unanimous judgement, that the most crucial aspect of the application of the 
death penalty is revealed: "the overwhelming majority of those sentenced to death are 
poor and black" . The subaltern "enters" in the sense that s/he "emerges" or "is 
translated into". By using the transitive verb "enters", I do not intend to attribute 
agency to the subaltern, just as when I use the descriptive noun "subaltern" I do not 
mean to construct an essentialised category of South Africa' s oppressed that has an 
effective voice clearly and unproblematically - univocally - intruding on the text, 
audible above the persistent and multiple echoes of its heterogeneity. The introduction 
of the subaltern does not (yet) effect agency for the postcoionial subject and any 
assumption on the part of the subaltern must be argued for. 247 In any event - in this 
event - the subaltern first appears in a footnote. Paratext has always been central to 
historiographic practice, to the writing of a double narrative of the past in the present. 
Footnote 78 provides an historical account, nothing more than a reference, of the 
oppression and extermination of blacks during apartheid, the extreme force of law 
metonymically represented by poverty and negritude. The function of the footnote is 
extra-textual. referring to a world outside the judgement, a world towards which the 
courts have long proclaimed a benign neutrali ty and for which they must now concede 
a history of malign partisanship. This reintroduction is mediated through an 
intertextual allusion rather than by direct reference to the fact of unequal conviction 
and sentencing: reference is made to the brief of Lawyers for Human Rights. The 
paratext operates on a discursive level; linear reading is disrupted by the presence of 
the lower text on the same page, a hermeneutic disruption which calls attention to the 
footnote ' s own doubled form and to a substantive bifurcation. The footnote opens a 
space in which to offer a supplement to the upper text, the text of South African legal 
history, with all its marginalising universalism. It disrupts our reading - our c~eating -
247 Gayatri Spivak contends that over-determinations in Europe's construction of its colon ised others 
ob literated their subjectivity, leaving no space from which the subaltern cou ld speak (Spivak 1995). 
This appears to overestimate soc ial constraint while occluding ways in which multiply constituted 
subjects refuse a position as object of another's representation. 
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of a coherent lOtalising narrative; it fractures the text and provides an opportunity for 
the other of legal discourse to emerge from the margins. The footnote as margin (one 
could just as easily refer to the silent. si lenced centre of what has gone before) is the 
asymmetrical !iteration of the trace of the other in its precarious subjectivity (Spivak 
1995: 25). It presents a paradox of represented yet resisted authority, a textual voicing 
of the other, the struggle for justice. At the same time it invokes a feeling of anxiety in 
Bhabha's sense referred to above. a tension between centre and margin, 
simultaneously an undennining and a novation, but more contestation than dialectic. 
As Bhabha notes, "to reveal such a margin is ... to contest claims to cultural 
supremacy .. . The marginal or minority is not the space of a celebratory, or utopian 
self-marginalisation. It is much more a substantial intervention" (Bhabha 1990: 4). 
The footnote as margin is also, as Derrida (1982: 122) reminds us in a footnote, a site 
of deconstruction: "deconstruction ... takes place on the margins of philosophy: in 
titles and footnotes". Lioda Hutcheon, commenting 00 postmodemism' s and 
postcolonialism's shared preoccupation with what she terms "ex-centricity", observes 
that " in granting va lue to (what the centre calls) the margin or Other, the postmodem 
challenges any hegemonic force that presumes centrality, even as it acknowledges that 
it cannot provide the margin without acknowledging the power of the centre" 
(Hutcheon 1995: 132). For post-colonial theorists, poststructuralism' s double-talking, 
ironic mode of address becomes a rhetorical strategy for working within existing 
imperialist discourses and contesting their hegemony at the same time?48 In the case 
of Makwanyane's footnote 78, the centre ' s claim to authority is subverted through the 
introduction of the quintessence of the death penalty ' s application from the margins, 
evocative of the paratextual denaturalising of the precedence and authority of the 
centre in Derrida's paratextual classic Glas (1974). 
There is, as I have mentioned, another kind of anxiety in the judgement which 
accompanies acknowledgements by the court of the inevitable "arbitrariness" of 
judging, at some deep level in the practice of a legal system supposedly grounded in 
technical , scientific dispute resolution, a practice which denies the ethics of the 
particular in favour of the neutral application of the rule. Judge Chaskalson writes of 
the arbitrariness with which the judge' s discretion to impose the death penalty is 
applied, evidenced by the fact that "out of thousands of persons put on trial for murder 
248 The location occupied by such criticism has been glossed by Gyan Prakash as "neither inside nor 
outside the history of West em domination but in a tangential relation to it" (Prakash 1993 : 16, 17). 
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only a small percentage are sentenced to death" (para 48 D-E) and "poverty, race and 
chance play roles in the outcome of capital cases and in the final decision as to who 
should die" (para 51 F-G). The disposition of individual judges, including their 
political affi liations and the race and class of the accused, cumulatively affect capital 
punishment cases: 
The differences that ex ist between rich and poor, between good and bad 
prosecutions, between good and bad defences, between severe and lenient 
Judges, between Judges who favour capital punishment and those who do not, 
the subjective (read: political] attitudes that might be brought into play by 
factors such as race and class, may in similar ways affect any case that comes 
before the courts and is most certainly present in all court systems. 
(Chaskalson P, para 54 C-E) 
At a stroke, the court abrogates the modem conception of legal justice, conceived of 
as being executed through the fonnal and structural symmetries of adjudication and 
administered by disinterested and objective arbiters. Judge Chaskalson continues: 
" Imperfection in criminal trials means that error cannot be excluded" and such 
imperfection is not limited to criminal trials but "wi ll he present in any system of 
justice" (para 54 E·G). The modem judge - Dworkin 's Justice Hercules say - must 
ask himself (female judges are a novelty even in the post-apartheid legal system - the 
male/female ration in Makwanyane was 8:2): "Monsieur lohn Doe, you have your 
moods, your mother-in-law, your little life. Can you take it upon yourself, such as you 
are , to kill someone?" (Foucault 1996: 245). The judgement evinces a growing 
incredulity toward the possibility of a justice-producing legal metadiscourse as well as 
the recognition of the fact of judges' situatedness within multiple heterogenous 
language-games and the concomitant absence of the archimedean judicial viewpoint. 
Judge and accused are suddenly suspended in shifting and ethically ambiguous 
relations to each other, with the issue of the authority of the judge to judge and 
sentence increasingly called into question. The discrediting of modem legality qua 
justice renders the act of judging anxious, an anxiety " [w]e have to accept ... in the 
ordinary criminal cases that come before the courts, even to the extent that some may 
go to gaol and others similarly placed may be acquitted or receive non-custodial 
sentences" since "if it is discovered, the prisoner can be released or compensated; hut 
the killing of an innocent person is irremediable" (para 54 F·H). It is useful to 
compare the court' s revelation of the inherent arbitrariness of judging with the liberal 
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position articulated by Montesquieu who writes that liberty " is in perfection when 
criminal laws derive each punishment from the particular nature of the crime. There 
are then no arbitrary dec i sions~ the punishment does not flow from the capriciousness 
of the legislator, but from the very nature of the thing" (Montesquieu 1949: 149). 
Contrarily, the court in Makwanyane realised that punishment derives as much from 
the circumstances of the criminal as from the crime itself. 
The death sentence is the relegation of the accused to the horror of the void. 
the ultimate absence, non-being, and since legal discourse has been exposed as 
lacking the necessary transcendence to guarantee justice, "sentencing is the 
prerogative of the j udge alone", This is so not merely in the banal sense of a 
designation of an administrative function, but in the sense in which Foucault writes: 
"Today the judge, grasping and uncertain, asswnes responsibility for the decision" 
(Foucault 1996: 247). Judge Chaskalson notes that the South African law has 
traditionally mandated that "due regard must be paid to the personal circwnstances 
and subjective factors which might have influenced the accused's conduct" , but has 
consistently denied that factors such as race and financial status play a role in the 
outcome of decisions. The court ' s theoretical commitment to equality and universality 
of application of legal rules, unaffected by the political prejudices of individual judges 
and without reference to the contingent circwnstances of litigants, is incompatible 
with the inevitably political and philosophical nature of adjudication. Before and 
during apartheid, the j udiciary was permitted to exhibit political partisanship of the 
most reactionary kind by denying the political nature of legal practice. The judiciary 
could profess neutrality and impartiality, whi lst acting in accordance with their 
political stances?49 At last, in Makwanyane, law is political (or in the words of the 
American realists: "Law is politics" ). As Foucault points out, "We judge the criminal 
more than the crime. And it' s the knowledge we gain of the criminal which justifies 
whether we inflict such and such a punishment" (Foucault 1996: 25). The law has 
never been "blind" and the judiciary 's failure to be candid about this has resulted in 
249 The much earlier murder case of Rex v Mbombela 1933 AD 269 is the paradigm case in this regard. 
The accused, an eighteen year old rural black man, had killed a ch ild in the bonafide belief that it was 
an ev il spirit ("tiholoshe"). In his judgemenl, De Villiers JA wrote: 
I have no doubt that by the law of this country, there is only one standard of the "reasonable 
man" .... It seems to me, therefore, that the standard to be adopted in decid ing whether 
ignorance or mistake of fac t is reasonable, is the standard of the reasonable man, and that race, 
or the idiosyncracies of the superstitious, or the intelligence of the person accused, do not even 
enter into the question (at p 273, 274). 
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injustice being perpetrated under a veneer of neutrality: with moral and political 
concerns safely excluded from the courts reasoning, the court can act in a politically 
definite manner whi lst legitimately excluding the politics and philosophy that is doing 
the work: from its reasoning, thereby pennitting the exercise of power to continue 
unchallenged. The modem legality of apartheid excluded blacks from constituting a 
legal personality, capable of representation within the quotidianity of the "civilised 
legal process"; black skin signified the absolute alterity of law. In Makwanyane, 
finally, the subaltern is wrinen back into the text, questioning the form, structure and 
the discursive power of the law a.nd the legal system. It is an anxious but promising 
moment in the performance of the judicial drama. The final remarks in a debate 
between Foucault, Jean Laplanche and Robert Badinter articulate this anxiety 
fluently : 
Badinter: But it is anguishing to judge. The judicial institution can only 
function to the extent that the judge is liberated from his anxiety. To succeed, 
he must know in the name of what values he condemns or absolves. Until a 
recent period everything was simple. The judges were comfortable. But today. 
in this uncertain society. in the name of what does onc judge, by means of 
what values? 
Foucault: I feel that it is dangerous to allow judges to continue to judge alone. 
by liberating them from their anxiety and allowing them to avoid asking 
themselves in the name of what they judge, by what right, by what acts, and 
who are they, those who judge. Let them become anxious, like we become 
anxious when we meet so few who are disturbed. The crisis of the function of 
justice has just been opened. Let's not close it too quick ly. (Foucault 1996: 
254) 
This exchange perfectly captures the geist of the South African judiciary in the 
transitional period: the acknowledged imperative to be just, despite the obsolescence 
of formerly secure foundations and the absence of generally agreed concrete 
interpretations of abstract values referred to in the Constitution?SO Section 35(1) of 
the interim Constitution reads: «In interpreting the provisions of this chapter [the Bill 
of Rights] a court of law shall promote the values which underlie an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality". The provision is question-
begging, since the values referred to are themselves not self-evident and, once 
2SO Alfred Cockre ll writes: " We would expect the transition to a substantive vision of law to be 
traumatic ... the judgements of the Constitutional Court in 1995 exhibit many of the signs of such 
trauma" (Cockrell 1996: 3). 
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ascertained, would require interpretation, as does Section 35 itself. How are we to 
interpret "an open and democratic society"? How are we to define «freedom and 
equality", given that in many cases these two principles often stand in a contradictory 
relation to each other? These questions can elicit no easy answers: application of 
constitutional rules is not a matter of consent, but of choice between competing rules 
and significations. an anxious process certainly; as Derrida more extremely phrases it, 
"the instant of decision is a madness" (Derrida 1992a: 26), a Kierkegaardian leap of 
faith in attempting to reach a decision in the face of the undecideable, since the 
necessity of reaching a decision brings a premature end to the process of rendering 
infinite justice 10 the other. Jeremy Sarkin begins to address the dilemma of 
transforming a multiplicity into a determinate singularity of a hermeneutic decision by 
observing that 
the values underlying an open and democratic society and their relative weight 
are by no means a matter of consensus. In the United States, for example, 
which could be considered an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality, the death penalty is permitled by the Supreme Court. (Sarkin 
1996b: 79) 
It is unfortunate that, given the court's acknowledgement that the judiciary has never 
app lied rules mechanically but has in fact interpreted them in relation to the 
contingent circumstances of each case to give effect to political values, the 
Makwanyane court could not now do likewise, and openly, by providing reasons, give 
effect to the values it esteems. The problem was never that the South African courts 
judged in accordance with the values they upheld, but rather that they were not candid 
about these values. so affording no opportunity for contestation, which is the essence 
of democratic constitutionalism. Instead, many of the judges in Makwanyane denied 
the political nature of judgement, thereby avoiding, as Robert Badinter observes, the 
anxiety of judging. I turn later in this chapter to a theory of democratic adjudication 




Ubuntu features centrally in Makwanyane as a value which undergirds the 
ideal of an open and democratic South African society. Six of the ten judges 
mentioned it as a specifically South African value incompatible with the death 
penalty. This section will discuss possible interpretations and application.s of ubunlu, 
showing how it penneates the reasoning of the court, and wi ll also attempt to find 
value in it. 
UbUnllI is referred to in the postamble of the interim Constitution, of which the 
concluding paragraph reads: "there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, 
a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for uhunlu but not victimisation". 
It fi gures throughout the judgement as the ultimate floating signifier, with a 
proli feration of not always compatible meanings: community and the interdependence 
of the members of the community (Langa J at para 224 G-H); humanity (Mad ala J at 
para 244 and 245); humanity, humanitarianism, cornmunitarianism (Mahomed J at 
para 263 A-B); humaneness, personhood, morality, compassion, respect for human 
dignity, "conformity to basic norms and collective unity" (Mokgoro J para 308 A-C 
and para 309 F-G) and as a melOnymy for the possibility for the possibility of a 
"trad itional African jurisprudence" (Sachs J para 373 A-B), In some of the 
judgements ubuntu is associated with social justice and nation-building, According to 
Madala J the concept is evocative of the ideas of "humaneness, social justice and 
fairness" , Judge Mahomed attributes ithe inclusion of ubuntu in the constitution to its 
ability to encapsulate the "shared aspirations of the nation" (Mahomed J at para 262) 
whilst Mokgoro J opines: "In South Africa ubuntu has become a notion with a 
part icular resonance in the building of democracy" (para 308 B-C), 
Such indeterminacy in signification has prompted pessimism about whether 
ubuntu can be regarded as a useful jurisprudential tool. For instance, in that it seems 
to reflect an attribute of both the individual and the community, and the individual 
wi thin the community, individual and community melded together symbiotically, it is 
unclear how ubuntu could be invoked in cases of adjudication where the interests of 
the individual and the community collide, in order to justly resolve this kind of 
conflict (English 1996). Nevertheless, there is something objectionably glib about 
Richard Wilson's broad Althusserian fonnulation ofubuntu as 
another always-already there element of pan Africanist ideology, Ubuntu 
should be recognised for what it is: a polysemous ideological concept which 
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conjoins human rights. reconciliation and nation-building in the popuiarist 
terms ofa relatively benign African nationalism. (Wi lson 1996: 14, l ~) 
My objection stems from an internal inconsistency in the definition of uhuntu: 
the reduction of ubuntu's indeterminacy to human rights, reconciliation and nation-
building seems to provide a closure that Wilson wants to deny. Semantic presence is 
also suggested by the phrase "always already there" which indicates the tying of 
ubWllll to an origin. to an authorising instance, which seeks to deny the iteration and 
difference suggested by its "poJysemous" nature. All attempts at definition are 
reductive, certainly, and I think Wilson is right to link ubuntu to human rights, 
reconciliation and nation-building - but this is only the beginning. 
If freedom from precision and closure has induced scepticism in some critics 
about the jurisprudential possibilities of IlbllntU, I would suggest that the very 
multivalencies of the notion may be valorised to rearticulate and respond to apartheid 
and its aftermath in South Africa. I want to read ubllntU, as postcolonial theory 
suggests, as being both indelibly marked by the cognitive modes of imperialism - the 
binaries of African and European, colonised and coloniser - and deconstructively, 
cultivating its indeterminacy in ways which are attentive to "the more complex, 
cultural and political borders that exist on the cusp" (Bhabha 1994: 173) that is the 
South African transitional moment. Mark Sanders (2000: 20) notes the doubleness of 
invoking lIbuntll as part of the rhetoric of nation-building: it is a function of a 
"postcolonial" logic, reflecting a desire no longer to be colonised politically or 
culturally, "but a logic which, at every turn, risks repeating what it seeks to reverse: 
the coloniser's repression of social and cultural formations". There is a danger that 
indulging in nostalgia about pre-colonial African cultures will reinforce the myth that 
there is a single African culture and that the continent lacks diversity in its difference. 
It is difficult to locate ubuntu on the political spectrum. Progressives are quick 
to recognise in it the dangerous sentimentality that yearns for a status quo ante in 
which men were men and women were women and the oppressed were seldom seen 
and never heard. On the other hand, ubzlntu resonates with a utopian romanticism, the 
characteri stit weakness of the progressive. Many critics will no doubt regard ubuntu 
simply as a term in the liberation lexicon, used in the interests of mobilising the South 
African peoples after apartheid, galvanising them into reconstructive activity and 
inviting their complicity with the new regime. In this mobilisation, notions of ethnic 
identity such as ubunlu are invoked, whilst indigenous cultural heritages that were 
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denigrated and despised during apartheid are affirmed as authentic traditions. 
Recuperations of this kind, such as Judge Sachs' genealogy of the death penalty in 
traditional African jurisprudence, are not, I will argue, made in the interests of 
discovering uncontaminated origins or claiming ethnic purity, but are rather attempts 
to write marginalised tradition back into the centre, if only to receive equal critical 
and deconslructive attention. While articulations of ubunlU, both in the law and 
elsewhere, have been repudiated by many as atavistic and essentialist, I want to argue 
that such attempts cannot be dismissed as a retrograde and impossible attempt to 
revive an irrecoverable past. Whereas, for instance, Fanon recommended the 
construction of an insurgent black subjectivity, with cultural affirmation being 
avowed as a necessary moment in creating a combative position,2S1 he repudiated 
anempts to create a new black culture, anticipating a time when national cultures 
would be transcended by a new univ~rsalism (Parry 1997: 18). Disenchantment with 
post-independence African regimes should not blind us to the possibility of 
envisaging an alternative to dominant western values which are orientated towards the 
task of reclaiming and renegotiating the conditions for community, from the 
conditions of apartheid power whose presence denied community. 
One might make an analogy between ubuntu and the Western liberal principles 
of equality and freedom: like them, ubuntll is an abstract principle, like them it is open 
to multiple interpretations and like them, where it is relied upon to decide a litigation, 
it must be concretised and contextualised to be efficacious. In Makwanyane, ubUniU is 
deployed in the Constitutional Court's rejection of the death penalty. It is the first 
elaboration on ubuntu in South African law and perhaps the most comprehensive 
exposition anywhere. I wish to analyse the development (or "cultivation'" in terms of 
a metaphor to be developed) of ubuntu to understand how it can be seen as contrary to 
the death penal ty. 
The Makwanyane judgements assume that the meanmgs of ubuntu, 
incorporating humanism, communalism and an "ethics of reciprocity" (Sanders 2000: 
20), are sufficient authority for establishing its incompatibility with the death penalty, 
just as it is regarded as self~evident that the constitutional prohibition of "cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (section II (2», or alternatively the 
m Fanon writes "This rediscovery, this absolute valorisation almost in defiance of reality, objectively 
indefensibl e, assumes an incomparable and subjective importance ... the plunge into the chasm into the 
past is the condition and (he source of freedom" (Fanon 1967: 43). 
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rights to " life" (section 9) and "dignity" (section 10), are self-evidently contrary to the 
imposition of the death penalty.2s2 I disagree on both counts, believing the 
concretising move from abstract principle to concrete social reality must be argued 
for, rather than merely asserted. Failure to do so constitutes a denial of judicial agency 
(Klare 1998: 173), which is understandable given the court's reluctance to face its 
new-found anxiety and its ambivalent self-regard, but not justifiable on these grounds. 
The association of traditional African values, such as ubUnfU (which 
constitutes a form of life, a reified and romanticised vision of the rural African 
community, as much as a principle) with democracy, both in the postamble of the 
interim Constitution and in the judgement of Judge Mokgoro, is foreshadowed by 
Nelson Mandela 's location of constitutional democracy in pre-colonial African 
societies. Mandela writes: 
I listened to the elders of the tribe telling stories about the good old days, 
before the arrival of the white man. Then our people lived peacefully under the 
democratic rule of their kings and their amapakhati and moved freely and 
confidently up and down the country without let or hindrance. Then the 
country was ours ... The structure and organisation of early African societies 
fascinated me ... The land, then the main means of production. belonged to 
the whole tribe, and there was no individual ownership whatsoever. There 
were no classes, no rich or poor, and no exploitation of man by man. All men 
were free and equal and this was the foundation of government. Recognition 
of this general principle fOWld expression in the constitution of the council ... 
there was much in such a society that was primitive and insecure and it could 
certainly never measure up to the demands of the present epoch. But in such a 
society are contained the seeds of a revolutionary democracy in which none 
will be held in slavery or servitude, and in which poverty, want , and insecurity 
shall be no more .... " . (Mandela, quoted in Derrida 1987: 24, emphasis in 
original) 
The socialist sentiment of this VISIOn is certainly discordant with South Africa's 
current neo-liberalism and participation in global circuits of late capitalism, but in a 
sense it is supposed to jar: it is a vision of the future as past. Derrida notes two 
important themes in the passage. The first is fascination: that which holds one' s stare, 
" looks at you, already concerns you and orders you to continue responding, making 
you responsible for the look" (Derrida 1987: 23). Later in the same ess.ay, Derrida 
elaborates "we must respect the other for himself, in his irreplaceable singularity" 
m All references to sections of the Constitution in this chapter are to the interim Constitution, Act 200 
of 1993, unless specified otherwise. 
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(Derrida 1987: 37). In The Force of Law, Derrida comes to define justice in similarly 
ethical terms as an "incalculable" demand to treat the other on the other's tenus and 
an unconditional duty to have regard for and recognise the other, an infinite duty 
without expectation of reciprocity: 
The deconstruction of all presumption of a detenninant certitude of a present 
justice, itself operates on the basis of an infinite " idea of justice" because it is 
irreducible, irreducible because owed to the other, before any contract, 
because it has come, the other's coming that is the singularity that is always 
other. (Derrida 1992a: 25) 
Can the postmodem justice of alterity. of irreducible othemess, be included under the 
umbrella of ubuntu' s possible significations? Asmal et al define ubunlu as implying 
both "compassion" and the "recognition of the humanity of the other" (Asmal et a1 
1997: 21 ), However, should not Asmal et ai 's definition be read as implying "the 
common humanity of self and other", an ethical responsibility based on commona1ity 
and sameness, rather than othemess? In short, is not ubunlu simply a form of 
humanism, perhaps we can say renaissant humanism, the humanism of the much 
vaunted "African Renaissance"? 
Postcolonial assertions of "Africanness", assenting and affirming a denied or 
alienated subjectivity, are seemingly incongruent with postmodernlpoststructuralist 
challenges to the coherent autonomous subject. Postcolonialism is generally eager to 
participate In the deconstruction of humanism, where this subject is also the 
imperialist or liberal subject. As Spivak (1988: 202) notes "there is an affinity 
between the imperialist subject and the subject of humanism", Postmodemism 
deconstructs universalist - liberal and humanist - discourses of the self, what 
Foucault has called the "founding subject" , so that , in Althuser's words, the subject 
becomes "decentred" (Althuser 1971: 219).'53 To briefly restate the poslmodem 
(de)construction of the subject: there is no innate faculty of reason that will "out" 
itself and no Cartesian ego that somehow predates its immersion into a particular 
language and culture. The self is always embedded in and constituted through 
language, This stance is anti-humanist in the sense that it rules out attempts to locate a 
common core of humanity which exists in every person; on the contrary it is non-
foundationalist or, in terms favoured by Rorty, "anti-foundationalist" , holding that the 
m Foucault also speaks of the "decentering" of the subject (Foucault 1972: 13), 
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individual and culture are radically contingent. It is for this reason that 
postmodemism claims that all attempts to find a transcultural, ahistorical account of 
justice and morality have failed and that universalising discourses such as liberal 
legality may be deconstructed to reveal the causes ofthi5 failure. 
Although poslcoloniai theory tends to he enthusiastic about the deconstruction 
of libera li sm and the subject of liberal humanism, it is generally antagonistic towards 
efforts to deconstruct (postcolonial theorists would likely substitute "eviscerate") the 
newly emergent and previously marginalised subjectivity of the subaltern, whose 
agency it is seeking to enable. While sympathy is due to postcoioniai theory's efforts 
at upwardly re-evaluating African subjectivity, where postcolonialism rejects 
poststructuralism, it does so by positing a set of antitheses - antifoundationalism 
versus political engagement, identity versus difference and deconstruction versus 
reconstruction. However, far from undermining postcolonial commitments, 
poststructuralist conceptions of subjectivity, identity and human agency actually 
enable and promote them . Against the claim that the poststructuralist view of the 
subject undermines the postcolonial project by rendering it inconceivable that there is 
any subject that could resist or challenge imperialism or liberalism, poststructuralism 
argues that the subject is a discursive position that can indeed act oppositionally or 
rewrite the script of history (see, for instance, Butler 1993, 1994). The 
poststructuralist proposition that there exists no subjectivity that is not always already 
an effect of a power discourse matrix, does not preclude (neither should it) the 
important acknowledgement that people have "critical capacities": they are not pre-
programmed pawns but are able to engage in novel actions and to modify social 
conditions (Fraser 1997: 2 14). In other words, poststructuralism is sanguine about the 
proposition that oppositionality and political contestation is a mode of our form of 
life. 
One of the reasons postcolonial theory feels that poststructuralism disables the 
resisting subject, is its habit of privileging linguistic metaphors, seemingly 
objectifying the subject as a "site of signification" and as a "permanent possibility of a 
certain resignifying process". Suppose, however, we put aside these linguistic 
metaphors and ask whether humanism and ubuntu could be conceived in postmodem 
terms. Stephen Toulmin, for instance, writes that "the stage in Western culture and 
society we are now entering - whether we see it as the third phase in modernity or as 
a new and distinctive posunodem phase - obliges us to reappropriate values from 
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Renaissance humanism that were lost in the heyday of Modernity" (Toulmin 1990: 
200. 201). But Toulmin is suggesting that hwnanism be incorporated into the 
postmodem era, not, as I believe, that it needs to be reformulated in accordance with 
postmodem theory, that is , in non-foundationalist and contingent, r~ther than 
universal , lenns, while still maintaining some kind of transcendental status. Appiah 
has such a reconceptualisation in mind when he writes 
what I am calling humanism can be provisional, historically contingent, anti-
essent ialist (in other words, postmodem) and still be demanding. We can 
surely maintain a powerful engagement with the concern to avoid cruelty and 
pajn whi le nevertheless recognising the contingency of that concern . . . maybe 
then we can recover within postmodemism - the concern for human suffering 
for victims of the postcolonial state .. . while rejecting the master narratives of 
modernism. (Appiah 1992: 155) 
Appiah adds that this concept of humanism "transcends obligations to churches and 
nations" . Steven Winter similarly contends that 
postmodems are deeply humanistic, but it is not because they reject a 
Hobbesian ontology of human nature in favour of a more uplifting narrative ... 
The deep humanism of postmodernism inheres in its affirmation that our 
values need not be underwritten by anything more than our own actions ... In 
contrast , the rational ist anxiety for some foundation more secure and more real 
than our actions is anti humanist; it is what Nietzsche identifies as a form of 
self-hatred, a "fatality" that he aptly describes as nihilism. (Winter 1992: 806) 
If we reconceive of humanismlllbllntu in this postmodem sense, then we might be in 
a posit ion to develop a view of collective identities such as "Africanness" as at once 
discursively constructed and complex, as enabling of collective action and amenable 
to decentering, in need of reconstruction and deconstruction - paradoxical certainly. 
but all the better for it. To return to Asmal et aI ' s definition of ubuntu as the 
"recognition of the humanity of the other", where humanity is conceived in non-
essentialist postmodern terms as a concern for suffering and victimhood, then we are 
not far from drawing a loose equivalence between ubuntu and say, Derrida's concept 
of ethics/justice as otherness, which is also notably opposed to cruelty and pain. 
Lesiba Teffo, for instance, claims that adherents of ubuntu 
appreciate the difference in their humaneness. Ubuntu means allowing the 
other .. . to be and to become. The Ubuntuist concedes that without the other, 
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she or he would not be human .... Africans who venerate tradition for fear of 
innovation and who ignore di fferences for the sake of an oppressive sameness 
are not true to themselves. (Teffo 1999: 167) . 
If I am right in redefining ubun/u in postmodem terms, then I would argue that on this 
basis ubuntu is opposed to the death penalty: the death penalty is unjust because it 
destroys irrecoverably the relationship between self and other as the other is finally 
eliminated. 
At this point, 1 would anticipate a two-fold objection to my interpretation of 
ublmlu in postmodem terms as follows: that the merits (that is, the potentially salutary 
effects) of theorising ubuntu in postmodem terms notwithstanding, the quotidianity of 
South African social experience is set at a considerable distance from the pristine 
space of a postmodem ethics of alterity - a space solely occupied by ethical 
responsibility. Instead, the objection continues, ubunlu within the South African 
context designates ethical relations between members of a community, a communal 
form of life based on an "ethics of reciprocity" (Sanders 2000: 20), which IS 
manifestly not the same thing as Derrida's ethics, which denies the necessity of 
reciprocity. My reply is to the effect that although ubunlu cannot be interpreted to 
mean anything I want it to mean, the fac t of its polysemy allows for the interpretation 
I want to ascribe to it and, furthennore, even if my interpretation runs contrary to its 
usually allocated meaning, the idea is to utilise interpretation as a mode of 
transformation, which calls for the accrual of novel resonances.254 
A second objection, more of a query perhaps, might be that in the introduction 
undertook to discuss not only the possible relationship of ubuntu to the death 
penalty, but also the role that ubumu actually played in the Makwanyane decision in 
its dismissal of the death penalty and in its development of a traditional African 
jurisprudence. And that, in the case of both these things, the discourse of nation and 
nation-building played a predominant ro le. It is to this task that I now turn. 
2$4 Douzinas and Warrington write : " texts could often be read explc itely against the grain of 
'authorised ' readings without in any way doing violence to the actual linguistic artefacts in question" 
(Douzinas and Warrington 1994a: 17). In the other judgement in which the Constitutional Court had 
recourse to ubuntu, AZAPO, ubuntu was held to be contrary to retribution and promoting of 
reconciliation . I would suggest that this is so in part because ubuntu's indeterminacy has the effect of 
break ing up the binary sense of political antagonism. Linguistic indeterminacy operates to disrupt the 
logic of oppositionality in apartheid thought, the proliferation of significations providing the impetus 
for a theoretical commitment to reject fi xed subject positions as ontoiogically faulty and dyadic 
polarities as epistemologically unsound. Indeterm inacy, as both Bhabha and Spivak have shown, posits 
relations between groups as transactional and dispenses with conflict as adverserial ity. 
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5.5 Ubuntu, Tradition and Nation 
It could convincingly be argued that it is ubuntu' s positioning within 
discourses of nationalism and nation-building that enables an understanding of the 
Consti tutional Court ' s ruling against the death penalty and is centrally motivational 
for Judge Sach' s development of a traditional African jurisprudence. I want to tease 
out a link between ubuntu, African nationalism and the death penalty and to show 
how their interact ion was manifested in the court 's decision. I return first to the 
Mandela quotation above and to Derrida' s extrapolation of a second theme (the first 
being "fascination", connoting an ethics of othemess), 
that af the seed: it furnishes an)ndispe nsable scheme for interpretation, it is by 
its very virtuality that the democratic model would have been present in the 
society of ancestors, even if it was not to be revealed, developed as such for 
reflection until afterward. (Derrida 1987: 23 , 24) 
It is my contention that ubunlu, as a signifier which embraces this model of traditional 
society, is this seed and that the Makwanyane court recognised this, including it as 
one of "the values which underlie an open and democratic society", in terms of which 
the court is directed to interpret the constitution following section 35. Derrida 
expresses the paradox of interpreting the present in the light of the past in order to 
pursue an ideal which exists only in the future, in the future perfect tense: the 
accomplishment of real democracy in the future "will only have taken place in the 
past of this non-Western society under the species of virtuality". The seeds of 
traditionaJ African society "prefigure, they make visible ahead of time, what still 
remains accessible in its historical phenomenon, that is to say, the 'classless' society 
and the end of the end of the ' exploi tation of man by man'" (Derrida 1986: 25). 
In the Makwanyane judgement there is a sense of the seed of ubuntu growing 
throughout each successive judgement in which it is referred to. In the first 
judgemenl, that of Judge Chaskalson, the seed is simply present but dormant, 
effective through its presence alone. Ub untu is stated to be manifestly contrary to the 
death penalty. In the judgements of Justices Langa, Madala, Mahomed and Mokgoro, 
the seed germinates, pushing out the first tender shoots of its multiple and unstable 
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significations. Only in the final judgement, does it start to resemble a young 
jurisprudential sapling. Sachs 1, declaring that 
the secure and progressive development of our legal system demands that it 
draw the best from all streams of justice in our country ... [which] means 
giving long overdue recognition to African law and legal thinking as a source 
of legal ideas, values and practice ... [in order 10] restore dignity to ideas and 
values that have long been suppressed or marginalised. (paras 364 and 3650) 
Sachs J then goes on to conduct a genealogy of the death penalty in traditional 
African jurisprudence developed prior to and during colonialism, concluding that 
the relatively well-developed judicial processes of indigenous societies did not 
in general encompass capital punislunent for murder. Such executions that 
took place were frenzied extra-judicial killings of supposed witches, a 
supposedly irrational form of crowd behaviour that has unfortunately 
continued to this day in the Conn of necklacing and witch-burning. (para 381 
E-G) 
He describes the imposition of the death penalty as a colonial imposition, exemplified 
by the governor of Natal's ire at the failure of the Zulus to impose the death penalty: 
Hearken to Shepstone on November 25, 1850, substituting capital punislunent 
for the native system of cattle fines in the case of murder: "Know ye all ... a 
man's life has no price: no cattle can pay for it. He who intentionall~ kills 
another_ whether for Witchcraft or otherwise, shall die himself. (para 380) SS 
Sachs' linkage of the death penalty with colonialism and the imperialism of Western 
legal discourse is undeniable and it is a matter of historical record that it bolstered 
slavery,256 colonial expansion and apartheid in South Africa?57 However, Sach's 
claim that indigenous African jurisprudence had no death penalty is less convincing. 
25S Sachs 1 cites Donald R. Morris, 1995, The Washing a/the Spears - A History o/the Rise o/the Zulu 
Nation Under Shaka and its Fall in the Zulu War 0/1879, Cape Town: 10nathan Cape, pp 174-5. 
2~6 Hahl0 and Khan note that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries "{tJorture was used to 
extract confessions. especially with slaves and where the death penalty was passed" (Hahlo and Khan 
1960: 202). 
m When the four separate colonies were united into the Union of South Africa in 1910. the statutory 
position in relation to the death penalty was fractured. however the Criminal Procedure ·and Evidence 
Act of 1917 provided unifonnity and clarification, sett ing out the extent of capital crimes in South 
Africa (Kahn 1989). This statute made the death penalty mandatory for murder. Sarkin observes that it 
was the rise to power of the National Party that saw a proliferation of capital offences on the statute 
book. The extension of use of the death penalty during the 1950's coincided with an intensification of 
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His genealogy lacks depth and breadth of reference: only nine sources are referred to; 
the authors of the historical accounts referred to are ethnically and culturally external 
to their subject and most are uninvolved in the internal mechanism of the traditional 
African ' legal practice under investigation. It is unclear, for instance, whether the 
execution of witches is extra-judicial or illegal, that is, whether the death penalty was 
not imposed by the judiciary for the simple reason that proofofa witch's existence in 
some extra-judicial forum constituted sufficient evidence for an immediate, extra-
judicial and legally sanctioned execution, perhaps on the basis of the immediate 
danger to society. It would be ,useful to ascertain whether the protagonists of the 
extra-judicial killings were ever brought to trial. More research needs to be carried out 
and Sachs J is the first to admit this. 258 
On the question of the value of ubunlu as a tool for interpretation and a point 
of entry into constitutional discourse for the marginalised African legal tradition, 
commentators are divided. Klare enthusiastically contends that 
these passages are the most legally innovative aspects of the court ' s judgement 
[in that they explain] their opposition to capital punishment in 
philosophical terms and also specifically in terms of the evils of the apartheid 
system and of the need to create a new culture of democracy for the future. 
Klare 1998: 173) 
Conversely, Wilson, commenting specifically on Sachs' judgement writes: 
This interpretation of capital punishment seems both highly implausible and 
an act of wilful naivety on Sach's part. The Constitutional Court is st ill 
seeking to legitimate its position as the sovereign institution in the land ... 
they sought to express the new culture of rights in a popular idiom. In so doing 
they participated in a wider process of connecting rights and reconciliation to 
nation-building and engendering social cohesion through an appeal to 
Africanist unity. (Wilson 1996: 12) 
At the risk of seeming over-accommodating, I agree completely with Klare and also, 
partly and qualifiedly, with Wilson. 
political oppression, so much so that by 1969. there were eleven capital crimes" (Sarkin 1996b: 73). 
See also Kahn 1970. 
m Sachs J prefaces his investigation of traditional African jurisprudence by noting both the 
controversial nature of the subject matter and the lack of evidence and resources at his disposal with 
which to detennine the matter (at para 374). 
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In the course of colonialism and during apartheid, the physical violence of 
European colonials was matched by epistemic violence as a range of indigenous 
knowledges were either weakened, marginalised or killed~off completely -
epistemicide within a heterogenous project to constitute the colonial subject as other. 
Spivak, commenting on this process of colonial "othering" remarks that 
in the constitution of the Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate 
the textual ingredients by which such a subject could cathect ... - not only by 
ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of law" , 
(Spivak 1995: 24, emphasis added) 
African customs and laws were either obliterated - executed - or relegated to a 
position parallel, but subjected and inferior. On Spivak' s reading, traditional African 
legal theory is "subjugated knowledge" and follows Foucault's definition of it as "a 
whole sel of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naiVe knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, 
beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity" (Foucault 1980: 82). This 
process of epistemic othering offers an account of how white colonial law was 
established as the normative legal discourse. The identity of traditional law is its 
difference: a negative identity. 
The reintroduction of ubuntu and African jurisprudence in Makwanyane is a 
writing of black experience back into the text of South African law, the voicing of the 
marginalised other. Neither Sachs J nor I am suggesting that traditional African values 
and modes of social isation should as a matter of course be privileged over those 
reflected in the legal theory of the current Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, there 
are discrepancies, and judgements are needed. Teffo, for instance, despite declaring 
that he is ' ·sensitive to the powerful feminist lobby in this country ... I fully support 
their cause ... education requires that gender distinctions be minimised to those areas 
where such distinctions are vital and necessary". proceeds to endorse as one of these 
areas the situation in which "[t]he more women a man has, the greater his stature in 
the community ... in the past a weaker chief would donate a young woman from his 
own kraal or from the tribe to the powerful chief in order to forestall the possibility of 
attack and invasion" (Teffo 1999: 155, 156), Now, it seems to me that whatever the 
strand of feminism Teffo is sensitive to , it would be hostile to the idea of women 
being utilised in quite so proprietorial and instrumental a fashion. If this is the 
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traditional African view of gender relations, it should be opposed. The point is not 
that African values must take precedence over Western values, but that its values and 
principles should be allowed to compete democratically and on equal terms with 
Western values in legal discourse. 
I would also like to reiterate my opposition regarding any suggestion that 
South Africa retreat into the "glorious past" of African civilisation. The rejection of 
postcoionial, (post)modern life to return to the past should be regarded as "absurd 
sentimentalism" (Buchanan, cited in Palmer 1986: 373) because changes have already 
occurred and the past caMOl be recaptured. Western and African legal cultures are 
mutually imbricated within a history of colonial incursions, definitional strategies and 
resistance to both. As Appiah contends, "[i]f there is a lesson in the broad shape of 
this circulation of culture, it is surely that we are all already contaminated by each 
other, that there is no longer a fu lly echt-A:frican culture awaiting salvage" (Appiah 
1992: 155). The romanticised rural culture captured by the concept of ubuntu is not a 
practical possibility in the present, it is the future perfect "will only have taken place" . 
The rhetorical incorporation of ubumu into legal discourse is also part of 
nation-building. As Benedict Anderson has argued, the formulation of a shared 
national past, the reactivation of shared histories and imagined communities, is at the 
same time the basis of the assertion ofa shared national future (Anderson 1991). With 
the advent of modernity, the concomitant collapse of the self-perpetuating order of 
fixed identities (brilliantly understood in Maclntyre's After Virtue) led to the "grand 
separation" of the elite and the masses. To bring about reconci liation, the kind of 
consensus and public-spiritedness evinced by the ancient polis needed to be recreated. 
However. since the conditions necessary for the polis experience (devotion to public 
goods at the expense of private interests and the elevation of the citizen over and 
above the private man) are no longer part of the modem world, they had to be created 
artificially (Smith 1986: 13 I). The reproduction of society in this new structure was a 
task that had (and still has) to be planned, managed and monitored. The methods 
appl ied to this task are , first , Foucault' s panopticism, which enabled close control of 
conduct through surveillance backed by confinement and second, related but different 
strategies, capture~ by Weber's concept of legitimation and Talcon Parsons" "central 
value cluster", which entailed efforts to conceal efforts to conceal repression by the 
elite through representing the specific order of a given society as tantamount to order 
itself and the introduction and perpetuation of such order as a mission to which these 
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lives ought to contribute if they are to acquire meaning. In order to ensure the 
effective deployment of these strategies, elites had to represent the social order which 
made their privilege secure, as a function or requisite of society or as a condition of its 
survival, in other words as a condition of group immortality. The most successful 
expression of this strategy is nationalism (Bauman 1992: 105). 
In the discourse of nation-building, the establishment and preservation of the 
nation is hailed as an extreme value, hovering above the short lives of its members, 
provided that it can demonstrate an exposure to threat, in the face of which members 
need to unite 10 ensure their survival. For South Africans, the main threat is the past 
itself, apartheid and the legality through which it was orchestrated, which found its 
most violent expression in the death penalty. The following dictum of Judge Didcott 
distinguishes the death penalty as a feature of the previous order: 
South Africa has experienced too much savagery. The wanton killing must 
stop before it makes a mockery of the civilised, humane and compassionate 
society to which the nation aspires and has constitutionally pledged itself. And 
the state must set an example by demonstrating the priceless value it places on 
the lives of its subjects, even the worst. (para 190) 
In this passage the calculated and clinical punishment of execution is analogised to 
the brutality of apartheid violence, past and present dichotomised through their 
characterisation as "savagery" and "civilisation", self and other through the 
romanticised rhetoric of nation-building. Langa J similarly observes: 
The history of the past decades has been such that the value of life and human 
dignity have been demeaned. Political, social and other factors created a 
climate of vio lence resulting in a culture of retaliation and revenge. In the 
process, respect for life and for the inherent human dignity of every person 
became the main casualties. The State has been part of this degeneration, not 
only because of its role in the conflicts of the past, but also by retaining 
punishments which did not testify to a high regard for the dignity of the person 
and the value of every human life. (para 2180-1) 
What is evident from this passage is not only the polemicising of past and present, but 
also the abstraction from the particularity of retaliation and revenge to respect for life 
and dignity of every person. This rhetoric of nationalism yokes together individuals 
divided in the past through their subsumption within universal and absolute values 
that were previously denied. Sachs J argues that the right to life is not only contrary to 
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the death penalty but is also an asset" the emerging nation could squander at its peril 
... the time to guard against future repression was when memories of past injustice 
and pain were still fresh" (para 388 F-G). What is missing from all these accounts of 
the death penalty as an abrogation of the abstract and universal discourse of human 
rights, are descriptions of the manifold particular injustices, not primari ly a violation 
of rights, but a violation of individuals, bodies, which opposed the apartheid state. 
Even Mokgoro J fail s to capture the particular nature of injustice when she describes 
the death penalty as o:an intimate part of a system of law enforcement that imposed 
severe penalties on those who aspired to achieve the values enshrined in our 
constitution today" (para 310 A-B). The victims of apartheid are unspecified and the 
impression that emerges is one of incommensurability between regimes rather than a 
structural division between sovereign and subject. O'Regan J directly articulates the 
death penalty as an instrument or political oppression and provides particular 
instances in which to ground it. She writes: 
The death sentence was imposed sometimes for crimes that were motivated by 
political ideals, In this way the death penalty came to be seen by some as part 
of the repressive machinery of the former goverrunent. Towards the end of the 
1980's there were several major public campaigns to halt the execution of 
people who were perceived to be political opponents of the Government. 
There is no doubt that these campaigns to prevent the execution of amongst 
others the ' Sharpeville 6' and the 'Upington 26' were partly responsible for 
the Goverrunent' s decision in 1990 to suspend the implementation of 
sentences of death. (para 333 A-C, emphasis added) 
Even though the passage states the pol itics of capital punishment more directly than in 
other judgements, it is notable that the judicial subject is dissociated from the opinions 
expressed, Although Judge O'Regan is inarguably correct that there was not universal 
recognition of the politically oppressive function of the death penalty, it is difficult to 
see why "came to be seen by some" is favoured over "was" or "was in my opinion", 
Why the reticence by the judiciary to describe capital punishment as political 
injustice? Of the 392 paragraphs of the judgement, only a handful relate indirectly to 
capital punishment as political oppression during apartheid, whilst only one paragraph 
relates directly, Part of the reason is the complicity of the apartheid judiciary during 
apartheid with National Party politics, manifested in the politicised application of the 
death penalty. Various studies (see, for instance, Dugard 1978) show that certain 
judges had been appointed recurrently to preside over political trials and that some 
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judges were more disposed than others to imposing the death sentence, strongly 
indicating political bias on the part of the judiciary. It is also impossible to deny that 
people of colour were the primary target. Dugard writes: 
It is impossible to divorce the racial factor from the death penalty in South 
Africa. Of the 2740 persons executed [between 1910 and 1975], less than lOO 
... were white; no white has yet been hanged for the rape of a black; and only 
about six whites have been hanged for the murder of blacks. Conversely. 
blacks convicted of murder or rape of whites are usually executed. (Dugard 
1978: 127)259 
By demonstrating that whi le South African judges during apartheid professed to 
follow the law as if it were an autonomous set of neutral principles divorced from 
politics, their interpretation and application of legal principles was typically a function 
of thei r political affiliations, the law/politics distinction is deconstructed, thereby 
erasing any rigid boundary between the two (Litowitz 1997: 90). As I discussed 
above, the judiciary feels unable to extend this recognition to its own activities for 
fear of sacrificing its own legitimacy. What I want to focus on here, however, is that a 
central reason for the abolition of the death penalty was the execution of those 
appositional to the National Party government, since those who were executed 
implicitly died as patriots, martyrs to the new national cause. 
The death penalty cannot survive because it is instrumentally responsible for 
the elimination of those individuals who preceded, fought for and are now 
incorporated into the new South African nation. "What is la Patrie?" asked Maurice 
BaITes and answered "The Soil and the Dead" (Barr"s 1902: 8). The members of the 
nation accede involuntarily: they are born onto its soil and riveted into its chain. The 
nation as the soil and the dead is the unconscious, unchangeable point of beginning, 
the point of origin (ursprunglich as Heidegger would say) that is and must have been 
259 See also Van Niekerk 1969 and Rhadamanthus 1970. A similar bias characterises the app lication of 
the death penalty in the United States. Of 500 prisoners executed between 1977 and the end of 1998, 
nearly 82% were convicted of the murder of a white person, even though blacks and whites were 
victims of homicide in approximately equa l numbers. A black person who kil ls a white person in the 
Un ited States is eleven times more likely to receive a death sentence than a wh ite who kills a black 
(www. amnesty.org). A fonner Illinois prosecutor recently admitted that the District Attorney's office 
ran a contest to see which prosecutor would be the fi rst to convict defendants whose we ight totalled 
4,000 pounds. Because most of the defendants were black, the competition was known as "Niggers by 
the Pound". There are many other recent racist stories of this kind. In the trial of William Andrews in 
Utah, a crude drawing by one of the all-white jury was discovered depicting a hanged man and the 
words "hang the niggers". The judge refused Andrew 's attorney's petition for a mistrial and his 
subsequent request to question the jury over the note (Brook 2000: 4-9). 
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already in place. In this light , ubunlll is the transcendental and absolute truth of the 
nation, but also vulnerable to attack. It is both la Verile and une verite franr;aise: a 
universal stipulation of the conditions for social justice and a particularly South 
African truth which appoints its addressees in advance, so that reception IS 
involuntary. Bauman observes the central contradiction of nationalism: that it 
promotes particularity while striving towards universality. Ubuntu has both particular 
connotations - Africanity and negritude (Wilson 1996: 13) - and universal 
connotations - humanism and human rights. Derrida similarly asserts: 
Whether it takes a national form or nOl, a refined, hospitable or aggressively 
xenophobic form or not, the self-affirmation of an identity always claims to be 
responding to the call or ass ignation of the universal. There are no exceptions 
to this law. No cultural identity presents itself as an opaque body of an 
untranslatable idiom, but always on the contrary, as the irreplaceable 
inscription of the universal in the singular, the unique testimony to the human 
essence and to what is proper to man. Each time it has to do with the discourse 
of responsibility: I have, the unique "I" has, the responsibility of testifying for 
universality. Each time the exemplarity of the example is unique. (Derrida 
1992c: 72, 73) 
It is at this point, Bauman observes, that rational argument grinds to a halt and 
sentiment takes over where reason surrenders (Bauman 1992: 109). Notice Judge 
Mahomed's tone in the following passage: 
"The need for ubuntu" expresses the ethos of an instinctive capacity for 
enjoyment and of love towards our fellow men and women; the joy and 
fulfilment involved in recognising their innate humanity; ... the richness of the 
creative emotions which it engenders and the moral energies which it releases 
both in the· givers and the society which they serve and are served by. (para 
263 A-B) 
There is unlikely to be a more emotive expression of the existential discovery of a 
shared human "attribute". That love should feature in the text is an allusion to the 
Immorality Act, passed in the 1950s, prohibiting sexual relations between masters and 
slaves. Coetzee writes: 
This was the most pointed of a long string of laws regulating all phases of 
social life, whose intent was to block horizontal fonns of intercourse between 
white and black. The only sanctioned intercourse was henceforth to be 
vertical, that is, it was to consist in giving and receiving orders. (Coetzee 
1992: 97) 
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Nevertheless, love is a particularly fugacious word, the evanescence of which sits 
uncomfortably with the court's concern with enlightenment constitution and its 
suspicion of evidence that is not "scientific" (para 305 G_H).260 
A likely reason for the particularities of past injustices not being discussed at 
all in the judgement is that, as nation-building discourse, it is a question of 'sweeping 
away" the old differences that stand in the way of new uniform standards promoted by 
the powers that back it. Divisions of the past are suppressed in favour of national 
unity, manifested in the dual forms of humanist universal ism and particular 
Africanness. The reason why the death penalty must be abolished is because 
nationalism precisely guarantees the immortality ofthe group. As Bauman shows, 
durability is to be secured not for life in general, but for a specific fonn of 
collective life; and this means a specific structure of domination, a certain 
allocation of privileges, a given distribution of freedom and dependency as 
well as of the chances of individual immortality - ... to give the group its 
distinctive identity and the meaning to its survival. (Bauman 1992: 104) 
In short, modernity ' s political answer to the individual 's fear of death is the 
immortality of the group, the nation, in which the individual 's mortality is effaced 
through participation in and perpetuation of the nation. The Makwanyane judgement 
reflects a recognition that the state's imposition of capital punishment qua "act of 
mortality" is too transparently incongruous with the construction of the nation as 
precondition for group immortality. Bauman, reminding us of Lyotard 's suggested 
conception of modernity, not as a socio-political system, but as a mode, pennits us to 
view ubuntu as expressing a certain rhetoric of sensibility whereby 
thought acts itself as history, that is to say that it transcends the present by 
decomposing it, simultaneously, as the over-determined residue of the past, 
overflowing with meanings, and an under-determined preamble to the future, 
waiting for a meaning yet to be given ... the present is incomplete (im-perfect) 
not yet quite what it could be if fully developed, not yet quite what it should be 
if it duly set itself free from the past that drags it down. (Bauman 1992: 109) 
260 Robert Hollinger notes "the En lightenment ideal of the moral and epistemological unity of mankind, 
which was to provide the tools for ' relieving man 's estate' (Bacon) withouttheoreticallimil. This led to 
the notion of a scientific culture in which everything was grounded in scientific doctrine or method, or 
commined to the flames as sophistry and illusion as Hume put it" (Hollinger 1985: x). 
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The concept of ubuntu operates in exactly this way, hearkening back to an idyllic pre-
colonial era of communalism and democracy which denies victory to the injustices of 
the present by being posed as an ideal for the future, "still always to come" in 
Derrida' s sense. Ubuntu is both overflowing with meanings, which are recurrent in 
the judgement , and yet still to be concretised - still to be finally determined. It is 
simultaneously universal and immutable and particular and contingent, or more 
accurate ly: a particular and contingent claim to the universal and immutable. 
5.6 Death as Penalty 
I turn now to consider execution as a strategy of penology. The court's anitude to the 
application of the death penalty closely follows the approach of the social 
contractarians and other liberal theorists of. the Enlightenment - Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and Beccaria. That the court should follow the approach of 
these theorists comes as no surprise, for it is in the eighteenth century that Rousseau 
and his contemporaries concerned themselves with the theoretical composition of 
parliamentary democracy, and it is during this period that the discourse of rights arose 
to mediate relations between citizens and the state. Given the Makwanyane court ' s 
eagerness to proclaim the legitimacy of liberal democracy and rights discourse, it is 
natural that the judges should be located within the emancipatory discourse of the 
Enlightenment. What is less clear is why the approaches to capital punishment of 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Beccaria should be favoured over Kant 
and Hegel , both firmly in favour of Gudicious, judicial) invocation of capital 
punishment. 
Of the three justifications for punishment mentioned in the previous chapter-
retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence - rehabilitation is the most obviously 
incommensurate with the death penalty, since "the death penalty is absolute in the 
sense that it abol ishes the criminal at the same time as the crime" (Foucault 1996: 
24 1). The judges in Makwanyane reject retribution as a justification for the death 
penalty on the grounds that it 
smacks too much of vengeance to be accepted, either on its own or in 
combination with other aims as a worthy purpose of punishment in the 
enlightened society to which we South Africans aspire and that the expression 
of moral outrage which is its further and more defensible object can be 
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communicated effectively by severe sentences of imprisonment. (Didcon J, 
para 185 A - C) 
Chaskalson P claims that "[r]etribution is one of the objects of punishment. but it 
carries less weight than deterrence" (para 129 G-H), and that punishment need not be 
identical to the offence but should instead be symbolic, Kentridge J notes: 
This too [the argument from retribution] I regard as an argument of weight. 
But as a civilised society it is not open to us, in my opinion, to express our 
moral outrage by executing even the worst of murderers any more than we 
could do so by the public hangings or mutilations of a bygone time. (para 203 
I-J) 
In summary, most of the Makwanyane judges see some value in retribution. but insist 
that deterrence is the determining consideration in its judgement of the death penalty. 
The horror of revenge as a motive for execution is first expressed by Plato in 
PrOlagoras and permeates through to the penal theory of the Enl ightenment. Hobbes 
specifies in Leviathan that "we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other 
design than for the correction of the offender or direction of others" and 
disapprovingly describes revenge, which effects neither correction nor deterrence, as 
'''vain-glory', against reason, against nature ... commonly called cruelty" (Hobbes 
1985: 2 10). Although he sometimes appears to stand in the Aristotelian retributive 
tradition ("whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all known consequences 
of it" (Hobbes 1985: 338)), the purpose of punishment for Hobbes is primarily as 
deterrent and corrective. Hobbes claims that the death penalty should be reserved for 
crimes most dangerous to the public, such as treason, for which he sees execution as a 
deterrence?61 The similarities between Hobbes' attitude to execution and that of the 
Makwanyane court are manifold: both regard the primary goal of correction and 
rehabilitation rather than retribution. Both view the instigation of the death penalty 
without regard to these aims as cruelty. In Makwanyane, although the court regards 
capital punishment as invasive of the right to life (section 10) and the right to dignity 
(section 9), the primary right regarded as being invaded is section 11 (2): the right not 
to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. Also, just as Hobbes 
sanctions the death penalty for treason, so the Malcwanyane court specifically 
excludes from its order the conditional set out in section 277(I)(b) of the Criminal 
161 "Punishment ofthe Leaders and teachers in a Commotion ... can profit the Common-wealth by their 
example" (Hobbes 1985: 390). 
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Procedure Act, namely "treason when the Republic is in a state of war" . Foucault 
refers to the sovereign's qualified right to exercise the death penalty when its 
existence is in danger as "a sort of right of rejoinder": a rejoinder from which no 
response is possible or even required (Foucault 1990: 135). 
Rousseau takes up the subject of the death penalty in his chapter on "The 
Right of Life and Death" in The Social COn/ract. For Rousseau, implicit in the desire 
for self-preservation is the need to fann a conunonwealth and create a sovereign with 
power ultimately to put citizens to death if they transgress the law. This sentiment is 
similar to those expressed by Hobbes and Locke, but Rousseau qualifies it by 
stipulating that "the state has no right to put to death, even for the sake of making an 
example, anyone whom it can leave alive without danger" (Rousseau 1973: 209). 
Montesquieu writes in a seemingly retributivist vein that "man deserves death when 
he has violated the security of the subject so far as to deprive, or attempt to deprive, 
another man of his own life" (Montesquieu 1949: 184), but this is qualified by his 
assertion that in 
moderate governments ... the love of one' s country, shame, and the fear of 
blame are restraining motives, capable of preventing a multitude of crimes . . . 
the civil laws therefore have a softer way of correcting and do not require so 
much force and severity. (Montesquieu 1949: 81) 
At other times the Makwanyane court opposes what it considers to be the 
cruelty of the death penalty with "the altruistic and humanitarian philosophy which 
animates the Constitution enjoyed by us nowadays" (Didcott J, para 177 F-G). There 
is a strong resemblance between the court ' s descriptions of the "dehumanising 
environment" of death row in which the condemned prisoner becomes one of "the 
living dead", who "broods over his fate. The horrifying spectre of being hanged by the 
neck and the apprehension of being made to suffer a painful ... death is ... never far 
from mind" (Didcott J, para 178 A-B), and Beccaria' s emotionally charged appeals 
for the abolition of the death penalty based on descriptions of "cold-blooded 
barbarity, ... the germs of the weak, ... barbarous torments ... [and] the filth and 
horror of prison" (Beccaria 1963: 10). If the Makwanyane court' s focus on 
rehabilitation and deterrence at the expense of retribution is utilitarian, then it is the 
humanitarian utilitarianism of Beccaria, rather than Bentham's formulation which 
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expressed a willingness to accept extremely severe punishment for the sake of 
deterrence and reforrnation.262 
The Ma/rwanyane court rejects out of hand arguments in favour of the death 
penalty based on the retributive approaches of Kant and Hegel. In response to the 
argument that "a murderer forfeits his or her right to claim protection of life and 
dignity". Chaskalson P argues that "rights vest in every person, including criminals 
convicted of vile crimes" (para 136 A- 137 E). Langa J similarly claims that the rights 
of "the worst among us" mllst be respected (para 229 H-I). Kant insists that a 
murderer must he put to death since by killing another one is "unfit to be a citizen" 
and so one deprives oneself of the right to life (Kant 1965: 99, 102). The murderer is 
executed not for the sake of correction or deterrence but because the death penalty can 
establish an equality between the crime and the punishment. G. W.F Hegel also 
advocates the death penalty from a retributive perspective. For Hegel the negation of 
the crime is negated by an act which the crime itself requires to be complete as a 
negative act. Moreover, deterrence is an insutficient justification for punishment, 
since it fails to erase the crime and so is unable to negate the negation. As Peter 
Steinberger puts it, punishment, "the negation of the negation . .. is in effect a 
statement, a declaration that the act of the criminal is a crime and that Right, although 
apparently annulled by crime, is in fact universal and eternal" (Steinberger 1983: 
861). On what grounds does the Makwanyane court reject the Kantian and Hegelian 
positions? Largely, it would seem, on the basis that such an approach is inhumane and 
uncivilised. It is ironic then that Judge Sachs refers to Theophilus Shepstone's 
declaration opposing attempts by the indigenous peoples of Natal to circumvent the 
abolition of the death penalty in KantianiHegelian tenns: "a man 's life has no price ... 
He who intentionally kills another shall die himself' (para 380 E-F). It is ironic 
because the colonial mission is a self-professedly "civilising" one, proclaiming its 
humaneness even in the act of slaughter. 
In Foucault ' s chronicle of the shift in penal strategy, he notes that prior to and 
during the eighteenth century, the sovereign exercised a "power of life and death" 
over his citizens, a right of deduction or appropriation of "things, time, bodies and 
ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life ' in order to 
suppress" (Foucauit 1990: 136). Thereafter power is transformed from a negative 
262 "It may sometim es be of use ... to stretch a little beyond that quantity [of punishment] which on 
other accounts would be strictly necessary" (Bentham 1970: 171 ). 
212 
force of suppression (the classical juridical model) to a concept of power as 
productive, normative and administrative. Turning specifically to the death penalty 
F oucault notes that as 
soon as power gave itself the function of administering life, its reason for 
being and the logic of its exercise - and not the awakening of humanitarian 
feelings - made it more and more difficult to apply the death penalty. How 
could power exercise its prerogatives by putting people to death when its main 
role was to ensure, sustain and multiply li fe, to put this life in order? ... Now it 
is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its domination; 
death is power's limit, a moment that escapes it; death becomes the most 
secret aspect of its existence, the most ' private"'. (Foucault 1990: 138, 
emphasis mine) 
Death is the limit of this productive power and also its antithesis. In the mid-
to-late nineteenth century new fonns of knowledge were brought to bear on the body 
(and the menIal life) of the offender which caused a shift in the method of punishment 
from capital punishment to the method most commonly applied in contemporary 
society - confinement, isolation. regulat ion, examination and normalisation. Where 
the juridical system purports to guarantee liberty and privacy, the disciplines busily 
erode these rights?63 Applying this idea to the South African situation, the claim is 
that whi lst since 1994 jurists have been establishing the formal rights of equality, 
liberty and fraternity. these rights have been eroded through the simultaneous creation 
ofa carceral or panoptic society. Foucault writes: 
The [social] contract may have been regarded as the foundation of law and 
political power; panopuclsm constituted the technique. universally 
widespread, of coercion ... The <Enlightenment ' which discovered the 
liberties also invented the disciplines. (Foucault 1979: 222) 
Whereas the law prior to the Enlightenment was effective by virtue of sanction, the 
disciplines and their regulatory apparatus work mainly through normalisation, by 
shaping individuals by continually subjecting them to normalising modes of 
regulation. 
263 Foucault observes: "The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that were 
egalitarian in principle was supported by these tiny. everyday physical mechan isms, by all those 
systems of micropower that were essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrica l that we call the 
disciplines" (Foucault 1979: 222). 
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In Makwanyane the court expressed a preference for life imprisonment over 
capital punishment, arguing that life imprisorunent not only provides for the 
possibility of correction! rehabilitation, (although this also verges on irony if as most 
of the judges suggest, "life" really means a lifetime of incarceration or a duration very 
close to it) but also has sufficient retributive and deterrent effects. Chaskalson J insists 
that a "very long prison sentence is also a way of expressing outrage and visiting 
retribution on the criminal" (para 129 A-B), and Kriegler J claims that "the death 
penalty has no demonstrable penoiogicai value over and above that of long term 
imprisonment" (para 212 C-E). Judge Mahomed writes 
Retribution has indeed constituted onc of the permissible objects of criminal 
punishment ... I have however some serious difficulties with the justification 
of the death sentence as a form of retribution ... I find it difficult to hold that 
the death sentence has been demonstrated by the State to be "j ustifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and inequality". (para 296 8-
H) 
I want to argue that a Foucauldian analysis is helpful in analysing transitional South 
African constitutionalism and is borne out by examples external to the Makwanyane 
case. Rights contained in the Constitution's Bill of Rights may be limited where such 
limitation is "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom,,?64 But judicial discretion to limit the right 
might result In its abrogation in certain instances. For example, section 14 of the 
Constitution provides that everyone has the right to privacy. However, and 
notwithstanding this right, all persons applying for identity documents are compelled 
to submit to having their fingerprints taken. 265 My argument is not that constitutional 
rights should be unlimited - [ agree with Stanley Fish, for instance, that in the 
absolute sense, there ' s no such thing as free speech and it's a good thing too. Rather I 
want to show that subjectivity is constituted in post-apartheid South Africa through 
the administrative classification which accompanies the nation-building process 
through the creation of types. The constitution constitutes by providing the illusion of 
freedom and liberty, all the while facilitating both the repression and the constitution 
of the individual. 
264 Section 36 of the final Constitution. A corresponding provision is contained in section 33 of the 
interim Constitution. 
26S This is in accordance with section 10 of the Identification Act 68 of 1997. A similar legislative 
provision applies to the mandatory taking of fingerprints for motor vehicle driving licences. 
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Although Foucault has been criticised by postcolonial theorists for failing to 
provide a fonnulation of power that accounts for Europe's dominating relations with 
its co lonies, I think a Foucauldian analysis may valuably be undertaken in this 
instance. Shepstone' s Kantian (retributive) approach to punishment in 1850 is 
distinguishable from the Makwanyane court's predominantly utilitarian 
(rehabilitative, preventative) approach in 1995, not because of a move away from the 
inherent va lue of the subject; indeed, the Constitutional Court 's adulation of rights 
discourse. in terms of which individuals are invested with a personhood of intrinsic 
worth would seem to demand a retributive approach. Raymond Koen, objecting to the 
predominance of utilitarian concerns in recent penal decisions of the judiciary, argues 
thal 
[r]ights theory requires that puni shment takes seriously the unique 
individualism of each human being, including those who have commined 
offences and hence to respect each as a bearer of rights. This translates into a 
retributive or desert theory of punishment, in terms of which offenders are 
punished simply because they deserve to be punished. (Koen 1999: 189, 190) 
Koen does not, however, deal with the influence on South African constitutionalism 
of the social contractarians, such as Locke and Rousseau who, greatly influenced by 
Beccaria, viewed the purpose of punishment as primarily didactic. There can be no 
doubt that Locke and Rousseau have greatly influenced post-apartheid liberal 
democratic constitutionalism, even if for these theorists, rights derive from the social 
contract, rather than directly from the individual. 
The answer to the question of why the retributive approach to penology was 
downplayed in Makwanyane has, in fact, little to do with the ri se of liberal rights 
discourse in Soulh Africa. As early as 1961 , the Appellate Division, while still 
holding that retribution " is by no means absent from the modem approach" to 
punishment, accepted that it had lost ground to prevention and correction.266 Since 
that time retribution has in the eyes of the judiciary been secondary to prevention and 
correction. 267 More to the point, South Africa was during apartheid the paradigm case 
l 66 Rv King 19611231 (A) 236. 
267 Ten years later the same court expressed the view that "retribution has tended 10 yield to the aspects 
of correclion and prevention, and it is deterrence which has been described as the ' essential' , 'all 
important ' , 'paramOllnl ' and 'universally admitted ' object of punishment" (S v Mauhee 1971 3 769 (A) 
77 1 D) . This approach was confirmed by the Appellate Division (S v Khumalo 1984 3 SA 327 (A) 330 
E and S v P 199 1 I SA 517 (A) 523 D-F. Soon after Makwanyane. the Constitutional Court again 
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of a panoptic society, In which life from cradle to grave was administered and 
controlled. An eDomlOUS bureaucracy was required for such an artificial social 
separation. Why does the constitutional court not take the opportUnity to follow a 
retributive approach? One reason is that South Africa follows the growing worldwide 
trend to abolish the death penalty in order to create the conditions for an increasingly 
panoptic society. The change in political regimes signals a break in the epistemic 
regime which, although promising humanitarian values, actually increases the level of 
panopticism and decreases the level of severity of punislunent in accordance with the 
transfonnation in Europe since the end of the nineteenth century, "of the judicial 
system to a mechanism of oversight and control~' (Foucault 2000: 32). The nation-
building project - classificatory, homogenising, normalising, and unifying - is the 
apogee of panoptic ism (Bauman 1992: 105). 
The judicial recourse to values appears as an appeal to humanitarianism, but 
on a Foucauldian reading it is simply a cover for the epistemic technology of 
posit ivism which continues to dominate judicial practice. Positivism and its chief 
interpretative mode, literal interpretation, permits law to establish in South Africa "[a] 
new mechanics: isolation and regrouping of individuals, localisation of bodies; 
optimal utilisation of forces; monitoring and improvement of the output; in short, the 
puning into place of a whole discipline of life, time and energies" (Foucault 2000: 55, 
emphasis in original). 
5.7 Public Opinion, Counter.majoritarianism and Democracy 
I want now to turn to the issue of public opinion and the degree to which it should 
justifiably influence judicial decisions in a constitutional democracy such as South 
Africa' s: what is known as the counter-majoritarian dilemma. A startling feature of 
the court's decision to abolish the death penalty in Makwanyane is that it was 
seemingly contrary to the will of the majority of South Africans. Although evidence 
placed before the court , to the effect that the majority of South Africans were in 
favour of the death penalty, was neither conclusive nor beyond dispute268, the court 
was prepared to assume that public opinion advocated retention of the death penalty 
referred 10 this "perceptible shift in approach and anirude towards punishment" (S v Williams 1995 (7) 
BCLR 861 (CC) 881G. 
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and were nevertheless prepared to abolish it. In doing so, the court adopted the view 
that justice was not equivalent simply to enacting the wishes of the majority. The 
court thereby opened itself to the charge of acting undemocratically. Makwanyane 
introduces into South African case law a debate over the legitimacy of judicial 
review: the counter-rnajoritarian dilemma, which has divided and enlivened 
constitutional theory in recent times. The debate concerns the right of judges who are 
neither elected into office by the majority. nor directly accountable to the majority, to 
make decisions which are contrary to majoritarian policies. The question is: how can a 
non-elective judiciary be justified in a democratic regime (Bickel 1986: 16)? Judge 
Chaskalson, delivering the unanimous judgement of the court deals with the question 
of public opinion as follows: 
Public opinion may have so~e relevance to the enquiry, but in itself it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the courts to interpret the Constitution and to 
uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be 
decisive there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection 
of rights could then be left to parliament, which has a mandate from the 
public, and is answerable to the public for the way its mandate is exercised, 
but this would be a return to parliamentary sovereignty and a retreat from the 
new legal order established by the 1993 Constitution. By the same token the 
issue of capital punishment cannot be referred to a referendum, in which the 
majority view would prevail over the wishes of the minority. The very reason 
for establishing the new legal order and for vesting the power of judicial 
review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities 
and others who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic 
process. Those who are entitled to claim this protection include the social 
outcasts and marginalised people of our society. It is only if there is a 
willingness to protect the worst and weakest among us, that all of us can be 
secure that our own rights will be protected. (para 88) 
In that the court expresses a distinction between democracy and majoritarianism and 
points to a concept of democracy which incorporates the protection of minorities, 
outcasts and the marginalised, a kind of ethic of alterity, it is refreshingly progressive, 
poignantly acknowledging that today's centre is yesterday's margin. It is all the more 
disappointing then that such a progressive statement of the judicial function - the 
protection of an ethically substantive concept of democracy as duty to the other -
should be followed by such a conservative approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Justice Kriegler specifies that the methods to be used by the court are "essentially 
268 Chaskalson P noted that public opinion was "disputed" (at para 87) as did Didcott J: "We have no 
means of ascenaining whether that is indeed so" (at para \88). 
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legal, not moral or philosophical" (para 207 E-F) and that "the incumbents are judges, 
not sages; their discipline is law, not ethics or philosophy and certainly not politics" 
(para 207 A-B). Judge Sachs, writing of various stances within South African society 
on the death penalty, and on the various values which animate the debate on capital 
punishment, writes: 
We are not called upon to decide between these positions. They are essentially 
emotional, moral and pragmatic in character and will no doubt occupy the 
attention of the Constitutional Assembly. Our function is to interpret the text 
as it stands. Accordingly, whatever our personal views on this fraught subject 
may be, our response must be a purely legal one. (para 349 D-E) 
The court's repeated insistence on the distinction between law and politics and law 
and philosophy seems to deny that jurisprudential stances contest and contrast with 
each other and suggests that judgement is a straightforward application of commonly 
agreed legal principles to the facts. The impression left, as Klare has noted, is a denial 
of agency, by a court which "was no doubt anxious to affinn that it fully internalises 
the desirability and appropriateness of judicial deference to the popular will in the 
first democratically elected South African government" (Klare 1998: 173). There is, 
therefore, a pronounced discord between the court's articulation of its new function as 
a buffer against Mill ' s "tyranny of the majority" and its attitude to judgement, 
denying the contested nature of contrary positions, the aporetic undecideability of 
decision-making and the almost total denial of semantic indeterminacy. 
Although the court agreed in principle with the "generous" and "purposive" 
approach adopted in the previous Constitutional Court case of S v Zuma/69 the court 
mostly argued that the words in the Bill of Rights have a determinate and self-evident 
meaning which is contained in the text itself, reflecting a metaphysics of presence 
which denies choice in the interpretative process; hence the exclusion of politics and 
philosophy; hence the modem insistence on the formal and mechanical application of 
"purely legal" rules, closely mirroring Patan' s expression of the judicial function in 
1948. All of which is immediately undermined by the political and phi losophical 
nature of the subject maner, which absolutely resists non-political, non-philosophical 
treatment. Most judges in Makwanyane relied on the classically literalist or "common-
sense" arguments: the view expressed by positivists such as Hart that the text 
'" 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
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expresses itself, lays bare its meaning, univocally, and only in the rare cases where 
there is more than one applicable rule or where there is a penumbra of manifest 
ambiguity can resort he had to texts external to the constitution, such as the lravaux 
preparafoires. Several of the judgements rested on the purported incompatibility of 
capital punishment with the right to life (section 9) in addition to other rights. In this 
regard. Kriegler J opines "Whatever else section 9 may mean in other contexts ... at 
the very least it indicates that the state may not deliberately deprive any person of his 
or her life" (para 208 B-D). This attitude is even more bluntly expounded by Sachs J: 
This court is unlikely to get another case which is emotionally and 
philosophically more elusive and textually more direct. Section 9 states: 
'Every person shall have the right to life' . These unqualified and unadorned 
words are binding on the state ... the right to life is not subject to incremental 
invasion. (para 350E - 35 1 G) 
The problem with this argument - that the Constitution's protection of " life" self-
evidently and necessarily entails that capital punishment is unconstitutional - is that it 
is less of an argument than a bald assertion. As Klare rightly observes, as an argument 
it is both circular and unpersuasive. The question is whether capital punishment 
should be forbidden and this requires some intermediate steps of reasoning, some 
justi fication, which will require the espousal of moral and political arguments. It is the 
case, for instance, that the state deprives persons of their right to life every day 
through its failure to redistribute wealth adequately, through the cessation of 
development programs initiated under the RDP. This is not to say that there are not 
important differences between capital punishment and death following economic 
choices of the state. These cases are clearly distinguishable and should perhaps make 
a difference which is reflected in law. But to make this distinction is to advance 
political and philosophical arguments. Kant, for instance would agree that everyone 
has the right to life but would insist on the death penalty being applied in the case of 
murder. Klare comments on the Makwanyane court's approach that "[t]o argue thus 
is to efface juridical power and responsibility, and to attribute constraining power to 
lexts Ihal they do not possess" (Klare 1998: 175). 
The argument is that the court in Makwanyane, despite at times articulating a 
defensible philosophical and political stance on adjudication, succumbs to a perceived 
pressure to legitimate the new South African democracy by denying choice and 
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agency - and so claiming more or less mechanically to follow the letter of the law -
even as it decides the issue contrary to the wishes of the majority. The denial of 
interpretative agency manifests not only in the literalist approach to language. but also 
in the court's extensive reliance on analogical reasoning. drawing parallels with 
decisions in foreign jurisdictions, rather than engaging in first order reasoning. The 
decision is characterised in the words of Cockrell , by "the absence of a rigorous 
jurisprudence of substantive reasoning" in favour of "a quasi-theory so lacking in 
substance that I propose to call it ' rainbow jurisprudence'" - glib, ephemeral, lacking 
in substance and seemingly intent on denying the existence of conflict in substantive 
reasoning" (Cockrell 1996: 11). The tension between the progressive formulation of 
justice and democracy and the unpersuasive and epistemologically conservative 
approach to justification features throughout the judgement: in the inconsistency 
between banishing philosophy and politics from the arena of adjudication and 
admissions that the issues involved are emotionally and philosophically complex 
(Sachs J, para 350 E-F) and that the death sentence "manifests a philosophy of 
indefensible despair" (Mahomed J, para 271 I-J). There is a disparity between the 
dominant literalist approach and a radical approach to interpretation which refers both 
to intertextual allusion and the "'interplay" of meaning between different sources, 
suggested by the following dictum of Mahomed DP: 
What the Constitutional Court is required to do in order to resolve an issue is 
to examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution, their text and context; 
the interplay between different provisions; legal precedent relevant to the 
resolution of the problem both in South Africa and abroad; the domestic 
common law and public international law impacting on its possible solution; 
factual and historical considerations bearing on the problem ... the balance to 
be struck between different and sometimes conflicting considerations reflected 
in its text. (para 266 G-I) 
I venture to argue that the court cannot reconcile its aspirations toward justice 
with a mode of interpretation and adjudication which will justify its decision, 
primarily because it has not fully thought through the seeming antithesis between 
democracy and majoritarianism, or to put it another way. it has not fully theorised a 
concept of democracy which incorporates substantive and procedural considerations, 
rather than a merely procedural conception of democracy, which would allow for 
contestation and conversation rather than slavish submission to "public opinion". 
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Before I make some tentative observations on a fannulation of democracy which 
might facilitate this, some initial remarks need to be made about the nature of public 
opinion. Most of the judges in Makwanyane dismissed public opinion on the basis of 
its transience and ephemerality. For instance, Mokgoro J distinguishes between 
"enduring values" and " fluctuating public opinion" en route to rejecting the latter's 
influence. Derrida notes that "[0 ]ne can also fear the tyranny of shifts in opinion". and 
observes the phenomenon of "opinion sometimes lagging paradoxically behind the 
representative agencies" (Derrida 1992c: 86): in Makwanyane the State agreed that 
the death penalty should be declared unconstitutional in contrast with public opinion 
(para 11 C-D). 
Moreover, as Duncan KeIU1edy (1997) argues, public opinion is not formed 
independently of the heterogenous and hierarchical powerlines of the institutional 
dissemination of knowledge and disciplinary pedagogy and its adjuncts and of the 
imbrication of techniques of knowledge with strategies of power. To put it simply: 
public opinion is a function of, or at least contaminated by, the various sources of 
insti tutional authority in society - media, religion, professions and the anus of 
government. This follows Foucault's assertion that subjectivity is constituted through 
the operation of power within discourse. Similarly Derrida, writing about the 
representation of public opinion in newspapers argues that "the newspaper or daily 
produces the newness of the news as much as it reports it" and similarly on televised 
representation: "this ' democratisation' never legitimately represents. It never 
represents without filtering or screening - let us repeat it - a ' public opinion '" 
(Derrida 1992c: 89, 98). I have argued in a previous chapter that the words " We the 
People" with which the South African Constitution begins is an example of metalepsis 
- a rhetorical reversal of cause and effect. In the same way, public opinion (cause) is 
falsely represented as being crystallized in the Constitution (effect), rather than public 
opinion being constituted through constitutionalism. Poststructuralism tends to 
challenge and reverse the represented succession of causal events by showing in this 
instance that the Constitution and the representative structures of the people in fact 
operate to produce public opinion. I am aware of the limits of construing and 
problematising caus~lity in this way, but I agree with Spivak that 
we can' t throwaway thinking causally ... One can't judge without causal 
thinking. But then to ground the cause that one has established for the analysis 
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into a certainty 1S what the POslstructuralisl would question. The 
poststructuralist would say that generally causes are produced as effects of 
effects. (Spivak 1990a: 23) 
Alan Hutchinson (1999) suggests a formulation of democratic adjudication 
which is both procedural and substantive. The procedural aspects of democracy - a 
framework for conversation, contestation, the right to assert and to reply - are crucial 
to democracy. Derrida argues that it " is necessary to maintain formal rigour, for 
without it, no right is protected; and so it is necessary to invent more refined 
procedures, a more refined legislat ion" (Derrida 1992c: 99). However, to define 
democracy only in procedural tenns is false ly to cast the government as representing 
the will of the people and to demonise courts as undemocratic. Moreover. as the court 
noted in Makwanyane, the will of the majority does not reflect a shared sense of 
justice; it reflects an aggregate of vested interest or a common (often misplaced) 
fear. 270 
Hutchinson, commenting on the recent Canadian judgement of Re Quebec 
Rejerencer ,. notes the court's observation that the Constitutional text is to be 
understood in the light of foundat ional principles of democracy, the rule of law and 
respect for minority rights. (In South Africa, as I have noted previously, this 
interpretative injunction is contained in the constitutional text: section 39 of the final 
Const itution mandates interpretations of the Bill of Rights which "promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality and 
freedom"). In the Canadian case the court regarded the principle of democracy as an 
essential interpretative consideration, but conceded that the meaning and demands of 
this principle are far from self-evident or universally accepted - hence, presumably, 
270 Hutchinson makes two imponant distinctions: fi rst, legis lative outcomes are not majoritarian in the 
sense that individual legislators rarely claim to adopt the same stance on issues as the majority opinion 
and second, majoritarian ism does not provide any substantial protection against leg islative action of 
minorit ies. The attitudes and opinions of the majority have long been treated with scepticism both in 
jurisprudence and phi losophy generally and with good reason. In a referendu m in Colorado, for 
example, 53.4% of the voters approved an amendment which would ban the passage or implementation 
of any gay-rights protection and ovenum an executi ve order prohibiting anti-gay discrimination in state 
employmen t (Vi ljoen 1996: 666). Thoreau argues in On Ihe Duty o/Civil Disobedience: "A wise man 
wi ll not leave the right to ... prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little justice in the 
actions of the masses of men" (Thoreau 1996: 192). John Han Ely has also pointed out the 
perniciousness of appealing to majority of opinion: "Now think again about consensus as a possible 
source, and the message will come clear; it makes no sense to employ the val ue judgements of the 
majority for protecting minorities from the value judgements of the majority" (Ely 1980: 69). On the 
issue of the death penalty, Ronald Dworkin argues that the case against the death penalty "is just as 
strong in a community where a majority of members favour it as in a commun ity of people revolted by 
the idea" (Dworkin 1987: 24). 
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the counter-majoritarian dilemma. The court in this case held that democracy is not 
simply concerned with the process of government. There is also an essential 
substantial component, a cluster of values which include "commitment to social 
justice and equality". The court went on to concede that the meaning of these values 
and how they affect each other is never fixed , but is a feature of the continuing debate 
over what democratic commitment entai ls: "a democratic system of government is 
committed to considering ... dissenting voices and seeking to acknowledge and 
address these voices in the laws by which all in the community must live" (para 68). 
For democracy, procedure is important, even essential. Derrida speaks of a 
"right of response", a right that allows the citizens to be more than a fraction ... of a 
passive consumer "public", necessarily cheated because of this" (Derrida 1992c: 106). 
Hutchinson agrees, but notes that "democracy has both a substantive and procedural 
section ... this holds that there are certain outcomes that cannot be tolerated in a 
society that claims to be just" (Hutchinson 1999: 206, 207). Values are important to 
democracy in that democracy is about making choices between political values: "what 
counts as 'democratic' is contingent and ahistorical ... it will always be a contested 
and contestable issue - law is politics" (Hutchinson 1999: 209). Derrida also 
distinguishes between democracy and public opinion which invokes the false 
privileging of consensus. False because the impossibility of establishing a consensus 
is crucial to understanding democratic politics. For Derrida, justice can never be 
completely instantiated in the institutions of any society and deconstruction forces us 
to keep democratic contestation alive. Democracy points to the necessity of 
antagonism and contestation, the aporia of undecideability and decision. With 
undecideability there can never be complete satisfaction that the " right" choice has 
been made. There is at once a risk and a chance which is the condition for the 
construction of poli tics (Mouffe 1996: 9). "Public opinion" can never be the same 
thing as justice since it is a temporary result ofa provisional hegemony, a stabi lisation 
of power which always entails some fonn of exclusion. A deconstructive approach to 
democracy acknowledges "the fact that difference is the condition of the possibility of 
construct ing unity and totality at the same time that it provides it essential limits" 
(Mouffe 1996: 10). Mouffe argues that radical and plural democracy infonned by 
deconstruction will be more amenable to mUltiplicity and heterogeneity within a 
'" (1998) 161 DLR (4"). 
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pluralist society. She argues that what distinguishes a modem pluralist democracy is 
"'the presence of institutions that permit these agents to be limited and contested" 
(Mouffe 1996: 11). 
Both the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy are present in what 
Derrida calls le droit de reponse: the right of reply and contestation but also the right 
of response. indicating a sense of responsibility which is simultaneously ethical, 
political and legal. Judgement by the court is a profoundly ethical activity, a political 
choice between options with a remainder. For Derrida this choice is ethical in that it 
involves an ethical relation between persons in Levinas ' sense of subjective 
experience as always already engaged in a relation of responsibility to the other 
(Critchley 1996: 33). Deconstruction is concerned with the suffering of other human 
beings and the obviation of suffering should be reflected in the justification 
(~easoning) of the court's decision. For Derrida, democracy is the political form that 
best provides justice: not a liberal democracy currently in existence such as South 
Africa's (although not not South Africa's), but a democracy "guided by thejillural or 
projective transcendence of justice" (Critchley 1996: 36, emphasis in original) - the 
democracy of ubuntu, an ideal always still to come and to which South Africa ' s 
democracy must direct itself. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The court in Makwanyane was too anxious to face the "madness" of judging. 
Anxiety is a facet of political transition, in which the exigencies of moral and social 
reconstruction may displace open self-reflexivity. It is not that I find the court's 
interpretation of the Constitution unconvincing. hut simply that its reasons are 
unpersuasive. The Constitution stipulates that the court must interpret it in accordance 
with the principle of democracy. On a deconstructive reading of democracy, the death 
penalty is unethical. It is an abrogation of the duty to the other. It is an annihilation of 
the other that affords to response. Equally, another facet of democracy for Derrida. is 
the moral and political obligation towards the other' s suffering. In that the I<death-
row" phenomenon is so barbaric, it offends against deconstruction's ·belief that 
"cruelty is the worst thing there is" (Critchley 1996: 33). In a recent interview Derrida 
asks in puzzlement, 
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Why is it so that for instance all the Western democracies have abolished in 
Europe the death penalty. while the United States, which presents itself not 
only as a great democracy but the mother of democracy in the world, doesn't 
abolish the death penalty. Not only doesn't abolish the death penalty but 
pr~ctices in a way that is absolutely massive, cruel and unbelievable. (Derrida 
1999b: 2) 
Stephen Clingman reminds us that "South Africa is a country that In some 
sense has been built on murder" (Clingman 2000: 156). The abolition of the death 
penalty is thus a symbolic repudiation of the violence characterising apartheid society. 
In this context, the court' s preference for rehabilitation over retribution is 
understandable, in that instead of a life for a life, there seems to be a possibility for 
moral and social re-education - for dispersion, relocation and re-alignment. There is, 
however, a problem with the analogy between the individual act of murder and the 
violence of the past: the prison is a world apart, removed from society, a place from 
which the prisoner cannot hear what others in society must - "the resulting profusion 
of voices that must make South Africa's future, transcending the past by building new 
relations beyond the fixed geometry of the old, offering a new vision of possibility" 
(C1ingman 2000: 156). Finally, if the abolition of the death sentence is a symbolic 
judicial act against violence, Foucault's warning is apposite: 'The intensity of feelings 
that surrounds the death penalty is intentionally maintained by the system, since it 
allows it to mask the real scandals" (Foucault 1996: 249). Against Gordimer's 
contention that "There is a serenity in justice", I refer to Patrick Cullinan' s poem 
"Triumph" in which he rightly castigates every strategy of detachment without 
continued commitment as follows: "Then you praised indifference/ Calling it: the 
triumph off Serenity" (Cullinan 1999: 16). 
My contention is that if we must follow Paton and Gordimer in describing law 
and justice in religious terms, then justice is messianic: always still to come.272 Justice 
can never be completely encapsulated in a judicial proclamation, since its 
determination will always exclude. Consequently, a further deconstruction of post-
apartheid society's legal discourse and institutions needs to take place, to compel it 
ethically to address its other, the inheritance of its past, the real scandals, like the 
oppressive effects of patent law in depriving AIDS victims of drugs. As Adomo 
observes "[a]s long as the world is as it is, all pictures of reconciliation, peace, and 
quiet resemble the picture of death" (Adomo 1973: 381). 
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Chapter 6: Widows and Orpbans 
""Perhaps" one must always say perhaps for justice" (Derrida I 992a: 27). 
In making a judgement about the effects of constitutionalism and legal theory 
deployed within the new paradigm273 of post-apartheid liberal democracy, in other 
words, to determine whether the Constitution has made good on its promises as a 
historic bridge between past injustice and future justice, a number of questions present 
themselves for urgent reply : has the Constitution and the Constitutional Court ' s 
interpretation of it furthered reconciliation? Have the Constitutional Court 's 
judgements reintroduced ethics into the law or is post-apartheid law, contrary to the 
Constitutional Court ' s proclamations reclaiming humanitarianism, equality and 
freedom for the law, simply a cover for a new insidious form of domination? In other 
words, has the violence of the law become tempered with concerns about substantive 
justice? 
It is not possible on the basis of my analysis of the AZAPO and Makwanyane 
cases, no matter how influential these may be, to pronounce on the overall 
performance of the Constitutional Court and although I have referred to other cases, 
such allusions have been brief and generally restricted in scope to their bearing on 
particular issues. To judge the Const itutional Court fa irly, and more importantly, to 
provide a sense of the injustice still present within the law, would require close 
readings of the kind that I have offered in the previous two chapters, in order to 
unearth new significations and point to bifurcations of reasoning that might reveal 
transformative possibilities. In addit ion, the cases I have alluded to are insufficient for 
a diagnosis of post-apartheid adjudication for reasons other than the fact that they are 
two out of over one hundred judgements. AZAPO and Makwanyane were decided 
212 This conception of justice is Derrida's. See for instance Derrida 1996. 
Z73 I have so far deliberately steered clear of the phrase "paradigm shift" to describe South Africa's 
transition to democratic constitutionalism. I have done so for a number of reasons. First, the expression 
is grossly over-used for this purpose and generally seems to be used to denote a new fonn of practice 
and mode of thought concomitant with the democracy and the new Constitution, when in fact the 
phrase "paradigm sh ift" has meanings both more varied and more specific than this. Thomas Kuhn's 
discussion of "paradigms" and the notoriously large number of meanings he assigned to the word, 
which he used to describe the history of science , makes conscri pting it into the service of legal theory a 
little daunting. Neverthe less, Kuhn 's theory of paradigm shi fts has been used to explain radical 
developments in the law. I do not deny Kuhn's point that rational ity is paradigm dependent and that the 
end of apartheid has ushered in a homeostatic gestalt that has destabi lised and in some cases changed 
irrevocably old modes of practice. For a discussion of the uses of Kuhn's theory of paradigms for legal 
theory, see Winter (1990). For an example of the phrase "paradigm shift" being applied to the South 
Afri can context, see Esterhuyse (2000: 149), Devenish (1998: 335-337). 
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under the interim Constitution which ceased to be of effect in February 1997. These 
cases cannot therefore be argued to represent the approach of the Constitutional Court 
from the effective date of the final Constitution without the necessary evidence and 
argument. 
Moreover, I have argued that AZAPO and Makwanyane were correctly 
decided. Where I have been critical of the court's reasoning in these cases I have been 
so primarily on the grounds that the court has failed fully to articulate its reasons, 
under-theorising or theorising falsely in order to present its decisions as the only 
reasonable decisions in the circumstances. The effect of this has been to deny or omit 
alternative possibilities without sufficient argument so as to present the Court' s 
decisions as more objective and neutral (and consequently less partisan) in order to 
provide legitimacy to judicial decision-making in a transitional moment in which little 
c?nsensus exists on the question of values. In order to pronounce more fully on the 
actions of the Constitutional Court I would have to provide a reading not only of cases 
decided under the final Constitution but also of cases decided in a way that is 
substantiveiy unjust. The primary purpose and main strength of deconstruction and 
other postmodem critiques for law is to provide readings which intervene in the text 
of judgements which have been decided unjustly - that is, decided in a manner which 
marginaiises or effaces the other - in order to present alternative ways of reasoning 
and viewing evidence which would permit a court committed to justice to decide such 
cases differently. Such an intervention would have the effect of diverting or refracting 
the discursive power and violence of legal discourse to salutary effect. 
This concluding chapter seeks to indicate briefly and by selective example the 
possibilities for such intervention in the future with reference to cases with which I 
have so far not dealt , either fully or at all. 1 shall not engage in any comprehensive 
way with the discourse of other judgements but will rather restrict myself to pointing 
to directions which further work could follow. I shall also say something, however 
incomplete, in judgement on the law and about the possibility of legal justice in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
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6.1 Exclusions and DeconstructioDS 
New National Parry a/South Africa 
. 2~· 
New National Parry of South Africa v Government of RSA and others IS an 
example of a case both recently and unjustly decided by the Consti tutional Court . The 
case concerned a challenge to the Electoral Act. which required a bar~coded identity 
document as a prerequisite for voting in the 1999 elections. The constitutionality of 
the Act was challenged on the basis that approximately 2.5 million predominantly 
rura l African people (some ten percent of the electorate) had no form of identification, 
by virtue of their ignorance of the requirements or their lack of financial and other 
means. It was averred that the relevant government department lacked the resources 
necessary to process applications for identity documents timeously. with the net effect 
of depriving a large proportion of the population of the right to vote. Yacoob J. 
de livering the majority judgement, although acknowledging the right to free and fair 
elect ions under section 19(2) and the right to universal suffrage under section 1 (d) of 
the final Constitution, held that the statutory requirement to obtain a bar-coded 
identity document did not infringe these constitutional rights. Seemingly in violation 
of constitutional supremacy, in accordance with which legislation promulgated by 
Parliament is to be held accountable under the Constitution, Yacoob J held: 
Decisions as to the reasonableness of statutory provisions are ordinarily 
matters within the exclusive competence of Parliament. This is fundamental to 
the doctrine of separation of powers and to the role of the courts in a 
democratic society. Courts do not review provisions of Acts of parliament on 
the grounds that they are unreasonable. They wi ll only do so if they are 
satisfied that the legislation is not rationally connected to a legitimate 
government purpose ... Reasonableness will only become relevant if it is 
established that the scheme though rational, has the effect of infringing the 
right of citizens to vote. (para 24 B-E, emphasis added) 
This is a striking passage. The court distinguishes between reasonableness and 
rationality: reasonableness has to with questions of substantive justice, whereas 
rationality relates to a measured linkage of means to ends, where the ethical status of 
the means is not to be questioned by the court. It is a further example of the separation 
of ethics and legality, that, as I have argued throughout this study, characterises 
'" 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC). 
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modern adjudication. The insistence on form - the doctrine of separation of powers-
and the artificial separation of reason and rationality. ironically justifies the 
judiciary's collusion with the substance of parliament 's decisions.27S The court' s 
fa ilure to consider the ethical dimensions of the requirement for identity documents 
"'reveals the similarity in approach between this judgement and those in the rather 
darkers days when the trust of the executive constrained review activity" (Davis 1999: 
174). The fact that there is "nothing irrational, arbitrary or capricious about the bar-
coded ID serving as the main identification instrument" should not lead to the Court's 
ultimate conclusion that excluding len percent of South Africans from voting is just, 
especially when it is conceded that " the reasons why people have not registered are 
probably complex and varied and at best for the appellant. not detenninable at this 
stage" (para 47 A-C). Rational coherence is no justification since. as Foucault and 
Adomo and Horkheirner have argued, rationality is instrumental and bifurcated; the 
Nazis were rational but evil.276 
The dissenting j udgement of O' Regan J draws attention to the injustice of the 
majority judgement in New Nalional Parry 0/ Soulh Africa. O'Regan J argues that 
given that the "South African democracy is still in its infancy and requires nurturing 
and care to ensure it [democracy becomes fully established ... it needs to draw all 
citizens into the political process" (para lI9E-122C). Judge Q' Regan rightly argues: 
"Given the constitutional obligations imposed upon Parliament to enhance democracy 
by providing free and fair elections, it seems incongruous and inappropriate that this 
court should be able to detennine whether citizens have acted reasonably but not 
Parliament"(para 126 D-E. emphasis in original). In contrast to Yacoob 1's decision 
that it is reasonable to expect all South Africans to comply with identity document 
m The Constitutiona l Court ruling in November 2000 that, on the basis of the doctrine of separation of 
powers Judge Willem Heath could nOI continue to head the successfu l corruption un it, weakens the unit 
and its efforts to rid the country of corruption. According to the Mail and Guardian: " In most modem 
democracies, including South Africa, judges are motivated in a variety of activities not di rectly related 
10 judicial office, such as commissions of enquiry and in the case of Judge Johan Kriegler, the 
Independent Electoral Commission" (" Replace Heath with Weltz". Mail and Guardian, 1-7 December 
2000, p28). 
276 Foucau lt notes that Nazism was conceived not by erotic genius bUI through petit-bougeois 
rationality: "Nazism was not invented by the erotic madmen of the twentieth century but by the most 
sinister, boring and disgusting petit-bourgeois imaginable ... the concentration camps were bom from 
the conjoined imagination ofa hospital nurse and a chicken fanne r" (Foucau lt 1996: 188). As it 
happens, concentration camps first appeared during the Angle-Boer War in South Africa - but 
Foucault 's point about 'ordinary' midd le class rationality having the potential for ev il on a large scale 
is well made. 
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regulations. O' Regan J observed that concepts such as reasonableness tend to 
exclude: 
South Africa is a diverse society. Some of its citizens are fully literate and live 
in wealth and comfort, many however are disadvantaged educationally and 
materially. What is reasonable for one group of citizens may be quite 
unreasonable for another. It is not clear to me how the test established by the 
majority can accommodate sensitively the realities of South African society .. , 
the test may be evasive of application in relation to those citizens who are 
unaware of legislative provisions which qualify the right to vote. (para 126 F-
H) 
The point IS that universally encompassing concepts like 'reasonableness' and 
categories like 'the reasonable man' or ' reasonable expectations' almost invariably 
exclude: 
[t]he most tenacious subjt:ction of difference is undoubtedly that maintained 
by categories ... Categories organise the play of affirmations and negations, 
establish the legitimacy of resemblances within representation, and guarantee 
the objectivity and operations of concepts. They suppress the anarchy of 
difference, divide differences into zones, delimit their rights and prescribe 
their task of specification with respect to individual beings ... They appear as 
archaic morality, the ancient decalogue that the identical imposed on 
difference. (Foucault 1977: 186) 
With the application of the legal concept of ' reasonableness' concrete individuals are 
turned into legal subjects, unique and unchangeable characteristics are subsumed 
under types, singular and contingent events transformed into model ' facts' and scenes 
in impoverished narratives with the limited imagination of evidence and procedure 
(Douzinas and Warrington I 994a: 231). As the law ascribes fixed and repeatable 
identities and expectations to those brought before it, it necessarily negates the 
singularity of the other. Legal rules - Lyotard's normative sentences - distinguish 
between those they represent as their addressees and others. silencing the call to 
responsibility of the other. 
New National Party of SA also expresses the philosophical limitations of 
human rights. The subject of hwnan rights enforces her entitlements witho.ut great 
concern for ethical' considerations and without sympathy for the other. When the 
transition is made from the legal rights-bearing subject to concrete persons in the 
world, the abstractions of human rights discourse prove of little use against the 
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concrete claims of power. The majority j udgement rationalises the exclusion of rural 
blacks on the grounds that they too have the right to vote, even if their circumstances 
prevent them from doing so. The community of human rights is universal but 
imaginary; it does not exist empirically and has limited value as a transcendent 
principle. In the universal community upon which the law is based, the other can 
easi ly be turned into the same. 
It is tempting on the basis of New National Party of SA to view the new 
system of constitutional rights, with its penal and other reform , in a Foucauldian light, 
that is, as being worked out in favo ur of an upper and aspirant middle class, 
possessing wealth, prestige and political clout. · The same set of socio-economic 
relations, on the other hand, creates conditions for surveillance, imprisonment and 
repression as a way of containing social unrest and as a means of placating and 
training a workforce. However, if the Foucauldian view is accepted, what is to be 
made of Derrida's claim that South Africa is in the process of deconstructing its 
Constitution and legal system: 
law must be inspired by justice ... That is why it is important to have 
constitutions ... here in South Africa you first had a previous constitution. then 
a provisional constitution, then a last provisional constitution and you will 
have to improve the one you are producing now ... even if there are 
regressions and so forth ... it is in the name of justice that you are improving 
your constitution. (Derrida 1999a: 284) 
The phrase " in the name of justice" is exactly what is at stake; while for Derrida 
justice is a simultaneously transcendental and imminent ethic of alterity, for Foucault 
it is a construct, a feature of a broader system of oppression. There is some validity in 
applying both formulations to post-apartheid South Africa. Although Foucault 's view 
of the whole process is too Manichaean, Derrida's description is overly rosy. It is 
anyway unnecessary to choose between a liberal democratic order positively 
deconstructing itself in furtherance of justice and the hellish picture of ubiquitous 
coercion. The record of South African constitutionalism is a mixed one, showing real 
libertarian and equalising trends beside configurations of power and coercive cultural 
and racial traits . 
Xu and Terrey 
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The Constitutional Court has been both just and unjust as Derrida 
acknowledges it must be. It has been both inclusive (the decriminalisation of gay sex 
serves as an example) and exclusive. Cases of exclusion need to be reviewed, 
amended, deconstructed, as in some cases they have been. In immigration cases, for 
example. the courts have tended to resist granting rights, both substantive and, until 
recently, procedural to asylum seekers and aliens seeking residency. Although the 
Constitutional Court has not yet decided an immigration case, in cases decided under 
the interim Constitution by the Supreme Court, the court ruled that applicants were 
not entitled to written reasons for the Home Office's refusal to grant residency on the 
basis that aliens have no rights under the Constitution and that whatever standing they 
have is as receivers of privilege.277 In XII \I Minister van BinneJandse Sake, the Court 
held that "the Constitution affinns precisely that an alien does not have any right to 
come into the Republic or stay therein: That right is explicitly given to "'every citizen" 
and not to any "person" ... The Aliens Control Act provides explicitly in section 
26(5) that the applicants can be dealt with as prohibited persons" (para 67 E-H). The 
Xu Court found that the applicant had no interest in continued residence in South 
Africa, that "it is in the State' s absolute and unlimited discretion who it wishes to 
tolerate in its territory" and that refusal to provide reasons did not breach the audi 
alrerem parlem (hear the other side) rule. However as lonathan Klaaren (1996: 612) 
points out, the Xu court 's reading of the term "interests" in section 24(c) - denying 
that an alien has any interest in an application for temporary or pennanent residency -
is perverse: "we do not know what happened to Yuandau Xu or his fellow aliens K.H. 
Tsang, Alexander Nikolaev Naidenov and Mr Parekh. But it seems more than likely 
that their losses in front of the court directly affected their interests: their careers, their 
families and their lives within the communities" (Klaaren 1996: 612). 
The immigrant or asylum seeker is Kafka' s man from the country in "Before 
the Law": A foreigner comes before the law and asks to be admitted and given 
sanctuary. The immigration officer demands: "Justify your requests. Give reasons 
why you want to come in". The man answers "I am in fear" or "I have been 
persecuted and I need assistance". The immigration officer looks at the man and tells 
him that he cannot come in, but will not tell him why or engage in any further 
m See for example Xu \I Minister van Binnelandse Sake 1995 (I) BCLR 62 (T), Naidenov \I Minis/er of 
Home Affairs 1995 (7) BCLR 891 (T) and PareJc.h \I Minister of Home Affairs 1996 (2) SA 710 
(DCLO). 
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discussion. The gatekeeper remains silent but firm. The asylum seeker is denied the 
means to have his fear and pain considered because he is denied the status of legal 
personality and so, before the law he cannot be a victim: he is always already a 
" prohibited person". The immigrant is silenced. despite the court's averment that it 
has nOl declined to hear the other side. The court can say this because for it there is no 
other side. Lyotard has termed this denial of the victim's voice an ethical lort, a 
differend; it is an extreme form of injustice in which the injury suffered by the victim 
(the fear/ pain which motivates the application for residency and the subsequent 
injustice of having the applicat ion refused without the provision of reasons) is 
accompanied by a deprivation of the means to prove it. The idiom and rules used to 
judge XU and the other cases referred to will be the idiom and rules which prevent the 
victim from testifying to the injustice and so the outcome is necessarily unjust. The 
a.sylum seeker experiences the judgement as performative; it acts violently upon his 
body and feelings. 
Were the 'alien ' cases to which I have referred to comprise the entire record of 
such cases under the Constitution, there would be cause for considerable pessimism 
about justice in this area. However, in the subsequent case of Tettey and another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and another178 a Ghanaian applicant who had applied for a 
temporary residence permit, had had his application rejected by Home Affairs without 
reasons being given. The Court held that the discretion of Home Affairs in relation to 
residence applications was not absolute since the constitution guarantees to every 
person the right to procedurally fair administrative action and that 
to the extent that Xu , Tsang, Parekh and Naidenov supra may be taken to 
convey that an alien who applies for residence within the republic has no 
rights, interests or legitimate expectations that may be effected by a decision to 
refuse to issue such a permit, and that the minister has an absolute and 
exclusive discretion to decide whether he or she would permit an alien's 
presence in the territory, the said cases do not, with respect, reflect the law as 
it exists under the Constitution. 
Moreover, Mthiyane J cited Chandra v Minister of Immigralion179 for the proposition 
that although the Home Office has a discretion about whether to grant such 
applications, "the presence of discretionary power does not preclude the application of 
271 An unreported decision in case number 3101 / 98, delivered on 16 October 1998 in the Durban and 
Coastal High Court . 
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the rules of natural justice; to require that the minister can, in the exercise of his 
power, observe the rules of natural justice. invokes no encroachment" (Teltey. quoted 
in Purshotam 1999: 33-34). 
The Telley case can be seen as representing a moment of legal deconstruction. 
During apartheid, the regime' s influx control policy meant that many black South 
Africans were stripped of their South African citizenship and relocated to the desolate 
' homelands '. requiring possession of a pass to move beyond their confines. When 
apartheid ended, the offending legislation was abolished. With the onset of nation-
bui Iding it is the other of the nation rather than the racial other with in the nation that 
has been excluded.280 Each of these exclusions has been deconstructed and remedied 
and although exclusion still exists, it would be churlish to deny that the law in this 
area is becoming more just. 
Soobramoney and Grootboom 
Another example of law moving in the direction of substantive justice is in 
relation to socio-economic rights. In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-
Natal/81 the Constitutional Court interpreted a provision limiting the state's duty to 
provide healthcare services to "within its available resources" (section 27(2», 
narrowly. As Moeliendorf (1998: 33 1) observes, "[t)he narrowest interpretation of 
'" (1978) 2 NZLR 559 (SC) at 573. 
210 Zygmunt Bauman observes that 
nationalism was also invariably a bid for the sole and exclusive rights to a terrilOry, a 
population, a populated territory ... Promotion of homogeneity had to be complemented by 
the effon to brand. segregate and evict the 'aliens' - already a prey of another national elite, 
convens of another national ism, and altogether poor prospects for assimi lation into the fought-
for uniformity. Drawing the boundary between the natives and the aliens, between the 
prospective nation and its enemies, was an inseparable pan of the self-assen ion of the national 
elite. There was a codicil, however: to acquire and retain an overwhelming grip over the minds 
and acts of the present or prospective nationals, this boundary-draw ing cou ld not be seen for 
what it in fact was. (Bauman 1992: 10S. 106) 
According to research published in 1998 by Human RighlS Watch entitled Prohibited Persons: Abuse 
of Undocumented Migrants, AsyJum-Seelcers. and Refugees in South Africa, 
Although South Africa, since the first democratic elections in 1994, has made remarkable 
progress towards establishing a free and democratic society based on respect for human rights 
of its own citizens, foreigners have large ly failed to benefit from these developments and 
remain subject to serious abuse. Anti-foreigner feelings have also increased alarmingly. 
(quoted in Purshotam 1999: 34) 
'" 1997 (12) BCLR 1696. 
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"available resources" is, however, incompatible with the understanding of the Court 
in the certification judgement where it allows that recognising socio-economic rights 
may require court orders with budgetary implications". However, in the recently 
decided Government of RSA and others v Groo/boom and o/heri81, the court 
explicitly distinguished socio-economic rights as rights rather than mere policy goals. 
The case deals with the state 's obligations under section 26 of the Constitution which 
gives the right of access to adequate housing, and section 28(1)(c), which affords 
chi ldren the right to shelter. The court held that in appropriate circumstances the state 
must give effect to these rights. The court issued a declaratory order which required 
the state to devise and implement a programme that included measures (including 
sanitation and housing) to provide relief for those desperate people who had not been 
catered for. 
Ubuntu 
Needless to say. not every amendment to the Constitution or addition to the 
common law is, in Derrida's words " inspired by justice"~ some constitute 
"regressions" (Derrida 1999: 264). A notable regression has been the omission of 
ubunlu from the text of the final Constitution, due, according to Davis to "the fact that 
the overseas expert, while a talented drafter in his own right, clearly employed a 
Canadian drafter's manual" (Davis 1999: 65), this is an example of what Susan Silbey 
(1997) has referred to as "postmodem colonialism". The Constitutional Court's 
unsettled method and its vacillation between literal interpretation and a value-oriented 
contextual approach, means that the effect of the omission is unclear; it is at least 
imaginable that the omission might lead to an abandonment of the development of 
ubuntu and perhaps African jurisprudence more generally. 
6.2 Reconciliation and Justice 
The law has been instrumental in fostering reconciliation both at the level of 
political parties and on the interpersonal level. Jakes Gerwel (2000: 28 1) writes: 
"South Africa, notwithstanding the complex divisions and differences of various sorts, 
282 CCT 11 /00. Judgement was handed down on 4 October 2000 and is currently unreported. 
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levels and intensities that may exist within it, is decidedly not an unreconciled nation 
in the sense of being threatened by imminent disintegration and internecine conflict". 
Gerwel is surely correct about political stabilisation having taken place, although it is 
a mistake to suggest that reconciliation is equivalent to a stabilisation of power 
relations. Gerwel continues: "Decisions, differences and conflicting interests of 
various kinds. levels and intensity occur throughout this society ... None of these can 
be said to threaten the legal, political or constitutional order. South Africans act out 
their differences within the framework of the constitution" (Gerwel 2000: 282, 283). 
Again Gerwel mistakes politically determinate relations for reconciliation. It may be 
that differences must be worked out through the law, in accordance with 
constitutional rights. But it is also true that constitutional rights cannot completely 
provide justice. Gerwel seems to want to deny the necessity of including the personal 
as a modality of reconciliation: 
It is, put in perhaps over-simplified terms, unrealistic to expect everybody in 
such a complex organisation as a nation to love one another ... 
Institutionalised commitment to consensus-seeking, cultivation of conventions 
of civility and respect for contracts have become the mechanisms of solidarity 
in contemporary society, replacing the organic idiom <love for neighbour' that 
might to a greater extent have made older, less complex societies cohere. 
(GenNeI2000: 283) 
As a description of modem liberal society Gerwel's description of civility and 
legality's replacing a deeper interpersonal ethic is correct. To say, however, that an 
ethic of regard for the other which transcends the calculated rationality of civility is 
unrealistic is to concede too quickly that the notion of responsibility is confined to the 
realm of the institutional and ontologicaL a reduction of other to self. Responsibility 
on this reading is not responsibility to widows and orphans, but a responsibility for 
civil concerns. If Levinas is correct, civic responsibility reduces all others to 
representations: we face no one. It is an entry into a blind social order, the domain of 
truth, which not only defaces the other, but anaesthetises us. Reconciliation, like 
justice, is predicated on personal responsibility and transcends what is real and 
knowable: 
No justice '" seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some 
responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living 
present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already 
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dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of vio lence, national ist , 
racist, calonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, of the oppressions 
of capitalist imperialism or any forms of totalitarianisrn. (Denida 1994: xix) 
I agree with Gcrwe! that law and constitutionalism has helped to avert civil war and 
reduce racial hatred by creating space for conflicts to be resolved. However, I would 
add to what he says that legality and constitutionalism is necessary but insufficient for 
reconcil iation and justice?83 South Africa has reached neither reconciliation nor social 
justice. I n order to be divested of the remaining forms of totali tarianism further legal 
texts must be analysed, deconstructed and reconstructed284 in " [y 1et another effort" 
(Sade 199 1: 297)285 
:!Il Balkin (J994: 1155) notes that "human law must always, even in its best moments, be merely a 
heuristic, a catch-as-catch-can solution to the problem of responsibil ity rather than a fu lly adequate 
solution to the problem of respons ibility". Accord ing to Gerwel however "[t]he South African 
Const itution and the process through which it was arrived at must - after the necessary deconstrnClion 
'" - be accepted as the signal of someth ing rea l in the collective national will", Gerwel's sense of 
deconstruction is of something, temporally or otherwise, finite, in the sense of it being a singular event 
or series of events that completes itself to reveal some incontestable veri ty in the text. Gerwel might, 
for instance, have wri tten "subject to the necessary deconstruct ion" to convey the idea that 
constitu tiona lism is conditional upon cont inuous deconstruction taking place. He did not do so, 
however, and one is left with a sense of his anicle as being more of an apologia for legal liberal ism 
than a critical engagement with it. 
2$4 Derrida has repeated ly affinned that deconstruction is anti-totalitarian, a fact wh ich shou ld be of 
cons iderable appeal in the light of South Africa's oppressive history. Derrida has insisted that 
deconstruction "has always seemed to me favourab le, indeed destined ( it is no doubt my principle 
motivation) to the analysis of totali tarianism in all its fonn s, wh ich cannot always be reduced to names 
of regimes" (Derrida 1988b: 648). 
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